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Abstract 
 
Since the very inception of the European Communities, the legal and political 
system for the civil nuclear industry created under the 1957 Euratom Treaty has acted as 
the ‘outsider within’ in the context of the overall European Union framework, the former 
being validated by the fact that in the wake of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty amendments the 
Euratom Community has managed to preserve the status of a separate legal entity while 
the Euratom Treaty has evaded any substantial amendment to its text ever since its original 
adoption. The Euratom is the only organization in the nuclear field that establishes a 
supranational regulation in an important number of segments of the civil nuclear industry, 
thus representing an original concept not merely from an external viewpoint i.e. in 
comparison to other international or regional organizations in the nuclear field, but also 
internally, at the level of the EU.  
The present thesis focuses on the radiation protection and nuclear safety (health 
and safety) and the nuclear safeguards regimes devised under the Euratom Treaty and the 
Euratom secondary legislation as areas where the Euratom Community lays an undisputed 
competence which, although short of exclusive, is preponderant to that enjoyed by the 
Member States. The fields of nuclear safeguards, on the one hand, and radiation protection 
and nuclear safety, on the other, are arguably the two most prominent fields covered by 
the Euratom Treaty that can be credited for the remarkable endurance of the Euratom 
project to the present day (especially in light of the proposals for the Euratom Treaty’s 
future abolishment and subsequent assimilation into the Union Treaties (The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU)), and 
are, ultimately, the two fields where the specificity of the Euratom Community 
predominantly lies.  
In this sense, the thesis explores the following research questions: How do the 
Euratom safeguards and health and safety regimes interact with the Union’s environmental 
policy and the Union’s non-proliferation policy as their respective proxies developed under 
the Union framework stricto sensu (i.e. the framework created under the Union Treaties)? 
What are the inconsistencies or lacunae underlying this interaction? Do the two Euratom-
devised regimes and the corresponding Union policies they most commonly interact with 
and are most immediately linked to in terms of their respective subject matter fully 
complement each other or are there any problematic issues or issues of conflict that 
characterise their relationship? Are such differences reconcilable and surmountable and in 
what way?  
 In order to adequately respond to the foregoing research questions the analysis 
employed in order to arrive at the desired answers follows two tenets. The first tenet of the 
analysis considers the correlation between the Euratom health and safety regime, on the 
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one hand, and the Union’s environmental protection regime, on the other, in the context of 
the interrelationship of the notions of radiation protection, human health protection and 
environmental protection. Namely, employing an ‘environmental’ approach towards 
radiation protection within the framework of Euratom’s health and safety policy allows for 
the notion of radiation protection to be expanded beyond the scope of the Euratom Treaty 
and thus put in the wider context of the notions of ‘protection of human health’ and 
‘environmental protection’, thereby implicating the corresponding regimes established 
within the Union legal framework stricto sensu.  
The second tenet of the analysis examines the Euratom regime on nuclear 
safeguards as crucial instruments in the attainment of the goal of non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and non-diversion of nuclear material, scrutinizing the Euratom 
safeguards regime both from an intra-Community and an international perspective by 
focusing on the operation of the Euratom safeguards arrangements and inquiring into their 
relationship with the international safeguards regime created under the auspices of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this context, the analysis approaches the 
non-proliferation role assumed by the European Union both from and internal and an 
external standpoint - the internal being concerned with the functioning of the Euratom 
safeguards system (established pursuant to the Euratom Treaty and the Euratom 
secondary legislation) and the external being articulated through the Union’s non-
proliferation policy (developed within the scope of the Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and thus belonging to the Union framework stricto sensu). 
The key objective of the research is to test the coherence and the fail-proof 
character of the Euratom health and safety and safeguards regimes both from an intra-
Euratom Community perspective and in the wider context of the European Union, with the 
intention of discerning the ‘problem areas’ or ‘weak spots’ inherent in the two regimes thus 
effectively preparing the ground for the contemplation of feasible solutions aimed at 
amending or making up for the detected lacunae. For this purpose, the thesis addresses the 
detected lacunae by accounting for or justifying their existence, or, alternatively, 
suggesting possible modifications to the existent Union or Euratom legal framework with 
the intention that the identified deficiencies can be overcome. 
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Introduction  
 
Ever since its creation in 1957, the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC, 
commonly referred to as the Euratom) has been considered as a bold political and legal 
enterprise of the six founding Member States of the European Community which, alongside 
to being a futuristic and forward-looking construct, represented a ‘threat’ to the ever-
frowned-upon loss of sovereignty of Member States - possibly greater than the one 
attributed to the creation of the European Economic Community and the establishment of 
the comprehensive European Common Market project. In fact, what originally began as a 
futuristic enterprise promoting the development of the civil nuclear industry grew to 
become a strange animal of sorts - at least in conceptual and organizational terms. The 
legal and political system for the civil nuclear industry created under the Euratom Treaty is 
largely a self-sufficient (almost autarchic) system, something that has been further 
confirmed by the Euratom Treaty’s notorious resistance to change. Namely, the Euratom 
Treaty has not undergone any substantial modification ever since its adoption, having even 
managed to evade the most recent vigorous reformatory sweep of the Lisbon Treaty 
(2007)1 aimed at rationalizing and consolidating the institutional and structural make-up of 
the European Union stricto sensu (as an entity created under the purview of the Treaty on 
the functioning of the EU (TFEU) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), different and 
differentiable from the Euratom Community as a separate entity).  
Nuclear energy is a highly topical subject in Europe, the production of nuclear 
energy having gone through a true nuclear renaissance in the first decade of the 2000s 
marked by a surge of new nuclear power plants being built throughout the Union spurred 
by the conviction that nuclear energy is one of the most effective ways to cope with EU’s 
growing energy demands. However, the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima plant in Japan in 
2011 put a halt to the former nuclear upheaval, leading to a reversal in certain national 
nuclear policies and raising the level of apprehension with regard to the use of nuclear 
energy which has traditionally been seen as a ‘controversial’ energy source not solely in 
terms of the underlying dismay regarding the possible lack of satisfactory health, safety 
and security standards surrounding the operation of nuclear power plants, but also in terms 
of the possibility of failure to ensure adequate management, handling and storage of the 
end-products of the nuclear fuel cycle (notably, nuclear waste).  
 
                                                            
1 Save for several non-substantial changes, the text of the Euratom Treaty has essentially remained the same 
since 1957. The Euratom Treaty has been amended by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) (Title IV:Provisions 
amending the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and Title VII: Final Provisions 
which extended the institutional changes introduced to the EC Treaty and the ECSC Treaty to the EAEC 
Treaty); the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) (Arts. 1,4,7,8,9,10,11 and relevant protocols applicable to the EAEC); 
the Treaty of Nice (2001) (Arts.1,3,7 and 9 and relevant protocols applicable to the EAEC); and lastly, the 
Treaty of Lisbon (2007)(see, Protocol No.2 Amending the Treaty establishing the EAEC and other protocols 
applicable to the EAEC); 
9 
 
Presently there are 132 nuclear reactors in operation in 14 Member States of the 
Union: Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (other 
states include Lithuania which has 2 reactors that are undergoing decommissioning and 
four reactors which are under construction)2. The fact that nuclear power plants cater to 
around 30% of EU’s electricity demand3 puts nuclear energy high up on EU’s energy 
agenda, bringing to the fore the relevance of the Euratom Treaty as the primary legal 
source regulating the civil nuclear industry at Union level. Currently, attitudes toward the 
use of nuclear energy vary significantly from one Member State to another: for instance, 
Germany, one of the EU ‘heavy-weights’, introduced a phase-out plan on nuclear energy 
production in May 2011 under which all nuclear reactors in the country are expected to 
close by 20224; while France and the United Kingdom, which are at the same time the EU’s 
only nuclear weapon states5, are to be found at the very opposite end of the spectrum with 
national nuclear policies favorable to an additional increase in the countries’ dependence 
on nuclear energy.    
 
Since the very beginning, the Euratom Treaty has acted as the ‘outsider within’ in 
the context of the overall European Union framework, having been kept ‘at bay’ from the 
mainstream developments in the Union. The former has been confirmed by the Euratom 
Community having preserved its status as a separate legal entity whereas its 
contemporary, the European (Economic) Community has been assimilated into the newly 
created legal personality of the ‘Union’. Moreover, pursuant to the language of the Lisbon 
Treaty amendments, among the current three EU founding treaties in force, the Euratom 
Treaty acts as a separate treaty from the other two, the TFEU and the TEU which are 
referred to as the ‘Union Treaties’. As a result, the legal personality of the Union exists 
alongside the singular legal personality of the Euratom Community with the Euratom 
Treaty having withstood the test of time without any substantial amendments to its text 
for which reason it has acquired the label of a ‘dinosaur’ treaty6. Hence, while we have 
witnessed the Common Market Treaty’s reason of being evolve and expand with time, that 
                                                            
2 Nuclear power plants in the EU (updated on 13 June 2013): Belgium: 7 reactors (2 nuclear power plants 
(NPP)); Bulgaria: 2 reactors (1 NPP); Czech Republic: 6 reactors (2 NPPs); Finland: 4 reactors (2 NPPs); France: 
58 reactors (19 NPPs); Germany: 9 reactors (12 NPPs, 17 reactors, 8 were shut down after Fukushima); 
Hungary: 4 reactors (1 NPP); The Netherlands: 1 reactor (1 NPP); Romania: 2 reactors (1 NPP); Slovakia: 4 
reactors (2 NPPs); Slovenia: 1 reactor (1 NPP); Spain: 8 reactors (6 NPPs); Sweden: 10 reactors (3 
NPPs);United Kingdom: 16 reactors (10 NPPs); Lithuania: 2 reactors under decommissioning (1 NPP);Four 
reactors are under construction: Finland: 1 France: 1 Slovakia: 2; Planned reactors: Bulgaria: 1 Czech Republic: 
2 Finland: 2 France: 1 Lithuania: 1 The Netherlands: 1 Poland: 2-3 Romania: 2 United Kingdom: 4;  
(source: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/doc/nuclear_power_plants.pdf) 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/index_en.htm. 
4 www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Germany. 
5 France and the United Kingdom figure among the five nuclear-weapon-states covered under the terms of 
the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), together with China, the Russian Federation 
and the United States (http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/Repository/submissions_2014.shtml). 
6C. True, Legislative Competences of Euratom and the European Community in the energy sector: The 
Nuclear Package of the Commission, European Law Review, 2003, Vol. 28 Issue 5, p.15. 
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of the Euratom Community seems to have been left untouched or, rather, ‘conserved’. 
Irrespective of whether such a state of affairs is laudable or not – seen from a strictly 
constitutional perspective, the endurance of the Euratom project is indeed something 
remarkable. 
The status of the Euratom Community is singular not only on account of the nature 
of its subject matter, but also in terms of the original kind of community of states in the 
field of nuclear energy it represents - one that has not been matched by any other similar 
kind of regional or international organization. The Euratom is the only organization in the 
nuclear field that establishes a supranational regulation in an important number of 
segments of the civil nuclear industry, which, from today’s perspective, started out rather 
humbly - with only six member states – and grew to comprise almost five times the number 
of its original members. Furthermore, the Euratom Community signifies an original concept 
not merely from an external viewpoint i.e. in comparison to other international or regional 
organizations in the nuclear field, but also internally, at the level of the EU. Thus, as much 
as the European Union itself has been perceived as a sui generis creation, the Euratom’s 
status can a fortiori be regarded as unique where its relationship to the wider Union 
construct represents a specificity which exists within the specificity. 
The present dissertation focuses on the nuclear safety and radiation protection 
(health and safety) and nuclear safeguards regimes devised under the scope of the Euratom 
Treaty which are areas where the Euratom Community lays an undisputed competence 
that, although short of exclusive, is preponderant to that enjoyed by the Member States 
and only extends to the civil uses of nuclear energy. The fields of nuclear safeguards, on the 
one hand, and radiation protection and nuclear safety, on the other, are arguably the two 
most prominent fields covered by the Euratom Treaty and - according to some – the most 
viable fields worth preserving should the scenario of the Treaty’s abolishment and 
subsequent assimilation into the Union Treaties materialize7. Moreover, it can arguably be 
held that the fields of nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear safeguards as 
covered under the scope of the Euratom Treaty are ultimately what justifies the existence 
of the Treaty in the present day8 and where the specificity and originality thereof 
predominantly lie.  
                                                            
7 See, similarly, where this has been suggested with regard to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe of 2004 - Contribution by Ms Marie Nagy, Ms Renée Wagner and Mr Neil MacCormick, alternate 
members of the Convention: "The Future of the Euratom Treaty in the Framework of the European 
Constitution" Brussels, 18 February 2003, CONV 563/03, p.4.  
8 J.M. Ayllon Diaz-Gonzalez, Derecho Nuclear, Granada, Comares, 1999, p.302 (as reported in, N. Prieto 
Serrano, Wakening the Serpent: Reflections on the Possible Modification of the Euratom Treaty, International 
Journal of Nuclear Law, 2006, Vol.1, No.1, 2006, p.17, ft. 7). The author argues that gradually, the concern [in 
the Euratom Treaty] for radiological protection, environmental protection and nuclear safety has become 
accentuated to such an extent that today these functions are, along with control of the non-proliferation of 
materials, those justifying its existence. 
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In this sense, the thesis explores the following research questions: How do the 
Euratom safeguards and health and safety regimes interact with the Union’s environmental 
policy and the Union’s non-proliferation policy as their respective proxies developed under the 
Union framework stricto sensu9? What are the inconsistencies or lacunae underlying this 
interaction? Do the two Euratom-devised regimes and the corresponding Union policies they 
most commonly interact with and are most closely linked to in terms of their respective subject 
matter fully complement each other or are there any problematic issues or issues of conflict 
that characterise their relationship? Are such differences reconcilable and surmountable and in 
what way? The foregoing research questions serve to test the coherence and the fail-proof 
character of the Euratom health and safety and safeguards regimes not solely within the 
boundaries of the Euratom Community, but within the wider context of the European 
Union in that discerning the ‘problem areas’ or the ‘weak spots’ inherent in these two 
regimes can effectively prepare the ground for the contemplation of feasible solutions 
aimed at amending or making up for the detected lacunae. 
 In order to adequately respond to the above outlined research questions the 
analysis employed in order to arrive at the desired answers follows two tenets. The first 
tenet of the analysis explores the correlation between the Euratom health and safety 
regime, on the one hand, and the Union’s environmental protection regime, on the other, in 
the context of the interrelationship of the notions of radiation protection, human health 
protection and environmental protection. Namely, employing an ‘environmental’ approach 
towards radiation protection within the framework of Euratom’s health and safety policy 
allows for the notion of radiation protection to be expanded further from the scope of the 
Euratom Treaty and thus put in the wider context of the notions of ‘protection of human 
health’ and ‘environmental protection’ thereby implicating the corresponding regimes 
established within the Union legal framework.  
The second tenet of the analysis concerns the Euratom nuclear safeguards regime and 
scrutinizes the former regime both from an intra-Community and an international 
perspective, centering on the operation of the safeguards regime at the level of the 
Euratom Community and inquiring into its relationship with the international safeguards 
regime created under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 
this context, the non-proliferation role assumed by the European Union carries both an 
internal and an external component - the internal being concerned with the functioning of 
the Euratom safeguards system (established pursuant to the Euratom Treaty) and the 
external being articulated through the Union’s non-proliferation policy (developed within 
the scope of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and thus belonging to the 
Union framework stricto sensu). 
                                                            
9 Hereinafter in the text the reference ‘Union framework’ will be used to denote the ‘Union framework stricto 
sensu’. 
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Apart from the Union’s environmental policy and non-proliferation policy, the 
Euratom does interact with other Union policies - especially pronounced is the link with the 
Union’s newly introduced energy policy10. Being that nuclear energy is a constitutive part of 
EU’s energy mix and the Union’s nuclear energy policy is part and parcel of the Union’s 
energy policy in its general sense11, it is required that the nuclear policy forged by the 
Euratom adheres to the goals and aligns with the rules relevant to the energy sector set out 
under the Union framework12. Although the link with the Union’s energy policy is immanent 
and a priori presumed, the character of the former is nevertheless straightforward and fairly 
uncontroversial. Furthermore, in comparison to the long track record of EU’s nuclear 
energy policy pursued under the Euratom’s purview, the Union’s energy policy has existed 
as a separate policy only since after the Lisbon Treaty amendments took effect whereas 
before that it had merely been considered as a ‘presumed’, de facto policy forged by the EU 
institutions13. For the reasons given supra, the present research is only confined to two 
                                                            
10 For a more basic understanding of the groundlines of EU’s energy policy and the stake of the nuclear 
therein, see, M. Kanellakis, G.Martinopoulos  T.Zachariadis, European energy policy—A review, Energy Policy, 
2013, Issue 62, pp. 1020–1030; T. Maltby, European Union Energy Policy Integration: A case of European 
Commission Policy Entrepreneurship and Increasing Supranationalism, Energy Policy, 2013, Issue 55, pp. 435–
444; A. Pointvogl, Perceptions, Realities, Concession—What is Driving the Integration of European Energy 
Policies?, Energy Policy, 2009, Issue 37, pp. 5704–5716; D. Helm, The European Framework for Energy and 
Climate Policies, Energy Policy, 2014, Issue 64, pp. 29–35; For a general outlook on EU’s energy policy, see, J. 
S. Duffield and V. L. Birchfield (eds.),Toward a Common European Union Energy Policy: Problems, Progress, 
and Prospects, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; 
11 R. Ptasekaite, The Euratom Treaty v. Treaties of the European Union: limits of competence and interaction,  
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, July 2011, Report number: 2011:32 ISSN: 2000-0456 (available at 
www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se), p.98. 
The European Commission has pronounced the nuclear energy as forming part of the integral common 
energy policy (see, e.g., Report from the Commission to the Council on Civil Protection, Tourism and Energy, 
SEC 1996 496 final (available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00003938/01/000135 _1.pdf); European 
Commission White Paper: ‘An Energy Policy for the European Union’, COM (1995) 682 final;. 
12 The Euratom regulatory framework does not cover all matters pertaining to the broad scope of nuclear 
energy to the effect that certain nuclear matters have been left unregulated under the Euratom framework, 
having been complemented by instruments in the field of energy policy - the example given is the internal 
electricity market which nuclear energy is part of and which is, however, designated Union competence (see, 
True, supra n.6, p.671); 
13 Before the chapter on energy was introduced via the Lisbon Treaty amendments, the single reference to 
energy as a general term was found in the former Art.3(1)(u) of the EC Treaty (amendment introduced 
through the Maastricht Treaty), providing for the adoption of “measures in the spheres of energy, civil 
protection and tourism” in the realization of the Community’s specific tasks outlined in Art.2 EC. In the 
absence of a specific legal basis, Member States had made use of various mechanisms available under 
different related titles of the EC Treaty as proxy, most notably: Taxation, the Internal Market and the 
Environment (see, K. Inglis, Anticipating New Union Competences in Energy, Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law, 2008, Vol.15 Issue 1, p.125, 126). 
The new Energy chapter of the TFEU reads: 
“ENERGY 
Article 194 
1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to 
preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between 
Member States, to: 
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; 
(b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; 
13 
 
aspects of the Euratom domain - health and safety in the nuclear field and nuclear 
safeguards. In this sense, the Euratom’s health and safety field is most immediately and 
most strongly linked to the field of environmental protection which makes the correlation 
between the Euratom’s health and safety policy and the Union’s environmental policy the 
most suitable one for analysis. The same applies viz. the field of Euratom safeguards where 
the exploration of the link between the Euratom nuclear safeguards system and the Union’s 
non-proliferation policy is considered as the most pertinent for the present discussion. 
Therefore, the choice of the Union’s environmental policy and non-proliferation policy as 
points of reference proves to be most relevant to the nature and scope of outlined research 
questions. Venturing on an analysis of the interaction between the Euratom and the 
Union’s energy policy would effectively exceed the scope of the research questions that the 
thesis pursues and thus provides the basis for a different and separate discussion14. 
 
The text of the thesis has been divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 (The nature 
and the specificity of the Euratom Community: the claim for supranationality) provides an 
insight into the idiosyncrasies of the Euratom institutional system through an elaboration 
of the governing balance of institutional powers embedded therein in light of the unique 
character of the Euratom Treaty as the only founding treaty of the Union which has 
survived nearly six decades of European integration almost intact15. The analysis pursues 
the following questions: Where does the specificity of the Euratom Treaty lie in comparison to 
the other Community/Union founding treaties? What are the peculiar features of the 
institutional system and the institutional dynamic established under the Euratom Treaty? 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
(c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; 
and 
(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
2. Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures necessary 
to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1. Such measures shall be adopted after consultation of the Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
Such measures shall not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy 
resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply, without 
prejudice to Article 192(2)(c). 
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure, shall unanimously and after consulting the European Parliament, establish the measures referred 
to therein when they are primarily of a fiscal nature.”; 
14 Exploration of the relationship between the Euratom and the Union’s energy policy provides the basis for a 
separate discussion, different from the present one, necessitating a different methodology employed in the 
appraisal of the relationship. For a discussion on nuclear energy as part of the common energy policy of the 
Union and the consequences thereof (see, Ptasekaite, supra n. 11, pp.96-99). 
15 To the difference of the Euratom Treaty, the other two founding treaties presently in force (the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and the Treaty on the EU (TEU)) have periodically been subject to important 
and extensive changes to their structure and content: the TFEU (formerly TEC, dating from 1957) has 
undergone a substantial transformation over the years having culminated with the Lisbon Treaty 
amendments while the TEU (dating from 1992) has also been significantly amended by the Lisbon Treaty.  
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Does the governing (dis)balance of institutional powers under the Euratom system correspond 
to that under the Union framework stricto sensu? 
The chapter begins by exploring the nature and specificity of the Euratom Treaty as 
a founding treaty in the context of and in comparison to the other two original founding 
treaties of the Union (the 1951 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
and the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community), testing the level of 
supranationality embedded in each of them and underscoring the essentially promotional 
and dirigiste character of the Euratom Treaty as a distinguishing characteristic thereof. The 
discussion proceeds with an insight into the governing institutional dynamic within the 
Euratom construct reflected in the division of competences among the Commission, the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the EU as the key institutional 
actors. All the foregoing institutions are examined separately in terms of the nature and 
scope of their prerogatives under the Euratom Treaty: the nature and scope of the 
prerogatives of the Council as the main decision-making organ juxtaposed to the broad 
scope of prerogatives attributed to the Commission as the main executive organ, on to the 
prerogatives of the Parliament which has not been endowed with the identical scope of 
extensive prerogatives as under the Union framework. In this context, the democratic 
propensity of the Euratom Community is appraised based on the availability of democratic 
mechanisms under the Euratom Treaty, primarily, judging by the breadth of the 
prerogatives accorded to the European Parliament as the most democratic of the Union 
institutions which is directly elected by the Union citizens. The elaboration of the 
institutional dynamic concludes with the EU Court of Justice as the judicial organ which has 
had a central role in the consolidation of the singularity and specificity of the legal order 
created under the Euratom Community and has thus earned the status as the ‘enabler’ of 
Euratom’s competence, its activist case law enabling for the remit of the Euratom Treaty to 
be gradually expanded (Ruling 1/7816; Commission v Council (Nuclear Safety Convention)17; 
Land de Sarre and others v Ministre de l'Industrie (Cattenom)18; Chernobyl II19; Commission v 
Ireland (MOX Plant)20; Temelín21). Ultimately, the analysis of the institutional dynamic and 
institutional power ratio created under the Euratom system aims to establish whether the 
division of powers that has been established under the Union framework stricto sensu, 
especially in light of the Lisbon Treaty amendments, has been fully translated to the 
Euratom domain and, in this sense discern the existence of a possible disbalance of 
prerogatives between the legislative and the executive branch as measured against the 
model of balance of institutional powers applicable under the Union framework.  
                                                            
16 ECR 1978 p.02151. 
17 C-29/99 Commission v Council ECR 2002 p.I-1122. 
18 C-187/87 Land de Sarre and others v Ministre de l'Industrie ECR 1988 p.I-05013. 
19 C-70/88 European Parliament v Council ECR 1991 p.I-04529. 
20 C-459/03 Commission v Ireland ECR 2006 p. I-4635. 
21 C-115/08 Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ ECR 2009 p. I-10265. 
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The fact that the Euratom Treaty has been often labeled as an ‘undemocratic’ and 
‘legitimacy-deficient’ treaty, combined with the critique of its vastly technocratic character 
and notorious resistance to amendment, has lead to the resurgence of a myriad of different 
case scenarios regarding the future modification of the Treaty. The last section of the 
chapter contemplates several potential alternatives for the future of the Euratom Treaty 
(and consequently, the Euratom Community) which range from pleas for treaty revision 
and/or its assimilation into the Union framework stricto sensu to calls for its complete 
abolishment.  
Chapter 2 (The interaction between the Euratom health and safety policy and the 
Union environmental policy) covers the interplay between the health and safety legal 
framework established under the Euratom Treaty, on the one hand, and the legal 
framework for environmental protection created under the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU i.e. the Union’s environmental policy, on the other. What are the modalities in which 
these two regimes interact and what are the areas of concurring or conflicting competence 
involved therein? Is the practice of extrapolation (spill-over) of legal norms of one framework 
to the scope of application of the other sufficient for the said competition of competences to be 
resolved? What are the practical effects entailed by the former practice of extrapolation both 
for the Union framework and the Euratom?   
The chapter commences by expanding on the instances of both concurring and 
conflicting competences between the Union stricto sensu and the Euratom Community in 
the fields of environmental and human health protection turning the attention to the 
nature of these competences and the interplay occurring among the tasks and objectives 
devised under each of these headings, accordingly. With regard to the notion of 
concurring/conflicting competences between the Euratom health and safety policy and the 
Union environmental policy, the discussion elucidates the concept of ‘borrowing’ or 
extrapolating legal bases which denotes the practice of extending the scope of Union rules 
to the Euratom domain, and, conversely, the practice of applying Euratom rules to areas 
covered by the Union Treaties (the TFEU and the TEU). The practice of extrapolating legal 
bases mainly occurs in instances of absence of corresponding provisions in the Euratom 
Treaty or secondary Euratom legislation, instances of concurring competence arising 
between the Euratom and the Union with respect to a particular issue, and instances 
requiring for a general principle of Union law to be extended to the purview of the Euratom. 
Further on, for the purpose of pertinently examining the modalities of the 
interaction between the Euratom’s health and safety policy and the Union’s environmental 
policy, the discussion builds up from the modalities of interaction occurring between the 
nuclear and environmental legal orders on the international arena equally reflected in the 
jurisprudence of the international and regional judicial fora of which the representative 
cases are looked at (Nuclear Tests I (New Zealand v. France22, Australia v. France23), Nuclear 
                                                            
22 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand  v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 457. 
23 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports  1974, p. 253. 
16 
 
Tests II (Request for Examination by New Zealand24) and Opinion on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons25 (before the International Court of Justice); the MOX Plant 
(before an UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal)26; Balmer-Schafroth27, Athanassoglou28 and L.C.B. v 
United Kingdom29 (before the European Court of Human Rights)). 
Proceeding to the level of the EU, the discussion examines the relationship between 
the Euratom’s health and safety policy and the Union’s environmental policy through the 
prism of the extent to which Euratom’s health and safety regime is compatible and 
corresponds with the concept of ‘environmental protection’ as developed under the Union 
framework. In this context, the discussion discerns the presence/absence of an 
‘environmental protection’ approach employed in the elaboration of the concepts of 
radiation protection and nuclear safety under the Euratom framework, looking to see 
whether the Euratom Treaty and the Euratom secondary legislation have been 
underpinned by an ‘environmental protection’ ratio, or, conversely, strictly adhere to the 
notion of ‘protection of human health’ thus fully ascribing to the concept of 
anthropocentricism. In this context, the spill-over effect of the Union’s environmental 
policy rules and mechanisms to the Euratom’s purview is further appraised with regard to 
the principles of preventive action and the precautionary principles as principles of the 
Union’s environmental policy and the possibility for their extension to the Euratom’s 
purview.  
 
Upon exploring the interface between the Euratom health and safety regime and 
the Union environmental policy and elaborating the ‘environmental protection’ aspect of 
the Euratom health and safety regime, Chapter 3 (The Euratom and environmental 
democracy: EU citizens' access to information and participation in decision-making in the 
nuclear arena) looks at the ‘grass-roots level’ and the options available to the EU citizens 
regarding access to information and involvement in decision-making in the nuclear field in 
matters which actually or potentially concern the environment. How reachable is the 
Euratom for the ordinary citizen to the extent that concerns the human health protection and 
environmental protection aspects of the Euratom regime? What are the available procedural 
mechanisms for the public to scrutinize and influence the work of the Euratom institutions and 
be part of the Euratom decision-making process? Has the concept of ‘environmental 
democracy’ been adequately translated to the Euratom purview? 
The discussion aims to appraise the level of environmental transparency within the 
context of the Euratom Community based on the applicability of the procedural standards 
for ‘environmental democracy’ fostered under the 1998 Convention on Access to 
                                                            
24 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of  the Court’s Judgment  of 20 
December  1974 in  the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v.  France) Case, I. C.  J. Reports  1995, p. 288. 
25 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I. C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226. 
26 http://pca-cpa.org/upload/files/MOX%20Plant%20Press%20Release%20Order%20No.%206.pdf. 
27 Balmer-Schafroth v Switzerland (1998) 25 EHRR 598. 
28 Athanassoglou v Switzerland (2001) 31 EHRR 13. 
29 L.C.B. v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 212.  
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Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters (the Aarhus Convention) - as the key global charter for environmental democracy - 
to the remit of the Euratom. In this respect, although important segments of the Euratom 
domain are indeed covered by its provisions and come within the scope of the Aarhus 
Convention30, nevertheless it is only the Union and the Member States (not the Euratom) 
that appear as contracting parties to the Aarhus Convention as a mixed agreement which 
entered into effect for the EU in 2005.  
Applying the standards of ‘environmental democracy’ to the Euratom domain is in 
itself a challenging task in view of the notorious element of secrecy associated with the 
nuclear field which stems from the inherently dual nature of nuclear energy as an energy 
source that, from a purely technical perspective, can easily be diverted from civil to military 
aims and vice versa. Therefore, the lack of transparency has traditionally been seen as 
idiosyncratic to the nuclear field. By contrast, the general tendency, especially pronounced 
in the past decade, has been to bring the EU closer to the citizens by reinforcing the 
transparency and accountability mechanisms available under the Union framework. The 
analysis aims to verify whether the Euratom Community has aligned with the former 
tendency of increasing the Union’s openness and transparency towards its citizens and 
whether the environmental democracy standards applicable to the Union framework have 
found an adequate expression within the scope of the Euratom Community. 
The chapter starts out by elaborating the procedural requirements set out under the 
Aarhus Convention (categorized in three different pillars: access to information, 
participation in decision-making and access to justice) which the EU and the Member 
States are bound by and thus responsible to ensure the full and correct implementation of. 
Successively, it looks at the transposing instruments adopted by the Union for the purpose 
of arriving at an uniform application of the Aarhus Convention requirements both at the EU 
and the national level adopted - part of which are specific to the nuclear domain (Directive 
2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information31, Directive 2003/35/EC providing for 
public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to 
the environment32, Regulation No 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (the Aarhus 
Regulation)33, etc.). The former instruments are looked at in function to the extent to which 
the relevant Aarhus Convention obligations have been transposed to the scope of the 
Euratom thus ascertaining the extent to which the Euratom is to be considered bound by 
those obligations. Further on, the discussion inquires into the justiciability of the Aarhus 
Convention requirements regarding the access to information and participation in decision-
                                                            
30 Arts. 4,5,6.1(a) and Annex I of the Aarhus Convention. 
31 OJ L 41, 14.2.2003, p. 26–32. 
32 OJ L 156 , 25/06/2003 P. 0017 – 0025. 
33 OJ L 264, 25.9.2006 p.13. 
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making by offering a comparative analysis of the relevant case law of the international and 
the Union courts and other dispute resolution bodies which is indicative of the general 
judicial tendencies in the interpretation and application of the Convention requirements - 
with a particular focus on the case law pertaining to the nuclear field (McGinley and Eagan 
v. United Kingdom34, L.C.B. v. United Kingdom case35, Sellafield MOX plant under the OSPAR 
arbitral tribunal36, etc.). 
Lastly, the discussion addresses one of the key shortcomings of the Union regime 
for procedural protection in environmental matters which is the absence of a specific 
directive transposing the access-to-justice pillar of the Aarhus Convention. The analysis 
assesses the void created by the lack of a Union access-to-justice regime in environmental 
matters to the effect that the former deficiency can be claimed to arguably undermine the 
overall Union regime for the citizens’ procedural protection in environmental matters as 
prescribed under the Aarhus Convention. Admittedly, the adoption of an access-to-justice 
directive would not only consolidate the former Union regime, but it would also help 
gradually eliminate the existent discrepancies in the national legal systems regarding the 
application of the Aarhus Convention with respect to matters pertaining to the scope of the 
Union Treaties and the Euratom Treaty. 
While Chapters 2 and 3 are concerned with the ‘environmental protection’ 
component of the research, Chapter 4 (The Euratom and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons) assesses the correlation between the Euratom safeguards system as 
representative of Euratom’s competence in the area of securing the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons (i.e. the non-diversion of nuclear material intended for civil applications to 
further military aims), on the one hand, and the Union’s non-proliferation policy as a policy 
belonging to the wider scope of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
Namely, as concerns the European Union’s non-proliferation role, the internal dimension of 
the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons devolves on the Euratom Community 
and is represented by the Euratom safeguards system whereas the external dimension of 
non-proliferation37 is assumed by the Union’s non-proliferation policy and is devised via the 
instruments and mechanisms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as an over-
arching Union policy. What is the extent of the Euratom Community’s role in the field of non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons? How do the internal and external dimension of the Union’s 
objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons interact and which are the issues involved? 
Has the EU’s non-proliferation role been pursued in an adequate and satisfactory manner 
                                                            
34 McGinley and Egan v. UK (1998) 27 EHRR 1.  
35 L.C.B. v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 212. 
36Final Award 2 july 2003, Ireland v UK, Dispute concerning access to information under Article 9 of the Ospar 
Convention (http://pca-cpa.org/upload/files/OSPAR%20Award.pdf); 
37 For practical reasons, throughout the text the term ‘non-proliferation’ will sometimes be used 
interchangeably with the term ‘non-proliferation of nuclear weapons’, certainly, bearing in mind that the 
scope of the latter term belongs to the much larger scope of the former.    
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considering the achievements resulting from the operation of the Euratom safeguards system 
and the Union’s non-proliferation policy, taken cumulatively? 
The chapter commences by examining the non-proliferation regime created under 
the 1970 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of nuclear weapon (the NPT) as the alpha and 
omega of the global legal regime on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, looking more 
closely at the nature and scope of the requirements prescribed for the nuclear-weapon and 
non-nuclear-weapons states (NWS and NNWS) in the light of the objectives of non-
proliferation and disarmament as two concurring objectives pursued by the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. The discussion then moves to the nuclear safeguards component of 
the NPT regime which represents an essential element to the realization of the non-
proliferation objective of the NPT regime further instrumentalised through the conclusion 
of nuclear safeguards agreements between the NPT contracting parties and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); More particularly, with respect to the 
Euratom, the Member States which are non-nuclear-weapon states are covered under the 
Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the Euratom while the nuclear-weapon states of 
the EU (France and the United Kingdom) have concluded Voluntary Offer Agreements with 
the IAEA and the Euratom). 
Having established the coordinates of the international safeguards regime, the 
ensuing discussion turns to the Euratom system of nuclear safeguards as a regional 
safeguards system devised pursuant to the Euratom Treaty and the related Euratom 
secondary legislation, primarily, the Commission Regulation (Euratom) No. 302/2005 on 
the application of Euratom safeguards38, where the modalities of the co-existence between 
the NPT/IAEA and the Euratom safeguards regimes and the level of complementarity 
between these regimes is assessed with the intention of establishing whether the Euratom 
safeguards regime as a regional regime fully and adequately follows the international one 
and whether - in certain respects - it may be considered as introducing an added value 
thereto.  
Further on, the discussion shifts from the internal dimension of EU’s non-
proliferation role to its external dimension articulated by the Union’s non-proliferation 
policy. In this sense, the former policy’s relationship with the NPT regime is examined with 
the aim of establishing its alignment with the objectives and mechanisms of the NPT 
regime. For this purpose, two segments that belong to the scope of the Union’s non-
proliferation policy are specifically brought into focus: the practice of inserting clauses 
relative to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD clauses) in agreements 
concluded by the Union with third countries (more particularly, the status of the clause and 
the effects produced by its insertion); and the issue of the NATO nuclear sharing 
arrangements established between NATO and certain Member States (in their individual 
                                                            
38 OJ 2005 L 54/1. 
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capacity, not in the capacity of EU Member States) whereby the latter are required to host 
NATO nuclear weapons on their territory in peaceful times. The issue of NATO nuclear 
weapons sharing on European territory does not come under the scope of the Union’s non-
proliferation policy per se but nevertheless has the potential to compromise the Union’s 
adherence to the NPT objectives and thus raises important legality and legitimacy-related 
issues.  
The delineation of Euratom’s share of competence in the area of non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons would be incomplete should it omit to address the issue of Euratom’s 
ambiguous relationship with the domain of military applications of nuclear energy and the 
discernment of the boundaries of the Euratom Treaty’s scope of application in this regard. 
The analysis inquires as to whether the scope of the Euratom Treaty can be presumed to 
cover the domain of military applications of nuclear energy given that, legally speaking, this 
issue is to be considered a grey area on account of the absence of an express or categorical 
exclusion of the domain of military (defense) uses of nuclear energy foreseen under the 
Euratom Treaty or the Euratom secondary legislation. In order to adequately address the 
issue, the discussion begins by offering insight into the original intentions of the Union’s 
founding fathers with respect to the issue by employing a teleological approach and 
looking at relevant historical projects and strategies for nuclear energy that have pre-dated 
the creation of the Euratom Community (the European Defense Community Treaty, the 
Western European Union Treaty (the Modified Brussels Treaty), the Spaak Report, the Draft 
minutes of the Venice Conference). Furthermore, the analysis looks at the provisions of the 
Euratom Treaty that (directly or indirectly) concern the military (defense) uses of nuclear 
energy (the chapters on Nuclear Supplies, Nuclear Safeguards and Property Ownership).  
Finally, the discussion regarding Euratom’s stake in the field of military uses of 
nuclear energy and thus, the possibility to apply the Euratom Treaty thereto, concludes by 
elucidating the EU Court of Justice’s standpoint in the matter and offering an insight into 
the relevant case law (C-61/03 Commission v. UK39; C-65/04 Commission v. UK40; Joined 
Cases C-205/10 P, C-217/10 P and C-222/10 P, Eriksen, Hansen and Lind41). The fact that the 
former issue is not in the least a clear-cut one has been further confirmed by the differing 
views expressed by other EU institutions, most notably the Commission and the 
Parliament, which have clashed with that of the Court of Justice.  
 
Finally, the Conclusions part addresses the lacunae detected with regard to the 
Euratom health and safety and safeguards regimes throughout the elaboration of the 
issues covered in the four chapters of the thesis, attempting to account for or justify their 
presence, or, alternatively, suggest possible changes in these regimes. Therefore, certain 
                                                            
39 ECR 2005 p. I-2477. 
40 ECR 2006 p. I-2239 
41 ECR 2011 p. I-1. 
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suggestions are made regarding the discharge of the tasks and activities of Euratom’s key 
institutional actors, and, where applicable, pertinent and feasible modifications of the 
existent Euratom rules are indicated.  
In view of the foregoing, it is important to note that the present text assumes a 
Euratom-neutral tone by observing the Euratom Community objectively as a unique 
creation in both legal and conceptual terms all the while avoiding to take a stance pro- or 
contra- the justifiability of the existence of the Euratom, or the justifiability of the use of 
nuclear energy in general, for that matter. Irrespective of whether the reader declares him 
or herself a friend or a foe of nuclear energy - or of the Euratom as a nuclear energy 
community - the fact remains that “(i)t is possible to be against the nuclear and still love the 
existence of Euratom”42.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
42Paraphrasing Nina Commeau-Yannoussis, former Head of Unit of Energy Policy and Security of Supply, DG 
Energy and Transport, in Conference report: The Euratom Treaty and Future Energy Options: Conditions for a 
Level Playing Field in the Energy Sector, September 23rd 2005, at the Danish Parliament Building 
Christiansborg, Conference by NOAH - Friends of the Earth Denmark, The Danish Ecological Council and The 
Danish Organisation for Sustainable Energy (http://www.energyintelligenceforeurope.dk/conf_p6.html), p.34. 
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Chapter 1:  
The nature and the specif icity of the 
Euratom Community: the claim for 
supranat ionality 
Chapter 1: The nature and the specificity of the Euratom Community: the 
claim for supranationality 
 
 
The creation of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in 1957 meant, 
in the words of French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, the joining of the atomic destinies of the 
original six Member States of the then European Coal and Steel Community43 in a venture 
which can most succinctly be described as the expression of a subjective ideal (that was 
integrated Europe) and an objective reality (that was atomic power)44. Euratom is 
essentially a supranational venture involving concomitant national sovereignty stakes 
which at its inception was conceived to be the more supranational of the two 1957 
Communities (the other being the European Economic Community (EEC)) given that it 
covered a very specific subject matter which was relatively less controversial and 
potentially less far-reaching than that of the EEC Treaty. Paradoxically, in spite of the 
nature of the subject matter the Euratom Treaty being more amenable to supranational 
regulation45, the provisions in the Euratom Treaty owning such a potential are fewer than 
those of the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty46.  
The Euratom Treaty belongs to the ‘first’ phase in the development of national and 
international nuclear law, beginning in the late 1940s and early 1950s marked by the 
adoption of instruments targeting the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear power47. 
                                                            
43 G. Mollet, Vital Speeches of the Day (15 March 1957), Vol. 23 Issue 11, p. 350. 
44 L. Scheinmann, Euratom: Nuclear Integration in Europe, International Concilliation, May 1967, No. 563, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p.5. 
45 Efron and Nanes considered that by the nature of its subject matter the Euratom Treaty “bite(s) deeper into 
the crust of national sovereignty than the Common Market Treaty” (R. Efron and A. S. Nanes, The Common 
Market and Euratom Treaties: Supranationality and the Integration of Europe, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 1957, Vol. 6, p.688). 
46 Efron and Nanes, supra, p.680. 
47 P. D. Cameron, The Revival of Nuclear Power: An Analysis of the Legal Implications, Journal of 
Environmental Law, 2007, Vol. 19 No.1, p.72; The author further distinguishes a second phase which heralded 
by the outbreak of the Chernobyl accident where the use of nuclear law serves as a constraint related to the 
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Although it cannot be qualified as an atomic bill of rights because of its prevalent technical 
character it certainly represents an ‘epoch-making’ treaty48 for European integration. The 
dynamics in the life of the Euratom Treaty has been characterized by a striving for a 
perennial balance between two opposite tendencies – one of ‘federalizing’ (unifying) the 
nuclear market between Member States and the other of preserving their nuclear ‘free will’ 
through the independent development of national nuclear programs and technologies 
(especially prominent with regard to the delimitation between the civil and the military 
uses of the atom). The Treaty does not curtail independent military activities of Member 
States, but nonetheless, the very fact of integrating nuclear human, technical and material 
potentials under one single treaty invariably impacts national nuclear decisions in the 
military sphere as well49. Thus, apart from the prevalent economic objective, the treaty 
concomitantly furthers the objective of preserving the peace on the European continent50 
as one of the long-term goals stipulated in the Treaty’s preamble. At the time of its 
adoption, the Euratom was seen as a forward-looking and futuristic achievement centered 
on promoting the development of the (then) nascent civil nuclear energy production, the 
world having already been familiarized with the military nuclear industry and its 
devastating consequences in the developments throughout the Second World War. 
The present chapter explores the unique nature of the Euratom Community as an 
independent legal entity, different and differentiable from that of the European Union strict 
sensu, positing the former within the overall European Union structure. The chapter 
inquires into the nature and specificity of the Euratom Treaty as a founding treaty in the 
context of the Union founding treaties (the TFEU and the TEU), proceeding with an insight 
into the institutional dynamic governing the Euratom construct which has been mirrored in 
the division of competences among the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Court of Justice of the EU as key institutional actors. The analysis of the 
institutional dynamic and the institutional power ratio of the Euratom system aims to 
establish the extent to which the principle of division of powers applicable to the Union 
framework stricto sensu has been translated to the Euratom domain, more particularly, by 
measuring the breadth of the prerogatives held by the legislative branch against those of 
the executive branch of institutional power. Further on, the chapter discusses the Euratom 
Community’s predilection for democracy (or, democratic disposition) based on the 
availability of democratic mechanisms prescribed under the Euratom Treaty (or, the Union 
Treaties and thereby extended to the Euratom domain), using the extent of the 
prerogatives accorded to the European Parliament as the most democratic of the Union 
institutions as the main parameter. Lastly, with the intention of painting a clear picture on 
the viability of the Euratom project for the future and having in mind certain past and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
nuclear safety concerns, as well as a third phase currently taking place, marked by a balancing between the 
elements of promotion and constraint. 
48 Efron and Nanes, supra n.45, p.684. 
49 J. G. Polach, Euratom: Its Background, Issues and Economic Implications, Oceana Publications, 1964, p.190. 
50 Polach, supra, p.190. 
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ongoing plans for revision of the Euratom Treaty, several case scenarios regarding the 
future of the Treaty will be elaborated, ranging from pleas for treaty revision or assimilation 
into the framework of the Union Treaties to calls for the Treaty’s complete abolishment.  
 
I Three treaties, one common concept 
 
After the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the 
main intention behind the ensuing adoption of the EEC and the Euratom Treaties and 
creation of two new Communities on the international scene was enable the restart of the 
engines of European economic integration and exit the stalemate caused by the failure of 
the European Defense Community in 1954. In this sense, the relance européenne was 
focused on achieving immediate economic goals mainly by employing vertical integration 
of particular sectors complemented by a horizontal integration of national markets51. The 
initial impetus was provided by the Memorandum prepared by the Benelux governments 
(the Benelux Memorandum) in May 1955 which had outlined transport, conventional energy 
and atomic energy as economic sectors for vertical integration alongside the envisaged 
creation of a general common market resulting from the horizontal integration approach52. 
The Benelux Memorandum lead to the adoption of the 1955 Messina Resolution which 
entrusted the Intergovernmental Committee (composed of government delegates) under 
the chairmanship of Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak with the mandate to 
reinvigorate the engines of European integration providing a report which would 
thoroughly explore the possibilities for the future creation of the common market and 
atomic energy Communities. The Spaak Committee established four commissions 
consisting of national experts in the fields of the general common market, conventional 
energy, atomic energy and transport53. The work of the Committee was concluded in April 
1956 and its achievements were presented in the Spaak Report and adopted at the Venice 
conference in June 1956 in order to serve as the groundwork for the preparation of the final 
treaty proposals54. Additional input to the drafting process was provided by the study 
entitled ‘A Target for Euratom’ which reviewed the factors justifying the establishment of 
the Euratom as an economic venture independent from the ECSC and the EEC 
Communities55.  
                                                            
51 Polach, supra, p.19. 
52 Polach, supra, p.20. 
53 Polach, supra, p.21. 
54 Polach, supra, p.23. 
55 Polach, supra, p.26; The text of the report “A Target for Euratom”, submitted by Louis Armand, Franz Etzel 
and Francesco Giordani at the request of the governments of Belgium, France, German Federal Republic, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in May 1957, can be consulted at 
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The prevalent conviction among the decision-makers at the time was that the 
pressing economic needs of Little Europe (‘the Six’) could be sustained primarily through 
integration in the nuclear field56. Such integration would not entail an assimilation of 
national nuclear industries into a supranational one: national nuclear industries were to 
remain independent while being governed by a common supranational authority in the 
respective fields covered by the Treaty57. Nuclear energy was, in a way, believed to be the 
panacea for the pressing economic problems of ‘the Six’, having the potential to spur 
economic growth for the still young and fragile European Community in the short-term. 
Effectively, the process that led to the final adoption of both Treaties was certainly 
not a peaceful sailing. The Euratom Community Treaty was considered to be Jean Monnet’s 
favorite favorite of the two as it dealt with a brand new economic field, free of any pre-
existing Member State claims and thus, standing a better chance of acceptance by the 
European public than the Common Market Treaty58. It was considered that the Euratom 
Treaty would win over the confidence of European parliamentary bodies more easily, 
primarily because nuclear energy was  still ‘virgin territory’ where it was believed there were 
no vested national interests which itself was sufficient guarantee for a smooth 
acceptance59.  
The negotiations for the Common Market Treaty that run in parallel did not enjoy 
the same enthusiastic reception by European audiences, the planned establishment of a 
Common Market having sparked certain animosities between individual Member States60. 
Conceptually from different the Euratom Treaty as a sectoral treaty specifically targeting 
the nuclear industry, the Common Market Treaty was a much more complex and far-
reaching project in terms of its scope and subject matter than. The latter was aimed at 
coordinating and unifying a multitude of economic policies which provided for the 
progressive establishment of an area of free movement of goods, workers, services and 
capital within the territory of the European Community. In a manner of speaking, the fairly 
uncontroversial response to the Euratom project seems to have served as a means to push 
the Common Market treaty through the back door since the plan was for the two Treaties 
to be adopted as a one-package deal, thereby linking together the destinies of the two 
Treaties61. In spite of the fervent instigation of the French side to treat the two projects 
separately, the predominant view shared by the rest of ‘the Six’ was for the negotiations on 
both treaties to run concomitantly and for the two treaties to share a mutual destiny62. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/report_by_the_three_wise_men_on_euratom_4_may_1957-en-e72917a4-3c9d-48b1-
b8cb-41307736731e.html (the website of the Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe); 
56 Polach, supra, p.28. 
57 Polach, supra, p.28. 
58 M. Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-1963, Princeton University Press, 1964, p.55. 
59 European Parliament - Directorate-General for Research, Working Paper: The European Parliament and the 
Euratom Treaty: Past, Present and future, Energy and Research series, ENER 114-EN 2-2002. 
60 Camps, supra, p.54 et seq. 
61 Camps, supra, p.54. 
62 Camps, supra, p.54. 
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In the immediate period prior to the approval of both treaties by the parliamentary 
bodies of the Member States the future of these two treaties was still hanging in the 
balance. On this point, the role of the Action Committee proved crucial. The Action 
Committee, founded in October 1955, was a political elite group consisting of the leaders of 
all key political parties and trade unions in the Member States and headed by Jean Monnet. 
It came into existence for the purpose of providing reinforcement to Spaak Committee’s 
relance efforts in generating support for the negotiation of the two new treaties, often 
through informal channels63. It is believed that this Committee played a vital role in 
securing the French Assembly’s support for the adoption of the Euratom Treaty in July 
1956. In this period France was going through a political turmoil which resulted in change of 
government, with the Prime Minister Mollet stepping down and Prime Minister Bourges-
Maunoury assuming office64. However, these events did not substantially affect the 
ongoing treaty negotiations in any substantial manner thanks to the active lobbying by the 
French members to the Action Committee65.  
While negotiations for the Euratom Treaty did not run as smoothly all the time, the 
Treaty was eventually fitted to accommodate the positions of all the six Member States, 
especially France who insisted that military uses of nuclear energy be left outside of the 
scope of the Treaty. Some argue that the rather benevolent acceptance of the Euratom 
project had prevented the potential failure of the Common Market project and assured a 
contemporaneous adoption of the two treaties66. The former should nevertheless be taken 
cum grano salis since the general objectives of the two treaties were mutually dependent 
carrying the danger that the goals of the Euratom Community would have become self-
defeating and obsolete should the creation of the Common Market not have been 
accomplished. In fact, one could plausibly go as far as conceive the existence of an 
independent, self-standing Common Market Treaty whereas the reverse – an isolated 
atomic energy Treaty only partially covering the broad-set common market goals of 
European integration – would seem as a much less viable concept. Another factor which 
hinders the independent existence of an atomic energy charter as the Euratom treaty is the 
delicate dual nature of atomic energy as an energy source that potentially caters to both 
civil and military needs67 which draws on the theoretical debate on the suitability of the 
nuclear field for any functional integration68.  
                                                            
63 W. Yondrof, Monnet and the Action Committee: The Formative Period of the European Communties, 
International Organization, 1965, p.896. 
64 Yondrof, supra, p.901. 
65 Yondrof, supra, p.901. 
66 C. Deubner, The expansion of West German Capital and the Founding of Euratom, International 
Organization, 1979, p.206. 
67 See for this also, Scheinmann, supra n.44, p.61. 
68 Scheinmann, supra, p.12. 
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II The nature and specificity of the Euratom treaty in the context of the 
founding treaties  
   
Ever since the adoption of the Paris Treaty and the two Rome Treaties the legal 
doctrine has inquired into the sui generis character of the Treaties and the overarching idea 
of supranationality that characterize the former69. The following analysis will refer to the 
three treaties in their original form and content for the purpose of establishing the specific, 
and therefore different and differentiable character, of the Euratom Treaty with respect to 
the other two treaties. It will be remembered that of the three founding treaties, the ECSC 
Treaty has expired with part of its provisions being assimilated to the TFEU, the EC Treaty 
has been modified and renamed as the TFEU whereas the Euratom Treaty, as the most 
fortunate of the siblings, has foregone any substantial amendments to its text ever since 
the original adoption.  
The three treaties are international legal acts idiosyncratic in nature both in terms of 
their legal status and the effect upon the domestic legal orders of Member States. The 
former have, each in their own domain, established a supranational organization in 
particular economic and political sectors that had previously not been considered amenable 
to supranational regulation. The concept of supranational regulation has remained as 
intrinsic to the institutional and legal order of the Union, accruing from its legal status of an 
entity that has exceeded the bounds of regional intergovernmental organization, but one 
which is nonetheless short of a federal state.  
 
An important manifestation of the interdependence between the Euratom, ECSC 
and the EEC Treaties are the instances of overlap of their long-term objectives. A textual 
reading of the original preambles of these three founding treaties reveals that the remits of 
the treaties’ general objectives coincide in two respects: the member states subscribe to 
the furtherance of the cause of peace70 and to contributing to the economic growth and the 
                                                            
69 On the supranational character of the treaties, see, R. Efron and A. S. Nanes, The Emerging Concept of 
Supranationality in Recent International Agreements, Kentucky Law Journal, 1955, Issue 44; R. Efron and A. S. 
Nanes, The Common Market and Euratom Treaties: Supranationality and the Integration of Europe, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1957, Vol. 6; D. D. Smith, The European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom): The Limits of Supranationalism, California Western International Law Journal, 1970 Vol 
1 Issue 33; and, P. M. Houben, The Merger of the Executives of the European Communities, Common Market 
Law Review, 1965-1966, Vol 3 Issue 37. 
70 The preambles of the Euratom Treaty and the TFEU read: 
“RECOGNISING that nuclear energy represents an essential resource for the development and invigoration of 
industry and will permit the advancement of the cause of peace (…)” (Euratom Treaty);  
“RESOLVED by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon 
the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts (…)” (TFEU)) [Emphasis added]; 
28 
 
prosperity and well being of the European citizens71. Preserving peace and stability alongside 
a continuous economic progress benefitting the wellbeing of European citizens have to this 
day invariably remained to be the bottom-line of the Community/Union Treaties.  
 
Having in mind the undisputed supranational character of the Treaties, authors have 
pointed to the existence of a hierarchy between the Treaties that has been functioned upon 
the extent of the supranational outreach of their provisions72.  Even though today 
belonging to the historical archives, the former ECSC Treaty is a legal document which is 
emblematic of the supranational effort of the six founding member states and serves as the 
gold standard against which the potential for supremacy of the other treaties can be 
measured. In spite of being confined to the domain of the coal and steel industry, the ECSC 
Treaty was underscored by a powerful integration ratio the intensity of which has not been 
replicated in the other treaties73. Furthermore, while the supranational provisions of the EC 
Treaty were considered to outnumber those of the Euratom Treaty74 the latter, by the 
nature of its field of application, was endowed with a greater potential to affect national 
sovereignty75. Some authors have considered the breadth of the prerogatives belonging to 
the Commission as a typically supranational organ as the litmus test for judging the 
supranationality input of the treaties76, while others have referred to the autonomous 
conduct of international relations and progressive assumption of an international 
personality, which under the Euratom compact has been perceived as comprehensive and 
fail-proof77. However, principally speaking, as will be demonstrated in the subsequent 
sections, while the potentiality for supranationality may be greater for the Euratom Treaty, 
the actuality of supranationality has been predominantly accomplished under the purview 
of the EC Treaty (today, the TFEU).  
                                                            
71 “RESOLVED to create the conditions necessary for the development of a powerful nuclear industry which 
will provide extensive energy resources, lead to the modernisation of technical processes and contribute, 
through its many other applications, to the prosperity of their peoples (…)” (Euratom Treaty);  
“AFFIRMING as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvements of the living and working 
conditions of their peoples (…)” (TFEU) [Emphasis added]; 
72 Efron and Nanes, supra n.45, p.680. 
73 The text of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community expressly refers to the 
supranational character thereof. Art.9 of the ECSC Treaty read as follows:  
“The members of the High Authority shall exercise their functions in complete independence, in the general 
interest of the Community. In the fulfillment of their duties, they shall neither solicit nor accept instructions 
from any government or from any organization. They will abstain from all conduct incompatible with the 
supranational character of their functions. 
Each Member State agrees to respect this supranational character and to make no effort to influence the 
members of the High Authority in the execution of their duties.” [Emphasis added]; 
74 Efron and Nanes, supra n.45, p.680. 
75 Efron and Nanes, supra, p.683. 
76 Efron and Nanes, supra, p.681, 682. 
77 H. J. Hahn, Euratom: The Conception of an International Personality, Harvard Law Review, April 1958, Vol 
71, Number 6, pp.1053-1056. 
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In function to the nature of their respective subject matter, the Euratom Treaty and 
the ECSC Treaty are sectoral treaties while the EC Treaty is to be qualified as a cross-
sectoral treaty78. As a sectoral treaty, the Euratom Treaty does not cover the totality of the 
nuclear energy sector; its scope is confined to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy79 
and extends to the following fields: Promotion of nuclear research (Chapter 1), 
Dissemination of Information (Chapter 2), Health and Safety (Chapter 3), Investment in 
nuclear projects (Chapter 4), Joint Undertakings (Chapter 5), Nuclear Supplies (Chapter 6), 
Nuclear Safeguards (Chapter 7), Property Ownership (Chapter 8), Nuclear Common Market 
(Chapter 9) and External Relations of the Euratom (Chapter 10). In fact, the ambit of 
application of the Treaty has not been modified by any of the amending treaties and has 
remained identical ever since its original adoption. 
Based on the extent of treaty provisions which are regulatory in nature contained 
therein, academic literature has categorized the ECSC and EEC Treaties as regulatory texts 
distinguishable from the Euratom Treaty as an essentially promotional enterprise80 by 
reason of the fact that nuclear industry as a field could not conceivably be created or 
developed merely through regulations, but rather through concrete actions81. Thus, while 
the main objective of the EC was to control and regulate the activities implementing the 
Common Market policies, the purpose of the Euratom was to promote the use and 
development of civil nuclear energy82. The task of promoting a new industry is much 
different than the task of regulating an already established industry. It is imminent that in 
the exercise of ‘promoting’ the competent institutions have to encourage, help and provide 
impetus for the development of a particular nuclear industry and in so doing are driven to 
promote or favour the operation of certain undertakings (enterprises) which essentially 
conflicts with the free market logic underpinning the EC Treaty83. By being given regulatory 
powers with relation to existing economic activities, the ECSC and the EC Treaties were 
comparatively ‘better off’ than the Euratom Treaty which, in turn, targeted activities that 
had not yet been introduced or had only existed in a pre-industrial stage84. Hence, it was 
necessary that within the context of an atomic energy treaty the emphasis be put on 
assistance, promotion and cooperation between the Community, the Member States and 
                                                            
78 S. Wolf, Euratom Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Non-Integration, European Integration Online 
Papers, 2011 Vol.15 - Article 10, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2011-010a.htm (last accessed in July 2013), p.8. 
79 Nonetheless, the Treaty does not contain an explicit pronouncement in favour of the non-application of its 
provisions to Member States’ military nuclear programmes. For a discussion on whether the Treaty can in 
certain respects be presumed to apply to the military applications of nuclear energy, see Chapter 3.  
80 Scheinmann, supra n.44, p.56. 
81 P. Mathijsen, Some Legal Aspects of Euratom, Common Market Law Review, 1965-1966 Issue 3, p.330. 
82 D. D. Smith, The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom): The Limits of Supranationalism, 
California Western International Law Journal, 1970, Vol. 1, p.53. 
83 T. Cusack, A Tale of Two Treaties, Common Market Law Review, 2003, Vol.40 Issue 117, p.126. Furthermore, 
Mathijsen has claimed that the existence of such a close relationship between the Euratom Community and 
the nuclear industry has given the Community an industrial mindset rather than an administrative one 
(Mathijsen, supra, p.337). 
84 Mathijsen, supra n.81, p.329. 
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the enterprises (undertakings) concerned85. However, it is important to note that the 
Euratom does possess certain regulatory powers pronounced in the domain of health and 
safety from radiation protection86. 
As a typically regulatory legal text, the ECSC Treaty had established a 
comprehensive institutional and normative framework, leaving little room for legislative 
action on the part of the institutions87. Therefore, instead of providing the basis for law-
making, the treaty itself was the law to be applied. Although a sectoral treaty as well, the 
subject matter of the Euratom Treaty is however not fully comparable to that of the ECSC 
given that the nuclear industry, unlike the coal and steel industries, was still an 
experimental field undergoing development in the late 1950s and early 1960s and had not 
yet progressed to the point where its impact on the economies of Member States could 
have been accurately assessed88.  
The former functional distinction between the treaties further leads to distinction 
between the market-oriented characted of the EEC treaty and the Euratom Treaty which 
was labeled as a dirigiste treaty89. Namely, the EEC Treaty was modeled to be the typical 
‘framework’ treaty which did not create substantive norms but left it to the institutions to 
discharge of the legislative functions, thus having an “almost exclusively constitutional 
character”90. Provided that the nuclear field was a fairly new and experimental field 
undergoing development, it was considered more suitable that the emphasis be put on 
assistance, promotion, aid and cooperation between the Euratom Community, the 
enterprises and the member States, as well as coordination of the activities within the remit 
of the Community91. In this way, the Euratom Community was driven to promote the 
development of nuclear industries by way of its direct engagement and active involvement 
in the nuclear field92. Such conceptual difference in approaches between Euratom and the 
other two communities had translated into differences in the prerogatives accorded to the 
institutions and the decision-making procedures prescribed under each of the treaties93.  
 
The Euratom Treaty establishes an institutional framework alongside laying down 
certain substantive norms (concrete regulations) which is however not to be identified with 
the purely legislative character of the ECSC Treaty94. The former relates to the distinction 
between the legislative and the quasi-legislative character of the Treaties. The quasi-
                                                            
85 Mathijsen, supra, p.329. 
86 Mathijsen, supra, p.334. 
87 H. Steiger, An Evaluation of Legal Development on a Regional Basis: The Search for European Unity, Ohio 
State Law Journal, 1961, Vol. 22, p.505. 
88 A. Nanes, The Evolution of Euratom, International Journal, 1957-1958, Vol 16, p.16. 
89 Cusack, supra n.83, p.125. 
90 Steiger, supra n.87, p.505. 
91 Mathijsen, supra n.81, p.329. 
92 Mathijsen, supra, p.343. 
93 Mathijsen, supra, p.343.  
94 Steiger, supra n.87, p.504. 
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legislative character is fully displayed in the EEC Treaty which did not contain any 
substantive norms, reverting to regulatory action of institutions in creating the norms 
themselves under the institutional frame provided by the treaty95. In this regard, the 
Euratom Treaty aligns to the EEC Treaty and prevalently performs a quasi-legislative in lieu 
of a fully-fledged legislative function, laying down a limited number of regulations 
alongside conferring broader legislative and executive authority on the competent 
institutions96. 
In terms of the nature of the competence exercised, the Euratom Community, unlike 
the EEC and the ECSC, has very little to no exclusive competence, except with respect to 
health protection97, a field where it has substantially greater competence than the Member 
States. The Euratom Community has not followed the trend of increase in the areas of 
exclusive competence culminating with the Lisbon Treaty amendments98. Thus, in the 
majority of the fields covered, the Euratom Community shares the competence with the 
Member States whereby the functions prescribed for the Euratom regarding nuclear 
integration are less imposing and are complementary in character rather than exclusive99.  
 
Another peculiar aspect of the relationship between the Treaties is the lex general 
versus lex specialis differentiation. The EC (now, TFEU) Treaty has a broader field of 
application and is thus considered as lex generalis whereas the Euratom covers a very 
narrowly circumscribed field and is therefore qualified as lex specials. Also, even if the two 
treaties had not been contemporaneously adopted, the international law principle lex 
posterior derogate legi priori would prove inapplicable to the relationship between the two 
particular Treaties. This is because each Treaty is an independent and autonomous entity, 
equal in statute, precluding the existence of any sort of hierarchical relationship between 
the two100. The Commission has confirmed the lex specialis character of the Euratom Treaty 
considering that in case of conflict or overlap between the Treaties’ respective fields of 
application, it is the special rules of the Euratom Treaty as a sectoral treaty that would 
apply101, perceiving the two Communties as mutually independent frameworks where the 
                                                            
95 Steiger, supra, p.504. 
96 Steiger, supra, p.513. 
97 Mathijsen, supra n.81, p.328. 
98 The scope of the Union’s exclusive competence has been extended via the Lisbon Treaty and covers the 
following areas (Art. 3(1) TFEU): the customs union, the establishing of the competition rules necessary for 
the functioning of the internal market, the monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the 
euro, the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy and the common 
commercial policy. The Union holds exclusive competence for the conclusion of international agreements 
when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to 
exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope 
(Art. 3(2) TFEU). 
99 Scheinmann, supra n.44, p.11. 
100 Cusack, supra n.83, p.127. 
101Commission Decision of 21 February 1994, 94/285/Euratom, OJ 1994 L 122/30, para.21. 
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legal acts of one Community are not subject to the acts of the other102. The former is 
reflected in the wording of Art.106a(3) Euratom (the bridging provision between the 
Euratom Treaty and the TEU and the TFEU) – more particularly, in the guarantee that the 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union will not derogate from the provisions of the Euratom Treaty103. The 
foregoing division will be further dealt with in Chapter 2 as one determining the direction 
and the quality of the ‘spill-over’ process occurring between the legal rules adopted under 
the Euratom framework and those adopted further to the TFEU and the TEU treaties. 
 
Certain of the categories of distinction between the three treaties outlined supra, 
although historical and teleological in nature, should nevertheless not be seen as 
anachronistic as they can serve to elucidate the current relationship between the Union 
Treaties (the TFEU and the TEU) and the Euratom Treaty. Conversely, there are also those 
types of distinction that have been invalidated in view of present day developments, 
especially those which center on the ‘new and experimental character of nuclear industry’ 
accounting for the fundamental conceptual differences between the treaties. What seems 
striking in this respect is that even though the nuclear industry and nuclear technology are 
today optimally developed and are thus no more considered as terra incognita, the former 
conceptual difference has been maintained in the present relationship between the 
Euratom construct and the legal order of the Union stricto sensu (established under the 
TFEU and the TEU treaties). These considerations will be further developed in the sections 
that follow. 
 
 
 
                                                            
102 Commission Decision 94/285/Euratom, para.22. 
103 “TITLE III 
INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 
Application of certain provisions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union 
Article 106a 
1. Article 7, Articles 13 to 19, Article 48(2) to (5), and Articles 49 and 50 of the Treaty on European Union, and 
Article 15, Articles 223 to 236, Articles 237 to 244, Article 245, Articles 246 to 270, Article 272, 273 and 274, 
Articles 277 to 281, Articles 285 to 304, Articles 310 to 320, Articles 322 to 325 and Articles 336, 342 and 344 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the Protocol on Transitional Provisions, shall apply 
to this Treaty. 
2. Within the framework of this Treaty, the references to the Union, to the "Treaty on European Union", to the 
"Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union" or to the "Treaties" in the provisions referred to in 
paragraph 1 and those in the protocols annexed both to those Treaties and to this Treaty shall be taken, 
respectively, as references to the European Atomic Energy Community and to this Treaty. 
3. The provisions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union shall not derogate from the provisions of this Treaty.”; 
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III The institutional dynamic within the Euratom compact  
 
 
Due to its dominant supranational tendency, the institutional dynamic (the 
interaction among the institutions and the decision-making procedures) of the European 
Union lato sensu differs in important respects from that of the domestic legal systems of 
the Member States. It is for this reason that the principle of division of powers is not always 
consistently applied and strictly followed as in the national systems – namely, the former is 
most clearly reflected in the prerogatives accorded to the Union’s legislative branch (the 
Council and the Parliament) which, in certain points, find themselves intertwined with 
those of the Union’s executive branch (the Commission). It is quite difficult to categorically 
differentiate among EU instiutions that can be considered to singularly and exclusively hold 
the legislative as opposed to the executive power and the former, as will be evidenced infra, 
holds true a fortiori with respect to the Euratom Community. 
 
What may be described as a certain discrepancy between the decision-making 
competences under the Union and the Euratom frameworks could be explained with the 
existent conceptual difference between the Euratom Treaty as a sectoral and the TFEU and 
the TEU as cross-sectoral treaties with a different propensity for supranationality. 
Admittedly, the signatories of the Euratom Treaty have transferred significant 
competences regarding the conduct of the nuclear energy policy to the supranational level 
(in the fields of nuclear safeguards104 and nuclear health and safety105) while simultaneously 
forseeing ’deliberative’ provisions which revert to the adoption of soft measures 
(promotion of nuclear research106)107.  
  
The interaction among the EU institutions within the scope of the TFEU and the 
Euratom Treaty is best conveyed by the concepts of hierarchical supranationalism and 
deliberative supranationalism as competing modes of governance108. The exercise of 
weighing out the supranational against the national interests in the context of these two 
modes of governance is performed at EU level109. Hierarchical supranationalism signifies the 
promotion of supranational interests in a particular field with Member States being barred 
from intervening via unilateral regulation110. The deliberative supranationalism approach 
                                                            
104 Arts. 77-85 Euratom. 
105 Arts. 30-39 Euratom. 
106 Arts. 4-11 Euratom. 
107 See, Wolf, supra n.78, p.5. 
108 For this see, S. Wolf, Euratom, the European Court of Justice, and the Limits of Nuclear Integration in 
Europe, German Law Journal, 2011, Vol 12 No.8, pp.1650-1653. The concept of deliberative supranationalism 
was largely elaborated in, C. Joerges, “Deliberative Supranationalism”—Two Defences, European Law Journal 
2002 Issue 8; and, C. Joerges and J. Neyer, “Deliberative Supranationalism” Revisited, EUI Working Paper 
LAW No.2006/20; 
109 Wolf, supra, p.1650. 
110 Wolf, supra, p.1650. 
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employs a balancing act between supranational and national interests whereby the solution 
is reached at supranational level through a deliberative process that favors a compromise 
to be achieved among the institutions and the Member States instead of the use of 
majority voting111. 
The following sections will consecutively look at the most relevant prerogatives of 
the key institutional players in the Euratom system – the Commission, the Council, the 
Parliament and the Court of Justice of the EU – in function to the respective fields covered 
by each of the Treaty chapters. As the goal is to adopt an analytical rather than a 
descriptive approach, only those prerogatives which are representative of the instiutions’ 
involvement in the field will be referred to. 
 
 
III.1 The European Commission and the Council of the EU – the regulatory power  
 
The regulatory power under the Euratom system is vested with the European 
Commission and the Council of the EU, with the extent of prerogatives belonging to the 
Commission as a central decision-making organ being preponderant to those of the 
Council. As the institution where the dominant part of the regulatory, supervisory and 
executive power under the Euratom Treaty is concentrated, the Commission exercises a 
functional control over national and sub-national actors as well as actors at the EU level 
(such as the Euratom Supply Agency created under the Supplies chapter of the Treaty). 
These prerogatives of control are administrative in nature and (and in most cases) are 
exercised on the Commission’s own motion112.  
In its capacity of an executive organ, the Commission dispenses of important 
administrative tasks which reverts to the pervasive technocratic character of the Treaty, 
which proved indispensable at the ‘promotional stage’ in the first decades of Euratom’s 
existence when nuclear energy production was still considered an obscure area. Since 
nuclear energy in Europe has now grown well past the promotional era, the impending 
question is whether such a technocratic approach is still justified and should be 
reconsidered. 
The Commission also carries the legislative initiative under the Euratom Treaty 
while the legislative power per se is held by the Council – although, in principle, the ‘real’ 
power and authority within the Euratom Community rests with the Commission given its 
extensive decision-making powers.  
                                                            
111 Wolf, supra, p.1652. 
112 H. J. Hahn, Control under the Euratom Compact, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 1958, Vol. 7, 
p.28. 
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Throughout the ‘formative’ years of the Euratom especially, the Commission was 
known to act as an enabling agent in the broad construction of the Euratom Treaty 
provisions leading to a gradual explicit and implicit enlargement of the former’s scope of 
application. It has played an invaluable role in actualizing the specificity and uniformity of 
the Euratom legal order by advocating the effet utile–type of interpretation of the Treaty 
provisions assuring that the Euratom competences are adequately delineated, or in certain 
cases, indeed broadened113. In addition, the Commission assumes a quasi-judicial role in the 
domain of Nuclear Safeguards, where it is entitled to impose sanctions on persons and 
undertakings that are in breach of the safeguards provisions of the Euratom Treaty and 
related secondary legislation thus performing a quasi-judicial function.  
In the area of Promotion of nuclear research (Chapter 1) the role of the Commission is 
central as the forum responsible to promote and facilitate nuclear research in the Member 
States which is to be complemented by conducting the Community research and training 
programme and all the operational tasks linked thereto – the former role is more 
supervisory than regulatory being that the main goal of these provisions is promotional114.  
The Dissemination of Information chapter (Chapter 2) establishes the regime for 
information over which the Community has the power of disposal where the Commission is 
empowered to grant licenses and sublicenses and has full authority over the dissemination 
of that information115 and other type of information the dissemination of which is 
performed by amicable agreement and information which is subject to compulsory 
communication to the Commission116. The Council also has an active role which is to adopt 
security regulations that lay down various security gradings, modify a particular security 
grading or declassify certain information via unanimous decision117.  
 The basic standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general 
public against the dangers of ionizing radiations (Health and Safety (Chapter 3)) are drafted 
by the Commission, having beforehand obtained the opinion of a group of persons 
appointed by the Scientific and Technical Committee (among which scientific experts, in 
particular public health experts, from the Member States), as well as the opinion of the 
Economic and Social Committee. The Council further adopts the basic standards acting by 
                                                            
113 Such are the Ruling 1/78, the Nuclear Safety Convention case, the Mox case, which will be considered in 
detail infra. 
114 Arts.4-11. 
115 Arts. 12,13. 
116 Arts.14-23; For a more elaborate overview of the role of the two institutions in the field, see Council 
Directive 96/29/Euratom of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of 
workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation  
 (OJ L 159, 29.6.1996, p. 1–114) and the proposal for a new Directive laying down basic safety standards for 
protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, Brussels, 30.5.2012 COM(2012) 
242 final. 
117 Art.24. 
36 
 
a qualified majority, after consulting the European Parliament and taking account of the 
opinions expressed by the two relevant Committees118.  
Under the Investment chapter (Chapter 4), the Commission is under the duty to 
stimulate action by persons and undertakings and to facilitate coordinated development of 
their investment in the nuclear field, inter alia, by periodically publishing illustrative 
programmes revealing particular nuclear energy production targets and scoping the types 
of investment required for their attainment119. The investment projects thus established are 
to be communicated to the Commission120.  
The provisions on Joint Undertakings (Chapter 5) point to a collaborative effort 
between the Commission and the Council – namely, those undertakings which are of 
essential importance to the development of the nuclear industry in the Community can 
qualify to be established as Joint Undertakings121 while projects aimed at establishing such 
a Joint Undertaking previously undergo an inquiry conducted by the Commission122. The 
Commission subsequently forwards the project for establishing a Joint Undertaking to the 
Council together with a reasoned opinion; provided the opinion is favorable, it further 
submits to the Council relevant proposals along with a detailed report on the project as a 
whole123. The Council reaches the final decision approving the establishment of the joint 
undertaking by a qualified majority, taking all of the former factors into consideration124. 
In the field of Nuclear Supplies title (Chapter 6) a common supply policy is 
established based on the principle of equal access to sources of supply, whereby the supply 
of ores, source materials and special fissile materials is guaranteed125. The Euratom Supply 
Agency has been established to pursue these tasks under direct supervision of the 
                                                            
118 Art.31. 
119 Art.40. 
120 Art.42. 
121 Art.45. 
122 Art.46(1). 
123 Art.46(2). 
124 Art.47(3). 
125 Art.52(1); For the purposes of the Euratom Treaty, pursuant to Art.197 thereof:  
“1. ‘Special fissile materials’ means plutonium 239; uranium 233; uranium enriched in uranium 235 or uranium 
233; and any substance containing one or more of the foregoing isotopes and such other fissile materials as 
may be specified by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission; the 
expression ‘special fissile materials’ does not, however, include source materials. 
[…] 3. ‘Source materials’ means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium 
whose content in uranium 235 is less than the normal; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, 
alloy, chemical compound or concentrate; any other substance containing one or more of the foregoing in 
such a concentration as shall be specified by the Council, acting by a qualified  majority on a proposal from the 
Commission. 
4. ‘Ores’ means any ore containing, in such average concentration as shall be specified by the Council acting 
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, substances from which the source materials 
defined above may be obtained by the appropriate chemical and physical processing (…)”; 
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Commission, which in turn can issue directives to the Agency and disposes of a right of veto 
over the Agency’s decisions126.  
Under the Safeguards title (Chapter 7), the Commission ensures that in the 
territories of Member States ores, source materials and special fissile materials are not 
diverted from their intended uses as declared by the users127. The Commission can issue 
directives urging Member States concerned to take all measures necessary to rectify 
infringements of their safeguards obligations and informs the Council thereof128. It can also 
impose sanctions on persons and undertakings that have breached the safeguards 
provisions129. The Commission requires the relevant authorities in Member States to keep 
and produce operating records in order to allow accounting for ores, source materials and 
special fissile materials used or produced130. The nature and the extent of these 
requirements are defined by the Commission in Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 the 
application of Euratom safeguards, approved by the Council131.  
For the establishment of the Nuclear Common Market (Chapter 9) Member States 
have been required to prohibit all customs duties on imports and exports or charges having 
equivalent effect, as well as all quantitative restrictions on imports and exports of the 
nuclear goods and products specified in Annex IV to the Euratom Treaty132. Thus, all 
restrictions based on nationality potentially affecting the right of nationals of any Member 
State to take skilled employment in the field of nuclear energy have been abolished133. The 
Council may issue directives to implement the former requirement, acting by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission (the latter having previously obtained the 
opinion of the Economic and Social Committee)134. 
 When it comes to the preponderance of institutional decision-making powers under 
the Euratom system, the ‘rule of thumb’ would be that for decisions of a financial nature or 
with financial repercussions the Council as the intergovernmental body has the ultimate 
power of approval – acting pursuant to a proposal from the Commission (e.g., in taking 
measures necessary to facilitate the conclusion of insurance contracts covering nuclear 
risks (Art.98); under the supply policy, the Council is competent to fix prices, acting 
                                                            
126 Art.53(1). 
127 Art.81. 
128Art.82(3). The safeguards procedures and the role of the Commission therein are further discussed in 
Chapter 4, Section II. 
129 Art.83. 
130 Art.83. 
131Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 of 8 February 2005 on the application of Euratom 
safeguards (OJ L 54, 28.2.2005, p. 1–71). Also, for the modalities of application of the former regulation, see 
Commission Recommendation of 15 December 2005 on guidelines for the application of Regulation 
(Euratom) No 302/2005 on the application of Euratom safeguards (notified under document number C(2005) 
5127), OJ  L 028 , 01/02/2006 P. 0001 – 0085. 
132 Art.93. 
133 Art.96(1). 
134 Art.96(2). 
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unanimously on a proposal from the Commission (Art.69); the Commission can decide to 
build up emergency stocks - the method of financing those stocks being approved by the  
Council by a qualified majority on a proposal from the former (Art.72(2)); The Council may, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission make applicable to each Joint 
Undertaking any or all of the advantages listed in Annex III to the Euratom Treaty 
(Art.48(1)); etc.); 
In the realm of the External relations of the Euratom (Chapter 10) the role of the 
Commission is fairly extensive, almost short from exclusive. From the very beginning, the 
Euratom was endowed with a comprehensive set of external prerogatives, at a time when 
the EEC’s respective external competences were still rudimentary. From the very 
beginning, the Euratom Community owned the capacity to enter into obligations by 
concluding agreements or contracts with a third State, an international organisation or a 
national of a third State, those agreements or contracts being negotiated by the 
Commission in accordance with directives from the Council and finally concluded by the 
Commission with the approval of the Council acting by a qualified majority135. Furthermore, 
agreements or contracts whose implementation does not require action by the Council are 
to be negotiated and concluded solely by the Commission – to the extent that the 
Commission keeps the Council informed on the developments.  
In conducting their nuclear foreign policy, Member States have the duty to 
communicate to the Commission draft agreements or contracts with a third State, an 
international organisation or a national of a third State where such agreements or contracts 
concern matters falling within the purview of the Euratom Treaty136. Member States are not 
allowed to conclude the proposed agreement or contract until the observations of the 
Commission have been met, and, furthermore, they have the option to proceed an 
application to the CJEU after having received the comments of the Commission concerning 
the compatibility of the envisaged agreement with the provisions of the Euratom Treaty137. 
In comparison to the procedure for the conclusion of international agreements foreseen in 
Arts.216-219 TFEU pursuant to which the Parliament is either consulted or its consent is 
required for the conclusion of international agreements envisaged under the Union 
framework, the corresponding procedure under the Euratom Treaty is legitimacy-deficient 
as it completely excludes the involvement of the Parliament138. The regime is different only 
with respect to agreements that the Euratom concludes with States or international 
organizations, establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations and 
                                                            
135 Art.101(2). 
136 Art.103 (1). 
137 Art.103(3). 
138This is to be contrasted to the view expressed by certain authors in the 1950s who have commended the 
external relations regime established under the Euratom Treaty to be forward-looking and revolutionary (see, 
Hahn, supra n.77). 
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common action which are concluded by the Council acting unanimously after consulting 
the European Parliament139. 
What is additionally to be perceived as a deficiency inherent in the Euratom external 
relations regime is the inability for the Commission or any other institution to request an 
opinion from the CJEU on the compatibility of an envisaged international agreement with 
the Euratom Treaty as this possibility is only reserved for Member States. In contrast, 
Art.218(11) TFEU enables the Member States, the Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission to obtain the opinion of the CJEU regarding the compliance of the envisaged 
agreement with the rules of the TFEU and the TEU. The CJEU has remarked on this 
shortcoming both in Ruling 1/78 and in the Nuclear Safety Convention140 case (the two 
judgments being almost 25 years apart from each other) whereas the said inconsistency 
has failed to be corrected by any subsequent treaty modification. Thus, in Ruling 1/78 it was 
the Belgian Government that appeared before the CJEU although it was clearly effectively 
voicing the Commission’s stance in the matter (which itself was unable to refer to the Court 
under the Euratom Treaty). The Court resolved the problem by stating that the former 
procedural deficiency can be overcome by reverting to the annulment procedure, namely, 
by requesting the review of the legality of an act approving a decision to conclude an 
international agreement since bringing an action for annulment is an undisputed 
prerogative of the institutions under the Euratom system141. 
 The overall impression when examining the decision-making procedures applicable 
within the Euratom framework is that the administrative powers are predominantly 
dispensed by Commission while in the legislative arena it is the Council that appears as the 
main legislator.  The latter departs from the legislative procedure applicable under the 
Union framework where both the Council and the Parliament appear as co-legislators for a 
great majority of the legislative acts i.e. acts adopted through the ordinary legislative 
procedure (Art. 294 TFEU et seq.) as the pervasive legislative procedure under the Union 
framework. Namely, Art.289 TFEU institutes two types of procedures for the adoption of 
legal acts, applicable both to the Union and the Euratom regimes: the ordinary and the 
special legislative procedure. Under the ordinary legislative procedure the European 
Parliament and the Council jointly adopt the legislative acts on a proposal from the 
Commission whereas in the special legislative procedure the Parliament adopts an act with 
the participation of the Council, or the latter with the participation of the Parliament142. The 
                                                            
139 Art.206. 
140 C-29/99 Commission v Council (Nuclear Safety Convention), ECR 2002 p. I-11221, paras.52,54. 
141 Para.54. 
142 “Article 289 TFEU 
1. The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the European Parliament and the 
Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the Commission. This procedure is defined in 
Article 294. 
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failure to incorporate the former changes into the consolidated version of the Euratom 
Treaty published subsequently to the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty143 indicates 
that a significant procedural inconsistency is to be observed in the fact that while the TFEU 
provisions relating to the ordinary legislative procedure have been formally extended to 
apply to the remit of the Euratom Treaty via Art.106a Euratom, the applicable Euratom 
decision-making procedures outlined supra have not been impacted. The former is, 
deplorably, an indication of the purely perfunctory character of the extension.  
The problematic aspect of the decision-making procedures within the Euratom is 
that along with a ostensible lack of actual legislative power for the Parliament there is a 
prevalence of a Euratom-specific type of a legislative procedure which only involves the 
Council and the Commission. Consequently, the dominant legislative procedure under the 
Euratom’s auspices is the special legislative procedure where the negligible legislative role 
of the Parliament involves consultation with the Council (Arts.31, 76, 85, 90, 96, 98, 203, 
206 of the Euratom Treaty). 
Irrespective of the arguments purporting the delicate nature and distinct character 
of the Euratom Community, it seems difficult to reconcile the foregoing divergent 
tendencies: one of enlarging the field of application of the ordinary legislative procedure 
(pioneered under the Union framework) and the contrasting tendency to discredit any 
attempts to expand the Parliamentary legislative powers under the Euratom remit. It is a 
worrying status quo being that both of these tendencies exist under the same roof, that of 
the European Union which is striving to keep up an exemplary image as a fully democratic 
political system both in the eyes of the international community and its own Member 
States.    
 
 
III.2 The Parliament under the Euratom: the quest for leverage 
 
Ever since the Euratom came into existence, the European Parliament and the 
Euratom Community have been experiencing their share of what can be described as a 
standing strenuous relationship due both to the elevated degree of democratic deficit 
inherent to the Euratom Treaty and its rigidity as a legal document that has ‘survived’ any 
substantial amendments. Even though democratic deficit is seen as a feature intrinsic to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
2. In the specific cases provided for by the Treaties, the adoption of a regulation, directive or decision by the 
European Parliament with the participation of the Council, or by the latter with the participation of the 
European Parliament, shall constitute a special legislative procedure. (…)” [Emphasis added]; 
143 Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ 2012/C 327/01; 
41 
 
the nature of the overall European Union construct144, its presence seems more 
pronounced with regard to the Euratom.  
The Euratom has been commonly regarded as a democracy deficient community 
chiefly on account of the Parliament’s insufficient involvement in the Euratom decision-
making145.  The concept of EU’s democratic deficit presupposes the existence of legitimacy 
deficit – in fact, the main reason that is usually invoked for the existence of EU’s democratic 
deficit is the lack of transparency and accountability in the work of certain of its institutions 
and bodies with respect to the citizens146 (i.e. legitimacy deficit). In addition, the European 
Parliament has been usually regarded as a legitimacy-deficient institution in view of the 
decreasing trend in the European Parliament elections turnout147. The tremendous input of 
the Treaty of Lisbon in this respect consists of both substantiating and expanding the 
prerogatives of the Parliament under the Union framework and thus making up, to the 
extent possible, for the impending legitimacy deficit in the Union. Unfortunately, the 
enlargement of the Parliament’s powers under the Union framework has not been 
paralleled by a corresponding enlargement within the Euratom remit.  
As was observed in the preceding section, the only involvement in the legislative 
process foreseen for the Parliament under the Euratom Treaty was through the special 
legislative procedure where the Council adopts the act after the Parliament has been 
consulted.  This procedure has been provided under the Health and Safety chapter for the 
adoption of basic standards for radiation protection148. Further on, regarding the possibility 
to modify the provisions belonging to the chapters on Supply149, Safeguards150 and Property 
Ownership151, the Treaty prescribes that in case of a change in circumstances or a 
compelling need, the provisions under each of these chapters may be subject to change 
requiring a unanimous decision of the Council acting from a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the Parliament.  
                                                            
144See T. D. Zweifel, Democratic Deficit?: The European Union, Switzerland, and the United States in 
Comparative Perspective, 2002, Lixington Books, pp.11–44. For further reading on the democratic deficit in the 
EU see also, A. Von Bogdandy, A Disputed Idea Becomes Law: Remarks on European Democracy as a Legal 
Principle in, B. Kohler-Koch and B. Bittberger (eds.), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European 
Union, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, p.36,37; and, R. Balme and D. Chabanet, European Governance and 
Democracy: Power and Protest in the EU, Rowman & Littlefield, 2008, p.202 et seq.; 
145 Comments in this direction have been voiced by the European Parliament, the Member States and NGO 
sector, covered in the last section of this chapter.  
146 J. Crowley and L. Giorgi, The Political Sociology of the European Public Sphere in, Giorgi, Von Homeyer 
and Parsons (eds.), Democracy in The European Union: Towards the Emergence of a Public Sphere, Routledge, 
2006, p.1. 
147 The 1999 European Parliament elections turn-out was estimated to be 49.51%, decreasing in 2004 to 
45.47% and to 43% in 2009 (source: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/turnout_en.html [Accessed March 31, 
2010]). 
148 Art.31. 
149 Art.76. 
150 Art.85. 
151 Art.90. 
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In the context of the Nuclear common market, for the purpose of abolishment of 
nationality-based restrictions so that nationals of any Member State are able to acquire the 
right to take skilled employment in the field of nuclear energy - subject to the limitations 
resulting from the basic requirements of public policy, public security or public health - the 
Council can issue directives acting by a qualified majority upon consultation with the 
Parliament152. Furthermore, in the effort for Member States to facilitate the conclusion of 
insurance contracts covering nuclear risks, the Council can issue directives acting by a 
qualified majority after consulting the Parliament153. 
 In addition to the foregoing, the Parliament is consulted also regarding the 
activation of the ‘flexibility’ clause of Art. 203 Euratom (‘extension clause’154) which acts as 
supplementary legal basis for Euratom action where the Treaty itself has not provided for 
the necessary powers. Should such action prove necessary for the attainment of the 
objectives of the Euratom, the Council can take the appropriate measures by acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament. The mirroring procedure established in Art. 352(1) TFEU is to be distinguished 
from the former in that it raises the threshold for Parliamentary involvement requiring that 
in addition to a unanimous vote in the Council and a proposal coming from the 
Commission, the consent of the Parliament is to be obtained. In this way, the Parliament’s 
consent is decisive to the final outcome of the procedure. This enhancement to the ‘open-
ended’ competence procedure under the TFEU has been introduced by the Lisbon Treaty - 
the former Art.308 TEC only requiring consultation with the Parliament.  
Lastly, with relation to the budgetary procedure, the TFEU provisions applicable 
thereto (Arts.314 et seq. TFEU) have been extended to the Euratom Treaty via Art.106a 
enabling for the European Parliament to be given equal weight with the Council in deciding 
on the final adoption of the budget. 
 
III.2.1 The Parliament’s legal and political struggle 
 
The story of the Parliament struggling to find its place in European nuclear territory 
has been an enduring one. The only legal challenge that the Parliament has initiated so far 
in favour of expanding its competences under the Euratom is the Parliament v Council 
(Chernobyl II)155 case, where it succeeded to assure its prerogative as an institution to bring 
actions for annulment of Community measures before the CJEU. The Parliament further 
demanded the annulment of Regulation 3954/87 (Euratom) laying down maximum permitted 
                                                            
152 Art.96. 
153 Art.98. 
154 A reference coined by H. J. Hahn (Hahn, supra n.77, p.1040). 
155 Parliament v Council (C-70/88) [1991] E.C.R. I-04529. 
43 
 
levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and of feeding-stuffs following a nuclear 
accident or any other case of radiological emergency156 claiming that Art.31 Euratom (the 
health and safety provisions) which foresees a consultation procedure, was not the correct 
legal basis and that the act should have been adopted under Art.100a EC (now art.114 
TFEU; provision on harmonisation of laws) - if necessary in conjunction with Art.31. The 
latter provision provided for a co-operation procedure which would have ensured the 
Parliament a more decisive role in the legislative procedure. However, the Court held that 
the purpose of the Regulation was to protect the population against the dangers arising 
from foodstuffs and feeding-stuffs which have undergone radioactive contamination157 and 
the fact that the Regulation contains a provision on the prohibition on the placing on the 
markets of certain products with level of contamination that exceeds the maximum 
permitted levels only served to enable the application of the maximum permitted levels158. 
The Regulation therefore simply had an incidental harmonising effect on the free 
movement of goods159 leading the Court to uphold Art.31 Euratom as the correct legal 
basis160. 
 
                                                            
156 Regulation 3954/87 (Euratom) laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of 
foodstuffs and of feeding-stuffs following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency 
[1987] OJ L371/11. 
157 Parliament v Council (C-70/88) [1991] E.C.R. I-04529, para.12. 
158 Para.16. 
159 Para.17. 
160 The Chernobyl II case will be further examined infra, in Section III.3;  
Another very recent example of a turf war between the Parliament and the Council regarding the choice of a 
legal basis for an act falling under the Euratom domain is case C-48/14 Parliament v Council 
(ECLI:EU:C:2015:91) in which the Parliament had seeked annulment of Directive 2013/51/Euratom of 
22 October 2013 laying down requirements for the protection of the health of the general public with regard to 
radioactive substances in water intended for human consumption (OJ 2013 L 296/12) claiming that Art.31 
Euratom concerning the adoption of the basic standards relating to the protection of the health of workers 
and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiations under which the Directive had been 
adopted was the incorrect legal basis and that the former should have instead been adopted under the 
Union’s environmental protection provisions of Art.192(1) TFEU - more particularly “the objectives of the 
protection of human health and the prudent and rational use of natural resource as listed in Art.191(1) TFEU”. 
Under Article 31 Euratom, the Council adopts the act after consulting the Parliament whereas under 
Art.192(1) Parliament would have benefitted from the ordinary legislative procedure. By relying on the lex 
specialis/lex generalis rule, the Court of Justice asserted that the purpose and content of the contested 
Directive corresponded to the purpose and content of a basic standard within the meaning of Article 30 
Euratom (Paras.32,33) in that Article 31 Euratom constituted a more specific legal basis for protecting the 
health of populations against radioactive substances in water intended for human consumption than the 
general legal basis resulting from Article 192(1) TFEU (Paras.37,38). Moreover, the Parliament even went as 
far as claiming that by having chosen this particular legal basis for the act the Council had breached the 
principle of sincere cooperation among the institutions laid down in Article 13(2) TEU, which the Court readily 
dismissed. 
 
Clearly, C-48/14 Parliament v Council represents yet another of the Parliament’s failed attempts to influence 
the Euratom decision-making process ‘through the back-door’, however, by exhibiting a blatant (possibly, 
intentional) disregard of the lex specialis/lex generalis rule governing the interaction between the Union and 
the Euratom legal frameworks and the principle according to which the provisions of the TFEU are not to 
derogate from the provisions of the EAEC Treaty. 
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Apart from legal challenges, the Parliament has also attempted to ‘politically’ 
challenge the imbalance of institutional competences under the Euratom Treaty and be 
more closely associated with the developments under Euratom auspices, mainly by issuing 
reports or adopting various legislative and non-legislative resolutions. In following, 
reference will be made to several recent European Parliament reports and resolutions 
where the Parliament has given its own assessment of the overall Euratom structure and its 
modus operandi.  
The Maldeikis Report161 which was drafted on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of 
the Euratom Community, offers an insight into the Parliament’s view on the issue of 
Euratom’s democratic deficit and possible modalities for correcting this lacuna. The report 
notes that (by the time of adopting the report, 2007) the Euratom Treaty had been 
amended only once in 50 years, its core provisions having remained unchanged162. Regret is 
expressed about the fact that the growth in Parliamentary powers and the operation of the 
co-decision procedure (now, ordinary legislative procedure) with regard to most of EU 
legislation has not been extended to the Euratom. It sees the current situation, where the 
Parliament is almost completely excluded from the Euratom legislative process, as 
evidence of an “unacceptable democratic deficit”, the practice of involving the Parliament 
in the preparatory phase and final drafting, as well as taking its opinions into consideration, 
being regarded as insufficient163.  
The Hökmark Report164 offers a discussion on the choice of the legal basis for the 
(then, proposed) Directive setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety of nuclear 
installations165 where the Parliament, although ending up by giving an affirmative appraisal 
of the proposed legal basis, examines several other possibly relevant legal bases which 
foresee a greater stake for it in the procedure for the adoption of the directive. The 
Directive lays down uniform standards for the safety of nuclear installations and is based on 
Arts. 31 and 32 Euratom, provisions on the protection of the health and safety of workers 
and the general public against dangers arising from ionising radiations. Concerning the 
appropriate legal basis, the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs examined the 
question whether Art.175 EC (now 192 TFEU) on protection of the environment should be 
added as a supplementary legal basis, giving the Parliament the benefit of the co-decision 
procedure166. In the alternative, the possible use of Art.203 Euratom in conjunction with or 
instead of Arts. 31 and 32 was argued for, for the purpose of covering both the 
technological aspects of nuclear safety and the environmental effects from the functioning 
                                                            
161 European Parliament, Committee on Industry,Research and Energy, Rapporteur : E. Maldeikis, Report on 
Assessing Euratom : 50 years of European nuclear energy policy (Maldeikis Report) A6-0129/2007. 
162 European Parliament, Maldeikis Report, p.5. 
163 European Parliament, Maldeikis Report, p.5. 
164 European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a Community 
framework for nuclear safety of nuclear installations A6-0236/2009.  
165 Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear 
installations [2009] OJ L172/18. 
166 European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) A6-0236/2009, p.40. 
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of nuclear installations167. Finally, the Parliament concluded that none of the provisions of 
the proposed measure deal specifically with protection against threats to the environment, 
finding that Arts. 31 and 32 Euratom were the correct legal bases168. Therefore, it was 
suggested that the reference to ‘protection of the air, water and soil’ be scrapped off which 
is something the Commission and the Council had conceded to in the final version of the 
Directive where in the definition for nuclear safety contained in Art.3(2) reference is made 
solely to “protection of workers and the general public from radiation arising from ionising 
radiations from nuclear installations”.  
  An important amendment to the text proposed by the Parliament was included in 
Art.9 on the reporting procedure for the implementation of the Directive. Namely, the 
rapporteur stressed the need for the European Parliament to be kept well informed on 
activities in the field of nuclear safety, proposing that the Commission should be obliged to 
submit reports on the progress made in the implementation of the Directive not solely to 
the Council, but also to the Parliament169. The wording of the present Art.9(2) reflects this 
demand. 
The Parliament has developed a keen interest in matters of nuclear safety and often 
feels called upon to state its opinions in this area which is of most immediate concern to the 
EU citizens. Thus, in a recent Resolution on risk and safety assessments (‘stress tests’) of 
nuclear power plants in the European Union and related activities170, the Parliament stressed 
the need for EU citizens to be fully informed and consulted on nuclear safety in the 
Union171. It welcomed the proposed revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive as an ambitious 
project aiming to introduce major improvements in safety procedures through the 
definition and implementation of binding nuclear safety standards which reflect modern 
technical, regulatory and operational practices in the EU172, and called on the EU and the 
Member States to treat nuclear power equally to the other energy sources under the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, in accordance with the notions of democracy, 
involvement of the European Parliament, transparency and full public access to 
information173.  
                                                            
167 Idem, p.41. 
168 Idem, p.47. 
169 Idem, p.39. 
170 European Parliament Resolution of 14 March 2013 on risk and safety assessments (‘stress tests’) of nuclear 
power plants in the European Union and related activities, 2012/2830(RSP). The resolution was issued pursuant 
to the Commission communication of 4 October 2012 on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments 
(‘stress tests’) of nuclear power plants in the European Union and related activities (COM(2012)0571). See 
also, the European Parliament Resolution on the problem of nuclear safety fifteen years after the Chernobyl 
accident, B5-0321/2001; and, European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the draft Council regulation 
establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety and Security Assistance (9037/2006 – C6-0153/2006 – 
2006/0802(CNS)A6-0397/2006); 
171 Point 15. 
172 Point 26. 
173 Point 31. 
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The Parliament passed Resolution of 10 May 2007 on the public health consequences 
of the 1968 Thule crash (Petition 720/2002) (2006/2012(INI)) in response to a citizens’ 
petition, urging Member States to implement and apply without delay the Basic Safety 
Standards Directive 96/29/Euratom174 and expressing great concern about the existence of 
a gap in the protection of the health of the general public regarding the use of nuclear 
energy for military purposes175. In order for the former lacuna to be made up, it has 
suggested the Commission to draft a proposal addressing the public health and 
environmental effects of the use of nuclear energy176. 
In a report prepared regarding the (then) proposal for a Council Directive laying down 
basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising 
radiation177, the Parliament cemented its eco-centric approach to nuclear safety and 
radiation protection which encompasses the protection of both the human and the non-
human environment, suggesting a bold stand on environmental protection in matters 
pertaining to the protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation. 
The inclusion of a chapter on environmental protection in the proposed directive was 
welcomed, the former introducing environmental criteria that guarantee the protection of 
humans and laying down rules on the protection of non-human species178. Nevertheless, 
the Parliamentary Committee that authored the report considered that at this point there 
was not any sufficient scientific basis to determine the impact of radiation on non-human 
species179. Thus, it was proposed that the chapter on environmental protection be deleted 
from the directive and a separate legal act specifically dealing with the protection of the 
environment against ionising radiation be drawn up once sufficient scientific data becomes 
available180. Interestingly, the Committee takes the view that such an act ought to be 
adopted under the TFEU environmental protection provisions (in the ordinary legislative 
procedure) since Arts.30 and 31 Euratom cannot be taken as adequate legal basis due to 
their relevance specifically to the protection of the health of workers and the general 
public181. Effectively, a view is taken that the Euratom lacks competence to espouse an 
environmental approach to radiation protection182. Therefore, If the Commission decides to 
concede with the former suggestion and drafts such an act, the Parliament will be given the 
benefit to co-legislate with the Council instead of only be consulted were the act to be 
based on the Euratom Treaty provisions. 
                                                            
174 Point 9. 
175 Point 11. 
176 Point 12. 
177 European Parliament Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (Draft Report) on the 
proposal for a Council directive laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising 
from exposure to ionising radiation (COM(2012)0242 – C7-0151/2012 – 2011/0254(NLE)) (Rapporteur: Thomas 
Ulmer); 
178 p.15. 
179 p.15. 
180 p.16. 
181 p.16. 
182 For a different approach, see Chapter 2, Section II.2. 
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III.2.2 The Lisbon Treaty amendments: (in)significant? 
 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the only envisaged legislative procedure involving the 
Parliament under the Euratom Treaty was the consultation procedure. The only change 
that has been achieved with the Lisbon Treaty amendments in this respect is purely 
nominal in that the consultation procedure has been assimilated into the new, broader 
notion of ‘special legislative procedure’.  
The modifications to the Euratom Treaty have been produced in the Protocol 
Amending the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community183 attached to the 
Lisbon Treaty. The Protocol, apart from making certain institutional adjustments and 
repealing a number of Treaty articles, does not insert any new substantial provisions into 
the Treaty. Among the repealed provisions are those concerning the legislative procedures 
on account of extending the legislative procedures provided under the Arts 288 et seq. 
TFEU (i.e. legislative procedures for Union acts) to the Euratom remit, which, as was argued 
in the sections above, is a change of a merely perfunctory nature. 
The fact that the Parliament’s role in the legislative process under the Euratom has 
not matured past consultation actualizes the significance of those Union acts (adopted 
under the TFEU) which regulate particular aspects of the nuclear sector and their potential 
to partially make up for the democratic deficit in the nuclear field184. In this way, the 
increase in the Parliament’s legislative powers under the Union framework offsets 
Euratom’s democratic deficit through the use of Union acts in the adoption of which the 
European Parliament co-legislates with the Council. The Union acts that pertain to the 
nuclear domain are chiefly acts based on the environmental protection provisions of 
Art.192 TFEU (former Art.175 TEC); Such acts pertaining to the nuclear field are: the 
Criminal Penalties Directive185, Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental 
                                                            
183 Art.3 of the Protocol Amending the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, inserting 
the new Art.106a to the Euratom Treaty. 
184 The European Parliament has fostered the possibility of such a cross-over of legal bases. In the Maldeikis 
Report (A6-0129/2007) it notes that ordinary law laid down by the EC Treaty applies to nuclear activities (p.8), 
whereas in the Hökmark Report (A6-0236/2009) it asserts the possibility of directives based on the EC Treaty 
to (also) regulate nuclear installations (p.48 of the report). 
185 Directive 2008/99 on the protection of the environment through criminal law [2008] OJ L328/28 (Criminal 
Penalties Directive); The Criminal Penalties Directive applies inter alia to activities covered by the Euratom 
Treaty and the legislation adopted pursuant thereto (Art.2) where the offences to which it applies include “the 
operation of a plant in which a dangerous activity is carried out or in which dangerous substances or 
preparations are stored or used and which, outside the plant, causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury 
to any person or substantial damage to the quality of air, the quality of soil or the quality of water, or to 
animals or plants” (Art.3); 
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information186, Directive 2003/35 providing public participation in respect of the drawing up of 
certain plans and programmes relating to the environment187, etc.  
In addition, the Union commercial policy provisions can also potentially affect the 
nuclear field. The applicable legislative procedure for the title on the Union commercial 
policy has been amended after Lisbon, namely, the present Art.207 TFEU (ex Art.133 TEC) 
forsees the ordinary legislative procedure. An example of a Union commercial policy act 
relating to the nuclear field is Regulation 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items188 which was adopted on 
the basis of ex-Art.133 TEC which then required a qualified majority in the Council, 
excepting any involvement of the Parliament. 
Regrettably, it would be unrealistic to consider that reliance on the former and 
similar TFEU provisions as legal bases providing for the ordinary legislative procedure can 
mitigate the Euratom democratic deficit in any significant manner, especially since the 
number of such Union acts is highly limited.  
There exists nevertheless another possibility for reduction in the democratic deficit 
to be accomplished through the involvement of national parliaments which according to 
the Lisbon amendments have been enabled to participate in the democratic review of 
legislative proposals. The involement of the national parliaments as democratic actors has 
been forseen in the Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union189 
(annexed to the TEU, TFEU and the Euratom Treaty) complemented by the Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality190 (only annexed to the TEU 
and the TFEU).  The former protocols have enabled Member States’ parliaments to become 
                                                            
186 OJ L 41, 14.2.2003, p. 26–32; The 2003 Access-to-information Directive guarantees the right of access to 
environmental information held by or for public authorities, while the definition of environmental information 
contained in Art.2(b) refers also to “factors, such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including 
radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect 
the elements of the environment”.  
187 Directive 2003/35 providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and 
programmes relating to the environment [2003] OJ L156/17. In addition, the Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 
1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive) OJ L 175, 5.7.1985, p. 40–48 (as amended by the 2003/35/EC 
Directive) applies to nuclear power stations (Art.4(1)) and, in specific cases, environmental impact assessment 
can be conducted with respect to installations for the production or enrichment of nuclear fuels as well as 
installations for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuels (Art.4(2)). The former two directives transpose the 
majority of the Aarhus Convention provisions to which the EU has been a party since May 2005 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/). It is believed there might be some degree of legal uncertainty in 
this regard given that the Aarhus Convention was signed under the auspices of the EC Treaty rather than the 
Euratom Treaty (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/governance_en.htm). A discussion on this point will be 
further developed in Chapter 3, Section I. 
188 Regulation 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and 
transit of dual-use items [2009] OJ L134/1. 
189 Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union [2007] OJ C306/148. 
190 Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality [2007] OJ C306/150; The 
Protocol is annexed only to the TEU and the TFEU. 
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more closely involved in the EU decision-making process as de facto co-legislators. 
According to the protocols, draft legislative acts are forwarded to national parliaments 
which, should they consider it pertinent, can send a reasoned opinion to the Presidents of 
the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on whether a draft legislative 
act complies with the principle of subsidiarity191. Each national parliament is assigned two 
votes so that where the reasoned opinions on a draft legislative act’s non-compliance with 
the principle of subsidiarity represent at least one third of all the votes allocated to national 
parliaments, the draft concerned must be reviewed192. Concerning the acts adopted in the 
ordinary legislative procedure, the threshold for mandatory review is even lower and 
represents a simple majority of the votes allocated to the national parliaments193.  
An important debilitating factor regarding the application of the former Protocol to 
the Euratom field is that neither the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality nor Art. 5 TEU which codifies the former two principles have 
not been foreseen to apply to the Euratom. Conversely, it is manifest that the assessment 
performed in light of the principle of subsidiarity is instrumental to the discharge of the 
newly accorded role of national parliaments in the legislative process under the Protocol on 
the role of national parliaments in the European Union which has been extended to 
Euratom’s purview194. Such a loophole in the parliamentary participatory regime leaves it 
unclear as to how the national parliaments are expected to fully discharge of their roles 
concerning their involvement in the Euratom legislative process in a situation where the 
principle of subsidiarity is de jure inapplicable to the scope of the Euratom Treaty. In spite of 
that, should one take an effet utile approach, the fact that the Protocol on the application of 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality was not foreseen to apply to the Euratom 
does not hinder a per extensiam application of certain of its provisions since Art.3(1) of the 
Protocol on the role of the national parliaments makes direct reference to the provisions of 
the former Protocol which lay down the procedure involving the national parliaments. 
In addition to the foregoing, the Lisbon Treaty attempts to empower the EU citizens 
as active participants in the Union legislative process by laying down the principle of 
representative democracy in Art.10(1) TEU and establishing direct democracy mechanisms 
for the EU citizens such as consultations with interested parties and citizens’ initiatives, 
envisaged in Art.11 TEU. Most importantly, Art.11(4) TEU offers the possibility for at least 
one million citizens of a significant number of Member States to take the initiative of 
inviting the European Commission to submit a proposal on matters where citizens consider 
                                                            
191 Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Arts. 4,5. 
192 Idem, Art.7(1) and (2). 
193 Idem, Art.7(3). 
194 Art.3 of the Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the EU: 
“National Parliaments may send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission a reasoned opinion on whether a draft legislative act complies with the principle of subsidiarity, 
in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality.(…)” [Emphasis added.]; 
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that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. These 
enabling democracy mechanisms for European citizens, unfortunately, have no impact on 
the Euratom regime since Art.11 TEU has not been extended to the field of application of 
the Euratom Treaty. In legitimacy terms, this is a serious shortcoming which cannot be 
compensated by simply employing an extensive interpretation of the relevant TFEU 
provisions. That being said, notwithstanding the great potential of these democratic 
mechanisms, it ultimately devolves on the authority of the Commission as the initiator of 
Union legislation to give full effect to Art.11(4) TEU by deciding, on its own discretion, 
whether a citizens’ initiative will eventually be materialized in a legislative proposal or 
not195.  
Having escaped the Lisbon democratic reform, the Euratom Community remains 
sheltered from any satisfactory level of scrutiny and supervision from the European 
Parliament, the national parliaments and the EU citizens with the Euratom Treaty 
preserving its reputation of an ‘undemocratic treaty’. Even if one uses European 
Parliament’s lack of legitimacy to downplay the striking democratic deficit within the 
Euratom system (especially in view of the argument as to whether the European Parliament 
indeed effectively voices the needs of European citizens), the fact remains that the 
Parliament is still the most democratic of all the Union institutions196. Moreover, it is 
plausibly the nature and composition of the Parliament that hinder it from having any 
greater bite on the decision-making in the nuclear realm. Being composed of directly 
elected and independent representatives of the peoples of the Member States, the 
Parliament truly represents an ‘invention’ from the perspective of nuclear decision-making 
since it does not have a counterpart in any other international and regional nuclear energy 
organization such as the IAEA, the OECD NEA, etc. as the former organizations do not 
possess deliberative bodies formed by directly elected independent representatives197. 
Furthermore, it seems to be a common feature inherited from the national systems that the 
nuclear domain is typically less stringently supervised by national parliaments on account 
of different national security considerations198. 
Effectively, there exists a persistent discrepancy between the decision-making 
patterns set out under the Union framework and the Euratom framework which has 
become increasingly pronounced in recent years with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty 
which democratized the decision-making procedures within the Union framework, leaving 
                                                            
195 See, B. Kohler-Koch and B. Rittberger, Charting Crowded Territory: Debating the Democratic Legitimacy 
of The European Union, in, Giorgi, Von Homeyer and Parsons (eds.), Democracy in The European Union: 
Towards the Emergence of a Public Sphere, Routledge, 2006, p.11. 
196 This argument actually goes both ways since, according to some authors, there is the option that the 
overcoming of the democratic deficit should presumably be followed by a reduction of the legitimacy deficit 
(J. Crowley and L. Giorgi, The Political Sociology of the European Public Sphere in, Giorgi, Von Homeyer and 
Parsons (eds.), Democracy in The European Union: Towards the Emergence of a Public Sphere, Routledge, 2006, 
p.1.). 
197 Hahn, supra n.112, in ft. 33 on p.30.  
198 Idem. 
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the Euratom decision-making almost untouched. In this sense, as was shown supra, the 
expansion of the legislative powers of the European Parliament under the Union structure 
has failed to be been matched by a corresponding reform within the Euratom compact. 
Therefore, in the presence of limited institutional reforms extended to the Euratom 
Community via the Lisbon Treaty, it is difficult to speak of an accomplished balance of 
institutional powers under the Euratom Treaty. The Parliament has maintained its fairly 
marginal role in Euratom’s decision-making procedures and disposes of mutatis mutandis 
the same ‘embryonic’ prerogatives199 ever since the Euratom Treaty was adopted whereas 
the Council, as an equally important legislative organ, does not dispose of the full legislative 
powers it has been endowed with under the Union framework. The former is a startling 
indication of a fractured institutional balance within the Euratom system where the main 
institutional weight is carried by one single institution (the Commission) which possesses an 
extensive array of executive, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial prerogatives, leaving much 
to be desired in both democracy and legitimacy terms. 
 
 
III.3 The Court of Justice of the EU - the ‘enabler’ of Euratom’s competence  
 
 
The judicial control over the Euratom compact is exercized by the Court of Justice of 
the EU, which from the very creation of the three Communties has been perceived as the 
strongest integrating factor of these Communities200 on account of its undisputed 
prerogative to review the work of the institutions and ensure a correct and effective 
interpretation and application of Euratom and European Union law both by the institutions 
and the Member States. In terms of the nature and scope of its powers, within the Euratom 
Community the CJEU can be seen as the most non-controversial institution in comparison 
to the often frowned upon ‘technocratic’ Commission and meagerly potent Parliament. The 
Court’s tendency to frequently apply a broad interpretation to the Euratom Treaty 
provisions has even gone as far as being described as an exercise of “breathing (…) new life 
into the moribund Euratom Treaty”201. 
 
 
The judgments of the Court have served to reinforce Euratom’s legal and political 
regime mainly in two ways: 1) by confirming or clarifying an already existent Euratom 
competence or, 2) by employing an extensive interpretation of the Euratom Treaty which 
practically leads to enlargement of the Euratom Treaty’s scope of application. The latter is 
                                                            
199 Idem, p.31. Although this observation dates as far back as 1958, it still stands valid today. 
200 Idem, p.31. 
201J. Woodliffe, Making Sense of Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, European Law Review, 1989, Vol 14 Issue 2, 
p.101. 
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what authors call a ‘spill-over’ of Euratom provisions to fields which are not covered by the 
Euratom Treaty which corresponds to the neo-functionalist approach employed with 
regard to the legal and institutional dynamic of the Euratom Community202. In fact, the two 
key assumptions of a law-based neo-functionalism that are presumed to trigger a spill-over 
effect of Euratom regulation to other (Union) fields/policies are the i) sub-national actors 
trying to overcome national law in order to pursue their interests by means of the 
preliminary reference proceedings before the CJEU, and the ii) political dynamics which is 
the consequence to a general strategy of the Commission to widen the scope of the 
Euratom which has been manifested, for the most part, in the infringement actions against 
Member States initiated by the former203. The spill-over of Euratom measures to 
neighboring policies is justified by functional reasons204 so that by allowing for such a spill 
over to occur the CJEU is effectively extending the competences of the Euratom, 
irrespective of whether such an extension has previously been occurring via facti and is 
subsequently merely acknowledged by the Court or, alternatively, is an extension that 
stems directly from the Court’s reasoning (i.e. an exercise of ‘deliberative 
supranationalism’).  
 
Following is an analysis of several CJEU judgments which have produced a powerful 
spill-over effect of the kind referred to supra, having both served to enable and reinforce 
Euratom’s competences. These ‘Euratom-empowering’ judgments majorly concern the 
Euratom’s policy on the health and safety of workers and the general public as a 
competence exercised internally and safeguarded externally i.e. through the Community’s 
involvement in the international sphere.   
 
III.3.1 Ruling 1/78 
 
In Ruling 1/78205 the CJEU was requested to examine the necessity for the Euratom 
Community to participate in the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material 
alongside its Member States in the light of Art. 103 Euratom206. Having noted that the draft 
Convention concerns in various ways matters which fell within the purview of the Euratom 
                                                            
202 For an elaborate account of how the neo-functionalist approach can be applied to the Euratom scope, see, 
Wolf, supra n.78. 
203 Idem, p.3. 
204 Idem, p.8. 
205 Ruling 1/78, ECR 1978 p. 02151. 
206 Council Decision of 9 June 1980 approving the conclusion by the Commission of the International 
Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material (80/565/Euratom, OJ L149 1980 p.41). The adoption 
of the new Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities was followed by the 
adoption of Council Decision 2007/513/Euratom of 10 July 2007 approving the accession of the European 
Atomic Energy Community to the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and 
Nuclear Facilities (OJ L 190, 21.7.2007, p. 12–14). 
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treaty207, the Court considered that the field of application of the Convention and that of 
the Treaty overlap, both covering the same type of materials and nuclear facilities208. In 
order to examine whether the absence of the Community as a party to the Convention 
would potentially hinder the application of the Euratom Treaty, it examined the relevant 
chapters of the Treaty (the Supply arrangements, the Nuclear common market, the 
Safeguards and the Property Ownership of the Community) concluding that the Euratom 
Community had exclusive jurisdiction over the domain of nuclear supplies along with a 
general responsibility for the proper functioning of the nuclear common market209.  Hence, 
it was held that those Convention obligations corresponding to the former field were to be 
applied by the Member States in conjunction with the participation of the Community210. 
With respect to Euratom’s competence in the area of safeguards which was not as clear-
cut, an exercise of ‘extension’ was performed by the Court which inferred that the actual 
and potential dangers the draft Convention aimed to counter were not as pressing for the 
negotiators and to the general public at the time when the Euratom Treaty was drawn up 
and implemented211 so that the exclusion of the Euratom Community from the draft 
Convention in this respect would have an impeding effect and would compromise the 
subsequent development of the Euratom safeguards system to its full scope212. Moreover, 
it was considered that the exclusion of the Community from participation in the Convention 
would detrimentally affect the powers conferred on it by the Treaty regarding supply and 
the nuclear common market, its right of ownership and the safeguards responsibilities213. 
In addition, the Court called on the duty of Member States to take all appropriate 
measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations that arise from the Euratom Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Euratom Community, prescribed in 
Art.192 Euratom214. The former corresponds to the duty of cooperation between the 
institutions and the Member States in the field covered by the Treaty implying that 
individual or collective action by Member States excluding the Community would 
undermine some of the essential functions of the Community and detrimentally affect the 
latter’s independent action in external relations215. Therefore, the draft Convention could 
only be adequately implemented through a close association between the institutions and 
the Member States in the process of negotiation, conclusion and implementation of the 
Convention216 given that the subject matter of the agreement fell partly within the power 
and jurisdiction and partly within that of the Member States217. Furthermore, the Court 
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sided with Commission’s claim that it was not necessary to determine in advance, 
regarding other parties to the Convention, the division of powers between the Community 
and the Member States being that the former may change in the course of time218.  
 Apart from clarifying the external competence of the Euratom in terms of the 
subject matter of the Convention, from a purely technical standpoint the CJEU ruling 
elucidates the deficiencies of the Art.103 Euratom procedure for obtaining the CJEU’s 
opinion from the CJEU on the compatibility of an envisaged agreement with the Euratom 
Treaty which, especially in comparison to the corresponding Art.218 TFEU (then, Art.228 
TEC) does not seem tenable. The judgment leaves the option open for the Euratom’s 
Community competence in the matter covered by the Convention to grow as a result of the 
former’s participation thereto and the fact that the Convention was to be regarded as an 
integral part of the Euratom Community legal order219. Undisputedly, the judgment can be 
considered as an example of extending the ‘field for mainoeuvre’ for Euratom’s external 
relations achieved through judicial means, revealing an evolutive approach exhibited on the 
part of the CJEU. 
 
 
III.3.2 Commission v Council (Nuclear Safety Convention)  
 
The Nuclear Safety Convention case220 is another case arising in the context of 
Euratom’s external competence in the field of nuclear safety where the Commission had 
requested the partial annulment of the Council Decision of 7 December 1998 approving the 
accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Nuclear Safety Convention, 
claiming that the ‘Declaration of competence’ which was part of the contested decision was 
incomplete in that it failed to enlist all the existent Euratom competences in the fields 
covered by the Convention221. The judgment displays CJEU’s deferential attitude towards a 
broad interpretation of Euratom’s competences and evidences a spill-over to fields that the 
Euratom Treaty does not (at least, nominally) cover but which are functionally and 
imminently linked to its scope of application.  
The safety of nuclear installations (nuclear safety) was formerly considered as 
inherent Member State competence as opposed to the safety of nuclear materials 
(radiation protection) which falls under the objectives set out in Article 2 of the Euratom 
Treaty and thus comes within the purview of Euratom’s competence. The Court was asked 
to determine the scope of Euratom’s competence as a signatory party to the Nuclear Safety 
                                                            
218 Para.35. 
219 J. A. Usher, International Competence of Euratom (Comment on Ruling 1/78 of November 14, 1978), 
European Law Review, 1979, Vol 4, p.306. 
220 C-29/99 Commission v Council [2002] ECR I-1122. 
221 Para.57. 
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Convention in the areas covered by the Convention, where in the absence of a specific title 
in the Euratom Treaty particular to the safety of nuclear installations the Court embarked 
on an interpretation of the health and safety provisions of Chapter 3 of the Treaty222. It 
pointed out that the protection of the health of workers and of the general public could not 
be achieved without controlling the sources of harmful radiation223 to the effect that the 
interpretation of the former provisions required that the Euratom Treaty’s preambular 
objective to “create the conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and 
health of the public” is duly taken into account224. Concurring with Advocate General  
Jacobs’ Opinion, the Court observed that there existed a significant overlap between the 
fields of radiation protection as a health protection objective of the Treaty, on the one 
hand, and the safety of nuclear installations, on the other, which warranted an extensive 
approach towards establishing Euratom’s competence in the latter field which would 
supersede the artificial distinction between protection of the health of the general public 
and the safety of the sources of ionizing radiation225. The Court went further than what was 
suggested by AG Jacobs and decided that the ‘Declaration of competence’ should have 
included not only Article 17 of the Convention that concerns the siting of nuclear 
installations, but additionally, Articles 18 and 19 concerning the design, construction and 
operation of nuclear installations. Thus, manifestly, the Court broadened Euratom’s 
regulatory competence to the field of technological aspects of nuclear safety, supported by 
the argument that there was no clear dividing line between nuclear safety in purely 
technological terms and general nuclear safety226. 
It is important to note that the Court reached the former conclusion without 
previously relying on any contemporary scientific developments in order to corroborate its 
broad and dynamic construction of the Treaty provisions which, according to 
commentators, in view of the technical nature of the subject matter would have been a 
more adequate route to take in order for the ‘effet utile’ approach to be better 
substantiated227.  
The Opinion of AG Jacobs in the case is further instructive in that it offers important 
directions as to the methodology to be applied in interpreting those provisions of the 
Euratom Treaty that have not been updated. Namely, with respect to the health and safety 
provisions of the Treaty it was suggested that the former are interpreted in the light of 
subsequent practice and, particularly, Euratom’s Basic Safety Standards Directive of 
1996228. Such ‘interpretation in the light subsequent practice’ is to be employed regarding 
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provisions drafted long ago, which have not been amended since and where there “is a 
common and consistent practice of all actors entitled to interpret, apply or modify the rules 
in question”229. AG Jacobs considers the Health and safety, Supplies and Safeguards 
chapters of the Treaty as most appropriate to be subjected to the former method of 
interpretation since, on their own these provisions could not be pertinently interpreted and 
understood without relying on the practice in their application230. 
By producing a clear spill-over effect, the Nuclear Safety Convention judgment 
unequivocally confirms that Euratom’s external competence can arise in the presence of an 
internal Euratom rule which prescribes minimum or less detailed/less concrete Euratom 
Community prerogatives in a particular field231. This goes beyond the famous ERTA 
doctrine where the Court derived the European Community’s external competence in the 
field of road transport from the existence of already clearly prescribed Community internal 
rules232.   
 
III.3.3 Land de Sarre and others v Ministre de l'Industrie (Cattenom) 
 
The two cases that follow have had a more modest impact in comparison to the 
former two. Namely in the Cattenom233 and Chernobyl II234 cases the CJEU, by way of a 
functional i.e. effet utile interpretation has helped circumscribe an already foreseen 
competence for the Euratom which however neither resulted nor was intended to result in 
further expansion of the scope of Euratom’s competence.  
The Cattenom case concerned the validity of French inter-ministerial orders 
authorizing the disposal of liquid and gaseous radioactive waste from the Cattenom nuclear 
power-station in France, the Court being seized with interpreting the scope of Art.37 
                                                            
229 Para.148. 
230 Para.149. 
231 Koutrakos, supra n.226, p.203. 
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05013. 
234 C-70/88 European Parliament v Council of the European Communities ECR 1991 Page I-04529. 
57 
 
Euratom requirement for Member States to provide the Commission with general data 
relating to plans for the disposal of radioactive waste allowing the latter to determine 
whether the implementation of such plans would be liable to result in the radioactive 
contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State. The issue was to 
ascertain the exact point in time when the data is to be supplied to the Commission: 
whether it should be done before any disposal of waste is actually effected (regardless of 
whether such disposal may have been authorized by national authorities before the 
Commission had been notified)235, or, whether the data is to be provided prior to the 
authorization of such disposal by the competent national authorities. The Court noted that 
the Commission possesses powers of considerable scope under the Health and Safety 
Chapter of the Euratom Treaty236 so that its contribution in the application of Art.37 
Euratom was of great importance to the Member State concerned on account of “the 
Commission's unique overview of developments in the nuclear power industry throughout 
the territory of the Community”237. It was indispensable that for Art.37 Euratom to attain its 
full effectiveness, the former was to be interpreted to the effect that Member States 
carried the obligation to provide the Commission with general data relating to a plan for 
the disposal of radioactive waste before238 definitive authorization for such disposal was 
granted by the competent national authorities of the Member State239.  
 
III.3.4 Chernobyl II 
While the previous judgment aimed to delineate the Commission’s prerogatives in a 
particular area, the Chernobyl II240 case examines the choice of the correct legal basis for an 
act adopted under the Euratom Treaty and the scope of the Parliament’s prerogatives 
pertinent to the adoption thereof. Namely, the Parliament had requested the annulment of 
Regulation (Euratom) No 3954/87 laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive 
contamination of foodstuffs and of feedingstuffs following a nuclear accident or any other 
case of radiological emergency which was adopted on the basis of Art.31 Euratom which lays 
down the procedure for the adoption by the Council of basic standards for the protection of 
the health of workers and the general public against the dangers caused by ionizing 
radiation, under which the Parliament is merely consulted. The regulation prohibits the 
placing on the market of foodstuffs and feedingstuffs which own a level of contamination 
exceeding the maximum permitted levels that have been set out in a measure adopted in 
accordance with the provisions of the Regulation241. Since the Parliament claimed that 
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Art.31 was the wrong legal basis the Court examined the purpose of the Regulation in the 
light of its aim and content which was to protect the population against the dangers arising 
from foodstuffs and feedingstuffs that have been subjected to radioactive 
contamination242. In this sense, the Regulation clearly did not represent a harmonization 
measure as the Parliament had indicated since the effect of the Regulation on the 
harmonization of the conditions for free movement of goods within the Community was 
only incidental and merely served to ensure the effectiveness of the maximum permitted 
levels243.  
The Court refused to take a restrictive stance in its response to the Parliament’s 
contention that Article 30 et seq. of the Euratom Treaty failed to apply to ‘secondary’ 
radiation (radiation emanating from contaminated products) and thus only concerned the 
protection of persons directly involved in the nuclear industry244. A fortiori, it held that the 
purpose of the former articles was to ensure a consistent and effective protection of the 
health of the general public against the dangers of ionizing radiations, regardless of their 
source and regardless of the categories of persons exposed to those radiations245. 
 
 
III.3.5 Commission v Ireland (MOX Plant) 
 
The last two cases to be covered in this section are the MOX Plant246 and the 
Temelin247 cases as representative of a type of CJEU cases where what was accomplished 
was an affirmation of a de facto extension of Euratom’s competences accompanied by a 
strong empowerment of both Euratom’s/Union’s internal legal order by way of establishing 
a particular external competence for the Community/Union. Both of these cases related to 
disputes that had (intentionally or not) ‘strayed’ from the Union legal order sensu lato 
risking for the application of pertinent Euratom/Union rules to be circumvented. More 
specifically, in the Temelin case, the national court referring the case considered the dispute 
to fall under the scope of the TFEU (then, TEC) and, consequently, the questions it had put 
out to the CJEU solely concerned the application of the former Treaty. In the MOX case, on 
the other hand, Ireland had initially brought before a foreign (non-EU) judicial forum a 
dispute which essentially fell within the Union’s jurisdiction. 
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The Commission in the MOX case alleged that by having instituted dispute-
settlement proceedings against the United Kingdom under the auspices of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concerning the operation of the MOX 
nuclear power plant located at Sellafield, Ireland had breached its obligations under Arts.10 
TEC (now Art.4(3) TEU; the duty of cooperation of Member States,) and Art.292 EC (now 
Art.344 TFEU)248. Pursuant to the former provisions, Member States undertake not to 
submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the TFEU to any method of 
settlement other than those provided for therein. The former two articles have been 
mirrored in Arts.192 and 193 Euratom249.  
The disputed claim Ireland had lodged before the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal was not 
confined to the immediate consequences arising from the operation MOX plant and 
covered the totality of the effects arising from the establishment and operation of the MOX 
plant250. Ireland held that the UNCLOS imposed on the United Kingdom obligations 
concerning the protection of the marine environment, the prevention and control of 
pollution and co-operation between the two States, and demanded that the Tribunal 
decide on appropriate remedies against the United Kingdom251. The Commission insisted 
that the fact that Ireland had submitted the matter to a jurisdiction other than that of the 
Union constituted a failure to respect the exclusive jurisdiction the CJEU enjoyed under to 
Art.292 EC (now, 344 TFEU) which was to rule on any dispute concerning the interpretation 
and application of Union law252. It was alleged that Ireland had breached Arts. 292 EC and 
193 EA by referring to an arbitral tribunal a dispute which necessitates interpretation and 
application of measures of Community law for its resolution253. Furthermore, Ireland was 
considered to have allegedly breached the duty of cooperation devolving on Member 
States (under ex-Art.10 EC (now Art.4 (3) TEU) and Art.192 Euratom) by exercising a 
competence that originally belongs to the Community and by omitting to inform or consult 
with the competent Union institutions prior to taking such a step254. 
                                                            
248 The legal saga surrounding the operation of the Sellafield MOX plant will also be examined from the 
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The CJEU brought the dispute between Ireland and the UK fully within the scope of 
the EU legal order by stating inter alia that the (former) Directive 80/836/Euratom laying 
down the basic safety standards for the health protection of the general public and workers 
against the dangers of ionizing radiation255 was applicable to the issue of the radioactive 
discharge from the Mox plant into the marine environment of the Irish Sea256 whereas UK’s 
refusal to provide Ireland with certain types of information was to be considered as coming 
within the scope of (former) Directive 90/313/EEC of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to 
information on the environment257. 
Regarding the choice of the appropriate dispute settlement mechanism, the Court 
unequivocally held that in spite of the available procedures for the resolution of disputes 
pursuant to Art.282 of the UNCLOS, it was nevertheless the system for the resolution of 
disputes established under the EC (TFEU) Treaty that must take precedence258. The Court 
considered the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS (a mixed international agreement) as 
belonging to the scope of Community competence as competence that the Community has 
exercised by acceding to the UNCLOS, thus making the former provisions an integral part 
of the Community legal order259. Therefore, the dispute in the Mox case was considered as 
pertaining to the interpretation or application of the EC (TFEU) Treaty according to the 
terms of Article 292 EC260 whereby the institution of proceedings before the Arbitral 
Tribunal carried a manifest risk for EU’s established jurisdictional order and the autonomy 
of the Union’s legal system to be potentially adversely affected261.   
As regards Ireland’s failure to respect the duty of cooperation by bringing 
proceedings unilaterally, without having informed and consulted the Community 
institutions beforehand, the Court reiterated the Member States’ obligation of close 
cooperation with the Union institutions primarily since the subject matter of the UNCLOS 
as a mixed agreement related to a field (protection and preservation of the marine 
environment) where the respective areas of competence of the Community and the 
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Member States could potentially overlap262 so that submission of the dispute to an external 
judicial forum entailed the risk that the former forum could become competent to rule or at 
least attempt to rule on the scope of the obligations carried by Member States under 
Community law263.  
The practical implications of the judgment go beyond strictly the Euratom scope, 
confirming the exclusive character of the CJEU’s jurisdiction regarding mixed international 
agreements that have become part of Union law and reinforcing the autonomy and 
coherence of the Union legal order264. The former completely removes any possibility for an 
external, non-EU jurisdiction to offer a more specialized grasp on a particular issue and thus 
be better suited to apply the relevant international legal rules265. With this judgment, the 
CJEU has permanently curtailed the possibility for international judicial fora to settle 
disputes which concern the Union Treaties’ scope of application thus preventing the 
Member States from instituting proceedings outside of the Union jurisdiction in this way, 
or, otherwise, be brought before the CJEU for incompliance266. Hereinafter, a Member 
State which brings a case against another Member State under an international public law 
dispute settlement system relating to the provisions of an international agreement within 
EU competence would be considered as acting in direct breach of its Union law 
obligations267. 
 
III.3.6 The Temelín case 
Another remarkable case is Temelín which is to be regarded as a typical ‘spill-over’ 
case on many fronts. It concerned the official authorisations for the construction and 
operation of the Czech nuclear power plant Temelín located near the Austrian border268 
where the Land Oberösterreich and other private owners had brought actions under the 
Austrian Civil Code requesting that an order is adopted to terminate the actual and 
potential nuisance relating to the ionizing radiation emanating from the Czech nuclear 
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power plant269. More particularly, according to the Austrian Civil Code an undertaking in 
possession of the necessary official authorisations for operating a nuclear power plant 
situated in the territory of another Member State (in the case in point, the Czech Republic) 
is liable to be the subject of an action for an injunction to prevent an actual or potential 
nuisance to neighbouring property emanating from that installation270.  Conversely, 
undertakings that have their industrial installation situated in the Member State where the 
action for injunction is brought and are in possession of an official authorisation may not be 
the subject of such an action and are only liable to be the subject of a claim for damages for 
harm caused to a neighbouring property271. Thus, the Austrian rules in question effectively 
established a prima faciae difference in treatment based on the national territory where the 
power generating installations have been set up.  
Although the questions referred from the national court related to issues arising 
under the EC Treaty and requested the interpretation of EC Treaty provisions which the 
national court presumed to be applicable to the case, the CJEU nevertheless decided to put 
the matter completely within the purview of the Euratom Treaty. It was insisted by the 
Commission that the case concerned the application of the principle of non-discrimination 
espoused in Art.18 TFEU (ex-Art.12 EC)272 which was equally considered applicable to the 
Euratom Treaty and thus making the difference in treatment arising under the application 
of the Austrian legislation impossible to justify273. Given that the Euratom Treaty does not 
contain a general non-discrimination clause corresponding to that of the TFEU, the CJEU 
decided to extend the scope of application of the principle of prohibition of discrimination 
as a general principle of Union law to the purview of the Euratom Treaty274, considering it 
to be unsuitable both to the purpose and the consistency of the treaties to allow 
discrimination on grounds of nationality which is prohibited under the TFEU to be tolerated 
within the purview of the Euratom Treaty275.   
Acknowledging that the Euratom Treaty does not contain a title on the safety of 
nuclear installations, the Court drew on its crucial pronouncement in the Nuclear Safety 
Convention case indicating that in defining the Euratom’s competences it would be 
inappropriate to uphold an artificial distinction between the protection of the health of the 
general public and the safety of sources of ionising radiation276. The Court opined that the 
granting of official authorisations for the construction and operation of nuclear 
installations, to the extent that it relates to health protection against the dangers of 
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ionising radiations for the general public, is to be considered as coming within the scope of 
application of the Euratom Treaty277. After establishing the existence of a difference in 
treatment, the Court sought to find a legitimate justification for such a difference in the 
form of objective consideration irrespective of nationality which is proportionate to the 
legitimately pursued objective278. In order to examine the justifications relating to health 
protection that lie behind the difference in treatment between the official authorisations 
granted to industrial installations situated in Austria and those granted regarding nuclear 
power plants situated in another Member State, the Court looked at the basic safety 
standards laid out in Chapter 3 of the Euratom Treaty and the related secondary legislation 
which has been amended in line with scientific developments in the field of radiation 
protection279 . It was noted that the applicable health and safety protection regime under 
the Euratom was not restricted to establishing basic standards, but additionally included 
important compliance and monitoring mechanisms supplementing the basic standards280. 
Furthermore, the Commission and the Council were, in line with their respective tasks, 
closely involved in the nuclear safety evaluation of the Temelín plant, having issued safety 
reports and opinions which concluded in the affirmative i.e. that the checks carried out 
under the health and safety requirements of the Euratom Treaty indicated a satisfactory 
level of nuclear safety, compliant with the relevant Euratom legislation281. 
The judgment confirmed that the Member States have a comprehensive system of 
legal remedies at their disposal to curb any arising deficiency in the Euratom health and 
safety protection system282, indicating that the level of protection provided under the 
former system was satisfactory and discounting any possibility for a difference in treatment 
such as that foreseen by the Austrian legislation that could be regarded as necessary for the 
purposes of health protection and that could be considered as fulfilling the proportionality 
requirement283. 
Temelín is a spill-over case which contributes to the strengthening of Euratom’s 
nuclear safety regime by prioritizing Euratom Community’s authority in the field of nuclear 
safety over particular Member States’ nuclear safety policies, even in cases occurring in 
Member States such as Austria284 which is a country with a strong national anti-nuclear 
sentiment where nuclear energy policy is a highly sensitive and delicate political issue285. 
The judgment conveys the message that Member States’ unilateral measures that 
undermine the established Euratom nuclear safety regime (especially those of a 
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discriminatory nature) should be outright dismissed. Consequently, nuclear activities 
carried out in the territory of a Member State that meet the requirements of Euratom 
legislation and satisfy the Commission’s scrutiny cannot be subject to national 
discriminatory measures of other Member States286. Aside from reinforcing Euratom’s 
position in the field of nuclear safety287, the judgment will presumably also have an impact 
on the relationship between the Euratom Community and the Member States, highlighting 
the extensive prerogatives of the Commission and making it more difficult for Member 
States to question its authority288. 
 
The cases in the present section have evidenced the spill-over effect produced by 
CJEU’s case law mainly concerning the scope of Euratom’s competence in the fields of 
radiation protection and nuclear safety. The foregoing analysis has shown that such spill-
0ver fostered by the CJEU is largely initiated by the Commission (via the infringement 
procedure) or the subnational actors appearing before the Court (via the preliminary 
reference procedure). Nevertheless, the Commission’s stake in the spill-over process is 
much more substantial than that of subnational actors mostly due to the rather modest 
number of influential actors at the national level involved in the nuclear field (nuclear 
operators, concerned individuals) and, generally speaking, the limited knowledge on 
Euratom law and the workings of the Euratom as a community289. On its own part, the 
CJEU appears to be selective of the potential spill-over possibilities it creates and is 
generally more inclined towards allowing a spill-over in cases that involve the basic 
principles of the Union legal order, the Union’s scope of competence in a particular policy 
field, or, cases that implicate its own prerogatives as a judicial organ290. Notwithstanding 
the CJEU’s decisive role in the spill-over process, there will equally be instances where an 
activist CJEU judgment will not materialize in an actual spill-over due to lack of agreement 
among Member States on the particular Euratom measures to be taken to achieve the spill-
over effect291.  
 
 
IV The dynamics of treaty modification: To assimilate or not? 
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The objective of the foregoing discussion was to offer a more general and basic 
insight into the nature and the workings of the Euratom Community as a separate entity 
existing under the hat of the Union. Such a discussion would prove incompete should it 
omit to cover the issue of the future of the Euratom and the planned alternatives 
elaborated with relation thereto. In the past decade, commentary on the future of the 
European Atomic Energy Community has ranged from calls urging its revision to pleas for 
its abolition, making the ratio essendi of the Euratom Treaty somewhat questionable, with 
as many foes as friends on its side. Many of the foes tend to point to the highly technocratic 
character of its provisions as one of the reasons why the Euratom Community has 
traditionally been kept at the outskirts of the EU’s legal and political framework, however 
questionable this argument might be in terms of justifying the ‘renegade’ status that the 
Euratom Treaty enjoys in relation to the other founding treaties of the Union. One of the 
peculiar features of this Treaty is that it has withheld the test of time, since its present text 
(save for several non-substantial changes)292 has essentially remained the same since its 
adoption in 1957 which is a far cry from the destiny that lay in wait for the EAEC’s sibling, 
the European (Economic) Community. 
The calls for a reform of the Euratom Treaty coming from the EU institutions,293 the 
Member States294 and the non-governmental sector295 as well as the academic 
community296, became increasingly loud throughout the Union “reform period” from 2001-
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2007 which had been marked by the drafting of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe (the Constitutional Treaty) in 2004 which subsequently failed to be ratified by all the 
Member States thereupon followed by the signature of the reformatory Lisbon Treaty in 
2007. With regard to the possibility for a Treaty reform, all of the former commonly 
consider the urgent need to add more democratic flesh to the Euratom construct in the 
direction of increasing the European Parliament’s involvement in the decision-making 
process297. Although the Lisbon treaty’s reformatory sweep did not significantly affect the 
Euratom Treaty and preserved the singular legal status of the Euratom Community, it 
would be appropriate to look at the possible ways in which the destiny of the Euratom 
Treaty will develop in the future in view of the still very topical character of the issue. 
 
The reasons indicated in the pleas for imminent Treaty reform have been mostly 
centered on the out-datedness of certain Treaty provisions, the potentially distortive and 
unbalancing effect of the Treaty provisions both upon the Union’s common market and the 
Union’s competition rules coupled with the perennial lack of consensus among Member 
States regarding nuclear energy use especially in light of certain Member States 
governments’ decisions to completely de-nuclearise (Austria) or phase-out nuclear energy 
in the foreseeable future (Germany).  
The proposals for a future Euratom Treaty reform have mainly revolved around 
three avenues. The first avenue concerns a revision intended to update the Treaty whereby 
its integrity and singular legal status would be maintained (to be accomplished by relying 
on the flexibility clause of Art.203 Euratom, the Art.48 TEU treaty revision procedure , or, 
by utilizing the relevant rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties298). The 
second avenue is represented by the option to repeal the Treaty, deleting the outdated 
provisions or those which duplicate the corresponding TFEU provisions, and incorporate 
the remainder of the Euratom Treaty provisions into the TFEU either in a separate chapter 
or into the existent ‘Energy’ chapter. Consequently to the former, the Euratom Community 
will be extinguished and its legal personality relinquished. The third option is the most 
radical of the three and suggests the abolishment of the Treaty and all of its provisions in 
their entirety  - a scenario most fervently advocated by the European anti-nuclear lobby 
                                                            
297 For example, the Maldeikis Report demanded an upgrade of the decision-making procedures under the 
Euratom Treaty, enabling the Parliament to be more closely involved thus allowing for greater transparency 
and involvement of the Union citizens. The Council and the Commission were called upon to address the 
“democratic deficit inherent in the Euratom Treaty” (point 43) whereby Art.203 Euratom was suggested as 
the legal basis for treaty reform (point 44). On the strengthening of the democratic legitimacy of the 
Euratom, see also, Contribution by Mr. Hannes Farnleitner, Mr. Caspar Einem and Mr.Reinhard E. Bösch, 
members of the Convention for the future of Europe: "A single legal personality - On the future of Euratom", 
CONV 358/02, p.4,5; 
298 See the transcript from the presentation “The Legal Perspective: The Euratom treaty and the new 
Constitution” by Dörte Fouquet, attorney from the European Renewable Energies Association, prepared for 
the conference titled “The Euratom Treaty and Future Energy Options: Conditions for a Level Playing Field in 
the Energy Sector”, organized by Friends of the Earth-Denmark, The Danish Ecological Council and The 
Danish Organisation for Sustainable Energy (http://www.energyintelligenceforeurope.dk/conf_p6.html). 
67 
 
represented by the ‘green’ political parties and the anti-nuclear NGOs who believe the 
Euratom Treaty to be an obsolete treaty that does not reflect the nuclear reality in the EU 
and propose that the current EU nuclear policy should be brought back to the national field 
and thus become re-nationalized. 
 
IV.1 The flexibility clause of the Euratom Treaty (Art.203) as a feasible 
procedural option  
 
The use of the flexibility clause of Art.203 Euratom was suggested by the Parliament 
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy in the Maldeikis Report as the means 
pertinent to make any necessary adjustments to the text of the Euratom Treaty299. 
Pursuant to Art.203 Euratom (analogous to Art.352 TFEU), if action by the Community 
proves necessary for the attainment of the objectives of the Community while in the 
absence of necessary powers provided by the Treaty, the Council is entitled to take the 
appropriate measures300. The former Committee considered that the option of deleting 
certain Treaty chapters or that of merging certain treaty provisions into the TFEU would 
“unbalance the Euratom Treaty as a whole by weakening supervision of nuclear energy use 
in Europe”301. It held that in the decades of its existence the Treaty has demonstrated the 
usefulness of its provisions and merging certain of its provisions into an ‘Energy’ chapter in 
the TFEU Treaty would undermine the legal supervision over nuclear energy in Europe and 
obliterate the existent specific nuclear control procedures established under the Treaty302. 
However, the Committee did require a comprehensive revision of the Treaty as one that 
would amend the democratic deficit and reinforce the safety and security framework of 
nuclear activities of the EU and the Member States303. In the Opinion of the Parliament 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs addressed to the Committee on Industry, Research 
and Energy which has been attached to the Maldeikis Report304 the former Committee 
expressed the need for the convening of an intergovernmental conference in order for a 
comprehensive revision to be accomplished by repealing of the outdated Treaty provisions 
and revision of the remaining provisions in the light of a sustainable energy policy which 
would subsequently be incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty, in a separate energy 
                                                            
299 Point 30. 
300 Art.203 Euratom: “If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain one of the objectives of the 
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate 
measures”. 
301 Point 39. 
302 Point 40. 
303 Point 43. 
304 Opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament (included in the Report on 
Assessing Euratom - 50 Years of European Nuclear Energy Policy (Maldeikis Report) A6-0129/2007 final) 
(2006/2230(INI)), Draftsman: Johannes Voggenhuber; 
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chapter305 . There is a noticeable inconsistency in approach between the two Committees 
as to the destiny of the Euratom Treaty – the Industry, Research and Energy Committee 
being inclined towards safeguarding the integrity of the Euratom Treaty and the Euratom 
Community and the Constitutional Affairs Committee being in favor for the nuclear policy 
established under the Euratom Treaty to be assimilated into the wider scope of the Union’s 
energy policy. Manifestly, there is a clear division in perceptions within the European 
Parliament concerning the future of the Euratom Treaty. Nevertheless, what is certain is 
that there does not exist any important political majority within the European Parliament 
that is against nuclear power and requires a complete abolishment of the Euratom Treaty, 
provided that the ‘Greens’ are the only political group in the Parliament that opposes 
nuclear energy use in a consistent manner in parliamentary votes306 . In turn, the former 
corroborates the European Parliament’s support for the longevity of the European nuclear 
energy policy and the coherence of the nuclear legal framework established at the EU level. 
 
One important advantage of the Euratom Treaty which makes it impervious to 
radical change is the nature of its text which for the most part is perfectly flexible307 
(especially the Chapter 6 on supply, Chapter 7 on safeguards and Chapter 8 on the system 
of ownership which have been drafted in such a way that makes them adaptable to newly 
arising circumstances (labeled as the Treaty’s ‘ability to learn’308). In this sense, utilizing the 
flexibility clause of Art.203 would prove as a more suitable way in order to effectuate Treaty 
adjustments while not affecting the overall Treaty structure and circumventing the 
application of the Art.48 TEU treaty modification procedure which requires that an inter-
governmental conference is convened for the purpose.  
While Art.203 Euratom can be relied on for enforcing simple adjustments to the 
Treaty, should a more substantial revision of the Treaty be required, the use of the ordinary 
treaty revision procedure of Art.48 EU would be the more pertinent solution (by virtue of 
Art.106a Euratom, the former article is equally applicable to the ambit of the Euratom 
Treaty). Art.48 TEU sets out the ‘small’ option for minor treaty adjustments (without  
Convention) and the ‘big’ option which necessitates that a Convention is assembled309. The 
latter allows the Member States’ governments, the European Parliament or the 
Commission to introduce proposals for the amendment of the Treaties directed at 
increasing or reducing the competences conferred on the Union under the Treaties310. 
Thereby, the European Council consults the European Parliament and the Commission and 
                                                            
305 Point 6. 
306 http://archive.greens-efa.eu/cms/topics/dok/172/172579.euratom_50_years_too_much@en.htm. 
307 N. P. Serrano, Wakening the serpent: reflections on the possible modification of the Euratom Treaty, 
International Journal of Nuclear Law, 2006, Vol. 1 No. 1, p.13. 
308 Idem, p.14. 
309 For a discussion on this point, see, W. Kilb, The Europan Atomic Energy Community and Its Primary and 
Secondary Law, in, International Nuclear Law: History, Evolution and Outlook, 2010, OECD NEA publication 
(downloadable at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/isnl/10th/isnl-10th-anniversary.pdf), pp.83-86. 
310 Art.48(2). 
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adopts a decision granting an examination of the proposed amendments, entrusting the 
President of the European Council with the task of convening a convention composed of 
representatives of the national Parliaments, of the Heads of State or Government of the 
Member States, of the European Parliament and of the Commission311. Should the 
European Council decide, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, not to 
convene a Convention justified by the extent of the proposed amendments, the European 
Council sets out the terms of reference for a conference of representatives of the 
governments of the Member States to be held312. Regardless of whether the option to hold 
a Convention is triggered or not, the amendments which are to be introduced to the 
Treaties are determined by common accord through a conference of representatives of the 
governments of the Member States that is to be convened by the President of the 
Council313. 
The option concerning the employment of the ordinary revision procedure in this 
respect had been formally raised in Declaration No.54 of the Final Act of the 
Intergovernmental Conference on the Lisbon Treaty, where the governments of five 
Member States (Germany, Ireland, Hungary, Austria and Sweden) expressed their support 
for the convening of a conference of the representatives of the governments as soon as 
possible for the purpose of bringing the Euratom Treaty provisions up to date.  
 
 
IV.2 The last word on the matter: The Convention on the future of Europe  
 
 In the course of the preparation of the text of the (now defunct) Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe (the Constitutional Treaty) within the framework of the 
Convention on the future of Europe, a number of proposals of a more radical nature had 
surfaced which related to the dissolution of the Euratom Community and the merging of 
the ‘viable’ provisions of the Euratom Treaty into the TFEU. The Declaration adopted at the 
2001 European Council Summit in Laeken heralded the start of a reform process for the 
Union that was to be crowned with the drafting of a new constitutional treaty which was to 
rationalize the Union’s institutional set-up and streamline Union’s policies. The former 
mandate was entrusted to the European Convention (the Convention on the Future of 
Europe) whose members were representatives of the national parliaments of the Member 
States, the European Parliament, the European Commission as well as representatives of 
heads of state and government of the Member States. The mandate of the Convention ran 
                                                            
311 Art.48(3). 
312 Art.48(3). 
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from December 2001 through July 2003 when it was finalized with the Convention 
producing the final draft of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe314.  
The Praesidium of the European Convention did not address the issue of reform of 
the Euratom Treaty considering that the former exceeded both its mandate and the 
timetable of the Convention so that it failed to find any basis for the Convention as a body 
to venture on substantially amending the provisions of the Euratom Treaty, regarding it as 
inappropriate for it to perform a task of that nature315. The actual changes to the Euratom 
Treaty were instead included in a protocol to the Constitutional Treaty316  and were merely 
formal and unsubstantial in nature (concerning certain institutional and financial 
adjustments), leaving the substantive rules of the Treaty untouched. The Protocol intended 
to amend the Euratom Treaty in order to bring it in line with the newly-introduced 
institutional, financial and procedural arrangements. The amendments set out in the Lisbon 
Treaty follow the same pattern of amending the Euratom treaty rather than engaging in a 
substantial revision thereof. 
Even though the Convention’s deliberations resulted in a decision to amend the 
Treaty to a limited extent (which was obviously performed via the Art.48 TEU ‘Convention’ 
mechanism for treaty revision), it would nonetheless be instructive to also look at certain 
formal and less formal proposals that had arisen in the course of the work of the 
Convention.  
The Feasibility study on the Constitution of the European Union, issued in December 
2002, was a working document (also known as the ‘Penelope document’) commissioned by 
then President of the Commission Mr. Romano Prodi the drafters of which were required to 
provide viable solutions for the rationalization of the Treaties and the simplification of the 
Union’s policies317. Apart from the draft constitutional text, the Penelope document 
contained five additional acts, Additional Act No.2 of which was entitled ‘Peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy’ which incorporated all the existing provisions of the Euratom Treaty save 
for those deemed to have become obsolete with time or those that duplicate the general 
provisions of the constitutional text318. The provisions retained were those of Chapter III 
(Health and Safety), Chapter IV (Investments), Chapter V (Joint Undertakings), Chapter VI 
(Supplies) and Chapter VII (Safeguards), amounting to a total of forty-five articles and two 
short annexes. Thus, the constitutional text proposed by the Penelope document was to 
abolish the legal personality of the Euratom Community, assimilating it into the singular 
and indivisible personality of the Union. Nevertheless, the Commission never submitted the 
                                                            
314 The official documents of the European Convention as well as the contributions from the members of the 
Convention can be found at the Convention’s official website (http://european-
convention.eu.int/EN/bienvenue/bienvenue2352.html?lang=EN.); 
315 Note of the Presidium of the European Convention dated from 14 March 2003, CONV. 621/03. 
316 Protocol no.36 amending the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ 310/391. 
317 p. III of the Penelope document. 
318 p. III of the Penelope document. 
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Penelope document before the Convention so that it never became part of the official 
deliberations held within the framework of the Convention319. 
In addition, several contributions issued by members of the Convention were 
brought to the attention of the Convention body dealing specifically with the future status 
of the Euratom Treaty, their authors having expressed the necessity for the reform of the 
Euratom Treaty to be placed at the Convention’s agenda (which the Presidium however 
subsequently did not concede to)320. The proposals ranged from requests for revision and 
modification of the Treaty to requests urging that the Treaty is abolished and its still 
‘current’ provisions incorporated into one general and comprehensive treaty (be it a 
Constitution or another document of a constitutional nature). In fact, a possible route 
examined in one of the proposals was to repeal the obsolete Treaty provisions and transfer 
the provisions relating to health and safety, safeguards and non-proliferation (as the only 
‘viable’ provisions of the Euratom Treaty) to the text of the new Constitution321. The former 
comes with an important caveat reflected in the legal and practical ramifications of 
adhering the Euratom Treaty provisions to the existent Union framework for the purpose of 
of rationalizing the bulky and technical Treaty, which have not been sufficiently examined 
and are not easily predictable322.  
 
 
IV.3 Calls for complete abolishment of the Euratom Treaty 
 
The third case scenario for the future of the Euratom Treaty is the option for a 
complete abolishment of the Treaty which would entail the extinguishment of Euratom’s 
legal personality and the conduct of Member States’ nuclear policies being brought back to 
the hands of national governments. It is a possibility which the EU institutions are for the 
time being not inclined to accept as they are decidedly the ones that are competent to 
                                                            
319 Serrano, supra n.307, p.15. 
320 Contribution from Mr. Hannes Farnleitner, Mr. Caspar Einem and Mr. Reinhard E. Bösch, members of the 
Convention :"A single legal personality - On the future of EURATOM " Brussels, 22 October 2002, CONV 
358/02; Contribution by Ms Marie Nagy, Ms Renée Wagner and Mr Neil MacCormick, alternate members of 
the Convention: "The Future of the Euratom Treaty in the Framework of the European Constitution" Brussels, 
18 February 2003, CONV 563/03; Contribution from Mr Klaus Hänsch, member of the Convention:"Future of 
the Euratom Treaty" Brussels, 14 October 2002 CONV 344/02; 
321 Contribution by Ms Marie Nagy, Ms Renée Wagner and Mr Neil MacCormick, alternate members of the 
Convention: "The Future of the Euratom Treaty in the Framework of the European Constitution" Brussels, 18 
February 2003, CONV 563/03, p.4. The former proposal is in line with the view that it is indeed the radiological 
protection, environmental protection, nuclear safety and non-proliferation which are the components that 
justify the existence of the Treaty in the present day (as reported in N. Prieto Serrano, Wakening the Serpent: 
Reflections on the Possible Modification of the Euratom Treaty, International Journal of Nuclear Law, Vol.1, 
No.1, 2006, at p.17, ft. 7).  
322 This was confirmed in the Final report of the Convention’s Working Group on Legal Personality, 1st 
October 2002, CONV 305/02, at point 15. 
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initiate any Treaty change in such direction. Within the European Parliament, the political 
group of the European Greens has been adamant in promoting a nuclear-free agenda for 
the European Union according to which the use of nuclear power could not be regarded as a 
solution for Europe’s energy needs. The former claims have won the support of a certain 
portion of the EU citizens, which was observed in the recent pan-European initiative 
launched on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Euratom Treaty323. On the same 
occasion, (then) EU Energy Commissioner Piebalgs received 630 000 signatures against 
nuclear energy from individuals and over 750 from organisations from all over the EU324. 
The signatories of the petition called for a complete phase-out of nuclear energy 
production across the EU and the abolishment of the Euratom Treaty325.  
The underlying reasons for the present status quo attitude towards the Euratom 
Treaty may well be political and socio-economic in nature and mutually intertwined (the EU 
institutions being wary of openly discussing them). At the time of the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty, certain observers argued that the reason why the Euratom 
Community had been intentionally kept outside of the framework of the Constitutional 
Treaty stricto sensu was to avoid that the text of the future Constitution becomes 
‘contaminated’ by the outdated nuclear text326. Another argument that has been put 
forward centers on the rationalization of any future attempts to revise the Euratom Treaty 
making it possible for the Treaty to be amended or even completely repealed without 
having to revise the Constitutional Treaty per se327. Furthermore, it is also important to 
acknowledge that none of the contributions submitted to the Convention on the future of 
Europe supported the prospect of a complete extinguishment of the Euratom Treaty, 
considering the former as an untenable solution especially in view of the pressing nature of 
the issues of nuclear waste disposal and nuclear safety that would be difficult to coordinate 
and tackle among the Member States in the absence of a nuclear treaty328. 
  
The ultimate word on the future of the Euratom Treaty coming from an official 
intergovernmental forum of the Union has been the ambiguous pronouncement of the 
Convention’s Praesidium that a discussion on the future of the Euratom Community 
surpasses the mandate of the Convention - pointing to a lack of consensus among and 
                                                            
323 The Greens/European Free Alliance group in the European Parliament hosted a conference titled “Euratom 
- 50 years too much : Nuclear error since 1957” where the issues of nuclear safety, nuclear proliferation and 
the future of the Euratom were discussed. For the Report from the Conference, see, http://archive.greens-
efa.eu/cms/topics/dok/172/172579.euratom_50_years_too_much@en.htm. 
324 http://archive.greens-efa.eu/cms/default/dok/173/173688.nuclear_error_since_1957@en.htm. 
325 Idem. 
326 Friends of the Earth Europe, “Will the New EU Constitution Promote Nuclear Energy?” available at 
http://www.foeeurope.org/publications/2005/euratom_and_constitution_may2005.pdf [Accessed in March 
2013], p.3. 
327 P. Norman, The Accidental Constitution: The Story of The European Convention, Euro-Comment (2003), 
p.267. 
328 Contribution from Mr Klaus Hänsch, member of the Convention: "Future of the Euratom Treaty", Brussels, 
14 October 2002, CONV 344/02, p.5. 
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within the Member States on the justifiability of the use of nuclear technology in the 
future329. Given that only five Member States have signed the fore-mentioned Declaration 
urging the updating of the Euratom Treaty, it is safe to conclude that for the time being the 
majority of Member States still consider the issue of the future of the Euratom project to be 
too politically sensitive to be addressed among the pro- and anti-nuclear energy states of 
the Union330. 
However, the matter of deciding on the definitive future of the Euratom Community 
will become more pressing in the future, on account of the increasingly divergent national 
attitudes towards the use of nuclear power: on the one end of the spectrum there are 
Member States with active phase-out policies in place (Austria, Germany), while on the 
other end there are those Member States which consider the nuclear as essential to their 
nation state identity (France, the UK). Such a diverse nuclear landscape in the Union of 
today significantly overshadows the initial nuclear consensus among the founding Member 
States out of which the Euratom Community was born331.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
329True, supra n.6, p.15.  
330 Kilb, supra n.309, p.85. 
331 On a similar note, see, Contribution from Nagy, Wagner and MacCormick, supra n.321, p.3. 
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Chapter 2: The interaction between the Euratom health and safety policy 
and the Union environmental policy 
 
The present chapter draws on the interaction between the Euratom health and 
safety policy as a policy developed under the Euratom Treaty, on the one side, and the 
Union envirironmental policy as a policy pursued within the scope of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union (formerly, the European Community Treaty). It 
examines the concurring as well as the conflicting areas of competence between the 
Euratom Community and the Union with respect to the two above designated areas of 
focus, the nature of the competences thereby exercised and the interplay occurring among 
the respective tasks and objectives employed in the elaboration of the two policies. The 
transformation undergone by the European Community Treaty (TEC) into a Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union (TFEU), pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty amendments, has 
nevertheless left the core objectives and respective policies developed under each of the 
three founding treaties (TFEU, TEU, Euratom Treaty) virtually unaltered. Therefore, the 
analysis of the pre-Lisbon relationship between the Euratom Community and the European 
Community/Union stands valid post-Lisbon as well, with the important difference that 
European Community’s legal personality has now been assumed by that of the ‘European 
Union’. 
By observing the modalities of interaction between the environmental and the 
nuclear health and safety legal frameworks created under the purview of the Euratom and 
the Union, accordingly, the discussion inquires into the instances of both concurring and 
conflicting competences between the Euratom and the Union exercised in this respect. 
Drawing on the aspect of concurring competences between the Euratom health and safety 
policy and the Union environmental policy, the discussion elaborates the concept of 
‘borrowing’ of legal bases signifying the practice of extending the scope of Union rules to 
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the Euratom domain, and, conversely, the practice of applying Euratom rules to areas 
covered by the Union Treaties (the TFEU and the TEU). The practice of ‘borrowing’ legal 
bases from the Union Treaties mainly occurs in instances of absence of corresponding 
provisions in the Euratom Treaty or secondary Euratom legislation, instances of concurring 
competence arising between the Euratom and the Union regarding a particular issue, as 
well as instances requiring for a general principle of Union law to be extended to the 
purview of the Euratom. 
For the purpose of adequately positing the link between Euratom’s health and 
safety policy and the Union’s environmental policy, the analysis starts out by observing the 
interaction between the nuclear and environmental legal orders on the international arena, 
proceeding with the EU level and the issue of the role accorded to the the concept of 
‘environmental protection’ within the scope of the Euratom health and safety regime. 
Relying on the concept of environmental protection to create the bridge between the 
Euratom health and safety policy and the Union environmental policy, the text examines 
the extent to which the former concept has been factored into Euratom’s policy on nuclear 
health and safety as well as the extent to which it corresponds with and is compatible with 
the concept of environmental protection as elaborated under the Union environmental 
protection policy. In this context, the analysis discerns the presence/absence of an 
‘environmental protection’ approach employed in the elaboration of the concepts of 
radiation protection and nuclear safety under the Euratom framework, looking to see 
whether the former have been underpinned by an ‘environmental protection’ ratio, or, are 
rather strictly confined to the notion of ‘protection of human health’ thus fully ascribing to 
the concept of anthropocentricism.  
 
 
 
I The possibility for extending the application of EU rules to the Euratom 
field 
 
Following the diverse nature of the subject matter covered accordingly by the Union 
(formerly, Community; the common market and the policies linked to the creation and 
development thereof) and the Euratom Community (confined to the development of the 
civil nuclear industry), it is imminent that competition among the different Euratom and 
Union policies in particular fields frequently occurs, resulting in the practice of 
‘extrapolation’ or ‘borrowing’ of legal bases. The ‘borrowing’ of legal bases covers the 
practice of extending the scope of EU rules to the Euratom domain (which is more 
frequent), or, conversely, applying Euratom rules to areas covered by the Union Treaties 
(the TFEU and the TEU). The ‘extrapolation’ of Union measures to the nuclear domain, 
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even though common in practice, has not sufficiently been dealt with in academic 
literature. Examining the links between these two closely knit legal frameworks contributes 
to a better understanding of the delicate relationship between their respective legal orders 
and is instrumental in adequately positioning the Euratom Community’s singular legal 
personality within the complex legal and political make-up of the European Union. 
With regard to the intersection among the competences belonging to the Union and 
the Euratom, a pattern is to be discerned regarding the modalities in which Union legal 
rules can be presumed to apply to Euratom’s field of application, and vice versa. The 
reliance on the principle lex specialis/lex generalis seems pertinent to this end. The correct 
application of this principle to the relationship between the Union and the Euratom legal 
frameworks is contingent on the correct interpretation of the Treaties’ ‘bridging provisions’. 
The ‘bridging provisions’ articulate the lex specialis/lex generalis formula and represent the 
basic link between the two separate legal orders which sets the foundations from which 
their interaction builds up. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the bridging provision for the 
EC/Euratom/ECSC Treaties was found in ex-Art. 305 EC which stipulated that:  
“1. The provisions of this Treaty [EC Treaty] shall not affect332 the provisions of the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, in particular as regards the rights and 
obligations of Member States, the powers of the institutions of that Community and the rules laid 
down by that Treaty for the functioning of the common market in coal and steel.  
2. The provisions of this Treaty shall not derogate333 from those of the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community.” 
 
The cited article performs the task of linking together the legal frameworks of the 
(then) three Communities (EC, Euratom and ECSC). Certain authors have argued that the 
term ‘affect’ used to describe the correlation between the ECSC and the EC and the term 
‘derogate’ used with regard to the Euratom are not to be construed as synonyms334. The key 
argument here is that the difference in wording exemplifies the essentially different 
character of the Treaties: the ECSC Treaty had established an almost autarchic legal system 
which could effectively function without any sort of European Community involvement 
much unlike the Euratom compact which does not benefit from such an elevated degree of 
autonomy.  
After the termination of the ECSC and the adoption of the Lisbon amendments, the 
provision which governs the relationship between the Euratom Treaty, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (successor of the EC Treaty) and the Treaty on the 
European Union is found in the Chapter entitled ‘Application of certain provisions of the 
Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’, 
Article 106a(3) Euratom: 
                                                            
332 Emphasis added. 
333 Emphasis added. 
334 A. Nikpay and J. Faull, The EC Law of competition, Oxford University Press, 1999, p.733. 
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“(…) 3. The provisions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union shall not derogate from the provisions of this Treaty.”335 
 
Ever since the creation of the EC and the Euratom, both the Union’s law-makers and 
the Union’s highest judicial body have been faced with the task to adequately and correctly 
interpret and apply the requirement that the provisions of the EC Treaty as lex generalis not 
derogate from those of the Euratom Treaty as lex specialis. Provided that the respective 
subject matter of the two legal regimes are in constant and intensive interaction, the need 
to utilise EU rules in order to regulate issues primarily falling under Euratom purview, in the 
absence of corresponding Euratom rules or Euratom legal bases, inevitably arises. Thus, the 
absence of relevant provisions both in the Euratom Treaty and secondary implementing 
legislation underscores the importance of the exercise of determining the exact scope and 
content of the duty ‘not to derogate’. Namely, such a duty arises either in instances where 
for an issue in the nuclear domain the Euratom legal framework has not provided an 
applicable legal rule thus resulting in a legal void to be filled through applying 
corresponding EU rules, or, alternatively, instances where the competence for regulating a 
particular issue falls equally under the general scope of the TFEU/TEU and the more 
subject-specific scope of the Euratom Treaty so that both of the legal framework 
potentially provide for an applicable legal rule (concurring competence). 
 
 
I.1 Lack of corresponding provisions in the Euratom Treaty 
 
  The practice of extrapolating EC (EU) norms to the Euratom field was endorsed by 
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in a number of cases where the CJEU has allowed for 
such an extrapolation to occur solely with respect to Euratom-related issues that are at 
want of regulation (i.e. where the Euratom Treaty and/or the secondary implementing 
legislation have failed to provide a pertinent legal rule to be applied). In this sense, the 
CJEU does not confine the possibility for extension to only certain types of nuclear issues, 
but rather endorses the ‘spill-over’ option as a general possibility. Thus far, the Court has 
dealt with cases involving extension of rules relating to the following Union policies: the 
common commercial policy, the competition policy (in the field of state aids and anti-
dumping), health policy and environment policy. However the absence of caveats in the 
Court’s dicta should not be taken for granted as, presumably, there could be issues 
potentially arising in the nuclear field which would prove unsuitable for regulation by 
strictly Union instruments.  
                                                            
335 Emphasis added.  
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An important analogy regarding the Union-Euratom regulatory interaction can be 
drawn from the Advocate General Slynn’s Opinion in the Deutsche Babcock336 case where 
the AG summarizes the co-existence of the EEC (European Ecnomic Community) and the 
ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) legal frameworks through the spectrum of the 
requirement that the EC Treaty provisions are not to affect those of ECSC Treaty which 
does not imply “(…) that the EEC Treaty is not concerned with coal and steel and that 
legislation made under it may not make rules in respect of coal and steel (…)… It would 
have been perfectly simple to provide that nothing in the EEC Treaty related to coal and 
steel products or to the coal and steel industry if that had been intended. That was not 
done. Instead the limitation imposed is that the provision of the EEC Treaty shall not “affect 
the provision” of the earlier Treaty, in particular as regards the matters specified.(…)”. In 
nuce, AG Slynn suggested that the EC Treaty may apply to the coal and steel industry to the 
extent that the particular matter at hand has not been covered by the ECSC Treaty rules or 
implementing secondary legislation under this Treaty. Per analogiam, the former reasoning 
could be extended to the EU-Euratom relationship in that it would be highly impractical and 
inopportune to deny or completely exclude the EU regulatory framework from matters 
falling within the remit of the Euratom Treaty.   
In following reference will be made to several cases which showcase the CJEU and 
the General Court’s approach to the matter of extrapolation of Union (then, EC) rules to the 
purview of the Euratom.  
In the joined cases C-188-190/80 France v Commission, Italy v Commission, UK v 
Commission337, the Court dealt with the possibility of applying the EC rules on state aids to 
undertakings in the nuclear sector. The Commission contended that the absence of 
provisions on state aids in the Euratom Treaty allowed for Arts. 92 and 93 EC (now, Arts. 86 
and 87 TFEU) to be applied to the nuclear sector, subject to the exceptions provided in the 
Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of financial relations between 
Member States and public undertakings338. In keeping with the ‘not to derogate’ obligation, 
the Court accepted the former argument and concluded that the provisions of the Directive 
did not depart from or compromise the effect of the Euratom Treaty provisions339.  
Similarly, in Opinion 1/94340 the Court remarked on the common concession made 
on the part of the Council and the Member States to the Commission’s claim that the (then) 
European Community had exclusive competence to conclude the Multilateral Agreements 
on Trade in Goods in so far as the former apply to Euratom products341. Reiterating the ‘not 
                                                            
336 C-328/85, ECR 1987 Page 05119. 
337 ECR 1982 p.2545. 
338 OJ 1980 L 195/35; Para.29 of judgment. 
339 Para.32. 
340 Opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994, ECR 1994 p. I-5267. 
341 Para.23 of Opinion. 
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to derogate’ principle, it accepted that the lack of Euratom provisions on external trade 
warranted that agreements dealing with international trade in Euratom products to be 
concluded on the basis of the common commercial policy provisions of Art.113 EC (now, 
Art.207 TFEU).  
 
In the ENU v Commission case342, the EU General Court examined the Euratom 
Supply Agency’s right of option and exclusive right to conclude contracts for the supply of 
nuclear ores, while not neglecting to indicate that, in principle, there was nothing hindering 
the application of the EC Treaty antidumping provisions to the nuclear sector, in the 
absence of corresponding antidumping rules in the Euratom Treaty itself.  
 
 Another instance in which the CJEU sanctioned the possibility to extend the 
outreach of EU (EC) legal rules to the Euratom scope concerned the delicate issue of 
radioactive waste stemming from military nuclear installations. Namely, in Commission v 
UK343, the Court ruled out the possibility to apply the Euratom health and safety provisions 
(more precisely, the Art.37 Euratom provisions on disposal of radioactive waste) to military 
applications of nuclear energy and instead, suggested the use of appropriate EU (EC) 
measures that carry the same objective of protecting the health of the public and the 
environment against the dangers related to the use of nuclear energy344. The reason why 
the Euratom provisions were considered inapplicable to the case was the fact that the 
Euratom Treaty in its entirety did not cover the realm of military use of nuclear energy345. 
  
 
I.2 Concurring competence between the Euratom and the EU 
 
Apart from instances of lack of applicable provisions in the Euratom Treaty and/or 
implementing legislation, there have also been instances of ‘competition’ between existent 
                                                            
342T-458/93 and T-523/93, ECR 1995 p. II-2459. 
343 C-61/03 ECR 2005 p. I-2477. 
344 Para.44 of judgment; To corroborate its claim, the Court offered the example of Case C-62/88 Greece v 
Council. The pertinence of such analogy seems questionable as the former case concerned the choice 
between two legal bases i.e. two different sets of provisions (the Euratom health and safety provisions and 
the EC commercial policy provisions). The particular case, however, did not involve any lacunae in the 
Euratom Treaty warranting an extension of EU (EC) rules to the Euratom matter in question. 
Furthermore, Advocates General Geelhoed and Van Gerven have also offered their views on the interaction 
between the Euratom and the EU(EC)-devised policies.  AG Geelhoed in C-61/03 Commission v UK considered 
it possible to utilize the Art.346 TFEU (ex-Art. 296 EC) conditions for Member States to derogate from their 
Treaty obligations in order to safeguard national defense interests (see, para. 107 of Opinion). With regard to 
the possible ways to interpret the scope of the Euratom-devised policies, AG Van Gerven, in case C-70/88 
Parliament v Council (para.23) opined that he: “(…) see[s] no valid reason for interpreting the scope of a policy 
laid down by the EAEC Treaty according to rules different from those relating to the scope of a policy laid down by 
the EEC Treaty (…)”; 
345 For more on the military applications of nuclear energy and the Euratom and a more elaborate discussion 
on the Commission v. UK case, see Chapter 4, Section V.3. 
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Euratom Treaty and/or secondary Euratom legislation on the one hand, and Union legal 
rules, on the other which is ordinarily resolved by applying the lex specialis/lex generalis 
principle by virtue of which the Euratom rules take priority. Given that the former is a well-
established principle, a competition of norms of this type is mostly resolved in a 
straightforward and non-controversial manner.  
The competition between the Euratom and Union legal rules can best be observed 
with regard to the balancing exercise performed when chosing the correct legal basis for 
the adoption of a particular act and in instances where regulatory action can only be 
performed either through the use of a Euratom or a EU measure. In this sense, it is to be 
reminded that it is settled case law that where a measure pursues a twofold purpose, one of 
which can be identified as the main or predominant purpose, that measure must be 
founded on the legal basis required by the predominant purpose346. Alternatively and by 
way of exception from the former, a measure can simultaneously pursue several 
inextricably linked objectives, none of which is predominant and both of which are equally 
important to attaining the purpose of the measure - such a measure must be founded on 
multiple legal bases347. However, thus far, such measures which fully or partly regulate 
nuclear issues while at the same time being founded on a double legal basis (of both the 
TFEU/TEU and the Euratom Treaty) have not been adopted.  
Following the catastrophic Chernobyl nuclear accident, the CJEU was asked to 
review the legal bases of two EC measures that concerned the nuclear field, namely, 
Regulation (EEC) No 3955/87 on the conditions governing imports of agricultural products 
originating in third countries following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power-station348 
and Regulation (Euratom) No 3954/87 laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive 
contamination of foodstuffs and of feedingstuffs following a nuclear accident or any other 
case of radiological emergency349. The validity of the former regulation was contested in the 
Chernobyl I case350 whereas the validity of the latter was at issue in Chernobyl II.  
In Chernobyl I the applicant (Greece) claimed that the Council could not adopt the 
Regulation on the basis of the EU (EC) commercial policy provisions since it considered the 
predominant objective of the measure to be the protection of the environment and the 
health of the public thus viewing the Art. 31 Euratom provisions on protection of the health 
of workers and the general public against the dangers of ionizing radiations or Art.192 TFEU 
(formerly, Art. 130(r)(s) EEC) environment protection provisions as the appropriate legal 
basis for the measure. The Court found that the preponderant objective of the Regulation 
                                                            
346 See, Energy Star Agreement (C-281/01 Commission v Council, ECR 2002 p. I-12049, para.34). Also, see C-
36/98 Spain v Council [2001] ECR I-779, para.59. 
347See, inter alia, para.35 of Energy Star Agreement case. 
348 Regulation (EEC) No 3955/87 of 22 December 1987, OJ 1987, L 371, p. 14. 
349 No 3954/87 of 22 December 1987, Official Journal 1987 L 371, p. 11. 
350 C-62/88 Greece v Council ECR 1990 p. I-1527. 
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was to regulate trade between the Community and non-member countries351 and 
concluded that the fact that the concerned measure additionally pursues an ancillary health 
protection objective was not sufficient to support the contention that the Euratom health 
and safety provisions (Art.31 et seq. Euratom) or the EU (EC) environmental protection 
provisions should have been chosen as the adequate legal basis. The former line of 
reasoning was further substantiated by the observance of the principle of integration of 
environmental policy into other Union (Community) policies pursuant to which the concept 
of environmental protection is to be made an additional component of the other Union 
(Community) policies352.  
Later on, the Chernobyl II case353 concerned the legal basis of Regulation (Euratom) 
No 3954/87 laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of 
foodstuffs and of feeding stuffs following a nuclear accident or any other case of 
radiological emergency, was at issue where the Parliament insisted that Art.31 Euratom 
was the wrong legal basis for the Regulation which ought to have been adopted under the 
harmonization provisions of Art.100a EC (presently, Art.114 TFEU). The Court found that 
the aim of the Regulation was to establish uniform safety standards for the protection of 
the health of workers and the general public354 and that the former only had an incidental 
effect on harmonizing the conditions for the free movement of goods within the 
Community by preventing the interference of unilateral national measures in the area of 
trade in foodstuffs and feedingstuffs that have undergone radioactive contamination355. 
According to the Court, this was not sufficient to qualify the regulation as a harmonization 
measure within the meaning of Art.114 TFEU (then, Art. 100a EC) and therefore upheld the 
Euratom legal basis.   
 
In addition, there have been instances where the application of a Euratom rule has 
actually or potentially hindered the application of a Union rule which, however, very rarely 
occur. The problematic was addressed within the scope of the Euratom supply policy, 
namely, in Commission Decision 94/285/Euratom356 where the German company 
Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems (KLE) in its reference letters to the Commission357 alleged that 
the Euratom Supply Agency, in applying the Euratom supply policy provisions, interfered 
with the Community commercial policy provisions358. In response to these claims, the 
Commission relied on the lex specialis status of the Euratom Treaty as a treaty containing 
special rules pertaining to the nuclear supply policy which “(…) takes precedence over the 
                                                            
351 Para.17. 
352 Para.20. 
353 Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council ECR 1991 p. I-4529. 
354 Para.10 of judgment. 
355 Para.17. 
356 Commission Decision 94/285/Euratom OJ 1994 L 122/30. 
357 Point 7 et seq. of Decision. 
358 Point 22 of Decision. 
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general provisions of the EC Treaty”359. Moreover, the Commission pointed out that the 
precedence in question does not flow solely from the lex specialis status of the Euratom 
Treaty, but is also derived from the (then) Art 232 EC ‘shall not derogate‘ requirement which 
determines the relationship between the two respective legal frameworks360.  
 
I.3. Transposing general principles of Union Law to the Euratom framework 
 
There is a caveat attached to the duty ‘not to derogate’ that is to be observed 
regarding the issue of binding the Euratom Community to the general principles of EU law 
as primary source of EU law and espoused as such (strictly formally speaking) under the 
Union Treaties. These general legal principles are nevertheless presumed equally to apply 
to the Euratom domain given that the Euratom Community is not merely attached to, but 
is one of the constitutive components of the legal and institutional system of the European 
Union.  
In this sense, the EU Court of Justice in the Temelin case361 recently departed from 
its settled practice of ‘extrapolating’ EC/EU rules to the Euratom domain. Namely, one of 
the issues raised was the application of the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in 
Art.18 TFEU (ex-Art.12 EC) to the Euratom remit and it was the first time that the Court was 
confronted with the issue of transposing a general principle of Union law to the Euratom 
legal framework. The case concerned Austrian national rules introducing different set of 
criteria for bringing actions for injunction to prevent actual or potential nuisance for nuclear 
installations on Austrian territory from those situated in the territory of another Member 
State. The Court noted that the Euratom Treaty does not contain any express provisions on 
the prohibition of discrimination, analogous to that of Art. 12 EC (now, Art.18 TFEU) which 
precludes all discrimination on grounds of nationality within the scope of application of the 
EC Treaty362. The former prohibition was considered by the Court as “(…) a specific 
expression of the general principle of equality, which itself is one of the fundamental principles 
of Community law”363. Deciding to circumvent the application of the EC provision, it directly 
applied the principle of non-discrimination as a general principle of Union law and one that 
equally covers the scope of the Euratom Treaty. By refraining from an automatic, by-default 
extension of the EC (EU) provisions, the Court deferred to the integrity and autonomy of 
the Euratom legal order as one that is both different and differentiable from the legal order 
established under the the TFEU (EC) Treaty, but one that nevertheless abides by the 
                                                            
359 Point 22 of Decision. 
360 Point 22 of Decision. 
361 Case C-115/08, ECR 2009 p. I-10265. For a consideration of a different aspect of the Temelin case, see 
Chapter 1, III.3.6;  
362 Para.88 of judgment. 
363 Para.89. 
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general principles of the Union legal system364. Conversely, it could be argued that the 
Court essentially sanctioned an existent state of affairs – the requirement of non-
discrimination is not foreign to the Euratom system, especially in view of, inter alia, the 
provisions of the Euratom Treaty relevant to the nuclear common market (Arts.92-100 
Euratom) which preclude the existence of any nationality-based restrictions and indicate 
that a compelling non-discrimination ratio has been embedded in the Euratom treaty’s 
provisions. 
The foregoing case has been the only time that the CJEU has had the opportunity to 
pronounce itself on the issue of applying the general principle of Union law to matters 
falling within the Euratom domain. Nonetheless, by analogy to the reasoning employed by 
the Court in Temelin, it could be inferred that the other general principles of Union law can 
be equally presumed applicable to Euratom’s purview (e.g., the principle of protection of 
fundamental rights, the principle of legal certainty, the principle of proportionality, etc.)365. 
 
II The interplay between environmental and nuclear law and policy  
 
The link between nuclear and environmental law and policy, given the nature of 
their respective subject matter, is intrinsic and immanent, regardless of whether the former 
are devised on a global, regional or national level. The primary objective of nuclear law is 
the regulation of nuclear energy production whereas the undisputed ancillary objective 
which enables the effectiveness of the primary objective is the protection of the 
environment and the health of the population (directly or indirectly) exposed to radiation. 
Effectively, one cannot adequately safeguard and legitimize the use of nuclear power 
without offering accompanying guarantees relative to environmental and human health 
protection. The global nuclear and environmental legal systems have their unique 
characteristics which are underpinned by different rationales and ideologies, but, 
undoubtedly, the ultimate goal shared by both is safeguarding the health of the population 
and the environment366.  
From the perspective of environmental law, a distinction is to be made with respect 
to the manner in which environmental law relates to the nuclear field – direct or indirect367. 
                                                            
364 See, also, Schärf, supra n.285, p.85; The author of the article sees the judgment as one that reinforces the 
autonomy and integrity of the Euratom Treaty in many ways. For more on the integrative role played by the 
Court in rendering the ČEZ judgment, see, S. Wolf, supra n.78, p.13 et seq.; 
365 The issue of the applicability of the horizontal Union principles (such as the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality) to the Euratom domain has been addressed in Chapter I, Section III.2.; 
366 See, S. Emmerechts, Environmental Law and Nuclear Law: A Growing Symbiosis, Nuclear Law Bulletin, 
2008-I, p.92; P. Reyners, Le droit nucléaire confronté au droit de l’environnement: autonomie ou 
complementarité?, Revue québécoise de droit international, 2007, Hors-série ed., p.184.  
367 Emmerechts, supra, p.92 et seq. 
84 
 
The relation is direct when particular nuclear aspects are made subject to international 
environmental regulation, and indirect in instances where different international nuclear 
law instruments touch upon aspects of environmental protection368. Effectively, 
environmental considerations are essential to the existence of the law and policy on nuclear 
energy which is reflected in the fact that for a long time practitioners of nuclear law have 
also inadvertently been creators of environmental law369. The former has even lead certain 
authors to go to the extent of denying the autonomous character of nuclear law as a legal 
framework which covers activities that predominantly belong to the scope of other, already 
existent legal frameworks (energy law, health law, etc.)370. 
When dealing with the law on environmental protection as an autonomuous legal 
system it is important to note there are views that ascribe to a ‘narrow’ definition of 
‘environmental law’ as the law that protects the ecosystem i.e. soil, water, air and 
biodiversity (flora and fauna)371 versus a ‘broad’ definition thereof. The difference is that the 
narrow definition fails to include the concept of human health protection within its scope372. 
The choice between a broad as opposed to a narrow circumscription of the scope of 
environmental law influences the modalities of interplay between the environmental and 
the nuclear legal frameworks and thus determines the direction of the inquiry into the 
complex nature of the correlation between the nuclear and the environmental legal orders. 
Namely, once a restrictive view on the notion of environment protection is taken, the link 
between nuclear energy and the environment becomes more remote, given that the 
‘environmental’ aspect of nuclear law is chiefly concerned with the protection of human 
health while the environmental protection component stricto sensu appears as somewhat 
secondary373.  
 
II.1.1 The interface between international nuclear law and international environmental law 
instruments 
 
The practice of back and forth ‘borrowing’ of legal instrumentaria occurring 
between the nuclear and the environmental policy as two mutually inter-twined policies is 
both natural and intuitive, mostly prominent in cases where a measure originally adopted 
within the framework of one policy touches upon or, indeed, regulates an issue belonging 
to the scope of the other policy (understandably, in the absence of an applicable rule 
adopted under the framework of the latter). The list of international environmental law 
instruments whose provisions directly or indirectly concern the activities in the nuclear field 
                                                            
368 Idem, p.92. 
369 Reyners, supra, p.184. 
370 Idem, p.163. 
371 Emmerechts, supra, p.92. 
372 Idem. 
373 For further reading, see, Emmerechts, supra, p.91. 
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is a non-exhaustive one, for which reason a reference shall be made to the more prominent 
of them. The same approach will be followed in relation to international nuclear law 
instruments applicable to the field of environmental protection. Pursuant to the 
devastating effects of the 1986 Chernobyl accident, there has been a noticeable increase in 
the body of international nuclear law documents dealing with environment and health 
protection since this nuclear predicament served as the turning point for raising the global 
awareness of the potentially catastrophic and far-reaching effects of nuclear radiation on 
the environment and the people374. More recently, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster in 
Japan which, after Chernobyl, is the world’s worst nuclear distaster in recent years, further 
spurred the awareness of the international community with regard to the issue of nuclear 
safety and lead to certain policy improvements both at the level of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the EU375. 
For this reason, it is to be noted that a number of treaties adopted in the nuclear 
field endorse a kind of a health protection/environmental protection dichotomy376. Among 
the nuclear law instruments there are those that merely make a passing, declarative 
reference to environmental protection and those that lay down concrete substantive rules 
and/or obligations thereto. An example of the former are the texts of the Partial Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Underwater signed on 5 August 1963), the signatories of which unequivocally 
declared their desire to put an end to “the contamination of man's environment by 
radioactive substances” (Preamble); and the Complete nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT)377, 
signed in September 1996, banning all nuclear explosions on Earth, both for military and 
peaceful purposes and acknowledging the hope that the CTBT Treaty could contribute to 
the protection of the environment378.  
One of the oldest conventions in the field of nuclear law that deals more 
substantially with environment protection is the Convention on Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material (1979), which, apart from a brief reference to the “protection of public 
health, safety, the environment and national and international security”379, criminalizes the 
                                                            
374 Nanda, V. P., International Environmental Norms Applicable to Nuclear Activities, with Particular Focus on 
Decisions of International Tribunals and International Settlements, Denver Journal of International Law, 2006, 
Vol. 35 Issue 1, p.49. 
375 The IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety was adopted in September 2011, the ultimate aim of which is to 
strengthen nuclear safety worldwide (see, www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/actionplan/); On the part of the 
EU, in order to enhance the safety of nuclear installations in the Union, the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive was 
amended in July 2014 (see, Council Directive 2014/87/Euratom amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing 
a Community framework for nuclear safety of nuclear installations, OJ L 219, p.42-52); 
376 This will be further discussed in Section II.2 of the present chapter. 
377 http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treaty_text.pdf.  
378 See, Preamble to the Treaty; The Complete nuclear-test-ban Treaty is not yet in force. 
379 From the Preamble to the Convention. 
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intentional commission of certain types of acts that cause or are likely to cause “death or 
serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property or to the environment”380.   
Another international nuclear law instrument that fosters the protection of life, 
property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases as one of its 
objectives is the Convention on Assistance in Nuclear Accident and Radiological Emergency 
(1986)381. The Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994) and the Convention on Spent Fuel and 
Radioactive Waste Management (1997) have both identified among their objectives the 
protection of “individuals, society and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing 
radiation” (see the first article in both conventions)382. Further on, the ‘Liability 
Conventions’ (The Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage (1997), the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage (1997) and the Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party 
Liability (2004)) have been additionally modified to accommodate certain upgraded liability 
requirements related to the environment. Under the former regime nuclear operators can 
be held liable for nuclear damage by incurring the cost of measures for reinstating a 
significantly impaired environment or for economic loss deriving from an economic interest 
in the use or enjoyment of the environment that has been significantly impaired due to a 
nuclear incident383.  
Conversely, as was indicated supra, there equally exist a number of international 
environmental law instruments that pertain to the nuclear domain. These are the London 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matter 
                                                            
380 Art.7 of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material criminalizes the intentional commission 
of: 
“(…) (a) an act without lawful authority which constitutes the receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, 
disposal or dispersal of nuclear material and which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person 
or substantial damage to property or to the environment; (…) 
(e) an act directed against a nuclear facility, or an act interfering with the operation of a nuclear facility, where 
the offender intentionally causes, or where he knows that the act is likely to cause, death or serious injury to any 
person or substantial damage to property or to the environment by exposure to radiation or release of radioactive 
substances, unless the act is undertaken in conformity with the national law of the State Party in the territory of 
which he nuclear facility is situated; (…) 
(g) a threat: 
(i) to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property or to 
the environment or to commit the offence described in subparagraph (e)… (…)” 
 
381 Art.1. 
382 The reference to ‘individuals, society and the environment’ is also present in Arts.4, 6, 11, 13 of the 
Convention on Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management used regarding the scope of the safety 
measures for the operation of nuclear facilities. 
Furthermore, concerning the siting of nuclear installations, Art.17(d) of the Nuclear Safety Convention reads 
as follows: 
“Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate procedures are established 
and implemented: (i) for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear 
installation for its projected lifetime; (ii) for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation 
on individuals, society and the environment (…)” [Emphasis added]; 
383 See also on this, Emmerechts, supra, p.93. For more on the concept of environmental damage caused by 
nuclear incidents see, Emmerechts, supra, p.99 et seq.; 
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(1972) and its Protocol of 1996 covering the prevention of pollution to the marine 
environment caused by the introduction of, inter alia, radioactive wastes in the sea; 
followed by the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-boundary 
Context (1991) (“Espoo Convention”) which requires states to conduct environmental 
impact assessment for nuclear energy activities liable to cause a significantly adverse trans-
boundary impact384.  
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic (OSPAR Convention, 1992) and the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (1998) 
are two highly comprehensive environmental legal instruments that just as importantly 
influence the nuclear field. The OSPAR Convention targets the prevention and elimination 
of pollution to the marine environment from land-based sources, offshore sources as well 
as pollution from dumping or incineration of wastes and other matter as well as pollution 
from radioactive substances (including waste) (Arts.3, 4 and 5)385. The Aarhus 
Convention386, in turn, deals with the procedural aspects of environment protection by 
introducing a sort of an ex ante control over measures liable to have a damaging effect on 
the environment and establishing an extensive array of procedural requirements for the 
public authorities to provide access for the public to environmental information related to 
the nuclear field as well as enabling the public to participate in the decision-making 
regarding specific nuclear projects and activities387. 
                                                            
384 Appendix I of the OSPAR Convention: 
“List of activities 
1. Crude oil refineries (excluding undertakings manufacturing only lubricants from crude oil) and installations for 
the gasification and liquefaction of 500 tonnes or more of coal or bituminous shale per day. 
2. Thermal power stations and other combustion installations with a heat output of 300 megawatts or more and 
nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors (except research installations for the production and conversion 
of fissionable and fertile materials, whose maximum power does not exceed 1 kilowatt continuous thermal load). 
3. Installations solely designed for the production or enrichment of nuclear fuels, for the reprocessing of irradiated 
nuclear fuels or for the storage, disposal and processing of radioactive waste.(…)”; 
385 For the types of radioactive substances covered by the OSPAR Convention see Annexes I, II and III of the 
Convention.  
386 The three pillars of the Aarhus Convention (access to information, participation in decision-making and 
access to justice) will be dealt with in greater detail infra in Chapter 3. 
387 See, for that matter, Art.6 and related Annex I of the Aarhus Convention: 
“Article 6 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS ON SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES 
1. Each Party: 
(a) Shall apply the provisions of this article with respect to decisions on whether to permit proposed activities 
listed in annex I; (…) 
(contd.) (…)  
Annex I 
LIST OF ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 6, PARAGRAPH 1 (a) 
1. Energy sector: 
- Mineral oil and gas refineries; 
- Installations for gasification and liquefaction; 
- Thermal power stations and other combustion installations with a heat input of 50 megawatts (MW)or more; 
- Coke ovens; 
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Another instrument that merits attention in this respect is the draft international 
framework document that codifies the existing legal principles related to environment and 
development, the Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, originally 
launched at the UN Congress on Public International Law in March 1995. Although a 
document lacking binding force, the Covenant serves as an authoritative reference for all 
stakeholders worldwide in their efforts to ensure that principles and rules of international 
environmental law are satisfactorily incorporated into regional and national legislation and 
policies388.  
The 2010 updated edition of the Draft Covenant makes no express mention of 
nuclear activities and is altogether more general in wording compared to its previous 
versions, most probably due to the intention of its drafters to give an all-encompassing 
character to the Draft Covenant as a reference document. Although from the commentary 
to the text of the Draft Covenant it is to be deduced that nuclear activities are indeed 
covered by its provisions, a retreat is nevertheless to be observed in the language used 
regarding protection from radioactive substances. For example, Art.28 dealing with 
‘Pollution’ provides that “(t)he Parties shall take, individually or jointly, all appropriate 
measures to prevent, reduce, control and eliminate, to the fullest extent possible, 
detrimental changes in the environment from all forms of pollution (….)”, to the difference 
of the 1995 edition of the Draft Covenant which provided a direct reference to radioactive 
substances as potential source of pollution (“Parties shall take individually or jointly, as 
appropriate, all measures that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of any 
part of the environment, in particular from radioactive, toxic and other hazardous 
substances (…)”389. 
 
As an exception to the above outlined spill-over of legal rules between the 
environmental and the nuclear legal frameworks, there also exist international 
environmental law instruments that explicitly exclude nuclear activities from their scope 
mainly due to the fact that the particular nuclear domain has already been specifically and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
- Nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors including the dismantling or decommissioning of such 
power stations or reactors 1/ (except research installations for the production and conversion of fissionable 
and fertile materials whose maximum power does not exceed 1 kW continuous thermal load); 
- Installations for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel; 
- Installations designed: 
- For the production or enrichment of nuclear fuel; 
- For the processing of irradiated nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste; 
- For the final disposal of irradiated nuclear fuel; 
- Solely for the final disposal of radioactive waste; 
- Solely for the storage (planned for more than 10 years) of irradiated nuclear fuels or radioactive waste;  
(…)”; 
388 The text of the most recently updated 2010 edition of the Covenant can be found at 
http://www.portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/EPLP-031-rev3.pdf; 
389 Emphasis added; The original version of the Covenant has been reproduced in, E. Molodtsova, Nuclear 
Enrgy Law and International Environmental Law: an Integrated Approach, Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law, 1995, p.277.  
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comprehensively regulated under a different international legal instrument390. An example 
for such ‘exclusionary clauses’ are provided in the Basel Convention on the control of 
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal (1989), the Convention on 
the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (1992), etc391.  
 
 
II.1.2 The interface between nuclear and environmental law before international and 
regional judicial fora 
 
The role of international and regional judicial fora has markedly contributed to 
acquiring a correct understanding of the active interplay occurring between the nuclear and 
environmental global and regional normative frameworks. Regarding the interpretation 
and application of international environmental law, generally speaking, the case law of 
international judicial bodies exhibits a certain degree of judicial self-restraint and caution392 
which possibly accounts for the wariness on the part of international judges in extending 
the scope of application of international environmental norms to the nuclear field. 
Nevertheless, in practice, the transposition of nuclear legal rules to the scope of 
environmental law is much less frequent than the opposite occurrence.  
While not always expressly endowed with the competence to adjudicate cases 
involving environmental protection, international judicial bodies have nonetheless 
accomplished this result either through extensive interpretation of the legal texts before 
them (which, as will be shown infra in the present section, is usually performed by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)), or through a marginal reference to 
environmental protection in the judgment which, given the undisputed authority of the 
judicial organ making the reference, serves as the basis for the creation of opinio juris 
encouraging future application of environmental legal norms (as is most commonly done 
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)).  
The former observations on the role of international judicial forums are predicated 
on guaranteeing the right to a clean environment as the bedrock of environmental human 
rights, which is a relatively recent concept in legal history. Unlike the ICJ or the ECtHR, the 
Court of Justice of EU did not, prior to the entry into force of the EU Charter of fundamental 
rights, enjoy the status of a forum for human rights adjudication - in spite of the Court of 
Justice’s irrefutable competence to apply the general principles of Union law, one of which 
is the principle on protection of fundamental rights. The CJEU’s take on the interface 
                                                            
390 Emmerechts, supra n.33, p.93. 
391 For more on this see, Emmerechts, supra n.366, p.94. 
392 See for this, N. Klein, Settlement of International Environmental Law Disputes, in, D.M. Ong, P. Merkouris 
and M. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Handbook on International Environmental Law, Edward Edgar Publishing, 2010, 
p.391. 
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between the Union nuclear and environmental legal orders will be examined infra in the 
section dealing with the health and safety provisions of the Euratom Treaty and the 
modalities of their application devised by the Court393. With regard to environment 
protection in the context of fundamental rights, Art.37 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU speaks of securing a high level of environmental protection and improving 
the quality of the environment which is to be integrated into the policies of the Union (an 
expression of the integration principle of Union environmental law), but nonetheless fails to 
introduce a specific right to a clean environment as a fundamental right of Union citizens. 
Due to its general nature and lack of prescriptive force, it is doubtful whether the 
requirement to integrate a high level of environmental protection awareness into the Union 
policies is justiciable on its own and can effectively act as legal grounds for claims made 
before both the CJEU and the national courts. 
 
a. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
 
The International Court of Justice’s role as a forum for environmental dispute 
settlement was only relatively recently instituted (since the early 1990s) 394 and frequently 
involves cases that are not strictly confined to environmental legal issues and 
simultaneously raise a conundrum of legal issues from other fields of international law395. 
While the ICJ cannot be qualified as an international environmental court per se, the Court 
has, on a number of occasions, made important pronouncements on the pre-eminence 
attached to the observance of international environmental protection requirements. 
Exempli gratia, in its judgments in the Nuclear Tests cases as well as the Advisory Opinions 
on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Legality of the Use by a 
State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, the ICJ has offered its insights on the delicate 
correlation between the use of nuclear weapons and environment protection. These cases 
did not directly concern the application of international environmental rules to the domain 
of the use of nuclear energy as the ICJ was requested to rule on the legality of the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons396.  
The Nuclear Tests I (New Zealand v. France397, Australia v. France398) and Nuclear Tests II 
(Request for Examination by New Zealand399) saga before the ICJ concerned French nuclear 
                                                            
393 For further elaboration, consult Section II.2 of the present chapter. 
394 For more on the history of the Court’s involvement in environmental law disputes, see, M. A. Fitzmaurice, 
International Protection of the Environment (Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law), 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001, p.363 et seq.; 
395 Idem, p.364. 
396 The first case heard by the ICJ where the subject of the dispute primarily concerned environmental issues 
was the 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case relating to the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project concluded between 
Hungary and Slovakia (see on this, Nanda, supra n.374, pp.58-60). 
397 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand  v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 457. 
398 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports  1974, p. 253. 
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testing in the South Pacific region with the radioactive fallout, byproduct of the nuclear 
testing carried out in this area, being considered a great source of concern for people in the 
Pacific region. The main difference between the contentions made by both Australia and 
New Zealand before the Court was that Australia relied on the dispersion of radioactive fall-
out as a violation of Australian sovereignty while New Zealand based its request for interim 
measures on the potentially harmful contamination borne by French nuclear tests on the 
environment400. The Court did not rule on the matter, considering New Zealand’s claim to 
be immaterial because at the time France, through a series of statements to that effect, 
had undertaken to refrain from further atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific 
region401.  
Subsequently, in Nuclear Tests II, New Zealand requested that the Court examines 
whether its previous judgment in Nuclear Tests I had been affected by France’s actions, 
demanding of the Court to order France to stop the ongoing underground nuclear tests in 
the South Pacific in line with its previously undertaken obligation of discontinuation of 
nuclear testing. New Zealand considered that the former obligation, in addition to 
atmospheric testing, comprised all other types of nuclear testing. France held the opposite 
view: it held that the case was solely concerned with atmospheric tests, so that 
underground tests fell outside the scope of New Zealand’s application given that France’s 
commitment not to undertake further atmospheric tests had not been “indissociably linked 
to its announcement of its intention to carry out underground tests”402. New Zealand argued 
that the only reason to confine the issue to atmospheric tests was because at the material 
time of depositing the original application before the ICJ in 1973 there existed no indication 
that underground nuclear testing might lead to environmental consequences similar to 
those from atmospheric testing403. In support to this, New Zealand referred to recent 
scientific evidence indicating the potentially detrimental effects of underground testing in 
the South Pacific regions of Mururoa and Fangataufa404. In addition to this, New Zealand 
invoked the precautionary principle in environmental law according to which the burden of 
proof fell on the State wishing to engage in potentially damaging environmental conduct to 
show in advance that its activities would not cause contamination405 so that by virtue of this 
principle, France was required to carry out an environmental impact assessment as a 
precondition for undertaking the tests, thereby demonstrating there was no risk associated 
thereto406. Stating that its Order in the instant case did not prejudice the obligations of 
States to respect and protect the natural environment407, the Court concluded that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
399 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of  the Court’s Judgment  of 20 
December  1974 in  the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v.  France) Case, I. C.  J. Reports  1995, p. 288. 
400 See, Nuclear Tests I, para.37 et seq. Also, see Fitzmaurice, supra n.394, p.370,371. 
401 Para. 59. 
402 Nuclear Tests II, para.22. 
403 Para. 32. 
404 Para. 33. 
405 Para. 34. 
406 Para. 35. 
407 Para. 64. 
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basis of its 1974 judgment had not been affected by France’s actions and therefore 
dismissed New Zealand’s request408.  
Failing to pronounce itself on the merits, the Court gave a judgment that imposed 
strict limits on its jurisdiction and offered complete deference to France’s sovereignty 
concerns409. Judge Weeramantry in his Dissenting Opinion appealed to a missed chance to 
further develop the concepts of precaution, environmental impact assessment and take 
stock of the environmental consequences for future generations, while in his Opinion judge 
Palmer deplored the fact that the Court, for purely technical and formalistic reasons, failed 
to address such an important problem of international environmental law410. 
 
Evidenced by the above, it is to be observed that the arguments presented by 
France were consistent with its overall ambiguous attitude towards participation in 
international nuclear treaties, especially those treaties dealing with the effects on the 
environment. France never became signatory to the 1963 Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(PTBT) which banned nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water 
and recognized the existence of a threat to human health and the environment caused by 
nuclear testing411, nor did it become party to the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 
Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty) banning all testing of nuclear explosive devices in the South 
Pacific412 - in spite of having formally declaring its intention to cease all atmospheric testing 
in the early 1970s and nevertheless having continued with underground nuclear testing. 
Arguably, the reasons behind France’s reticence to adhere to the former treaties are 
similar, if not identical, to those that lie at the bottom of its refusal to sign the 1968 Non-
Proliferation Treaty413. Eventually, however, France came around in September 1996 and 
                                                            
408 Para. 65. 
409 Fitzmaurice, supra n.394, p.376. 
410 For further reading on the Nuclear Tests cases see, Klein, supra n.392, p.391,392. 
411 See, P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgewell (eds.), International Law and the Environment, Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p.490. 
412 There was also popular resistance to the French nuclear tests in the Pacific headed by Greenpeace as global 
non-governmental organization, as a response to which the French government reportedly engaged in lethal 
sabotage against the Greenpeace vessel, The Rainbow Warrior in 1985 while the ship was docked in the harbor 
at Auckland, New Zealand (for this, see the oral and written arguments by Australia and New Zealand in the 
Nuclear Tests Cases; also, see, R. Falk, The Second Cycle of Ecological Urgency: An Environmental Justice 
Perspective, in, J. Ebbesson and P. Okowa (eds.), Environmental Law and Justice in Context, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009, p.47). 
413 For more on Frances’s initial reticence towards abiding by its international non-proliferation obligations, 
see Chapter 4, Section I.1.; 
The Partial Test-Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty were not primarily concerned with environment 
protection considerations. Nonetheless, these treaties followed an important subsidiary objective of 
protecting the environment against the dangers of nuclear radiation and are therefore often included in the 
category of international environmental agreements (see, D. Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International 
Environmental Law, Harvard University Press, 2010, p.27). 
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concluded the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which has not yet entered into 
force414.  
Following the Nuclear Tests cases, the ICJ was seized by a similarly delicate political 
issue – the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In 1995 the Court was referred a 
request for an Opinion by the UN General Assembly regarding whether the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons was in any circumstance illegal under international law. Although the 
1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons415 did not 
particularly deal with the environmental ‘justifiability’ of nuclear weapons, the Court 
nonetheless felt urged to additionally consider this aspect at the insistence of a number of 
UN Members States which in their written and oral statements had argued that any sort of 
use of nuclear weapons should be considered unlawful in view of the existing international 
norms on safeguarding and protection of the environment416. Therein, a specific reference 
was made, inter alia, to the 1977 Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
which prohibits the employment of "methods or means of warfare which are intended, or 
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment" (Art. 35(3); and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques which prohibits the use of weapons 
that have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects on the environment (Art.1). Also cited 
were Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration which articulate the common conviction regarding the existence of a duty 
among states "to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction"417. 
    The Court recognized that nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe for the 
environment418, the term environment taken to encompass ‘the living space, quality of life 
and the health of human beings, including the unborn generations’419. Thus, it factored in 
the respect for the environment as one of the parameters to be used in assessing whether 
an action pursuing a military objective is in conformity with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality420.  The Court considered that the existing body of international 
environmental law did not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons as such, but, however, 
suggested that environmental factors needed to be taken into account when rules and 
principles of the law applicable in armed conflict are given effect421. It referred to the 
                                                            
414 Although 162 out of a total of 183 signatories have ratified the CTBT, according to Annex 2 of the Treaty it 
is mandatory for countries such as, inter alia, the United States, Israel, Iran, Republic of North Korea to ratify 
in order for the Treaty to enter into force (www.ctbto.org/map/#status). 
415 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I. C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226. 
416 Para. 27. 
417 Para. 29. 
418 Para. 29 
419 Para. 29. 
420 Para. 30. 
421 Para. 33. 
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seriousness of the use of nuclear weapons and the potentially catastrophic effect thereof as 
well as their immense and indiscriminate destructive power on civilization and the eco-
system of the planet422 all the while confirming the potential damaging effect to future 
generations attributed to the ionizing radiation’s potential to damage the future 
environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic defects and illness in future 
generations423. For these reasons, the Court esteemed it indispensable that in order to 
correctly apply the UN Charter law on the use of force and the law applicable in armed 
conflict, account needed to be taken of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons and 
their destructive capacity to cause damage to the present and future generations424. 
 
Effectively, the Court did not intend to reach a conclusion that would in any way 
undermine the states’ right of self-defence under international law, much less if this would 
have been done through the application of environmental treaty obligations425, esteeming 
that the use of weapons with potentially destructive effect needs to be restricted, but 
however, not prohibited426. The foregoing is an example of international environmental 
rights and obligations being in competition with rights and obligations under the 
international law of armed conflict before the ICJ where the latter superseded427.  
 
Two years prior to the reguest for Opinion lodged by the UN General Assembly, in 
1993, the World Health Assembly (the parliamentary organ of the World Health 
Organization (WHO)) called upon the ICJ to render an Opinion on whether, in view of the 
health and environmental effects related thereto, the use of nuclear weapons by a state in 
war or other armed conflict would be a breach of its obligations under international law 
including the WHO Constitution428. The reasons that lead the WHO to make a request for 
an ICJ Opinion was achieving ‘primary prevention’ as the most appropriate means in 
tackling the health and environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons429. The WHO 
was strongly convinced that the primary prevention from the health hazards engendered 
by nuclear weapons use required a preliminary clarification regarding the latter’s status 
under international law430. From an environmental law perspective it is important that the 
WHO had centered its request on the application of the principle of prevention in 
international environmental law, inquiring as to whether in the light of this principle the use 
                                                            
422 Para.35. 
423 Para.35. 
424 Para.36; More on the theory of intergenerational equity as a concept that has largely influenced the 
development of international environmental law (see Fitzmaurice, supra, n.394, p.186 et seq.); For further 
commentary on this judgment, see, Nanda, supra n.374, p.57,58; 
425 Birnie, supra n.411, p.207. 
426 Idem, p.208. 
427 J. Ebbesson and P. Okowa, Environmental Justice in Situations of Armed Conflict, in, P. Okowa (ed.), 
Environmental law and justice in context, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.238. 
428 Legality  of  the Use by a  State of Nuclear  Weapons in Armed  Conflict,  Advisory  Opinion, I.C. J. Reports 
1996, p. 66. 
429 Para. 1 of Advisory Opinion. 
430 Para. 1. 
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of nuclear weapons should be presumed to be illegal. Judge Weeramantry in his dissenting 
opinion offers a similar reasoning, basing his views on the compelling medical facts 
surrounding the use of nuclear weapons and thus, the necessary attention that is to be 
given to the notion of prevention431.  
 
However, from the outset the Court observed that the question put before it related 
not to the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on health, but to the legality of the use of 
such weapons in view of their health and environmental effects (emphasis added in the 
Advisory Opinion)432. In this sense, it was considered that declaring the character of the use 
of nuclear weapons to be legal or illegal did not have any influence on the effects of their use 
or the requisite measures aimed at tackling these effects433. On a more substantive note, 
the Court considered that it could not give the requested opinion since WHO’s request did 
not relate to a question arising within the scope of the activities of that Organization, thus 
failing to satisfy the essential condition for founding the Court’s jurisdiction (Article 96(2) of 
the UN Charter enables specialized agencies to request advisory opinions of the Court on 
legal questions arising within the scope of their activities)434. 
 While the ICJ adopted a fail-safe approach by making a statement on the potentially 
devastating effects of the use of nuclear weapons, it nevertheless failed to make a direct 
link between the UN Charter law on armed conflicts and the global environmental law 
regime. The former validates the academic commentary regarding the ICJ’s history of 
‘tentative endorsement of international environmental law’435 and the Court’s tendency to 
interpret international environmental norms restrictively resulting in jus cogens rules of 
international law prevailing over environmental considerations436. 
 
b. The tribunals under the UNCLOS framework 
 
The focus of the discussion will now turn to the cumbersome MOX litigation where 
the origin of the issue concerned the discharges into the Irish Sea coming from the mixed 
oxide (MOX) fuel plant at the Sellafield nuclear facility in the UK. One part of the MOX legal 
                                                            
431 Judge Christopher Gregory Weeramantry, in point 5: “The futility of medical treatment after a nuclear 
catastrophe is a reason that cries out aloud for attention in the fields of planning and prevention, and it would be 
an irresponsible custodian of global health that stands aloof from that question, waiting for the medical 
catastrophe to occur in which it is powerless to extend any meaningful medical assistance”; 
432 Para. 21. 
433 Para. 22. 
434 Para. 31; For a critique, see point 5 of the Dissenting opinion Judge Christopher Gregory Weeramantry who 
argues that the it is not a case of lack of jurisdiction, but rather, fault regarding the status of the applicant 
requesting an opinion from the Court thus overstepping its prerogatives as a specialized agency. He considers 
that the compelling medical facts surrounding the use of nuclear weapons trump over this procedural ‘snag’, 
affording the WHO as a protector of global health the prerogative to seize itself with the issue of the legality 
of nuclear weapons. 
435 Klein, supra n.392, p.391. 
436 Idem, p.393. 
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saga was dealt with under the Union judicial system while the rest was covered before 
different international judicial fora. Originally, Ireland instituted proceeding against the UK 
relying on the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic (OSPAR) Art.9(2) regarding the Contracting Parties’ obligation to provide access to 
any available information on activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to affect the 
maritime area.  The OSPAR Arbitral Tribunal found that the UK did not breach the former 
provision (Final Award 2 July 2003, Ireland v UK, Dispute concerning access to information 
under Article 9 of the Ospar Convention)437. 
 
Almost coincidentally with instituting the OSPAR proceedings, Ireland commenced 
arbitral proceedings against the UK before a UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea) Arbitral Tribunal. Pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, Ireland 
requested the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to rule on provisional 
measures which consisted of ordering the UK to immediately suspend the authorisation of 
the operating license of the Sellafield MOX plant or alternatively, take appropriate 
measures to prevent, with immediate effect, the operation of the MOX plant. Additionally, 
Ireland requested that the UK immediately ensure there were no movements into or out of 
the waters under Irish jurisdiction of any radioactive substances, materials or wastes 
associated with the operation or the preparatory activities for the operation of the MOX 
plant438. The ITLOS did not rule on the material aspects of the case, but suggested that the 
UK and Ireland cooperate and enter into consultations in order to exchange information on 
the consequences for the Irish Sea arising from the commissioning of the MOX plant, 
monitor the effects on the Irish Sea of the operation of the MOX plant and introduce 
appropriate measures to counter the pollution of the marine environment linked thereto. 
The ITLOS did not grant the provisional measures requested by Ireland, putting the stress 
on the duty of cooperation as a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the 
marine environment. The decision not to grant Ireland the requested provisional measures 
can be seen as evidence of the facilitative role courts and tribunals play in relation to 
international environmental law disputes as the former frequently tend to reach an 
outcome that would be satisfactory to both parties i.e. one that emphasizes the importance 
of reaching a solution through mutual cooperation rather than normative regulation439. 
Such an approach is to be attributed to the uncertainties and ambiguities related to the 
extent of the normative character of international environmental law440.  
Concomitantly, the proceedings instituted before the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal 
were suspended since problems closely related to Community law had arisen implicating 
crucial procedural issues such as Ireland’s and the United Kingdom’s standing before the 
                                                            
437 http://pca-cpa.org/upload/files/OSPAR%20Award.pdf. 
438 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), case no. 10, 
Order of 3 December 2001, para.27. 
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Arbitral Tribunal, the division of competences between the European Union (Community) 
and its Member States with respect to the scope of the Convention, as well as the scope of 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU in the matter that initially gave rise to the 
proceedings441. The UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal took the view that, given the risk of reaching 
conflicting decisions and for the purpose of maintaining mutual respect and co-existence 
between the judicial organs, it would not have been appropriate to continue the 
proceedings without prior resolution of the issues that were related to Community law442.  
Being that the jurisdiction to review the matter hade been primarily deferred to the EU 
judicial fora, the issue appeared before the Court of Justice of the EU in Commission v 
Ireland (MOX)443 where the CJEU sanctioned Ireland for bringing proceedings under the 
dispute-settlement system instituted under the UNCLOS without previously informing and 
consulting with the competent Union institutions, thus failing to comply with its duty of 
cooperation under Articles 10 EC and 192 EA444. Essentially, the Court found that Ireland’s 
locus standi before the UNCLOS Tribunal had been pre-empted both by its duty of 
cooperation as a Member State under EU law and by the competence that the Union enjoys 
with regard to the matter at issue445. 
The chapter on the MOX saga finally closed in June 2008 when the UNCLOS Arbitral 
Tribunal issued Order No.6446, officialising the withdrawal of Ireland’s claim against the UK 
and the termination of the proceedings. Unfortunately, due to procedural defects, the 
substantive aspects of the issue were left untouched and therefore never decided upon. It is 
therefore still open for speculation what the decision on the merits of the case would have 
been had the issue of radioactive discharges originating from the MOX plant been dealt 
with in meritum either by the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal or the EU Court of Justice447. 
 
c. The European Court of Human Rights 
 
The text of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter, the Convention) 
does not contain provisions laying down environmental human rights guarantees. The 
reason for this is that in the early 1950s, when the Convention was originally adopted the 
                                                            
441 See, C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (MoX), para.43. Also, see Order No.3 on Susprension of Proceedings on 
Jurisdiction and Merits… (http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1148); 
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443 C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (MoX), ECR 2006 p. I-4635. 
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445 For more on the Commission v Ireland (MoX) case, see supra, Chapter 1, Section III.3.5; 
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universal need for environmental protection had not been as apparent448. To counter these 
shortcomings, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed an activist 
judicial approach by considering the Convention as a living instrument and thus, 
occasionally, opening the way for extensive interpretation thereof in the light of the 
dynamism of changing conditions449. In the field of environmental protection, this resulted 
in the right to a healthy environment being fitted into the wider scope of the right to respect 
for private and family file450. The right to a healthy environment understood in this sense 
encompasses the right to protection against various types of pollution and nuisances (such 
as those caused by harmful chemicals, offensive smells, noise etc)451. Moreover, as a direct 
consequence of this sort of progressive interpretation there has been a rise in the level of 
protection of rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention452. In cases involving 
environmental pollution and nuisances, the ECtHR has taken the position that severe 
environmental pollution is liable to affect the well-being of individuals in that it is disruptive 
on the enjoyment of their private and family life, while not necessarily seriously 
endangering their health (para.51 of the 1994 Lopez Ostra453 judgment, reiterated in 
para.60 of the 1998 Guerra454 judgment).  
Generally, applicants before the ECtHR have traditionally attempted three 
alternative routes in order to be able to fit these types of violations by states within the 
scope of the Convention, that is by relying on Art.2 (right to life), Art.6 (right to a fair trial) 
and Art.8 (right to respect for a person’s private and family life) of the Convention.  
 
Article 2: Right to life 
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a 
crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than abso-lutely necessary: 
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
(…) 
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Article 6: Right to a fair trial 
“1.  In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from 
all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life 
of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
2.  Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law. 
3.  Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and indetail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
(b)  to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he 
has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the 
interests of justice so require; 
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of wit-nesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him; 
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court. 
(…) 
Article 8: Right to respect for private and family life 
1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2.  There shall be no interference by a  public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”; 
 
Art.8 of the ECHR is most commonly invoked as legal grounds for claims concerning 
human health and environmental protection; it guarantees the individual’s right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence while precluding the 
interference on the part of public authorities in the exercise of this right455. Pursuant to the 
                                                            
455 On how the protection of the right to privacy and home life has evolved in ECtHR’s case law see, D. 
Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment: Substantive Rights, in, D.M. Ong, P. Merkouris and M. 
Fitzmaurice (eds.), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010, 
pp.275-279. 
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text of the article, the State bears a positive obligation to ensure the enjoyment of the 
individual’s right and a negative obligation not to interfere in the said enjoyment456. Thus, 
Art.8 is applicable both to environmental cases where pollution is directly caused by the 
State and cases where the State is responsible for its failure to act457. Regardless of whether 
a case is examined in the light of the positive duty of the State to take reasonable and 
appropriate measures to secure the applicant’s rights or, from the perspective of the duty 
of non-interference by a public authority, the applicable principles are similar458. Taking 
into account the tests on the proportionate balancing of interests with respect to the first 
and second paragraph of Art.8, the margin of appreciation is considerably wider in the case 
of positive obligations459 and is predicated on the existence of a procedural parameter for 
assessing the scope of the ‘positive obligation’ of the State, especially in environmental 
cases460.  
Cases of environmental damage directly caused by a State’s actions are rare in 
comparison to those where environmental damage is caused by other persons or entities 
whereby the authorities have not provided for an adequate redress461. The ECtHR has on 
occasion demonstrated a certain degree of self-restraint in establishing the referential 
procedural parameter: e.g. in the Hatton II462 case pertaining to the noise nuisance from 
London’s Heathrow Airport, the Court failed to address the existence of a different 
procedural parameter and confined the examination to whether the state had acted within 
its margin of appreciation in striking a balance between its own interests and environment 
protection concerns, stating that “(…)it would not be appropriate for the Court to adopt a 
special approach in this respect by reference to a special status of environmental human 
rights”463. 
The ECtHR has dealt with several cases related to nuclear energy projects with 
potential impact on the environment and the population that involved the application of 
Arts.2, 6 and 8. In Balmer-Schafroth464, regarding the extension of the operating license of a 
Swiss nuclear power plant, the applicants maintained that such an extension would have a 
nugatory effect on the life and health of the local population465. They originally brought the 
matter before the Swiss Federal Council (as part of the Swiss government executive) relying 
on the right to have their physical integrity protected from the risks connected to the use of 
                                                            
456 See, Case of Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom (Application no. 36022/97, judgment of 8 July 2003), 
para.98. 
457 Para.98 of the Hatton II judgment. 
458 Para.98 of the Hatton II judgment. 
459 D.J. Harris, M. O'Boyle, E.P. Bates and C.M. Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p.391. 
460 Idem, p.392. 
461 J.G. Merrills and A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe: A study of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Manchester University Press, 2001, p.156. 
462 Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom (Application no. 36022/97, judgment of 8 July 2003). 
463 Para.122 of Hutton II judgment. 
464 Balmer-Schafroth v Switzerland (1998) 25 EHRR 598. 
465 Para. 33. 
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nuclear energy466. In spite of the applicant’s claim, the Federal Council reached a decision in 
favor of extending the operating license based on the technical data it was provided with467, 
which the applicants did not consider as a judicial decision and demanded that a Swiss 
judicial body re-evaluate the issue, invoking Art.6(1) (“In the determination of his civil rights 
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law(…)”468). Regarding the applicability of Art.2 of the Convention, the Court 
held that the applicants had not established a direct link between the operating conditions 
of the power station they contested and their right to protection of their physical integrity 
since they failed to show that the power station exposed them personally to a danger “that 
was not only serious but also specific and above all imminent”469. Therefore, the connection 
between the Federal Council’s decision and the right invoked by the applicants was 
regarded as too tenuous and remote470.  
However, Judge Pettiti in his Dissenting Opinion (joined by judges Gölküklü, Walsh, 
Russo, Valticos, Lopes Rocha and Jambrek) suggested that in order for Art.6 (1) to apply, 
the applicant does not need to prove from the outset that a risk exists or what the exact 
consequences are. Likelihood for the occurrence of risk and damage should be sufficient 
proof of the existence of a link. He does not neglect to mention that the Court had been 
oblivious to a growing trend in international institutions and public international law as 
evident in the EU and the Council of Europe instruments on the environment, especially 
with regard to the application of the precautionary principle and the principle of 
conservation of the common heritage. The judge was also highly critical of the Court’s 
insistence on the tenuous character of the connection and the absence of an imminent 
danger to the environment and the population, thus begging the question whether the 
population first needs to be irradiated in order to be entitled to exercise the right to a 
remedy. 
  The case Athanassoglou471 was very similar to Balmer-Schafroth in that it involved 
the granting the extension for the operating license of a Swiss nuclear plant bringing into 
play the identical applicable domestic rules and the same grounds for raising the complaint 
(Art.6 (1))472. Applying the same reasoning as in the previous case, the Court considered the 
former article to be inapplicable to the facts of the case. In contrast to this, the Joint 
Dissenting Opinion of judges Costa, Tulkens, Fischbach, Casadevall and Maruste found 
there had indeed been a violation of Art.6(1) since it was impossible to determine if the 
applicants had been personally exposed to a danger that was serious, specific and above all, 
                                                            
466 Para.33 
467 Para. 37. 
468 Para. 36. 
469 Para. 40. 
470 Para. 40. 
471 Athanassoglou v Switzerland (2001) 31 EHRR 13. 
472 Para. 42. 
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immanent. The judges supported their claim with the argument that nuclear catastrophes 
that have happened in a number of countries were unforeseeable or in any event, 
unforeseen. In addition to this, they suggested there was also a violation of Art.13 ECHR 
according to which everyone whose rights have been violated under the Convention is 
entitled to an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in official capacity. They found that the 
Federal Council’s decision on extending the operating license (as a decision of an executive 
body) should be subject to judicial review under national law. According to the judges, the 
ECtHR in the instant case had acted as court of first instance, thus allowing for a 
governmental body to act as both judge and party given that the option to raise a challenge 
before the Swiss Federal Council against which body there was no appeal under Swiss law, 
did not in itself constitute an effective legal remedy.  
The disclosure of documents on radiation exposure levels of service personnel at the 
time of the UK Christmas Island nuclear tests used in support to their pension claims made 
before the UK Pensions Appeal Tribunal was at issue in the case McGinley and Egan473. The 
ECtHR found there had been no violation of Art.6(1) as the applicants failed to exhaust all 
available national procedures for the disclosure of documents. The Court equally 
considered Art.8 to be inapplicable to the case. Namely, the right of respect for private and 
family life presupposed an effective and accessible procedure to be established under 
national law enabling the persons to demand the relevant information474. The Court 
considered the available national procedures to be sufficient since they assured the 
applicants’ access to all the relevant and available information on radiation exposure levels 
surrounding the conducted nuclear tests as a hazardous activity that might have lead to 
adverse consequences on the health of those involved475. Nonetheless, the Court reminded 
that “the exposure to high levels of radiation is known to have hidden, but serious and long-
lasting effects on health, it is not unnatural that the applicants’ uncertainty as to whether or 
not they had been put at risk in this way caused them substantial anxiety and distress”476. 
Judge Pekkanen, in his Dissenting Opinion, was not persuaded that it had been 
satisfactorily demonstrated that the national procedures offered the applicants sufficient 
means to obtain the disclosure of documents477. According to the judge, the national 
procedure the Court had advised the applicants to avail themselves of did not exhaust the 
State’s positive obligation to provide the necessary means for the applicants to obtain 
access to information478.  
                                                            
473 McGinley and Egan v UK (1998) 27 EHRR 1. For more commentary on the case, see Chapter 3, Section VI; 
474 Para. 101. 
475 Para. 101. 
476 Para. 99. 
477 Point 4. 
478 Point 5. 
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Another relevant case in this regard is L.C.B. v United Kingdom479 which, unlike the 
previous cases, deals with the application of Art.2(1) ECHR (right to life). The material time 
of the facts of the case was once again the period of UK’s Christmas Island nuclear tests. 
The applicant, diagnosed with leukemia, claimed that the State’s failure to warn her 
parents of the possible risks to her health caused by her father’s participation in the nuclear 
tests and its earlier failure to monitor her father’s radiation dose levels gave rise to 
violations of Art 2(1) of the Convention480. However, the Court could not establish a causal 
link between the radiation exposure of the father and the diagnosed leukemia in a child 
subsequently conceived481. This position stemmed from the Court’s consideration that the 
information available to the State at the relevant time concerning the likelihood of the 
applicant’s father having been exposed to dangerous levels of radiation and of this creating 
a risk to the health of his unborn child was not conclusive. Therefore, it could not have been 
expected from the State to act on its own motion to notify the parents on the matter or 
take any other special action in relation thereto482. The judgment offers an important 
clarification with regard to the degree of scrutiny the ECtHR is prepared to perform in 
assessing the State’s Art.2(1) positive obligation to protect the individual’s right to life. The 
Court reminded that its task in the present case was confined to determining “(…) whether, 
given the circumstances of the case, the State did all that could have been required of it to 
prevent the applicant’s life from being avoidably put at risk”483. 
In defence of the ECtHR’s reticence to apply a more generous standard of 
appreciation in the nuclear-related cases, what needs to be taken into consideration is both 
the complex and delicate nature of the nuclear field and the issues arising therefrom as a 
result of which it is often difficult to successfully establish the existence of the requisite 
causal link between the State’s action/inaction and the harmful effects of radiation on the 
population and the environment. It could be argued that the foregoing cases demonstrate a 
‘politically correct’ approach on the part of the Court, which, inter alia, considered the issue 
of nuclear testing to be inherent to the national security interests of States. Quite plausibly, 
one could further suggest that the ECtHR was indeed in a position to make up for the 
enounced procedural deficiencies by attempting a preventive or, even, a precautionary 
approach to the matter which, in turn, is not always as straightforward to substantiate. The 
result is that, at least for the time being, the environmental and human health effects 
attributed to nuclear activities have evaded any substantive scrutiny before the Strasbourg 
court. By comparison, the ECtHR’s Luxembourg counterpart has had a relatively better 
                                                            
479 L.C.B. v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 212. For further commentary on the case, see Chapter 3, Section 
VI; 
480 Para. 24. 
481 Para.39. 
482 Para. 41. 
483 Para. 36; For an elaborate account, see, Harris, supra n.459, p.42. 
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track record of being more receptive to arguments relative to health and environmental 
protection in the nuclear field, however, not always to the fully desirable extent484. 
 
 
 
II.2. Euratom and the EU Environmental Policy  
 
II.2.1. The health and safety policy of the Euratom in the wider context of environmental 
protection 
 
The intrinsic and indivisible link that exists between the health and safety policy 
developed under the Euratom Treaty and the Union environmental policy has engendered 
a significant interface between the two respective legislative frameworks created 
thereunder. The health and safety provisions of the Euratom Treaty take up a substantial 
part of the subject matter covered by the Treaty and their prominence, in retrospect, 
proves all the greater given that these provisions were considered to be the closest 
reference to ‘environmental protection’ included in the founding treaties485. The provisions 
relative to environmental protection under the Union construct stricto sensu and thus, the 
Union (Community) environmental policy, were introduced into the Union Treaties as late 
as in 1987 with the adoption of the Single European Act486. For this reason, certain authors 
consider the most significant environmentally relevant legal bases outside of the Union 
framework to be found in the Euratom Treaty487. The nature of the former argument may 
seem slightly one-sided given that it is questionable whether the Euratom Treaty provisions 
can be presumed as being specifically directed at environmental protection as an integral 
concept, or, indeed, only partially cover the former concept i.e. to the extent that it 
concerns the protection of human health488.  
For the purpose of determining the extent and the intensity of the interface 
between the Euratom health and safety policy and the Union environmental policy, the aim 
and objective of the Euratom health and safety provisions need to be looked at more 
                                                            
484 On the case law of the CJEU on nuclear health and safety, consult infra, Section II.2. 
485 D. Edward and W. Robinson, The Court of Justice and Environmental Protection, in, D. S. MacDougall and 
T. W. Wälde (eds.), European Community Energy Law : Selected topics, Graham&Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 
1994, p.152. 
486 On the stages of the development of European Community environmental policy, see, J.H. Jans and H.B. 
Vedder, European Environmental Law, Europa Law Publishing, 2008, p.3 et seq.; 
487 Idem, p.81.  
488 L. Kramer, EC Environmental Law, Sweet&Maxwell, 2000, p.269; Kramer argues that energy measures 
based on the Euratom Treaty do not target the impact of nuclear energy on the environment in any significant 
way since they mainly consider the effects borne on human health by nuclear energy, not on the fauna and 
flora or any other environmental assets. 
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closely and placed into the wider context of the concept of environmental protection. To 
begin with, the core objective enounced under the ‘Health and Safety’ chapter of the 
Euratom Treaty (Arts.30 et seq.) is to lay down the basic standards within the Community 
for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers 
arising from ionizing radiations489 while Art.35 Euratom introduces an obligation for 
Member States regarding the establishment of the necessary facilities that perform 
continuous monitoring of the level of radioactivity in the air, water and soil (the Commission 
having the right of access to such facilities in order to verify their operation and 
efficiency)490.  
Further on, under Art.37 Euratom, dealing with the disposal of radioactive waste, 
Member States are obligated to communicate to the Commission the general data relating 
to any plan for the disposal of radioactive waste in whatever form which enables the former 
to determine whether “the implementation of such plan is liable to result in the radioactive 
contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State”. By virtue of Art.38, 
in the execution of its tasks, the Commission makes recommendations to the Member 
States regarding the levels of radioactivity in the air, water and soil (the reference to ‘fauna 
and flora’ being absent from the treaty text).  
 As can be inferred from the foregoing language of the Euratom Treaty, while the 
human health protection objective is clearly predominant and over-arching, the aspect that 
provides the link between the health and safety provisions and the objective of 
environmental protection lies in the reference to ‘air, water and soil’ as a reference which, in 
turn, only partially covers the ‘broad’ definition of the concept of environmental protection 
(and the ‘narrow’ definition, for that matter, being that the difference between the two is 
that the latter excludes the notion of protection of human health)491. Hence, the narrowly 
defined concept of ‘environment protection’ which comprises the protection of ‘water, air, 
soil, and fauna and flora’ as environmental assets, has been incompletely and non-
exhaustively covered by the Euratom Treaty. Moreover, to the difference of the provisions 
of the ‘Health and Safety’ chapter which specifically target the protection of the health of 
workers and the general public (Arts. 30 et seq.), Arts.37 and 38 Euratom have no real 
regulatory ‘bite’ as they do not lend themselves as potential legal bases for the adoption of 
                                                            
489 According to Art.30 Euratom, the term ‘basic standards’ refers to:  
(a) maximum permissible doses compatible with adequate safety;  
(b) maximum permissible levels of exposure and contamination;  
(c) the fundamental principles governing the health surveillance of workers. 
490 Under Art.36 Euratom, the competent national authorities periodically communicate information on the 
checks referred to in Art.35 to the Commission, keeping the former informed of the level of radioactivity to 
which the public is exposed. 
491 Literature has not been very prescriptive in defining for the elusive term ‘environment’. Authors disagree as 
to whether the scope of the term should be confined to the notion of natural environment or also include 
other elements of the environment, such as human health (See, Fitzmaurice, supra n.394, p.24). An erratic 
pattern of approaches is discernible with regard to the definition for ‘environment’, fostered by a number of 
prominent international environmental law instruments. For a wider discussion on this, see, Fitzmaurice, 
supra n.394, pp.22-28; 
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legislative measures and can only be relied upon as grounds for conducting the data 
collection and the adoption of recommendations492. 
It follows that the emphasis in the Euratom Treaty is put primarily on the protection 
of the health of humans (the workers and the general public), which in itself is not sufficient 
so as to conclude that the Euratom Treaty completely excludes environmental protection 
from its scope and consequently does not endorse an environmental approach towards 
radiation protection. In fact, even if the Treaty fails to ascribe to a broad definition of 
environmental protection or even comprehensively uphold the narrow definition thereof, 
the reality is that one could not artificially divorce the ‘human health protection’ 
component from the ‘protection of air, water, soil’ as the former would, effectively, amount 
to depriving the Euratom Treaty’s health and safety provisions from attaining their full 
effect. Manifestly, the former two concepts are inextricably linked since the quality of the 
health of humans is directly derived from and dependent on the quality of their living 
environment i.e. the surrounding ‘air, water and soil’ space493. 
                                                            
492See, Hökmark Report, supra, p.48; The extent to which the the institutions have made use of their 
prerogatives flowing from Arts.37 and 38 Euratom is a different matter. For an analysis, consult the following 
documents: 1999/829/Euratom: Commission Recommendation of 6 December 1999 on the application of 
Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty OJ L 324, 16/12/1999 p. 0023 – 0043; 2000/473/Euratom Commission 
Recommendation of 8 June 2000 on the application of Article 36 of the Euratom Treaty concerning the 
monitoring of the levels of radioactivity in the environment for the purpose of assessing the exposure of the 
population as a whole (notified under document number C(2000) 1299); 2010/635/Euratom: Commission 
Recommendation of 11 October 2010 on the application of Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty OJ L 279, 
23.10.2010, p. 36–67;   
493 By comparison, under the head of the Union’s environmental policy a clearly broad approach towards the 
notion of ‘environment protection’ has been embraced. In fact, the protection of human health figures among 
the objectives of the Union environmental policy (Art.192(1) TFEU). However, in this respect, a different 
problem of interpretation has arisen with the introduction of a separate chapter for the Union’s public health 
policy in the TFEU, different from that of the Union’s environmental policy. The dividing line between the two 
policies has proven to be significantly blurred both in the practice of EU institutions and the case law of the EU 
Court of Justice.  
For this reason, the differentiation between the notions of ‘human health’ as covered under Art.192 TFEU et 
seq. (the Union environmental policy), and the notions of ‘public health’ and ‘human health’ as used in the 
context of Art.168 TFEU et seq. (the Union public health policy) persists to be unclear (On this, see, Kramer, 
EC Environmental Law, Sweet and Maxwell, 2003, p.12 (ft.49)). Kramer gives the example of Case C-293/97 
Standley (1999 ECR I-2603) where the Court considered Directive 91/676 on the protection of water from 
nitrates pollution to be aimed at protecting public health in spite of its ‘environmental protection’ legal basis 
(then, Art.130 EC on the EC environmental policy). 
Furthemore, regarding the use of the concepts of public health and human health interchangeably, the 
Chernobyl I case concerned the choice of a correct legal basis for Regulation No.3955/87 fixing maximum 
permitted levels of radioactive contamination in response to a concern to protect public health, where the EU 
Court of Justice stated that, “the protection of public health is also one of the objectives of Community action in 
environmental matters (…)”493.  Contra to the Court’s reasoning, Advocate General Darmon was reluctant to 
accept that protection of public health falls entirely within the concept of environment since contributing to 
the protection of human health as one of the objectives of Union’s (Community) action relating to the 
environment does not entail that all “(…) preoccupations of that kind are exclusively reserved to the sphere of 
environmental matter”493. The reason for the Court’s ‘inclusive’ approach may have been the fact that the 
separate treaty chapter on public health did not exist at the material time of the case as it was introduced 
later on with the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Hence, in the absence of an express treaty basis specific to the 
protection of human health, the provisions on the Union environmental policy were considered as the most 
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II.2.2. The ‘environmental approach’ to radiation protection and nuclear safety 
endorsed at the international and the EU level 
 
In the context of examining the breadth of the outreach of the Euratom Treaty’s 
health and safety provisions regarding the concept of environmental protection, another 
concept that equally deserves attention is ‘radiation protection’ which is a concept which 
fully encapsulates and is inherently linked with the objectives of health protection and 
nuclear safety enounced under the Euratom Treaty. Similarly to the evasive definition of 
‘environmental protection’, a broad and a narrow approach to radiation protection have 
been advanced, predicated upon the choice of a broad as opposed to a narrow approach 
applied in examining the relationship between EU’s human health protection and 
environmental protection frameworks.  
From the outset, a preliminary clarification is required regarding the definition of the 
terms ‘radiation protection’ and ‘nuclear safety’. The former implies the setting out of 
parameters for radiation doses and radioactivity levels originating from various sources of 
radiation, whereas the latter relates to the safety of the design and operation of nuclear 
power plants and other nuclear facilities as sources of radiation494. The way in which the 
two concepts complement each other has been reflected in the definition espoused by the 
IAEA for radiation protection and nuclear safety. According to IAEA’s Safety Glossary - 
Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection495, radiation protection is 
understood as the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks, while 
nuclear safety represents the safety of facilities and activities giving rise to radiation 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
suitable ‘proxy’ to attaining the objective of protection of human health. However, in view of the imminent 
correlation between human health protection and environment protection, these two policies will in the 
future persist to be subjected to a frequent intertwining between of respective legal bases.  
The former approach has been consistently followed by the Union legislators in their choice between the 
treaty provisions on public health and those on environmental protection as potential legal basis for 
Union/Euratom acts (See, for example, Directive 2002/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 January 2003 setting standards of quality and safety for the collection, testing, processing, storage and 
distribution of human blood and blood components and amending Directive 2001/83/EC (based on then, 
Art.168 TFEU (ex-Art.152 EC) on public health); Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 31 March 2004 on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, 
processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells (based on Art.168 TFEU (ex-
Art.152 EC) which have a clear public health protection objective. Conversely see, Council Directive 
1999/13/EC of 11 March 1999 on the limitation of emissions of volatile organic compounds due to the use of 
organic solvents in certain activities and installations, which also mentions the protection of human health as 
one of its objectives and is however based on Art.192 TFEU (ex-Art.130 EC; the Union environmental policy 
provisions); 
494 Molodstova, E. "Nuclear Energy and Environmental Protection: Responses of International Law." Pace 
Environmental Law Review, 1994, p.190. 
495 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Glossary: Terminology used in Nuclear Safety and 
Radiation Protection, 2007 edition, IAEA, 2007;  
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risks496. The EU Court of Justice embraced the former definitions in the Nuclear Safety 
Convention Case C-29/99, where in order to define the Union (Community) competence in 
the field of nuclear safety it refused to draw an artificial distinction between the protection 
of the health of the general public and the safety of sources of ionising radiation497, thus 
aligning with the appraisal of the evolution of the disciplines of ‘nuclear safety’ and 
‘radiation protection’ offered in AG Jacobs’s Opinion in the same case498. According to AG 
Jacobs, the two concepts had originally been treated as separate and not impinging upon 
each other with nuclear safety being focused on the technological safety of nuclear 
installations and radiation protection being concerned with the maximum exposure levels 
and dose limits for workers and the population499. However, the rapidly changing 
conditions in the global nuclear sector inevitably lead to the two formerly separate and 
autonomous domains to partially coincide: in addition to its core technological aspect, 
nuclear safety gradually developed a radiation protection aspect thereto, whereas radiation 
protection grew increasingly concerned with limiting radiation exposures through 
strengthening of the control over radiation sources (including nuclear installations)500.  
 
The dynamic concept of radiation protection and the different approaches adopted 
with regard thereto will now be elaborated. In this sense, once more, a broad and a narrow 
view on radiation protection are to be put forward, where the broad view is one which 
couples the human health protection requirements together with the requirements specific 
to the protection of ‘air, water, soil, flora and fauna’ (i.e. the narrowly construed notion of 
‘environment’). In practical terms, adopting a broad approach to radiation protection 
presupposes an ‘environmental protection’ approach to radiation protection as opposed to 
the narrow one which implies a restrictive view that only includes ‘human health 
protection’. In order to arrive at the ‘correct approach’ to be followed, first and foremost, an 
insight must be provided into the approaches taken in the texts of various international and 
regional instruments, followed by a comparative view of individual EU institutions’ views on 
the matter (the Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the EU Court of Justice). 
 
The approaches regarding radiation protection devised at both the international and 
the EU level have varied from inclusive to completely exclusionary in view of the extent of 
their endorsement of the concept of ‘environment protection’. According to the original 
definition of radiological protection given by the International Commission on Radiological 
Protection (ICRP), the environment is to be considered as sufficiently protected as long as 
human beings are deemed sufficiently protected being preoccupied with the issue of 
radiation protection only to the extent that the former coincides with the concept of human 
                                                            
496 P.2 of the Glossary. 
497 Para. 82 of judgment. 
498 Para.81 of the judgment; See also, Paras.123-132 of Opinion. 
499 Para. 132 of Opinion. 
500 Para. 132 of Opinion. 
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environment i.e. to the extent that the radiological protection of man is directly affected501. 
Since the 1990s there has been a departure from this restrictive view spurred by the rise in 
prominence of environmental protection concerns and the increased proliferation of 
international and regional legal instruments in the field of environmental protection. 
Therefore, the ICRP is no longer predicating ‘environment protection’ on ‘human health 
protection’, but rather offers a unique and independent outlook on the former concept by 
introducing a more extensive approach to the relationship between radiation protection 
and the environment  which aims to prevent/reduce “(…) radiation effects in the 
environment to a level where they would have a negligible impact on the maintenance of 
biological diversity, the conservation of species, or the health and status of natural habitats, 
communities, and ecosystems”502. The foregoing is evidence to an extension in the scope of 
the ICRP definition of radiation protection as one which is not confined to the notion of 
‘human environment’, but equally aims to include the broader eco-system503.  
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s approach to radiation protection 
has also been one to evolve with time. The IAEA Statute as the Agency’s founding act fails 
to provide a specific and concrete reference to environment protection, the closest 
reference thereto being found in the provisions on ‘Health and Safety’ of Art.III. It has been 
speculated that the absence of an express reference is accounted for by the fact that at the 
time the IAEA Statute was adopted the potential risks inherent to the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy had not been as evident as those resulting from military uses504. 
Nevertheless, other IAEA official documents and publications such as the recently reviewed 
IAEA Safety Standards of 2014 accord equal importance to the protection of humans and 
the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation505. The former exhibits an 
                                                            
501 Molodstova, supra n.494, p.192. 
502 Abstract of Annals of the ICRP, vol 38 issues 4-6, 2008: ICRP Publication 108 - Environmental Protection - the 
Concept and Use of Reference Animals and Plants 
(http://www.icrp.org/publication.asp?id=ICRP%20Publication%20108); 
In addition, in the Abstract of Annals of the ICRP, vol 38 issues 4-6, 2008: ICRP Publication 108 - Environmental 
Protection - the Concept and Use of Reference Animals and Plants, the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection considered it necessary “ (…) to address, directly, the subject of protection of the 
environment, although it acknowledged that there is no simple or single universal definition of ‘environmental 
protection’, and that the concept differs between countries and from one circumstance to another. It is a very 
large and complicated subject. Nevertheless, the Commission did consider it appropriate to set out some high-
level ambitions with regard to environmental protection and the specific issue of potential radiation effects, and 
thus included within its general aims those of wishing to prevent or reduce the frequency of deleterious radiation 
effects in the environment to a level where they would have a negligible impact on the maintenance of biological 
diversity, the conservation of species, or the health and status of natural habitats, communities, and ecosystems..  
The Commission also stated, however, that it believed that its approach to environmental protection should be 
commensurate with the overall level of risk (and thus optimised), and that it should be compatible with other 
approaches being made to protect the environment.” 
http://www.icrp.org/publication.asp?id=ICRP%20Publication%20108); 
503 See, also, ICRP, Protection of the Environment under Different Exposure Situtation, ICRP Publication 124, 
Ann. ICRP 43(1); 
504 Molodstova, supra n.494, p.201. 
505 The IAEA Safety Standards set out the basic requirements for protection of people against exposure to 
ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. See, Safety Standards for protecting people and the 
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important shift in approach in comparison to the language used in the 1996 IAEA Basic 
Safety Standards which predominantly focused on the protection of people against 
exposure to ionizing radiation and the safety of radiation sources506. 
 
In addition, a significant change in IAEA’s view can equally be observed in the 2007 
IAEA Safety Glossary - Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection where a 
prevalent use of the phrase ‘safety standards for protecting people and the environment 
from harmful effects of ionizing radiation’ can be observed. In addition, it needs to be 
reminded that under various other official IAEA documents, the term radiation protection 
has been construed as ‘protection of people and the environment against radiation risks’507. 
Furthermore, an environmental approach to radiation protection has also been fully 
endorsed in Principle 8 of the IAEA fundamental principles which reads as follows: 
“Whereas the effects of radiation exposure on human health are relatively well understood, 
albeit with uncertainties, the effects of radiation on the environment have been less 
thoroughly investigated (…) The general intent of the measures taken for the purposes of 
environmental protection has been to protect ecosystems against radiation exposure 
that would have adverse consequences for populations of a species (as distinct from 
individual organisms)”508. 
 
Coming to the EU level, it follows from the discussion supra regarding the areas of 
intersection between the Euratom health and safety policy and the Union’s environmental 
policy that the Euratom Treaty has only to a limited extent ascribed to an ‘environmental 
protection’ approach to radiation protection. The Treaty’s reference to ‘air, water and soil’, 
which neglects to include ‘fauna and flora’ as a crucial component of the environment, 
additionally prevents that the Euratom’s approach to radiation protection be qualified as 
fully ‘environmental’. However, the former is not completely indicative of Euratom’s overall 
approach to radiation protection which has further evolved pursuant to the terminology 
employed in Directive 96/29/EURATOM of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards 
for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising 
from ionizing radiation and its successor, Directive 2013/59/EURATOM laying down basic 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
environment: Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, IAEA, 
2014 (http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1578_web-57265295.pdf), p.17, 18, 21, 22 and 24. 
506 Safety Series No. 115, IAEA 1996, International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing 
Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub996_EN.pdf; 
For a discussion on the legal status of the IAEA Safety Standards, see, Veuchelen, L., The Legal Value of 
General Principles, Technical Norms and Standards in European Nuclear Safety Law: The Imbalance Between 
Soft and Hard Law and the Need for Global Regulatory Governance, European Energy and Environmental Law 
Review, 2009, Vol. 18 Issue 4, p.219 et seq.; 
507IAEA Safety Glossary: Terminology used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, IAEA, 2007;  Also, for a 
list of recent IAEA publications, see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/documents/recent-
pubs.asp?s=11&l=84;  
508 IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1 (2006); Emphasis added. 
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safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising 
radiation509. Namely, while both the directives carry a prevalent human health protection 
objective, the former attempted an ‘environmental’ definition for the term ‘radioactive 
contamination’ defining the term as “the contamination of any material, surface or 
environment or of an individual by radioactive substances”510. The 2013 Directive, however, 
clearly puts the emphasis on the protection of the health of individuals subject to 
occupational, medical and public exposures against the dangers arising from ionising 
radiation511, stipulating that its provisions apply to risks “from exposure to ionising radiation 
which cannot be disregarded from a radiation protection point of view or with regard to 
the environment in view of long-term human health protection”512. 
 
In establishing the existence of an ‘environmental’ approach to radiation protection, 
it would also prove useful to gain insight into the stance of the EU institutions in the matter 
which can be qualified as mostly environmental, but, however, short of consistent. Among 
the majority of institutions, there is a noticeable tendency not to prioritize or in any way 
favor the health protection over the environmental protection objective.  
The European Parliament was involved in a back-and-forth with the Commission 
regarding the initial proposal for the Directive establishing a Community framework for the 
nuclear safety of nuclear installations513 where the Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee 
examined the possibility of basing the Directive on the Treaty’s environmental policy 
provisions thus accommodating both the technological aspects and environmental aspects 
of nuclear safety514. The Legal Affairs Committee remarked the insistence on the part of the 
Parliament’s Industry Committee that environmental protection considerations be 
incorporated into the scope of the Directive through the insertion of a provision regarding 
the IAEA fundamental principles reflecting the environmental protection concerns515. The 
                                                            
509 OJ 2014 L 13/1. 
510 See, Title I Definitions; See also on this, Molodstova, supra n.494, p.229 (Molodstova discusses the Basic 
Safety Standards Directive’s pre-cursor - Directive 80/836/Euratom where the identical approach to radiation 
protection was upheld). 
511 Art.1 of the Directive. 
512 Emphasis added; Art.2 of the Directive. In the course of preparation of the final text of the 2013 Directive, 
there was a version of the draft directive (Proposal for a Council Directive laying down basic safety standards 
for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, European Commission, 
Brussels, 30.5.2012 COM(2012) 242 final 2011/0254 (NLE)) which carried an eco-centric component, consisting 
of targeting the reinforcement of the Euratom regime for the protection of the non-human environment (and 
including a separate chapter on ‘Protection of the environment’ for this purpose). The text of the proposed 
directive was not solely aimed at reinforcing the overall health and safety protection regime under the 
Euratom; it went on further in developing a broader notion of environmental protection as encompassing 
both the human and the non-human environment.  
513
 Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear 
safety of nuclear installations  OJ L 172 P. 0018 – 0022. 
514 Hökmark Report, European Parliament Report on the proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up 
a Community framework for nuclear safety of nuclear installations, A6-0236/2009, at p.40. 
515 Hökmark Report, p.46. 
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former Committee took special note of Art.2 of the draft Directive which defined “nuclear 
safety” as “the achievement of proper operating conditions through measures taken with a 
view to the prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in 
protection of workers, general public and the air, water and soil from undue radiation 
hazards arising from nuclear installations”516.  
 
It appeared that the centre of gravity of the proposed directive was nuclear safety in 
general, the main objective being to supplement the basic standards previously laid down 
in the Basic Safety Standards Directive 96/29/Euratom in order to ensure that a high level of 
safety of nuclear installations is attained and constantly improved517. The explicit reference 
to environment in Art.2 had indicated that, for the purposes of the Directive, nuclear safety 
needed to include environment protection requirements, in addition to the requirements 
regarding the protection of the health of workers and the general public518. However, being 
that the main thrust of the instrument was considered to be in the enhancement of the 
existing system of radiation standards laid down by Directive 96/29/Euratom whereas none 
of the provisions set out in the proposed directive were specifically aimed at protection 
against threats to the environment519. Eventually, the Committee inferred that in spite of 
the ‘inclusive’ definition for nuclear safety in Art.2, the protection of the environment was 
not covered by Art.31 Euratom (basic health and safety standards provision) whereas it 
regarded the ‘air, water and soil’ reference of Arts.37 and 38 Euratom as lacking the 
potential to provide a legal basis for the adoption of legislative measures and therefore 
upheld Arts.31 and 32 as the Directive’s appropriate ‘center of gravity’520.  
 
The Commission took an important cue from the Parliamentary Committee’s 
appraisal and the Art.2 reference to ‘air, water and soil’ was removed from the definition of 
nuclear safety in the final text of the Directive adopted in June 2009. In the present text 
"nuclear safety" is defined as the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention 
of accidents and mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers 
and the general public from dangers arising from ionizing radiations from nuclear 
installations521. Nevertheless, the lawmakers did not go completely oblivious to 
‘environment protection’, the former having found its place in the Directive’s preamble: 
“(…) the provisions of Chapter 3 of the [Euratom] Treaty, related to health and safety, form 
a coherent whole conferring upon the Commission powers of some considerable scope in 
                                                            
516 Emphasis added; Hökmark Report, p.45. 
517 Hökmark Report, p.46. 
518 Hökmark Report, p.46. 
519 Hökmark Report, supra, p.47. 
520 Hökmark Report, supra, p.48. 
521 Art.2 of the Directive. Although the Directive was subsequently amended by Directive 2014/87/EURATOM 
amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear 
installations (OJ 2014 L 219/42) the definition of ‘nuclear safety’ provided therein has remained unaffected. 
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order to protect the population and the environment against risks of nuclear 
contamination”522. 
Unlike the European Parliament, the Commission has not been as keen on the 
prospect of widening the scope of the Euratom health and safety provisions which is to be 
expected bearing in mind the role accorded to the Commission in the legislative process as 
the institution holding the monopoly over Union legislation proposal. Namely, the 
Commission could not venture on drafting a legislative act that would depart from the 
circumscribed scope of application of the Euratom Treaty provisions thereby risking the act 
to be declared invalid before the Court of Justice. By exception, the former would arguably 
be possible in the presence of progressive case law of the EU courts paving the way for a 
broad construction of the Euratom Treaty’s provisions concerning radiation protection523. 
Nevertheless, there have been a panoply of Commission policy documents pertaining to 
radiation protection that have acknowledged the importance of environmental protection, 
while viewing it as an objective which is distinct and subsidiary to the original health 
protection objective written into the Euratom Treaty524.  
In the context of nuclear safety, the Council of the EU has been open to pairing the 
concept of protection of the health of the population and workers together with the 
concept of protection of the environment from dangers resulting from ionizing radiation, 
recognizing the progress the Union has been making in providing a satisfactory threshold 
of protection thereof in a number of resolutions specifically related to the matter525. 
                                                            
522 Emphasis added; Recital 5 of the Preamble; For this, see also, European Parliament, Report on Assessing 
Euratom – 50 Years of European nuclear energy policy, FINAL A6-0129/2007. The Parliament considered that 
the provisions of 
the Euratom Treaty that have helped prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials along with those which 
address health, safety and the prevention of radiological contamination, should be carefully coordinated with 
the health and safety provisions of the EC Treaty (point 26 of Report);  
523 For example, the Preamble of the Nuclear Safety Directive makes a direct reference to the case law of the 
EU Court of Justice, at point 4. 
524 For an overview of the Commission’s stance, see the following documents: Commission Communication to 
the Council, The Development of Community measures for the application of Chapter III of the Euratom 
Treaty ‘Health and Safety’ COM/86/434FINAL; 1999/829/Euratom: Commission Recommendation of 6 
December 1999 on the application of Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty (notified under document number 
C(1999) 3932)  Official Journal L 324 , 16/12/1999 P. 0023 – 0043; 2000/473/Euratom: Commission 
recommendation of 8 June 2000 on the application of Article 36 of the Euratom Treaty concerning the 
monitoring of the levels of radioactivity in the environment for the purpose of assessing the exposure of the 
population as a whole (notified under document number C(2000) 1299); 2010/635/Euratom: Commission 
Recommendation of 11 October 2010 on the application of Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty OJ L 279, 
23.10.2010, p. 36–67;   
To the contrary, in the oral proceedings in the C-29/99 Nuclear Safety Convention case, where the CJEU 
examined Euratom’s competence in the field of nuclear safety, the Commission expressed the view that 
Arts.30 et seq. of the Euratom Treaty and the relevant articles of the Nuclear Safety Convention pursued the 
same core objective, which was that of protection of the people and the environment against ionizing 
radiation (see para.117 AG Jacobs Opinion in C-29/99). 
525 See, Preamble of Council Resolution of 18 June 1992 on the technological problems of nuclear safety (92/C 
172/02), Council Resolution of 18 June 1992 on the technological problems of nuclear safety  OJ C 172, 
8.7.1992, p. 2–3; 
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The role of the EU Court of Justice in this respect is equally not to be neglected as the 
former has directly contributed to a progressive extension of the scope of application of the 
Euratom Treaty provisions pertaining to radiation protection. Back in the late 1980s, in its 
Cattenom526 judgment concerning the disposal of radioactive waste from a French nuclear 
power plant in Cattenom, the EU Court of Justice noted that the health and safety 
provisions of the Euratom Treaty conferred upon the Commission powers of considerable 
scope in the protection of the population and the environment against the risks of nuclear 
contamination527. This statement conveys a fully-embraced environmental approach on the 
part of the Court stemming from its tendency to interpret the Euratom health and safety 
provisions extensively so as to include environment protection into their scope528. In the 
Chernobyl I case, confronted with the issue of maximum permitted levels of radioactive 
contamination being fixed in response to a concern to protect public health, the Court 
viewed the protection of public health as one of the objectives of Community action in 
environmental matters529, quite the opposite from AG Darmon, who was not convinced 
that the protection of public health fell entirely and exclusively within the concept of 
environment530. According to AG Darmon, the fact that protection of human health falls 
under one of the objectives of Community environmental action does not presuppose that 
issues of that kind are exclusively reserved to the sphere of environmental matters531. It also 
needs to be pointed out that at the time of the deliberation of these cases the Union’s 
public health policy had not yet been introduced as such. Nevertheless, the former was not 
determinative for the Court’s willingness to couple the public health and the environmental 
protection objectives for the purpose of tackling with the dangers arising from the use of 
nuclear energy. The Court did not subsequently abandon its broad approach, as both in C-
61/03 Commission v UK and C-65/04 Commission v UK it again referred to the “(…) the vital 
importance of the objective of protecting the health of the public and the environment 
against the dangers related to the use of nuclear energy (…)”532.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
“(…) Whereas the issue of nuclear safety is an important one, particularly with regard to the protection of the 
health of the population and of workers as well as the protection of the environment from the dangers 
resulting from ionizing radiation, particularly in the view of the developments which have taken place 
throughout Europe,(…) 
RECOGNIZES the progress towards an equivalent and satisfactory degree of protection of the population and 
of the environment in the Community at the highest practical safety levels, as called for in the 1975 resolution, 
and in contributing to the international acceptance of similar high safety levels (…)”;  
526 C-187/87 Saarland v. Minister for Industry ECR 1988 p.5013. For an appraisal of a different aspect of the 
Cattenom judgment, see supra, Chapter 1, Section III.3.3; 
527 Para.11 of judgment. 
528 The Opinion of AG Slynn in the Cattenom case follows the same approach. 
529 Para.18 of judgment. 
530 Para.33 of Opinion. 
531 Para.33 of Opinion. 
532 Emphasis added; Para.44 of the former and Para.28 of the latter judgment; See, for a similar favorable 
extension, AG Geelhoed’s Opinion in C-61/03 Commission v UK: “(…) the objectives underpinning Chapter 3 of 
the EAEC Treaty – public health and safety and environmental protection – have, since the entry into force of 
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Finally, in the Temelin533 case where the Court discussed the potentially nugatory 
effects of the operation of a Czech nuclear power plant on part of the Austrian population 
living at the border with the Czech Republic, it recognized that it was “(…) common ground 
that [the Euratom] Treaty contains a set of rules relating precisely to the protection of 
populations and the environment against ionising radiations”534 and reiterated its 
Cattenom judgment dictum that the provisions of Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty form a 
coherent whole conferring upon the Commission powers of considerable scope for the 
purpose of protecting the population and the environment against the risks of nuclear 
contamination535.  
Consequently, it can be firmly held that the EU Court of Justice has endorsed an 
environmental approach to radiation protection, treating the concepts of ‘radiation 
protection’ and ‘environmental protection’ as inextricably linked and giving a green light to 
the practice of extrapolation of the Euratom health and safety provisions to the field of 
environmental protection536. It would seem that the Court sees the former as ‘impliedly’ 
written into the Euratom Treaty to the extent that the linking of the two concepts is most 
often a natural occurrence in the wider context of the application of the Euratom Treaty, 
independent of any hidden agendas or deeply rooted political motives.  
 
II.2.3 The overlap between the Euratom devised policies and the Union environmental 
policy through the use of secondary law instruments 
 
Coming again to the issue of extrapolation of legal rules between the domains of 
nuclear energy and the environment (elaborated supra for the international level) what 
follows is an insight into the patterns of extrapolation discerned at the EU level where there 
are a number of Union acts containing provisions which, comprehensively or marginally, 
cover a particular nuclear energy aspect (e.g., radioactive waste or other radioactive 
matter-related nuisances, nuclear power plant construction planning), and vice versa. The 
former type of extension of legal rules occurs more frequently and concerns issues which 
have not been regulated under the scope of the Euratom, either due to lack of an express 
competence prescribed under the Euratom Treaty for regulation to occur or due to the fact 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
the Treaty, consistently been viewed as being of the utmost importance.”(Para.77 of Opinion); Both C-61/03 
Commission v UK and C-65/04 Commission v UK will be looked at more closely, however from a different angle, 
infra, in Chapter 4, Section IV.3.; 
533 For the Temelin judgment, see also supra, Chapter 1, Section III.3.6. and Chapter 2 Section I.3. 
534 Emphasis added; Para.83 of judgment. 
535 Para. 118. 
536 Some authors consider that any confusion regarding application of the environmental policy standards and 
principles to the Euratom field would be removed when the scenario of assimilating the Euratom Treaty to 
the TFEU materializes (see, True, supra n.6, p.15); 
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that the Euratom has not yet acted in the direction of regulating a particular area, thus 
making way for the Union to be ‘impliedly’ allowed to step in and regulate instead of the 
Euratom. 
 
Directive 85/337/EEC on assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects 
on the environment537 lays down an obligation for assessment to be conducted regarding 
the environmental effects of public and private projects likely to have significant effects on 
the environment, thereby covering nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors and 
installations designed for permanent storage or final disposal of radioactive waste. 
Although primarily targeting environmental protection, the Directive was adopted under 
Arts. 114 and 352 TFEU (then, Arts. 100 and 235 EC; i.e. the open-ended clause for 
establishing Community competence and the provisions on legal harmonization) since at 
the time of its adoption a separate Community environmental policy was still not envisaged 
under the Treaties. The Directive was later on amended by Directive 2001/42/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of 
certain plans and programmes on the environment538 which was based on Art.192(1) TFEU 
(ex-Art.175(1)EC – the Union’s environment policy provisions), complementing and 
reinforcing the Union’s existent environmental impact assessment regime.  
 
Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 
on public access to environmental information539 (based on Art.192(1) TFEU (ex-Art.175(1)EC) 
guarantees the right of access to environmental information held by or for public 
authorities, whereby the term ‘environmental information’ covers any information in 
written, visual, aural, electronic or any other material form on factors, among other, 
radiation and waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases 
into the environment affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment540. These 
elements of the environment comprise the air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape 
and natural sites including wetlands, coastal and marine areas, as well as biological 
diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms541.  
The much debated upon Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment 
through criminal law542 had a curious life cycle as it was originally adopted under the EU 
Treaty provisions in the form of Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 
on the protection of the environment through criminal law. Subsequently, the Commission 
challenged the choice of legal basis for the said Framework Decision in C-176/03 
                                                            
537 OJ 1985 L 175/40. 
538 OJ 2001 L 197/ 30. 
539 OJ 2003 L 41/ 26. 
540 Art.2. 
541 See, Art.2 Definitions. 
542 OJ 2008 L 328/28. 
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Commission v Council543 where the EU Court of Justice sanctioned the use of a Community 
measure as a first pillar instrument for harmonizing the national regimes on environmental 
offences which entailed the imposition of penalties on the part of the Member States which 
are effective, proportionate and dissuasive in nature544. With respect to the nuclear field, The 
Directive treats the following type of conduct as criminal offence, when unlawful and 
committed intentionally or with at least serious negligence : “(…) (a) the discharge, 
emission or introduction of a quantity of materials or ionising radiation into air, soil or 
water, which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial 
damage to the quality of air, the quality of soil or the quality of water, or to animals or 
plants; (…) and] (…) (e) the production, processing, handling, use, holding, storage, 
transport, import, export or disposal of nuclear materials or other hazardous radioactive 
substances which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or 
substantial damage to the quality of air, the quality of soil or the quality of water, or to 
animals or plants”545. 
Conversely, there have been a few Euratom legislative acts that have directly or 
indirectly impacted on the scope of the Union’s environmental policy since, generally 
speaking, Euratom acts regularly refer to the observance of ‘environmental considerations’ 
applicable to the nuclear field being that the prevention/protection from risks liable to 
adversely affect the environment  is a vital corollary objective of the Euratom rules. In this 
vein, the Preamble of the Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework 
for nuclear safety546 invokes the general aim of the Euratom health and safety rules to 
protect “the population and the environment against risks of nuclear contamination” (albeit 
the Euratom Treaty text does not mention the concept of ‘environment protection’ per 
se)547. In a similar manner, Directive 2006/117/Euratom on the supervision and control of 
shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel548 couples together the notions of human 
health protection and environment protection549, as is the case with Council Directive 
2003/122/Euratom of 22 December 2003 on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive 
sources and orphan sources550 where a reference is made to the potential risks for human 
health and the environment caused by high-activity sources551. What the former three 
directives have in common is that their texts merely make a passing mention of the 
importance of the objective of environment protection in the nuclear sphere where those 
                                                            
543 ECR 2005 p. I-7879. 
544 Emphasis added; See, paras.46 et seq. of judgment. The Court had considered that this type of measure 
could only appropriately be based on Art.192 TFEU (ex-Art.175 EC) as its main purpose was undisputedly, the 
protection of the environment (para. 51 of judgment); 
545 Emphasis added; Art.3 of the Directive.  
546 OJ 2009 L172/18. 
547 Recital 5 of Preamble. For a further discussion, see, section IV.2 of this chapter. 
548 OJ 2006 L 337/21. 
549 Recital 11 of Preamble. 
550 OJ 2003 L 346/57. 
551 Recital 8 of Preamble. 
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provisions seem to be intended more as declaratory statements rather provisions of a 
regulatory nature. In contrast to this, the former Directive 96/29/Euratom laying down basic 
safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the 
dangers arising from ionizing radiation, as was discussed in the preceding section, was not 
strictly confined to the objective human health protection and contained operative 
provisions with a direct, regulatory effect on the environment552. Although the new 2013 
Basic Safety Standards Directive exhibits a retreat in the ‘environmental’ language used, it 
nevertheless contains important operative provisions concerning the protection of the 
environment as such553.  
 
II.2.4. Transposing the principles of Union environmental law to the Euratom field  
Another issue corollary to the issue of extending the scope of Union environmental 
rules to the Euratom domain is the possibility for applying the principles of the Union 
environmental policy to the Euratom framework. These principles have a status different 
from that of the general principles of EU law which rank as primary sources of Union law in 
that there exists a certain controversy regarding their legally binding effect (some authors 
consider these principles as merely a policy orienteer lacking any binding force554 while 
others claim that the Union environmental policy principles cannot be completely denied of 
having any legal effect555).  
Article 191(2) TFEU (ex. Art.174(2)) enumerates the following as principles that the 
Union policy on the environment is based upon: the precautionary principle, the principle of 
preventive action, the principle that environmental damage should be rectified at the source 
and the polluter-pays principle. The TFEU is silent as to the precise content and binding 
nature (if any) of these principles making it difficult to adopt one general position regarding 
the potential of these principles to produce any legal effects556. In view of the uncertainty as 
to their status as legal principles, it is to be gathered that the former principles have greater 
prominence in international environmental law (as a legal system predominantly based on 
                                                            
552 See, Arts. 19, 22, 44, 45 and 47 of the Directive.  
553 See Arts. 28(4), 67(1), 68, 72, 73 of the 2013 Directive. 
554 See, Kramer, supra, n.493, p.14; Kramer, supra, n.488, p.10; 
555 See, A. Epiney, Environmental Principles, in, R. Macrory (ed.), Reflections on 30 Years of EU Environmental 
Law: High Level of Protection?, Europa Law Publishing, 2006, p.22,33; 
556 Nevertheless, the EU General Court has boldly stepped out on one occasion by referring to the 
precautionary principle as a ‘general principle of Union law’ (See, Artegodan and others v Commission (T-74/00, 
T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00), ECR 2002 p. II-4945. For more 
commentary on the case, see, J. Scott, The Precautionary Principle before the European Courts, in, R. 
Macrory (ed.), Principles of European Environmental Law (Proceedings of the Avosetta Group of Europan 
Environmental Lawyers), Europea Law Publishing, 2004, pp.53-56). 
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soft law instruments) while as far as the Union environmental law is concerned, they have, 
to a large extent, already been translated into binding Union acts557. 
The principles of the Union’s environmental policy have been characterized as 
guiding principles of a policy nature which decision-makers use to justify the planned 
adoption of a measure558 and which are only enforceable by courts in instances of 
‘systematic disregard’ thereof559. Thus, it would be difficult to deny these principles of 
having (at a minimum) an indirect legal effect given that the former often serve to reinforce 
the justification for the choice of a particular legal basis of a measure and have, in addition, 
been instrumental to the process of interpreting secondary Union legislation560. It may be 
somewhat misleading to discuss the legal character of these environmental principles in 
general terms (by treating all the principles as a whole), making it more appropriate to 
examine their individual (‘legal’) effects by considering all the principles separately561. From 
the perspective of EU law, the practical consequence of acknowledging the legally binding 
nature of the environmental policy principles is to impose an obligation for the Union 
institutions to act upon them562. However, the imposition of an obligation to act would only 
occur by exception in view of the difficulty to comprehensively determine the scope and 
content of these principles so as to allow for an obligation to act which is both enforceable 
and definable to be discerned563. In turn, it would be virtually impossible for the EU courts 
to precisely determine the ‘failure to act’ at issue, because the type of action required to be 
taken in application of the principles is not sufficiently clear in the first place564.  
The CJEU has pronounced itself on the matter of the legal effect of the principles of 
Union’s environmental policy by considering the former as judicially reviewable only in 
exceptional cases where there is a systematic disregard of their aim and content565. In Safety 
Hi-Tech566 the Court of Justice opined that the Union institutions were bound by the 
principles enshrined in Art.192 TFEU (ex-Art.130 TEC), deciding to regard this particular 
Treaty article as one that “(…) sets a series of objectives, principles and criteria which the 
Community legislature must respect in implementing the environmental policy (…)”567. The 
Court held that, in view of the need to strike a balance between certain of the objectives 
and principles mentioned in Article 130r (present Art.191(2) TFEU) and of the complexity of 
the implementation of these criteria, the review by the Court must necessarily be limited to 
                                                            
557 Kramer, supra, n. 488, p.10;  
558 Kramer, supra, n.493, p.14; 
559 Kramer supra, n.488, p.10; 
560 Idem, p.11. 
561 See on this, P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed.), Cambridge University Press, 
2003, p.231, 232. 
562 Epiney, supra n.555, p.33. 
563 Idem, p.33. 
564 Idem, p.34. 
565 See for this, Kramer, supra n.488, p.10. 
566 C-341/95 European Court Reports 1998 Page I-04355.  
567 Para.34 of judgment. 
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the question whether the Council, by adopting the Regulation, committed a manifest error 
of appraisal regarding the conditions for the application of Article 130r of the Treaty 
(present Art.191(2))”568. It follows that once the Union has decided to act, the principles are 
presumed to have a binding effect for the institutions only where there has been a manifest 
breach of the obligation to act in which case the EU courts would be competent to rule on a 
violation of these principles569. Again, the notoriously difficult task of establishing what 
would exactly constitute a ‘manifest error of appraisal’ committed on the part of the Union 
institutions comes to the fore in this regard. 
 
a. The prevention principle and the precautionary principle as principles of EU 
environmental action 
 
The two most prominent of the Union environmental policy principles, the principle 
of prevention (principle of preventive action) and the precautionary principle, are equally 
the most evasive in terms of defining their exact content570. The principle of prevention, 
which concerns the notion of “(…) preventing the creation of pollution or nuisances at 
source, rather than subsequently trying to counteract their effects”571, was introduced as a 
principle of the Union’s environmental policy through the Single European Act (1987) and 
was the first environmental principle to be included earlier on in the EC’s First 
Environmental Action Programme in 1973572. With the precautionary principle being 
introduced to the Union framework later on with the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the 
temporal difference regarding the inauguration of the two principles accounts for the 
previously established practice of blurring the boundaries between them, which, in turn, 
resulted in perceiving the two principles as mutually intertwined in terms of their respective 
aim and content573.  
  
The precautionary principle, as it is understood and applied today, is one that is both 
different and differentiable from the prevention principle. It is a highly controversial 
principle given that the required degree of certainty for indentifying the extent of 
                                                            
568 Emphasis added; Para.35. 
569 Epiney, supra n.555, p.34. 
570 For more on the principle of preventive action and the precautionary principle as principles of international 
environmental law, see, P. Sands and J. Peel (eds.), Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd 
edition), Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 200-203 and 217-228. 
571 P.9 of the Action Programme; See for this, L. Kramer, The Genesis of EC Environmental Principles, in, R. 
Macrory (ed.), Principles of European Environmental Law (Proceedings of the Avosetta Group of Europan 
Environmental Lawyers), Europa Law Publishing, 2004, p.38); 
572 Programme of action of the EC on the Environment (1973) OJ C 112 p. 1. 
573 Hence, prior to the Maastricht Treaty, all cases of scientific uncertainty that would have otherwise 
triggered the application of the precautionary principle were subsumed under the notion of prevention 
(Kramer, supra n. 571, p.39); 
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environmental danger in the activities covered by its scope of application574 is still 
considered as ambiguous and largely dependent on the context in which the principle is 
applied. The most distinct features of the precautionary principle are that it mainly applies 
to instances of lack of conclusive scientific evidence, where the existence of a threat is not 
tangible and there is no concrete causal link between the activity and the potentiality of the 
harm575. For these reasons, the principle has also been labeled as a ‘in dubio pro natura’ 
principle576.  
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development defines the 
precautionary approach in the following terms: “(…) Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”577. 
Alternatively, the OSPAR Convention (Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic) considers the precautionary principle as a principle 
“(…) by virtue of which measures are taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern 
that substances or energy introduced directly or indirectly into the environment may bring 
about damage to human health, or harm living resources, even where there is no 
conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and effects578” to be 
applied by the State Parties. The definition of the precautionary principle that the Union 
has endorsed is more in line with the OSPAR definition579, as can be observed, inter alia, in 
the Commission’s Communication on the Precautionary principle580. The Communication 
serves to establish a common understanding of the factors leading to recourse to the 
precautionary principle and introduce practical guidelines for its application581. According 
to the Communication, the decision to invoke the precautionary principle is exercised 
where scientific information is insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain and where there are 
indications that the effects on the environment or the human, animal or plant health may 
be potentially dangerous582. As for the legal nature of the principle, the Commission 
considers that it devolves on the decision-makers and (if necessary, the courts) to 
                                                            
574 See, Fitzmaurice, supra n.394, p.263,274. 
575 N. de Sadeleer, The Principles of Prevention and Precaution: Two Heads of the Same Coin?, in, Ong, 
Merkouris and Fitzmaurice (eds.), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2011, p.184. Fitzmaurice, on the other hand, distinguishes three common features of the 
precautionary principle: 1) regulatory inaction threatening non-negligible harm, 2) lack of scientific certainty 
on the cause and effect relationship and 3) under the circumstances regulatory inaction is unjustified 
(Fitzmaurice, supra n.394, p.263,264).  
576 As reported in, Jans, supra n.486, p.38; 
577 Emphasis added; For an overview of the wording of other international law instruments that follow the 
wording of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, see, Annex II of the Communication from the Commission on the 
Precautionary principle COM/2000/0001 final.; 
578 Emphasis added; p.3, (1998) OJ L 104.  
579 Kramer, supra n.571, p.40. 
580 Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary principle COM/2000/0001 final. 
581 p.8 of Communication. 
582 p.7. 
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materialize it583, reminding that the former practice is not contingent on the adoption of 
legally binding instruments which are subject to judicial review584. 
Regarding the scope of application of the precautionary principles, the Commission 
distinguishes between the terms ‘scientific evaluation’ and ‘risk assessment’, insisting that 
every decision must be “(…) preceded by an examination of all the available scientific data 
and, if possible, a risk evaluation that is as objective and comprehensive as possible”585. In 
this sense, the Commission considers the scientific evaluation as mandatory, while the 
requirement to perform a risk assessment is seen as complementary and optional thus 
making the ‘risk assessment’ requirement one susceptible to manipulation liable to 
potentially downplay the importance of the application of the principle in a particular case 
and effectively reduce its field of application586.  
The application of the precautionary principle under the Union framework is not 
confined to the field of environmental protection and can be extended to other fields in 
“(…) specific circumstances where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain 
and there are indications through preliminary objective scientific evaluation that there are 
reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, 
human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the chosen level of protection”587 A 
similar sort of ‘extension’ is equally taken to apply with regard to the prevention 
principle588.  
The extension of the scope of application of the precautionary principle was equally 
acknowledged by the EU’s General Court in the Artegodan case589 where the Court decided 
to extend the scope of application of the principle beyond the concept of ‘environmental 
protection’ stricto sensu. It considered  the scope of the principle to additionally cover the 
“(…) protection of health, consumer safety and the environment in all the Community's 
spheres of activity (…)”, substantiating its approach by referring to “(…) the requirements 
relating to that high level of protection of the environment and human health [which] are 
expressly integrated into the definition and implementation of all Community policies and 
                                                            
583 p.9. 
584 p.15 
585p.21; Emphasis added. 
586 Kramer, supra n.488, p.17.  
In the BSE case (C-157/96 A998 ECR I-2211 and C-180/96 1998 ECR I-2265) the Court did not consider that it 
was required of the Commission to have should have made a risk assessment before pronouncing an export 
ban for British beef. (See, Kramer, supra n.493, p.22). Contrary to this, Jans considers that protective 
measures could be adopted on the condition that a risk assessment is conducted that would be as complete 
as the peculiarities of the case in question allow it to be (Jans, supra n.486, p.39); 
587 Commission Communication, p.9. 
588 The use of the precautionary and the prevention principles has been extended to other fields such as health 
protection and food safety (De Sadeleer, supra n.575, p.184); 
589 Artegodan and others v Commission (T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-
141/00), ECR 2002 p. II-4945. 
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activities under Article 6 EC [11 TFEU]  and Article 152(1) EC [ 168(1) TFEU], respectively”590. 
Evidently, the Court attempted to promote an ‘environmental’ approach to the field of 
human health protection, performing a ‘coupling’ of the environment protection and the 
human health protection objective by relying on the use of the integration principle591 of the 
Union’s environmental policy592.  
A certain pattern can be discerned in the Union courts’ treatment of the application 
of the precautionary principle depending on whether the case at hand is health/food safety-
related or environment protection-related593. The former is an area where scientific 
knowledge is much more advanced than the strictly environmental protection sector where 
the existence of scientific uncertainty is greater given the growing difficulty in foreseeing 
the ways in which ecosystems would potentially react to various ecological risks594. In 
consequence, the Union courts have acquired a stricter approach when examining the 
application of the principle with respect to the health and food safety cases than the 
environmental protection cases595.  
As a sublimation of the foregoing, it is clear that the dividing line between 
precaution and prevention is very thin and often times not as evident596, the crucial 
characteristic differentiating the two principles lying in the (in)existence of a causal link i.e. 
sufficient scientific evidence that links the behavior or the existence of a threat with the 
subsequent potentially dangerous effect597.  The former has been confirmed by the EU 
Court of Justice in C-180/96 BSE598 where the Court, intentionally or not, practically 
equated the scope of application of the two principles, by referring to the uncertainty of the 
                                                            
590 Para.183 of judgment. 
591 For more on the integration principle and how it can be used to extend the application of the prevention 
and the precautionary principles to the Euratom framework, see, infra in the present chapter;  
592 The General Court’s activism exhibited in this particular judgment did not stop there as it courageously 
went on to award the precautionary principle the status of general principle of Union law, defining the principle 
as one requiring the competent authorities to take appropriate measures to prevent potential risks to public 
health, safety and the environment (Para.184 of judgment). The EU Court of Justice however did not come 
back to these points when reviewing the case on appeal in Commission v Artegodan and others (C-39/03 P, ECR 
2003 p. I-7885). In the second Artegodan judgment (Artegodan II Judgment of 3 March 2010, Artegodan / 
Commission (T-429/05), on appeal  C-221/10), the General Court was noticeably more reserved regarding the 
legal status of the precautionary principle, considering the former as merely a ‘corollary’ to the principle of 
pre-eminence (primacy) of public health protection which itself was qualified as a ‘general principle’ (Paras. 
106 and 125 of judgment); 
593 De Sadeleer, supra n.575, p.194. 
594 Idem. 
595 Idem. 
596 Similarly, Kramer, supra n.488, p.17; 
597 According to Fitzmaurice, it would seem erroneous to view the two principles as having the same features 
in the legal and economic content they are applied to (Fitzmaurice, supra n.394, p.275); The issue of applying 
the precautionary principle was raised before the ICJ in Gabickovo-Nagymaros and Nuclear Tests II, where the 
dissenting opinions expressed by the judges in the latter case have been valuable to the legal discourse on the 
precautionary principle (see for this, Fitzmaurice, supra n.394, p.266,267). Moreover, Sand distinguishes 
among those European states that are ‘precaution’ countries (such as Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden) 
and those that are ‘protection’ countries (France, the UK) (see, P. Sand, The Precautionary Principle: Coping 
with Risk, Indian Journal of International Law, January-March 2000, No.1, pp.1-13); 
598 OJ 1998 ECR I-2265. 
124 
 
existence of harmful effects (which would typically lead to the application of the 
precautionary principle) in the context of the application of the principle of preventive 
action599. According to the Court, the uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to 
human health opens way for the institutions to take protective measures without having to 
wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent600. The Court 
supported this approach by invoking Art.191(1) TFEU (ex-Article 130r(1) EC), pursuant to 
which the Union policy on the environment is to follow, inter alia, the objective of 
protecting human health601 as well as Art.191(1) TFEU which foresees that the 
environmental policy is to be based, among other, on the principle that preventive action 
should be taken, in addition to the obligation to integrate the environmental protection 
requirements into the definition and implementation of other Community policies602. This 
is an example of how an environmental policy principle (in this instance, the prevention 
principle) can be applied with relation to human health protection by way of liaison 
performed via the integration principle (principle which requires that environment 
protection requirements are integrated into the definition and implementation of the 
Union’s policies). In this way, the integration principle has been commonly used as a tool to 
justify the ‘exportation’ of Union environmental principles to fields other than 
environmental protection, and even (as will be shown infra) fields and activities that do not 
necessarily belong to the Union framework stricto sensu. 
 
b. The precautionary and the prevention principles examined under the Euratom 
framework 
 
The previous sections of the present chapter dealt with the interface between the 
Union environmental policy and the Euratom health and safety policy and the possibility to 
apply the Union environmental provisions to the Euratom domain. In this vein, it is 
pertinent to inquire into the possibility of integrating the principles of the Union 
environmental policy into the Euratom-devised policies, more particularly, Euratom’s 
health and safety policy. The discussion will focus on the principle of prevention and the 
precautionary principles where, in view of the confirmed possibility for Union 
environmental provisions to apply to the Euratom domain, by implication, the principles 
underlying these environmental provisions would equally be presumed to apply.  
Curiously enough, at this point there are no international nuclear law instruments in 
existence which provide a direct reference to the precautionary principle603. International 
                                                            
599 See on this, Kramer, supra n. 493, p.22; Kramer observes that the English version of the text of Para.100 of 
CJEU’s BSE judgment only mentions prevention while the German and other versions mention both prevention 
and precaution. 
600 Para.99. 
601 Para.100. 
602 Para.100. 
603 De Sadeleer, supra n.575, p.192. 
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courts have thus far equally shied away from taking a view on whether the precautionary 
principle applies to risks stemming from the use of nuclear energy. The application of the 
principle was unsuccessfully invoked by states before international and regional judicial 
bodies on several occasions (e.g., New Zealand relied on the principle in the Nuclear Tests II 
case; Ireland raised the relevance of the principle before the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal in 
the proceedings against the UK concerning the MOX nuclear plant; the ECtHR equally 
failed to address the issue of ‘precaution’ in the McGinley and LCB since as it failed to see a 
sufficient causal relationship between the action/inaction of the national authorities and 
the potential/actual damage)604.  
All the while, the ‘preventive’ character of certain international nuclear law 
instruments cannot be denied, as the objectives they convey are often underpinned by the 
notion of prevention of potentially harmful effects. The Convention on Nuclear Safety, aims, 
among other, to prevent the occurrence of accidents with radiological consequences and 
mitigate the effects of such consequences (Art.1(iii)); while the Convention on Assistance in 
the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency refers to preventing or minimising 
injury and/or damage which may result from a nuclear accident or radiological emergency 
(Art.1). Similarly, the Preamble of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 
ascribes to preventing nuclear accidents and minimising the consequences of any such 
accident, should they occur; the Joint Convention for the management of spent fuel targets 
the prevention of accidents with radiological consequences and the mitigation of their 
consequences should they occur during any stage of spent fuel or radioactive waste 
management (Art.I(iii)); while the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
and Nuclear Facilities speaks of necessary precautions regarding the levels of physical 
protection for nuclear material during international transport605. The latter use of the term 
‘precaution’ is not linked to the precautionary principle as defined supra, the aim and 
content of the text suggest the term ‘precaution’ used here serves as synonym for 
‘prevention’.  
                                                            
604 For an extended elaboration on the missed opportunities for applying the precautionary principle in the 
nuclear field, see, De Sadeleer, supra, p.193; Furthermore, the application of the precautionary principle to the 
nuclear field has been examined in the context of its relationship with the ALARA principle (the principle 
according to which radiation doses should be kept ‘as low as reasonably achievable’) where the former has 
been regarded as a risk assessment tool whereas the latter as a principle of risk management (see, Lierman, S. 
and Veuchelen, L., The Optimisation Approach of ALARA in Nuclear Practice: An Early Application of the 
Precautionary Principle? Scientific Uncertainty versus Legal Uncertainty and its Role in Tort Law, European 
Environmental Law Review, 2006, Vol. 15 Issue 4, p.8 et seq.); 
 
605 “Annex I 
(...) 2. Levels of physical protection for nuclear material during international transport include: 
(a) For Category II and III materials, transportation shall take place under special precautions including prior 
arrangements among sender, receiver, and carrier, and prior agreement between natural or legal persons 
subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of exporting and importing States, specifying time, place and 
procedures for transferring transport responsibility; 
(b) For Category I materials, transportation shall take place under special precautions identified above for 
transportation of Category II and III materials, and in addition, under constant surveillance by escorts and 
under conditions which assure close communication with appropriate response forces (…)”; 
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In spite of the lack of an express reference in the text of the Euratom Treaty 
endorsing the application of the principle of prevention and/or the precautionary 
principle606, what can be inferred from the character and aim of the health and safety 
provisions of the Treaty is that the health protection (and to a certain extent, the 
environmental protection) objective these provisions carry is effectively underpinned by the 
concept of prevention. Thus, the principle of prevention can arguably be presumed to be, at 
the very least, impliedly written into the Euratom Treaty. It is doubtful, however, whether 
the same applies to the precautionary principle in view of the relatively recent coinage of 
the principle in international legal instruments and especially since the Euratom Treaty has 
not undergone, since its adoption, any substantial changes to its text. The former, as is the 
case with most of the ‘old’ texts of a constitutional nature, enables that a dynamic 
interpretation of the Euratom Treaty’s provisions is permitted in this respect. 
The Euratom secondary legislation has translated the implied ‘prevention’ 
requirement in the following way: the 2009 Directive establishing a Community framework 
for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations607 defines “nuclear safety" as the achievement 
of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents and mitigation of accident 
consequences, resulting in protection of workers and the general public from dangers 
arising from ionizing radiations from nuclear installations608; the wording used throughout 
Directive 2013/59/Euratom laying down basic safety standards for protection against the 
dangers arising from exposure to ionizing radiation609 indicates that the concept of prevention 
underpins the overall objectives of this Directive; the aim of prevention of potential 
pollution and nuisances also underpins Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information (extended to 
the Euratom domain). Finally, Directive 2003/122/Euratom on the control of high-activity 
sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources in Art.1 (1) identifies the prevention from 
exposure to ionizing radiation of workers and the general public as one of its objectives.  
                                                            
606 Alternatively, it may be argued that the precautionary principle fails to apply with regard to the field of the 
Euratom and thus with regard to nuclear radiation altogether given that the dangers arising from nuclear 
radiation are a priori presumed. However, the former claim would be difficult to substantiate with regard to all 
applications of nuclear energy, especially, provided the requirements of nuclear health and safety as well as 
nuclear security (the security of nuclear installations) have been satisfied. In this respect, what would be the 
most pertinent approach to follow is that a scientific assessment of the entirety of related risks is conducted 
on a case-by-case basis. 
607 Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations 
OJ L 172/18; The former has been amended by Council Directive 2014/87/Euratom amending Directive 
2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations, OJ L 
219/42; 
608 Art.3. 
609 Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the 
dangers arising from exposure to ionizing radiation and repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 
96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom OJ L 13 p.1-73; The former directive is largely based on 
the text of the former 1996 Basic Safety Standards Directive (Directive 96/29/Euratom laying down basic safety 
standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from 
ionizing radiation OJ L 159, p.1-114); 
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Judging by the way in which the aforementioned Euratom measures have been 
phrased with regard to the concepts of ‘prevention’ and ‘precaution’, it cannot be 
definitively concluded whether the intention of the Union legislators had been to introduce 
these principles ‘through the back door’ to the Euratom domain, in the absence of an 
express legal basis in the Euratom Treaty or the Union Treaties warranting an extension of 
the Union environmental policy principles. The answer possibly lies in examining the 
boundaries of the scope of application of the integration principle enshrined in Art.11 TFEU, 
more specifically, by predicating the option for extending the prevention and the 
precautionary principles to the Euratom framework upon the possibility for extending the 
scope of the integration principle to the said framework.  
The integration principle, enshrined in Art.11 TFEU, is a typically horizontal principle 
which is primarily directed at the Union institutions, concerning the definition and 
implementation of the Union’s policies and activities. Under the former article, 
“(e)nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to 
promoting sustainable development”610. Unlike its previous versions611, the current Art.11 
TFEU avoids a numeris clausus approach of enumerating the Union policies and activities 
that the integration principle is to apply to, and instead, makes a general reference to all 
Union policies.  
On the point of what the integration requirement functionally entails, it has been 
argued that the practical implications of the principle are only visible at the level of 
elaboration of Union policies while with respect to individual measures the approach is not 
as straightforward being that in the latter instance the Union institutions enjoy a greater 
discretion in the implementation of the integration requirement612. In comparison, the 1987 
version of the integration principle introduced via the Single European Act creates a greater 
‘obligatory’ effect (“Environment protection requirements shall be a component (…)” 
(Art.130-r)) rather than the principle’s present version which centers on the necessity to 
                                                            
610 Emphasis added. 
611 Prior to being officially inaugurated in Art.130-r (2.2) of the Single European Act (1987)611 (in the following 
terms: “Environment protection requirements shall be a component611 of the Community’s other policies.”), 
the integration principle had already been part of the Union’s Environmental Action Programmes (in its 
rudimentary version, it was initially inserted in the 1973 First Commission Environmental Action Programme  
(Programme of action of the EC on the environment OJ 1973 C 112 p.I) with a reference to the activities of the 
Communities that must take into account concerns related to the protection and improvement of the 
environment where those concerns need to be taken into consideration in the elaboration and implementation 
of these policies (Kramer, supra n.571, p.33). A similar reference was found in the Second, Third and Fourth 
Action Programme (Kramer, idem, p.34,35).  
The Maastricht Treaty version of the integration principle read: “Environment protection requirements must 
be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community policies”611 while the Amsterdam 
Treaty subsequently introduced a new Art.6 TEC according to which: “Environment protection requirements 
must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community policies and activities referred 
to in Art.3 [TEC] (…)”; 
612 Kramer, supra n.488, pp.1-26. 
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integrate environment protection requirements into the Union’s policies and activities. The 
former casts doubt as to the legal consequences produced by Art.11 TFEU provided that 
compliance with the integration requirement depends largely on the political will of the 
institutions making it highly unlikely for the principle to be judicially reviewable on its own 
before the Union courts613. By contrast, there have been views that, regarding the 
possibility for reviewing the validity of secondary legislation in the light of the integration 
principle, consider the present version of the integration principle to be formulated ‘more 
forcefully’ than that of the Single European Act614, thus opening the possibility for judicial 
review of measures in the light of the environmental principles (including the integration 
principle)615. However, irrespective of whether an act can in exceptional cases be open to 
annulment on grounds of non-compliance with the Union’s environmental objectives, the 
obligation to interpret secondary European legislation in the light of the Union’s 
environmental objectives still remains616.  
Furthermore, another clarification is to be made with regard to defining the exact 
content of the integration requirement i.e. what effectively needs to be integrated. The 
conundrum of environmental requirements that need to be integrated include, primarily, 
the Art.191 TFEU environmental principles617 which adds credit to the assumption that 
predicating the application of the Art.191 TFEU principles upon the application of the 
integration principle would instrumentalize the transposition of the former principles to the 
Euratom domain. However, the Euratom policies and activities per se have not been 
included under Art.11 TFEU618 and cannot be fitted within the scope of the term ‘Union 
policies and activities’ (the Euratom Community having remained a separate legal 
personality from that of the Union). A fortiori, Art.11 TFEU does not figure among the 
Euratom Treaty’s bridging provisions that concern the extension of the application of 
certain TFEU and TEU provisions to the Euratom domain (Title III, Art.106a of the Euratom 
Treaty). The former is indicative of a lack of a clear intention on the part of the treaty 
makers to broaden the purview of the integration principle to policies and activities covered 
under the Euratom Treaty619, while the reasons for such exclusion remain obscure620.  
                                                            
613 Idem. 
614 Jans and Vedder, supra n.486, p.17. 
615 Even though the integration principle figures in treaty article separate from that of the Union 
environmental principles, it is nonetheless treated as a Union environmental principle (See the tables of 
contents of both, Jans and Vedder, supra) and (Kramer (2003), supra)). 
616 Jans and Vedder, supra n.486, p.5. 
617 Idem, p.15. 
618 See, N. Dhondt, Integration of Envrionmental Protection into Other EC Policies, Europa law Publishing, 2003, 
p.43. 
619 Idem, p.44. 
620 Idem, p.47 ; A comparison with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as horizontal principles of 
Union action seems pertinent in this regard. The two principles have been stipulated in Art.5 TFEU and while 
they have not been formally extended to the Euratom domain (through Art. 106a Euratom), the Protocol on 
the role of national parliaments in the European Union which, annexed to the TEU, TFEU and the Euratom 
Treaty, establishes the option for national parliaments to appraise legislative acts in the light of the principle 
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The foregoing claims are made with regard to an explicit extension of the 
integration principle to the Euratom field. In this sense, the shortcoming of adopting a 
purely legalist and formalistic approach on the matter ostensibly undermines the potential 
for applying the Art.191 TFEU environmental principles to the Euratom sphere, and more 
particularly, the prevention and the precautionary principles, being that the concepts of 
prevention and precaution are concepts which are inherently and indissociably attached to 
the field of nuclear health and safety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
of subsidiarity (Art.3). The former protocol is complemented by the Protocol on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality which, in turn, has solely been annexed to the TEU and the TFEU. In spite of 
the existent mismatch of applicable instruments, the former is evidence of yet another implied extension of 
Union principles to the Euratom domain given that the subsidiarity and proportionality principles are 
presumed to apply thereto.  
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Chapter 3:  
The Euratom and environmental 
democracy: The EU cit izens' access to 
informat ion and part icipat ion in 
decision-making in the nuclear arena 
Chapter 3: The Euratom and ‘environmental democracy’: EU citizens' 
access to information and participation in decision-making in the nuclear 
arena 
 
 
Having established the link between the Euratom health and safety regime and the 
Union environmental policy, and, in this sense, more generally, Euratom’s relationship with 
environmental protection as a concept, the present chapter proceeds with a discussion on 
the issue of environmental transparency within the Euratom framework, focusing on the 
options available to EU citizens regarding access to information and involvement in the 
decision-making in the nuclear field in matters which actually or potentially concern the 
environment. In this sense, the level of ‘environmental democracy’ under the Euratom 
framework will be appraised in light of the procedural standards for ‘environmental 
democracy’ fostered under the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters as the 
ruling international legal document in the field of environmental democracy. The analysis 
aims to verify whether the Euratom Community has aligned with the prevalent tendency 
within the Union of increasing the Union’s openness and transparency towards its citizens 
and, thus, whether the ‘environmental democracy’ standards applicable to the Union 
framework have found an adequate expression within the scope of the Euratom. 
The chapter examines the procedural requirements set out under the Aarhus 
Convention which the EU and the Member States are bound by and thus responsible to 
ensure the full and correct implementation of, both at the EU and the national level. For the 
purpose of arriving at an uniform application of the Aarhus Convention requirements both 
at the EU and the national level, the EU has adopted a series of transposing instruments in 
the form of directives and regulations, part of which are specific to the nuclear domain. The 
former instruments are looked at in function to the extent to which the relevant Aarhus 
Convention obligations extend to the scope of the Euratom thus ascertaining the extent to 
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which the Euratom is to be considered bound by these obligations. The discussion proceeds 
by inquiring into the justiciability of the Aarhus Convention requirements relative to access 
to information and participation in decision-making both before the international and the 
Union courts by offering a comparative analysis of the relevant case law which is indicative 
of the general judicial tendencies in the interpretation and application of the former 
requirements, with a particular focus on the case law pertaining to the nuclear field.  
Lastly, the chapter addresses one of the key shortcomings of the Union regime for 
the procedural protection in environmental matters and that is the absence of a directive 
transposing the access-to-justice requirements of the Aarhus Convention, namely the 
justiciability of the Convention obligations pertaining to the access to information and the 
participation in the decision-making process. The adoption of an access-to-justice directive 
would not only consolidate and reinforce the Union standards for procedural protection in 
environmental matters, it would also gradually help eliminate the existent discrepancies in 
the national legal systems regarding the application of the Aarhus Convention 
requirements regarding access to justice in the former field.  
 
I The EU, the Euratom and the concept of ‘environmental democracy’  
 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters of 1998 (the Aarhus Convention) is arguably the most prominent 
international legal instrument of environmental democracy621 which represents a successful 
attempt of linking together two different sets of rights: human rights and environmental 
rights622. The adoption of the Convention constitutes a crucial step forward in the nascent 
field of ‘information governance’ in environmental matters understood as the kind of 
governance where information, information technologies and information processes play a 
central role623.  
The notion of ‘environmental democracy’ signifies the balance between 
representative and participatory decision-making, reflecting the will of those with an 
essential stake in the outcome and bringing environmental values into the policy-making 
                                                            
621 See, J. Wates, The Aarhus Convention: A Driving Force for Environmental Democracy, Journal of European 
Environmental and Planning Law, 2005, Issue 1, p.2. 
622 See, L. Lavrysen, The Aarhus Convention: Between Environmental Protection and Human Rights, in, Liège, 
Strasbourg, Bruxelles: parcours des droits de l'homme. Liber amicorium Michel Melchior, 2010, Anthemis, p.653. 
The article provides a general overview of and explanatory commentary on the Aarhus Convention. 
623Mason, supra n.623, p.13. 
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process624. The notion can be further described as the achievement of a satisfactory level of 
transparent, inclusive and accountable decision-making processes galvanised through the 
provision of access to information, public participation and access to justice625. 
Furthermore, it would be a grave oversight to omit the notion of environmental justice 
from the discourse involving environmental democracy. Much like environmental 
democracy, ‘environmental justice’ is a term that is both delicate and complex and does not 
yield to a simplified definition. ‘Environmental justice’ is frequently referred to as the fair 
treatment and meaningful involvement of the public in the development, implementation, 
and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies whereby everyone is 
entitled to the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and 
afforded equal access to the decision-making process concerning a healthy environment in 
which to live, learn, and work626. In international environmental law terms, it encompasses 
the “rational sharing of the burdens and costs of environmental protection, discharged 
through the procedural and substantive adjustment of rights and duties”627. Construed in 
more basic terms, the environmental justice frame consists of four major components: the 
right to obtain information about one’s situation; the right to a serious hearing when 
contamination claims are raised; the right to compensation from those who have polluted a 
certain environment; and the right of democratic participation in deciding the future of the 
contaminated community”628.  
Prior to discussing the nature and the scope of the rights covered under the Aarhus 
Convention, it is to be reminded that the legal doctrine is not unanimous as to the issue of 
whether human rights and environmental rights are different sets of rights which are 
complementary and thus intrinsically related, or, are, to the contrary, essentially 
irreconcilable629. The former division notwithstanding, the Aarhus Convention establishes a 
link between procedural rights and the right to a healthy environment and attempts to 
address the most common difficulty associated to the human right to clean environment 
                                                            
624 J. Foti et al., Voice and Choice: Opening the Door to Environmental Democracy, 2008, World Resources 
Institute (available at http://pdf.wri.org/voice_and_choice.pdf), p.4. 
625 Idem, p.X. 
626 This is the way the US Environmental Agency defines environmental democracy 
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/; For this and more on the notion of environmental justice in the 
context of the EU, see, L. Kramer, Environmental Justice in the European Court of Justice, in J. Ebbeson and P. 
Okowa (eds.), Environmetal law and justice in context, 2009, Cambridge University Press, p.197 et seq. 
627 D. Shelton, Describing the Elephant: International Justice and Environmental Law, in J. Ebbeson and P. 
Okowa (eds.), Environmetal law and justice in context, 2009, Cambridge University Press, p.72. 
628 S. M. Capek, The “Environmental Justice” Frame: a Conceptual Discussion and an Application, Social 
Problems, 1993 Issue 40, pp.5-24; The former definition only takes into account the contamination occurring 
ex post (rather than ex ante) and disregards the equally important ‘prevention’ aspect of the notion of 
environmental justice. 
629 D. Shelton, Resolving Conflicts between Human Rights and Environmental Protection: Is there a 
Hierarchy?, in, E. de Wet and J. Vidmar (eds.), Hierarchy in International law, 2012, Oxford University Press, 
p.207. The article offers further insight into the conflicts and convergences between human rights and 
environment rights. 
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which is that of lack of effective implementation630, without intending to introduce a 
substantive right to a clean environment and thus being strictly concerned with the 
procedural aspects of the realization of this right. The procedural aspect to the right to a 
clean environment, covered by the Aarhus Convention, is considered instrumental to the 
attainment of the goal of “(…) protection of the right of every person of present and future 
generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, 
[whereby] each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation 
in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the 
provisions of [the] Convention”631. Effectively, the procedural rights established there under 
carry the objective of maintaining an adequate and decent environment for people and 
serve to reinforce the substantive aspect of the right to clean and healthy environment632. 
In a certain way, the rights espoused by the Aarhus Convention act as a cross-section 
between procedural entitlements and substantive environmental quality requirements633 in 
which regard the Convention builds up from the foundations previously laid down by the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 Rio Declaration634 as international environmental 
soft law instruments that have majorly contributed to developing and reinforcing the right 
of humans to a clean and decent environment adequate to their needs. The Principle 10 of 
the Rio Declaration635 represents the milestone for the development of procedural rights in 
an environmental context, endorsing the three key aspects of environmental democracy 
                                                            
630 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE), The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation 
Guide, ECE/CEP/72 (prepared by S. Stec and S. Casey- Lefkowitz in collaboration with J. Jendroska (Editorial 
Adviser)), December 2000 (available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/acig.pdf), p.29. 
The Guide is not a legally binding document, it is reference document of a great interpretative value intended 
to assist Signatories and potential Parties to the Aarhus Convention in implementing the Convention, and in 
understanding its implications in order facilitate its ratification and entry into force (p. ix of the Guide). 
631 Art.1 of the Aarhus Convention (Emphasis added). The Convention espouses a clear anthropo-centric 
approach to the right to clean environment as it deals with the concept of environment only to the extent that 
the former concerns the human beings.  
632 O. W. Pedersen, European Environmental Human Rights and Environmental Rights: A Long Time Coming?, 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 2008, Vol. 21 No. 1, p.35. 
633 Mason, supra n.623, p.17. Mason holds that the absence of substantive environmental standards in the 
Convention poses a certain restriction on the enjoyment of human rights since it allows that information 
disclosure and public participation become more of a means to legitimize rather than scrutinize the national 
institutions (p.26). 
634 Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration: “Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. 
They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature (…)”; 
Principle 10 of the Stockholm Declaration:“ Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a 
solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations. In this 
respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other 
forms of oppression and foreign domination stand condemned and must be eliminated.”; 
635 Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration: “(…) Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all 
concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to 
information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on 
hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information 
widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, 
shall be provided.”; 
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which were subsequently elevated to the level of procedural rights under the Aarhus 
Convention - the access to information, the public participation, and the access to justice636.  
 
The Aarhus Convention was adopted at the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe’s Fourth Ministerial Conference “Environment for Europe” in Aarhus, Denmark, 
on 25 June 1998, presently comprising 46 State Parties, 29 Parties to the Convention 
Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTRs) and 27 Parties to the 
Amendment on public participation in decisions on the deliberate release into the environment 
and placing on the market of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)637. Both the EU and all 
of the Member States638 have acceded to the Aarhus Convention; the EU ratified the 
Convention in 2005 via the adoption of Council Decision 2005/370/EC639 and the Convention 
is applicable in the EU as of 18 May 2005, with a large majority of Member States having 
already acceded by that time. Given that the material scope of the Aarhus Convention 
covers important segments of the nuclear field640, the Euratom Community, nevertheless, 
does not appear as contracting party to the Aarhus Convention.  
The Declaration of competence annexed to the Council Decision 2005/370/EC on EU’s 
conclusion of the Aarhus Convention confirms the external competence of the EU to enter 
into environmental agreements, indicating the areas in the field of environmental 
protection with regard to which the Union is competent to enter into international 
agreements: preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment; 
protecting human health; prudent and rational utilization of natural resources and 
promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems641. The former, thus, coincides with the scope of the objectives of 
the Union’s environmental policy listed in Article 191(1) TFEU. Additionally, the Union 
remarks that it has already adopted several legal instruments, binding on its Member 
States, which implement the provisions of the Aarhus Convention. The fairly laconic 
manner in which the Union’s scope of competence in the matter covered by the Aarhus 
Convention has been delimited fails to offer any real guidance for third parties to be able to 
                                                            
636 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.13. 
637For an overview of the parties to the Convention, consult the following UNECE webpage: 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ratification.html. 
638 Ireland was the last one to ratify the Convention as late as in June 2012. 
(http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-13&chapter=27&lang=en); 
Ireland officials have been sketchy in revealing the factors that accounted for the late ratification 
http://www.environ.ie/en/Environment/News/MainBody,30480,en.htm. 
639 Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access 
to justice in environmental matters OJ L 124, 17.5.2005, pp. 1–3. 
640 The areas of the nuclear field covered by the Aarhus Convention are further discussed infra in the present 
section and the ensuing sections of the chapter. 
641 See, in the Annex to Council Decision 2005/370/EC, Declaration by the European Community in accordance 
with Article 19 of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to 
justice in environmental matters; 
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comprehend whether a particular provision of the Aarhus Convention is to be implemented 
by the EU or by the Member States642. From merely mentioning the Union’s objectives in 
the environmental field (as is done in the Declaration of competence) it does not follow that 
the Union would own full competence over the scope of the Aarhus Convention643. Namely, 
environmental protection is a field of shared competence, where, by virtue of Article 2.2 
TFEU the Member States can exercise their competence only to the extent that the Union 
has not previously exercised its competence in the matter. In fact, the only indication for 
third parties to be able to discern the matters for which the Union is solely responsible is 
found in the statement that the European Union is to be considered responsible for the 
performance of those obligations resulting from the Convention which are covered by 
Union law in force644. 
 
Within the EU legal order, the Aarhus Convention enjoys the status of a mixed 
international agreement binding on both the EU institutions and the Member States which 
in the hierarchical order of norms takes precedence over secondary legislation645, while at 
the same time it does not enjoy the status of primary law. Prior to EU’s accession to the 
Aarhus Convention, two directives covering a large part of the subject matter of the 
Convention had already been in existence - (Directive 90/313/EEC on the freedom of access 
to information on the environment646 and Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment647). 
Therefore, EU’s conclusion of the Aarhus Convention was, in a certain way, seen as a 
transposition of already existing EU legal rules into an international legal instrument648. 
Nevertheless, in order to match the improved level of procedural protection under the 
regime of the Convention, it was necessary to amend or replace the existent EU rules. Thus, 
in anticipation of EU’s conclusion of the Aarhus Convention649, two new directives were 
adopted in 2003 aligning the existent Union legislation with the access-to-information and 
the participation-in-decision-making requirements of the Convention: Directive 2003/4/EC 
                                                            
642 For this and a critique of the lack of clarity/precision of the declaration of competence with regard to the 
Aarhus Convention, see, A. D. Casteleiro, EU Declarations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: A 
Useful Reference Base?, European Foreign Affairs Review, 2012, Vol. 17, No. 4, p.501; 
643 Idem. 
644 Idem. 
645 Compliance Committee, ACCC/C/17 (European Community), para.35. 
646 Council Directive 90/313/EEC on the freedom of access to information on the environment OJ L 158, 
23.6.1990, p. 56. 
647 Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment OJ L 175, 5.7.1985, p. 40–48. 
648 J. Jendroska, Public Information and Participation in EC Environmental Law: Origins, Milestones and 
Trends, in R. Macrory (ed.), Reflections on 30 Years of European Environmental Law: A High Level of Protection, 
The Avosetta Series: Proceedings of the Avosetta Group of European Environmental Lawyers, 2006, Europa 
Law Publishing, Part IV.2. 
649 Both the Union (then, Community) and the Member States signed the Convention in 1998, whereas the 
ratification occurred at different dates/years for different MS (See, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-13&chapter=27&lang=en). 
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of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to 
environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC650 and Directive 
2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 providing for public 
participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the 
environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council 
Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC651.  However, the initial ‘package deal’ proposed by the 
Commission in October 2003 contained three legislative proposals: proposal for a 
regulation on the application of the Aarhus obligations with relation to the Union 
institutions652, proposal for a directive implementing the requirements under the 
Convention ‘access to justice’ pillar653, and a proposal for a Council decision for the 
ratification of the Convention654. Hence, it was only the first and the third proposal of the 
package deal that were successful, while the second proposal fell through, the reasons for 
which will be further elaborated in the last section of this chapter which concerns the 
‘access to justice’ pillar of the Aarhus Convention. 
 
In view of the foregoing, the process of transposing the Aarhus Convention’s 
provisions into the domestic legal orders of the Member States can be characterized as a 
two-fold legal harmonization process, occurring at two levels: harmonization occurring at 
the EU level (the EU transposes the Aarhus obligations into EU law by adopting 
implementing legislation), followed by harmonization at the national level (Member States 
transposing EU implementing legislation into national law). As can be inferred from the 
Declaration of competence annexed to the Council Decision regarding EU’s conclusion of the 
Aarhus Convention, there still remain areas covered by the Aarhus Convention which the 
EU has failed to transpose, leaving it open for Member States to legislate independently 
and directly transpose the Convention rules into national law, in the absence of Union 
implementing legislation. Although the former inevitably creates certain discrepancies 
                                                            
650 OJ L 41, 14.2.2003, p. 26–32. 
651 OJ L 156, 25.6.2003, p. 17–25 (referred to as the Public Participation Directive).  
Provisions on public participation in environmental matters can also be found in Directive 2001/42/EC of 27 
June 2001 on the assessment of certain plans and programmes on the environment (OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p. 30–
37), also known as the Strategic Environmental Assessment directive. The former directive complements the 
Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment (OJ L 175, 5.7.1985, p. 40-48) (known as the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Directive). The codified version of the EIA directive is Directive 2011/92/EU of 13 December 2011 on the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (codification), OJ L 26 p.1-
21; 
652 Subsequently adopted as Regulation (EC) N° 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (OJ L 264, 
25.9.2006 p.13). 
653 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to justice in 
environmental matters COM(2003) 624 final. 
654 Subsequently adopted by the Council on 17 February 2005 as Council Decision of 17 February 2005 on the 
conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public 
participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters OJ L 124, 17.5.2005, p. 1–3. 
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between the national legal systems, such a phenomenon is intrinsic to the EU legal system 
and cannot be circumvented655.  
Arriving at the issue of detecting the degree of ‘environmental democracy’ within 
the Euratom system, it is to be stated from the outset that on account of the intrinsic 
nature of the management of nuclear energy as a ‘top-down’ rather than ‘bottom-up’ 
venture, nuclear energy remains to be perceived as a domain which is predominantly 
dirigiste, carrying a strong confidentiality imprint. Nuclear policy-makers do not always 
enjoy a reputation of being in close touch with the demands of the public, especially in the 
earlier days of nuclear power when nuclear policy and law were more commonly associated 
with the military uses of nuclear energy. The area of civil uses of nuclear energy grew in 
salience subsequently in the 1950s, having been considered as an unexplored domain with 
an uncertain future. Although the roles between civil and military application today have 
been reversed, we are witnessing an ‘era of civil nuclear energy’ in which nuclear 
stakeholders continue to escape a full transparency grasp. With the global political and 
legal discourse being dominated by the green language of ‘environmental democracy’ and 
‘environmental justice’, it becomes indispensable (if not, highly desirable) to apply the 
standards of environmental democracy to the nuclear realm and bring the citizens in closer 
touch with matters of nuclear safety through securing an effective access of the public to 
information and to reliable expertise on nuclear safety as a crucial condition for the 
involvement of civil society656.  
The European Commission has insisted that information and public participation in 
the nuclear sector remain insufficiently developed in the EU, which demands a further 
                                                            
655 See on this, J. Jendroska, Citizen’s Rights in European Environmental Law: Stock-Taking of Key Challenges 
and Current Developments in Relation to Public Access to Information, Participation and Access to Justice, 
Journal of European Environmental and Planning Law, 2012 Vol. 9 Issue 1, p.79;  
In light of the foregoing, a definite answer cannot be offered as to whether all matters which are subject to 
the binding provisions of the Convention must also have a corresponding EU law provision to that effect (see, 
J. Jendroska, Public Participation in Environmental Decision-making, Interactions Between the Convention 
and EU Law and Other Key Legal Issues in its Implementation in the Light of the Opinions of the Aarhus 
Convention Compliance Committee, in, M. Pallemaerts (ed.), The Aarhus Convention at Ten: Interactions and 
Tensions between Convenional International Law and EU Environmental Law, 2011, Europa Law Publishing, 
p.112).  
Thus, in the absence of Union implementing measures for particular requirements of the Aarhus Convention, 
the Member States have the choice to either adopt national implementing legislation or resort to directly 
apply the Convention provisions (See, Jendroska, supra n.655, p.79).  Peter Faross (ex-Head of Commission 
Department General for Transport and  Energy)  has indicated that in the absence of EU implementing 
legislation Member States have resorted to direct application of the Aarhus Convention requirements which 
in some cases has proven to be more stringent than application performed via the implementing directives 
(Proceedings of the European workshop on practical implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the nuclear 
field (24-25 June 2009, Luxembourg) organized by the Belgian Nuclear Research Center, 
http://www.sckcen.be/en/Events/AARHUS , p.19). 
656 Summary of a Working paper circulated by the Association Nationale des Comités et Commissions Locales 
d’Information (ANCCLI). The Working paper was prepared in the framework of the conference on public 
participation in decision making in the nuclear domain (Luxembourg 12-13 March 2013), accessible at 
http://www.anccli.fr/Europe-International/ACN-Aarhus-Convention-Nuclear/European-round-tables-Tables-
rondes-europeennes/Quatrieme-Table-Ronde-Europeenne-surete-nucleaire, p.2. 
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elaboration of processes and vehicles that can enable a continuous integration of these 
procedural democratic rights both into the EU and the national contexts657. It has stressed 
that the public opinion and the public perception of nuclear power are paramount to the 
future of nuclear policy making it essential for the public to be provided access to reliable 
information and participation in a transparent decision-making process658. Moreover, the 
potential for the public acceptance of any project or activity associated with the nuclear 
industry increases in direct proportion to the extent to which the stakeholders have been 
involved in the initial appraisal of the justifiability thereof659. The Commission has further 
indicated that European citizens do not feel appropriately and sufficiently informed about 
nuclear energy and radioactivity given the significant degree of misinformation and lack of 
knowledge where yet another problem persists to be the quality and reliability of the 
received information660. Overcoming the former is critical to the reinforcement of the 
existent European legal framework in the direction of enhancing the transparency of 
nuclear activities by requiring that factual, timely and easily understandable information is 
provided to the public661. 
The European Parliament has also urged for transparency in the nuclear field. 
Namely, MEPs from different political groups recently launched a call to the European 
institutions and to the Member States for increasing the transparency of nuclear activities 
and the involvement of civil society in order to achieve and preserve a high level of nuclear 
safety in the EU in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident662. In this respect, the 
Parliament has failed to see the legitimacy in the assumption that Euratom issues are of 
such a technical nature that they can circumvent effective political oversight and public 
                                                            
657 Summary of ANCCLI Working paper, supra, p.2. 
658 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Nuclear Illustrative 
Programme  (Presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty for the opinion  of the European Economic 
and Social Committee), COM(2006) 844 final, Brussels, 10.1.2007, p.16. 
659 S. Gadbois et al., Final Report: Situation concerning public information about and involvement in the 
decision-making processes in the nuclear sector, May 2007, commissioned by the Commission’s DG TREN, 
Contract Number: TREN_04_NUCL_S07-39556, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/doc/governance/2007_05_summary_en.pdf, p.14. 
660 Gadbois, supra, p.9; According to the Report, polls indicate that physicians, independent scientists and 
environmental groups are the most trusted groups (together with university and school teachers), while 
authorities and operators are the least trusted categories of actors. 
661 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and 
Social Committee: Update of the Nuclear Illustrative Programme in the context of the Second Strategic 
Energy Review, COM(2008) 776 final, Brussels 13.11.2008, p.6. 
662 European Parliament Call for a “Nuclear Transparency Watch” issued on 4 December 2012 (available at 
http://www.anccli.fr/Europe-International/Nuclear-Transparency-Watch), p.1. See also, Resolution of the 
European Parliament of 14 March 2013 on risk and safety assessments (‘stress tests’) of nuclear power plants 
in the European Union and related activities (2012/2830(RSP)) (available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2013-89). In 
point 31 of the Resolution the Parliament appeals to the EU and the Member States, in the interests of 
democracy, involvement of the European Parliament, transparency and full public access to information, to 
treat nuclear power in the same manner as any other energy source under the TFEU. 
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scrutiny, demanding that appropriate mechanisms of accountability to which the public can 
relate are put into place663.  
Furthermore, the Council of Europe has, on its own part, taken an interest in matters 
of transparency in the nuclear sector. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
has picked up on the seriousness and the crucial role of exchange of information in matters 
of radiation protection. Namely, in a 1996 Resolution on the consequences of the Chernobyl 
disaster 664, aimed at coping with the consequences of the nuclear disaster and motivated 
by the irreparable consequences brought on by the tragic Chernobyl incident, the 
Parliamentary Assembly underscored the importance of the public’s access to clear and full 
information on the subject of preventing and coping with nuclear accidents and went as far 
as viewing the right to access to clear and full information as a basic human right665.  
The relationship between the Aarhus Convention and the nuclear field is not in the 
least an issue sufficiently covered in the political or legal discourse - in fact, the forums 
where the issue has been covered are quite scarce666. In this sense, there have been certain 
misapprehensions as to whether the Euratom Community can be considered to be bound 
by the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, given that only the Union (at the time, 
Community) appears as a contracting party thereto. Nonetheless, the fact that the 
Convention provisions cover an important range of nuclear activities and given that all the 
parties to the Euratom Community Treaty are equally parties to the Aarhus Convention, 
implies that the Convention is indeed applicable to the Euratom domain667. Namely, the 
obligations that the Convention establishes with regard to access to environmental 
information (Arts.4 and 5) clearly extend to the nuclear field (thus, the Euratom’s purview) - 
the definition of environmental information provided therein comprises information on 
                                                            
663 European Parliament - Directorate-General for Research, Working paper: The European Parliament and 
the Euratom Treaty: past, present and future (Energy and Research Series) ENER 114 EN  2-2002 (accessible at 
http://www.uni-mannheim.de/edz/pdf/dg4/ENER114_EN.pdf), pp.xvi-xvii. 
664Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1087 (1996) on the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, adopted 
on 26 April 1996 (available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int//Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta96/eres1087.htm
#1.); 
665 Point 4 of the Resolution. 
666 See, Proceedings of the European workshop on practical implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the 
nuclear field (24-25 June 2009, Luxembourg) http://www.sckcen.be/en/Events/AARHUS organized by the 
Belgian Nuclear Research Center; Proceedings of the Round table discussion “Aarhus Convention and 
Nuclear: Joint Event on Public Participation in Decision-Making in the Nuclear Domain” (12-13 March 2013, 
Luxemburg, organised under the auspices of the Aarhus Convention's Task Force on Public Participation in 
Decision-making, the Directorate-General Energy of the European Commission and the Association Nationale 
des Comités et Commissions Locales d' Information (ANCCLI), available at http://www.anccli.fr/Europe-
International/2013-ACN-Aarhus-Convention-Nuclear). 
667 It has even been proposed that an attempt is made for the Euratom Community to accede to the 
Convention (See J. Haverkamp in, Proceedings of the European workshop on practical implementation of the 
Aarhus Convention in the nuclear field, supra, p.31). Contra to this, a future accession of the Euratom 
Community to the Convention could conceivably achieve the opposite effect - that of undermining all 
environmental transparency efforts (political and legal) in the nuclear field that have been undertaken under 
the Union purview preceding such accession. 
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“[f]actors, such as substances, energy, noise and radiation (…) affecting or likely to affect 
the elements of the environment”668. Furthermore, Annex I of the Aarhus Convention 
enumerates the activities covered by the requirements regarding public participation in the 
decision-making process (Art.6.1(a)), among which the following are included: 
 
Annex I of the Aarhus Convention 
 
“(…)1. Energy sector: 
(...) 
- Nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors including the dismantling or 
decommissioning of such power stations or reactors 1/ (except research installations for the 
production and conversion of fissionable and fertile materials whose maximum power does 
not exceed 1 kW continuous thermal load); 
- Installations for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel; 
- Installations designed: 
- For the production or enrichment of nuclear fuel; 
- For the processing of irradiated nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste; 
- For the final disposal of irradiated nuclear fuel; 
- Solely for the final disposal of radioactive waste; 
- Solely for the storage (planned for more than 10 years) of irradiated nuclear fuels or 
radioactive waste in a different site than the production site; 
(...)”; 
 
 
Nevertheless, it is vital to note that the Union has transposed the provisions of the 
Aarhus Convention relevant to nuclear activities through the use of Union instruments 
(directives and regulations) with legal bases found in the ‘Union’ treaties, which however 
apply both to the Union and to the Euratom framework669. The former has been 
accomplished through the practice of extension (extrapolation) of Union rules to the 
Euratom domain which was deftly elaborated in Chapter 2.  
 
II The Aarhus Convention pillars - key aspects 
 
As indicated supra, the Aarhus Convention establishes three main groups of 
obligations for the State parties representing the three Convention ‘pillars’: access to 
information, participation in decision-making and access to justice by citizens. The ‘access to 
information’ and ‘participation in decision making’ pillars shall be covered in two separate 
sections of this chapter, in function to their relevance to the nuclear domain. 
Before going into a more in-depth analysis of the Convention’s provisions, several 
clarifications need to be made regarding the nature and scope of the procedural standards 
endorsed by the Convention. These procedural standards represent a floor, rather than a 
ceiling in the sense that Parties may introduce higher standards by granting wider access to 
                                                            
668 Art.2.3(b), Emphasis added. 
669 These instruments and their relevance to the nuclear domain will be covered infra, in Sections III.1 and IV.4. 
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information and participation in decision-making procedures, including wider access to 
courts to their citizens670, thus unhinging a process of so-called ‘upward harmonization’671. 
The Convention inroduces rights for ‘the public’ and ‘the public concerned’672 where the 
definition of ‘public’ follows the ‘any person’ principle according to which there are no pre-
set conditions to be met by a particular member of the public in order for them to avail 
themselves of a particular right under the Convention (for ex., such as that of ‘being 
affected’ or ‘having an interest’)673.  
Article 2 - Definitions 
“(…) 
4. “The public” means one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national 
legislation or practice, their associations, organizations or groups. (…)”; 
5. “The public concerned” means the public affected or likely to be  affected by, or having an 
interest in, the environmental decision-making; for the purposes of this  definition, non-
governmental organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting any 
requirements under national law shall be deemed to have an interest.(…)”; 
 
The term ‘public concerned’, on the other hand, is less broad in scope and only covers 
the public which is affected or likely to be affected by environmental decision-making, or, 
the public having either a factual or legal interest therein674. Moreover, in keeping with the 
overall tenor of the Convention of promoting a more advantageous treatment to non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)675, those NGOs active in the field of environmental 
protection that satisfy the national law requirements are regarded as having an a priori, 
presumed interest under the Convention. However, while it has been argued that the 
Convention enhances the participatory rights of NGOs, it has failed to broaden 
participation outside of the NGO sphere to other interest groups belonging to the civil 
society by entitling them to a facilitated access to public participation under Articles 6, 7 
and 8 thereof676. This point is especially valid being that certain NGOs could be reputed to 
solely cater to their own specific agendas and interests rather than the interests of the 
public677.  
                                                            
670 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE), The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation 
Guide, ECE/CEP/72 (prepared by S. Stec and S. Casey- Lefkowitz in collaboration with J. Jendroska (Editorial 
Adviser)), December 2000 (available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/acig.pdf), p.5. 
671 Idem, p.31. 
672Idem, p.5. 
673 Idem, p.39. 
674 Idem, p.40. 
675 Idem, p.39. 
676 See, Pedersen, supra n.632, p.99; Similarly, see, Lee and Abbot, M. Lee and C. Abbot, The Usual Suspects? 
Public Participation Under the Aarhus Convention, Modern Law Review, 2003, Vol 66 Issue 1 2003, p.108. 
677 Lee and Abbot, supra, p.86,87. 
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The obligations set out under the Convention are directed at the States’ public 
authorities, to the exclusion of bodies and institutions that perform a judicial or legislative 
function678. This exception further extends to the executive branch authorities acting in a 
legislative or judicial capacity679. According to Art.2.2, for the purposes of the Convention, 
“public authority” denotes: 
 
“(…)  (a) Government at national, regional and other level; 
(b) Natural or legal persons performing public administrative functions under national law, I
 ncluding specific duties, activities or services in relation to the environment; 
(c) Any other natural or legal persons having public responsibilities or functions, or providing 
public services, in relation to the environment, under the control of a body or person falling 
within subparagraphs (a) or (b) above; 
(d) The institutions of any regional economic integration organization referred to in article 17 
which is a Party to this Convention.(…)”; 
 
The Convention is not applicable to the legislative process, but nonetheless, for the 
purpose of achieveing transparency in all branches of government, legislative bodies are 
invited to implement the principles of the Convention in their work680. Furthermore, the EU 
institutions are covered under the definition of ‘public authority’ of Art.2.2 (d) of the 
Convention681 which, however, is not to be taken to mean that the Convention provisions 
apply solely to those EU organs enjoying the status of ‘institutions’. Actually, the term 
‘institutions’ used in the context of the application of the Convention is considered to 
encompass all the Union bodies and agencies682.  
In addition, a strong non-discrimination ratio has been embedded in the 
Convention’s legal regime where Art.3.9 stipulates that: 
“Within the scope of the relevant provisions of this Convention, the public shall have access 
to information, have the possibility to participate in decision- making and have access to 
justice in environmental matters without discrimination as to citizenship, nationality or 
domicile and, in the case of a legal person, without discrimination as to where it has its 
registered seat or an effective centre of its activities.”683; 
 
                                                            
678 Art.2 of the Conventon. 
679 The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p.35. 
680 Para. 11 of the Preamble. 
681 “(…) (d) The institutions of any regional economic integration organization referred to in article 17 which is 
a Party to this Convention (…)”; 
682 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.34. See also, Art.1 of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the 
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies. 
683 Emphasis added. 
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The former non-discrimination clause provides that citizens and non-citizens of the 
States Parties alike enjoy equal rights under the Convention, irrespective of their 
citizenship, nationality or domicile. With respect to legal persons, any sort of discrimination 
based on their place of registration or their effective centre of activities is prohibited. The 
non-discrimination clause has served to delineate the scope of both the notions of ‘public’ 
and ‘public concerned’ of the Convention and thus safeguard the rights belonging to the 
persons who are not citizens of the States Parties, counteracting the tendency of public 
authorities to sometimes disregard the legitimate interests of non-citizens when applying 
the Convention principles684. 
The language of the Convention is not always consistently prescriptive as to 
establish precise and unconditional obligations, thus leaving additional room for legislative 
action to be further taken at national level (or the EU level) via the adoption of 
implementing measures intended to give effect to the Convention’s provisions. It must be 
noted that the text of the Convention abounds with terms such as ‘within the framework of 
national legislation’ and ‘in accordance with national legislation’685 which, in turn, have not 
been defined anywhere in the Convention. Such lack of stringency of the Convention’s 
provisions could be justified by the need for flexibility in accommodating to the variety of 
approaches embedded in national legal systems. Flexibility is mainly observed regarding 
the means that a State has at its disposal in meeting the obligations flowing from the 
Convention, framed by the obligation of the State to refrain from adopting new or keeping 
in force national rules that contradict the Convention obligations686. The breadth of the 
Convention’s flexibility has been considered by some to comprise both the choice of the 
means used to implement the obligations and the discretion in interpreting the scope 
and/or content of the obligations687 which potentially bears the effect of undermining the 
uniformity of the procedural protection system of the Aarhus Convention. At the same 
time, it is this very flexibility which articulates the intrinsic value of the Convention as an 
instrument that regulates a cross-cutting domain joining aspects of administrative and 
governmental practice together with environment protection and procedural aspects688.  
Furthermore, the obligations set out by the Aarhus Convention are reviewable 
before national courts (irrespective of whether they have directly become part of national 
law or via implementing national or EU legislative acts). The Convention itself has provided 
for the establishment of a mechanism for the review of compliance689 discharged by the 
Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee which was established by Decision 1/7 of the 
                                                            
684 The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p.48. 
685 Found in Arts.2, 4,5,6 and 9. 
686 The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p.30. 
687 Idem, p.30,31. 
688 Idem, p.31. 
689 See Art.15 of the Convention. 
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Meeting of the Parties690 as the main governing body of the Convention. The Compliance 
Committee is comprised of independent experts who are nationals of the Parties and 
Signatories to the Convention, elected upon their personal capacity rather than 
nationality691. The Convention compliance mechanism can be activated in the following 
ways692: through a submission from a Party concerning compliance by another Party, a 
submission from a Party concerning its own compliance, a referral from the Secretariat, and 
through communications proceeded by members of the public concerning a Party's 
compliance with the Convention. The third avenue has been most frequently used since any 
member of the public (natural or legal person), regardless of their country of citizenship, is 
entitled to file a communication regarding the non-compliance of a Party693.  
The Convention compliance mechanism is non-confrontational, non-judicial and 
consultative in nature694 with the Compliance Committee’s findings being non-binding on 
the Parties given that the former was not intended to serve as a forum for redress of 
violations of individual rights695. The main task of the Compliance Committee consists of 
adopting findings and addressing recommendations to the Meeting of the Parties, or, 
sometimes, to individual States696. Once the Meeting of the Parties has received the 
findings and the accompanying recommendations from the Compliance Committee, it 
proceeds with deciding on the adequate measures to be taken to tackle the non-
compliance. These measures include: issuing recommendations to the Parties on specific 
measures, requesting the Party concerned to submit a strategy (together with a time 
schedule which involves the duty of the Party to report back to the Compliance Committee 
regarding the implementation of the strategy), issuing declarations of non-compliance, 
issuing cautions or, in extremis, suspend the special rights and privileges a Party enjoys 
under the Convention697. 
 Finally, in the event of a dispute arising between the Parties to the Convention 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, the former have the choice 
to either submit their dispute for arbitration or to the International Court of Justice as the 
ultima ratio698. Given that only States are eligible to appear before the ICJ in contentious 
cases, with respect to the EU it is only the former alternative that would apply. 
                                                            
690United Nations Economic and Social Council, ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8, at 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/mop1/ece.mp.pp.2.add.8.e.pdf; 
691 J. Jendroska, Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee: Origins, Status and Activities, Journal of 
European Environmental and Planning Law, 2011, Vol 8 Issue 4, p.302. 
692 http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ccbackground.html. 
693 Jendroska , supra n.691, p.311. 
694 V. Koester, Review of Compliance under the Aarhus Convention: A Rather Unique Compliance Mechanism, 
Journal of European Environmental and Planning Law, 2005, Issue 1, p.42.  
695 Jendorska, supra n.691, p.311. 
696Idem, p.312; Since its establishment in 2002, the Committee has issued a number of findings: for an 
overview of the meetings of the Committee and the findings adopted with respect to individual Parties (see 
at, http://www.unece.org/env/pp/cc.html). 
697 See Decision 1/7, point 37.  
698 Art.16(2) of the Convention. 
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III The ‘access to information’ pillar of the Aarhus Convention  
 
In comparison to similar access-to-environmental-information provisions which can 
be found in various international legal instruments with a narrower scope than the Aarhus 
Convention699, the ‘access-to-environmental information’ provisions of the Convention are 
unique in that they are general in scope i.e. relate to all types of environmental information. 
Principally, the ‘access-to-environmental-information’ pillar of the Aarhus Convention 
covers two main types of access to information. The first one concerns the right of the 
public to seek information from public authorities, entailing the mirroring obligation on the 
part of public authorities to provide information in response to such a request. This is the 
‘passive’ type of access to information, covered by Art.4 of the Convention which grants all 
the members of the public the right to address requests for provision of environmental 
information to public authorities without having to state an interest700. The second type of 
access to information, prescribed by Art.5 of the Convention, is known as the ‘active’ access 
to information whereby the authorities have the duty to collect and disseminate 
information of public interest to the public, which is not contingent on any specific request 
from the public701. The term ‘environmental information’ is defined in Art.2.3 as: 
 
“(…) any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other 
material form on: 
 
(a) The state of elements of the environment, such as air and 
atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites, biological 
diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms, 
and the interaction among these elements; 
 
(b) Factors, such as substances, energy, noise and radiation, and 
activities or measures, including administrative measures, environmental 
agreements, policies, legislation, plans and programmes, affecting or likely 
to affect the elements of the environment within the scope of 
subparagraph (a)above, and cost-benefit and other economic analyses and 
assumptions used in environmental decision-making; 
 
                                                            
699 Such instruments are, the Convention on Civil Liabilities for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to 
the Environment (1993), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), the Convention 
on the Protection and Use of Trans-boundary Watercourses and International Lakes (1992), etc. (see, The Aarhus 
Convention Implementation Guide, supra, p.50). The obligation to collect and disseminate environmental 
information (as prescribed in Art.5 of the Aarhus Convention) is also found in many other environmental 
treaties of the past 15 years (that is, environmental information respective to the nature of the subject matter 
of those treaties) - e.g., the 1992 Convention on the Trans-boundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (see for this, 
The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p.50). 
700 See, Art.4(1)a. 
701 The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p.6. 
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(c) The state of human health and safety, conditions of human life
702, 
cultural sites and built structures, inasmuch as they are or may be affected 
by the state of the elements of the environment or, through these 
elements, by the factors, activities or measures referred to in subparagraph 
(b) above;” 
 
Pursuant to the former article, the ‘environmental information’ does not need to be 
in any specified form (apart from, obviously, material form)703, the scope of the term 
                                                            
702 The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p.38. The notion ‘conditions of human life’ correlates to the 
notion of a ‘right to healthy environment’ since only in conditions of a healthy environment can human 
existence be imaginable. The Convention reference’s to ‘conditions of human life’ therefore seems to reflect 
the intention to promote a right to healthy environment (The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p.38). 
The Preamble of the Convention reads to this effect: 
“(…)Recognizing that adequate protection of the environment is essential to human well-being and 
the enjoyment of basic human rights, including the right to life itself, 
   Recognizing also that every person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her 
health and well-being (…)”; 
703 Compare with the term ‘documents’ used in the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official 
Documents (Tromso Convention) - the terms ‘access to information’ as considered within the framework of the 
Aarhus Convention and the term ‘access to documents’ under the Tromso Convention cannot be presumed to 
be essentially different, the Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide suggesting that the main difference 
between the former terms is that document implies a ‘finished product’ making the scope of the Aarhus 
Convention somewhat larger, additionally including information which is in raw and unprocessed form (p.35 
of the Implementation Guide); 
The Tromso Convention was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 27 
November 2008 of the Convention on Access to Official Documents (Tromsø Convention) and is open for 
signature as of 18 June 2009; for the text of the Convention 
(http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/205.htm). Being the first binding international legal 
instrument to recognize a general right of access to official documents held by public authorities, the Tromso 
Convention lays down the minimum standards to be applied in the processing of requests for access to official 
documents (forms of and charges for access to official documents), review procedure and complementary 
measures and it has the flexibility required to allow national laws to build on this foundation and provide even 
greater access to official documents (http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Summaries/Html/205.htm.). To 
date, only seven EU Member States of the Union have signed the Tromso Convention, with only three of 
them having ratified it while it is required that the ratification threshold of minimum ten Council of Europe 
Member States is reached in order for the Convention to take effect 
(http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=205&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG.).  
In certain respects, the Tromso Convention signifies a progressive step forward from the Aarhus 
Convention regime. More particularly, under Art.1(a)(i) of the Tromso Convention, the notion of public 
authority comprises: i) the government and administration bodies  (at national, regional and local level); ii) 
legislative bodies and judicial authorities insofar as they perform administrative functions according to 
national law; as well as iii) natural or legal persons insofar as they exercise administrative authority. In 
comparison, Art.2.2 of the Aarhus Convention explicitly excludes bodies or institutions acting in a judicial or 
legislative capacity, failing to specify whether such an exemption applies to legislative and judicial bodies with 
relation to their entire activity or solely to the exercise of their legislative or judicial functions. In addition, the 
Tromso Convention invites the Convention parties to extend, on their own motion, the  definition of “public 
authorities” so as to supplementary cover legislative bodies in performance of their other, non-legislative 
activities; and/or judicial authorities regarding their other activities (primarily, adjucatory activites) 
(Art.1(a)(ii)); 
The future ratification of the Tromso Convention by all or by the majority of EU Member States as 
Council of Europe States would eventually lead to the existence of multiple legal frameworks potentially 
covering the access to environmental information in the EU Member States. The former consideration would, 
per extensiam, apply to the general access to documents, not only those pertaining to environmental 
information. In the event of such a development, the potential applicants, having the choice of multiple legal 
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encompassing the information on the “state of elements of the environment”, information 
on various factors “affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment”, as well as 
information regarding the state of human health and safety and the conditions of human 
life provided the former are affected or may be affected by the state of the elements of the 
environment (or, alternatively, through these elements, by the factors, activities and 
measures that Art.2.3(b) enumerates). The scope of the term ‘environmental information’ is 
rather comprehensive and serves to convey the approach taken by the Convention drafters 
towards defining the notion of ‘environment’ being that the definition of ‘environmental 
information’ is the closest that the Convention comes to defining the scope of the former 
notion704. Consequently, it implies that, by virtue of Art 2.3(a), the Convention considers the 
notion of environment as consisting of “(…) elements of the environment, such as705 air and 
atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites, biological diversity and its 
components, including genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these 
elements (…)”. The former list of ‘elements of the environment’ is non-exhaustive and leaves 
room for other elements of the environment to be included in the definition706 affording a 
latitude to the Convention Parties to broaden the scope of the definition of environmental 
information in their national laws implementing the Convention707. The aforementioned 
definition of ‘environmental information’, which includes factors such as, inter alia, 
substances, energy, noise and radiation, clearly points to a link between the field of nuclear 
energy and the scope of the Convention, further developed in EU’s implementing 
legislation covering the access to environmental information in the civil nuclear domain.  
 
The ‘active’ access to environmental information is broad in scope and follows the 
‘any person’ principle for the requests for information directed at public authorities. In 
addition, Art.4.2 foresees that the requested environmental information is to be made 
available as soon as possible and at the latest within one month after the submission of the 
request, except for those instances where the volume and the complexity of the 
information require an extension of this period up to two months after the request has been 
made708. Apart from the usual deficiencies on the grounds of which the request may be 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
avenues for their legal claims, would most probably rely on the more favorable legal regime. For a discussion 
on the Tromso Convention and how it relates to the Union’s legal regime on access to information, see, 
Jendroska (2012), supra, pp.80-82; Also, F. Schram, From a General Right of Access to Environmental 
Information in the Aarhus Convention to a General Right of Access to All Information in Official Documents: 
The Council of Europe’s Tromsø Convention, in, M. Pallemaerts (ed.), The Aarhus Convention at Ten: 
Interactions and Tensions between Convenional International Law and EU Environmental Law, 2011, Europa 
Law Publishing. 
704 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.36. 
705 Emphasis added. 
706 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.30. 
707 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.35. 
708 In comparison, the Tromso Convention provides no strict time limits for the handling of requests: “A 
request for access to an official document shall be dealt with promptly. The decision shall be reached, 
communicated and executed as soon as possible or within a reasonable time limit which has been specified 
beforehand.” (Art.5.4 of the Convention); 
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refused (if the public authority to which the request is addressed does not hold the 
environmental information requested; the request is manifestly unreasonable or too 
generally formulated; or, if the request concerns material in the course of completion or 
concerns internal communications of public authorities (where such an exemption is 
provided for in national law or customary practice))709, the public authorities are allowed to 
derogate from the obligation of disclosure of information and may refuse to disclose a 
particular information on the condition that such disclosure would jeopardise (Art.4.4):
   
 
“(…) (a) The confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, 
where such confidentiality is provided for under national law; 
(b) International relations, national defence or public security; 
(d) The confidentiality of commercial and industrial information, where 
such confidentiality is protected by law in order to protect a legitimate 
economic interest. Within this framework, information on emissions which 
is relevant for the protection of the environment shall be disclosed; 
(…)  
The aforementioned grounds for refusal shall be interpreted in a restrictive 
way, taking into account the public interest served by disclosure and 
taking into account whether the information requested relates to 
emissions into the environment.” 710; 
 
The breadth of the former derogations is curtailed by the last subparagraph of 
Art.4.4 which sets a limit upon the public authorities’ discretion when invoking the grounds 
for refusal to respond to a request. The public authorities are under the obligation to 
interpret the derogations restrictively, by taking into account the public interest served by 
the disclosure and ensuring that the requested information relates to emissions into the 
environment. The two cumulative requirements raise the bar of ‘contingency’ for the 
effective provision of the requested information. A purely literal reading of the latter 
requirement may indicate that it would not be applicable to emissions which are not 
relevant to the protection of the environment. The fact that Convention fails to delineate 
the scope of the term ‘emissions into the environment’ creates a potentially unwarranted 
latitude for the public authorities in interpreting the foregoing exemptions711. Attempting 
to adequately construe the term ‘emissions’, the Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide 
has referred to Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution 
prevention and control which defines the former term as the “direct or indirect release of 
                                                            
709 Art. 4.3. 
710 Emphasis added. 
711 See, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.60. 
149 
 
substances, vibrations, heat or noise from individual or diffuse sources in the installation 
into the air, water or land”712. Given that the Convention has previously made a specific 
mention to ’radiation’ (Art. 2.3(b)), it is difficult to assume that it was intended for 
‘radiation’ to be fitted under the scope of the term ‘emissions’ as used in the last paragraph 
of Art. 4.4. Substantiating its broad construction of the former provision, the Aarhus 
Convention Implementation Guide sides with the view that any information on emissions 
that may affect the quality of the environment is to be considered relevant for the 
protection of the environment, irrespective of the extent of the actual or potential effect 
thereto713.  
 
 
The attention now turns to the Art.5 ‘active’ access to environmental information 
regarding the obligation of public authorities to collect and disseminate information of 
public interest without the need for a specific request to that effect coming from the public 
or the public concerned.  
 
 
Article 5 
COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION 
 
1. Each Party shall ensure that: 
 
(a) Public authorities possess and update environmental information which 
is relevant to their functions; 
(b) Mandatory systems are established so that there is an adequate flow of 
information to public authorities about proposed and existing activities 
which may significantly affect the environment; 
(c) In the event of any imminent threat to human health or the 
environment, whether caused by human activities or due to natural 
causes, all information which could enable the public to take measures to 
prevent or mitigate harm arising from the threat and is held by a public 
authority is disseminated immediately and without delay to members of the 
public who may be affected. 
 
2. Each Party shall ensure that, within the framework of national 
legislation, the way in which public authorities make environmental 
information available to the public is transparent and that environmental 
information is effectively accessible, inter alia, by: 
(a) Providing sufficient information to the public about the type and scope 
of environmental information held by the relevant public authorities, the 
basic terms and conditions under which such information is made available 
                                                            
712 Idem. 
713 Idem.; Another similar problem of interpretation arises in the appraisal of the ‘public interest’ within the 
meaning of Art.4.4, which is again a term that the Convention does not define the scope or content of, or 
provide any guidance to that effect (The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.58,62). 
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and accessible, and the process by which it can be obtained. (…)”;714 
 
Corresponding to the obligation of States to ensure that public authorities possess 
and update the environmental information relevant to their functions (Art.5.1(a)), 
mandatory systems are to be established to ensure an adequate flow of information to 
public authorities with regard to activities that may significantly affect the environment 
(Art.5.1(b))715. There is a notable discrepancy regarding the scope of application of the 
former and the latter provision: while the former applies to all environmental information 
as defined under Art. 2.3(b), the latter only concerns information on proposed and existing 
activities which may significantly affect the environment. In this sense, the threshold for 
the nature of the information that the public authorities are under a duty to impart has 
been set higher in comparison to the Art.4 reference to activities affecting or likely to affect 
the elements of the environment. Furthermore, Art.5.1(c) provides that in the event of an 
imminent threat to human health or the environment, all information that the public 
authorities are in possession of and which could enable the public to take measures to 
prevent or mitigate harm arising from such a threat, is to be immediately disseminated to 
members of the public who may be affected716. The existence of an imminent threat to 
human health or the environment presupposes that actual harm does not have to exist in 
order to trigger the application of the provision717, but the public authority’s action must 
nonetheless be driven by ‘urgency’ concerns. In this way, only once the public authority is 
satisfied with the imminent character of the threat would the positive obligations arising 
from Art.5 be triggered718. Grosso modo, the foregoing evidences that the type of 
information covered by Art.5 only involves specific categories of environmental information 
which is to be made available to the public, underpinning the requirement for active 
collection and dissemination of information with a certain demand of ‘urgency’ and 
‘importance’ for those types of information to reach the public domain719. 
 As to the specific category of ‘people’ targeted by the obligation to 
disseminate environmental information, it is only Article 5.1(c) which makes an express 
mention of ‘members of the public who may be affected’. The Implementation Guide 
interprets the former use of the word ‘may’ to the effect that there should exist a 
reasonable possibility that members of the public could be affected in order for the public 
authority to act720. However, the parameters for determining the existence of a ‘reasonable 
                                                            
714 Emphasis added. 
715 For a discussion on the ‘significance’ of the effect, see, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, 
p.67. 
716 Emphasis in text. 
717 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.70. 
718 On the practical ways in which sates can execute the task of dissemination and collection of information, 
see, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.69,70. 
719 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.67. 
720The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.71. 
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possibility’ for the population to be affected depends on the individual finding of the public 
authority seized with the matter. To the difference of Art.5.1(c), all the other provisions of 
Art.5 introduce a myriad of tasks to be undertaken by the Parties in order for an adequate 
flow of information to be provided to the public. Regrettably, these provisions lack any 
precision that would help determine the exact scope and content of the requirements 
incumbent on the Parties and therefore fall short of creating actual and concrete 
obligations721.    
  
The options for the public authorities to derogate from the obligation ‘to collect and 
disseminate’ the environmental information are the same exemptions provided under 
Art.4(4) supra722 while the exact time frames for the execution of the Art.5 obligations have 
not been specified, save for the occurence of imminent threat to human health or the 
environment where the public that may be affected should immediately and without delay 
be imparted all information that would further enable them to take measures aimed at 
preventing or mitigating the harm arising from such threat723. 
 
III.1 The access-to-information pillar transposed in Union/Euratom law 
 
The access-to-information and participation-in-decision-making requirements 
endorsed under the Aarhus Convention seize the Euratom’s purview, more particularly, 
with regard to the domain of radiation protection (and to a certain extent, environmental 
protection). The scope of the former transparency obligations applicable to the Euratom’s 
purview will be examined through an analysis of the relevant primary law and secondary 
law instruments adopted within the Union and the Euratom legal framework. From a more 
general perspective, the transparency under the Euratom system will be examined starting 
out from the standards and principles concerning transparency devised at the level of the 
Union’s and the Euratom’s primary law, relative to the general access to information as a 
wider notion, going beyond strictly the fields of radiation protection and environmental 
protection.  
The access-to-information principles applicable to the work of the EU institutions 
were initially introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty and extended to the sphere of 
application to the Euratom Treaty by way of Declaration no.41 on the provisions relating to 
transparency, access to documents and the fight against fraud (attached to the Treaty of 
                                                            
721Art. 5(2)- (10). 
722Art. 5(10): “Nothing in this article may prejudice the right of Parties to refuse to disclose certain 
environmental information in accordance with Article 4, paragraphs 3 and 4. (…)”; 
723Art. 5(1)c. 
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Amsterdam)724. The former principles have now been translated into Art.15 TFEU which 
refers to the duty of transparency and good governance on the part of the institutions, 
guaranteeing a right of access to documents to every citizen of the Union725. Art.15 TFEU 
has been extended, through the bridging provisions of Art. 106(a)1. Euratom, to the 
purview of the Euratom Treaty. According to the article, all citizens of the Union and all 
natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State are 
granted a right of access to documents of the Union's institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies where the general principles that govern this right of access to documents are to 
be determined by the European Parliament and the Council726. As a corollary to the former 
right, a duty is established for each institution, body, office or agency to ensure that their 
proceedings are transparent where the details for the execution of which duty is to be 
additionally devised in their respective Rules of Procedure by including specific provisions 
regarding the access to documents 727.  
The text of the Euratom Treaty itself contains provisions relating to access to and 
exchange of information among the EU institutions and the Member States, with the 
noticeably influential role of the Commission as the intermediary in the process of provision 
and exchange of information728. The Chapter on Dissemination of information (Arts.12-29) is 
divided into a section on information over which the Community has the power of disposal 
and a section covering other types of information, complemented by corresponding 
security provisions serving to safeguard the flow of the information. The nature of the 
former type of information is highly technical and does not concern (at least not in any 
                                                            
724 Indicated by P. Faross, in, Practical implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the nuclear field…, supra 
n.666, p.19;  
The text of Declaration no.41 on the provisions relating to transparency, access to documents and the fight 
against fraud (OJ C 340, 10 November 1997) reads: 
 
“The Conference considers that the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, when they act in 
pursuance of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community, should draw guidance from the provisions relating to transparency, access 
to documents and the fight against fraud in force within the framework of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and related acts.”; 
  
725 Art.15 TFEU (ex Article 255 TEC) : 
“1. In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union’s institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible.  
2. The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council when considering and voting on a draft 
legislative act.  
3. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member 
State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever 
their medium, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with this paragraph. 
Each institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its proceedings are transparent and shall elaborate in its 
own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents, in accordance with the regulations 
referred to in the second subparagraph.”; 
726 Art.15(3) TFEU. 
727 Art.15(3) TFEU. 
728 See, Arts.12-29; Art.187, Art.194, Arts.35-38; Arts.41-44; 
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direct way) the protection of human health or the environment. The Commission enjoys 
the dominant authority for the disposal over this information: the information acquired as a 
result of the Community’s research programme the disclosure of which is capable of 
harming Member States’ interests is subject to a security grading system established via 
security regulations adopted by the Council which introduce a panoply of security gradings 
and corresponding security measures applicable to those gradings729. The Commission 
thereafter applies a particular security grading to the information it considers liable to harm 
Member States’ defense interests, in accordance with the applicable security regulation730.  
In addition, under Art.187, the Commission has been vested with the general 
prerogative, exercised within the limitations posed by the Council in accordance with the 
provisions of the Euratom Treaty, to “collect any information and carry out any checks 
required for the performance of the tasks entrusted to it [the Commission]”731. However, 
the Treaty does not prescribe the modalities in which the Commission is to discharge of this 
important prerogative, nor does it offer the possibility for individual undertakings or natural 
persons to request the information that the Commission has acquired in the former way. 
Furthermore, Art. 194 Euratom, acting as a safeguard clause, introduces a duty of 
non-disclosure regarding any persons, whether they be members of the EU institutions or 
persons who, in the course of their duties or their public or private relations with the 
institutions/installations of the Community/Joint Undertakings, have had access to any 
facts, information, knowledge, documents or objects that are subject to a security system. 
Pursuant to the duty of non-disclosure, these persons are required, upon the discharge of 
their duties or termination of their relations, to keep the former material secret from the 
general public732. Moreover, Member States are asked to communicate to the Commission 
all national rules that apply to the classification and secrecy of information, knowledge, 
documents or objects covered by the Treaty, upon which the Commission ensures that the 
respective provisions are then further communicated to the other Member States733.  
Being that, for the most part, the types of information covered by the Euratom 
Treaty concern the technical aspects of nuclear energy production, the former cannot be 
subsumed under the definition of ‘environmental information’ pursuant to the Aarhus 
Convention. Actually, it is only the Health and Safety Chapter of the Treaty, dealing with 
the human and environmental effects of radiation and the disposal of radioactive waste, 
which is of direct relevance to the provision and exchange of environmental information. 
Here, again, the Commission plays a crucial role in managing the information on radiation-
related nuisances which calls for interaction between the Commission and the Member 
States’ authorities. While there is no possibility for any direct involvement of natural or 
                                                            
729 Art.24(1). 
730 Art.24(2). 
731 Art.187; Emphasis added. 
732 Art.194(1). 
733 Art.194(2). 
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legal persons, under Arts.35 and 36 Euratom, Member States are obliged to perform 
continuous checks of the level of radioactivity in the air, water and soil and periodically 
communicate information to the Commission regarding the performed checks in order that 
the latter is kept informed of the level of radioactivity to which the public is exposed734. 
Furthermore, the Member States are to furnish the Commission with the general data 
relating to any plan for the disposal of radioactive waste (a particular form for the data has 
not been prescribed), enabling the latter to estimate whether the implementation of the 
disposal plan is liable to result in radioactive contamination of the water, soil or airspace of 
another Member State735.  
 
Proceeding down to the secondary law instruments relevant to the access to 
information in the environmental field and pertaining to Euratom’s scope of application, 
the discussion will further focus on the two Union instruments implementing the first pillar 
of the Aarhus Convention at Union level: Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to 
environmental information and Regulation No 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions 
of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (the 
Aarhus Regulation). Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information736 
establishes the legal regime for access to information regarding environmental matters in 
the EU while the Directive’s pre-cursor, Directive 90/313/EC on freedom of access to 
information on the environment737 which was already in place at the time of signature of the 
Aarhus Convention on the part of the European Community, served as the starting ground 
for the negotiations on the ‘access to information’ regime to be established under the 
Convention738. The 1990 Directive was, understandably, somewhat more restrictive in 
scope than the subsequent access-to-information provisions of the Convention739.  
                                                            
734 Art.36; See for the application of Art.35 Euratom, Commission Communication, Application of Article 35 of 
the Euratom Treaty: Verification of the operation and efficiency of facilities for continuous monitoring of the 
level of radioactivity in the air, water and soil, Report 1990-2007, Brussels, 20.12.2007 COM(2007) 847 final. 
735 Art.37. On the modalities of application of the article, see, Commission Recommendation on the 
application of Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty (2010/635/Euratom) L 279/36-67. 
736 OJ L 41, 14.2.2003, p. 26–32. 
737 OJ L 158, 23.6.1990, p. 56–58. 
738 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.65. 
739 See, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.65, for a comparison of the texts of the 
Convention and the Directive, especially regarding the definition of the terms ‘environmental information’ 
and ‘public authority’ (which appears to be broader in the Convention) and the requirement for the applicant 
to state their interest (which is absent from the Directive which does not foresee any requirement for the 
applicant to prove the existence of an interest). 
Nevertheless, the EU Court of Justice contributed for the former restrictive scope of the Directive 90/313/EEC 
on the freedom of access to information on the environment to be overcome by extending the scope of the term 
‘environmental information’ in the Mecklenburg case (C-321/96 ECR 1998 Page I-03809) by deciding to treat a 
statement of views given by a public authority in development consent proceedings as `information relating 
to the environment’, according to the language of the Directive.  
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In order to cater to the reinforced procedural protection regime of the Aarhus 
Convention, it was imminent that a new directive be adopted, improving the regime on 
access to information in the environmental domain. With respect to the nuclear realm, the 
2003 Access-to-information Directive, extends the scope of the term ‘environmental 
information’ circumscribed in the Convention by including “substances, energy, noise, 
radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases 
into the environment” among the factors that influence the state of the environment (Art. 
2.1(b)) 740. Effectively, with regard to the factors linked to nuclear energy, the Directive goes 
further from the Convention’s sole reference to ‘radiation’, complementing it with an 
express reference to ‘radioactive waste’. The EU Court of Justice has, in its own right, 
accepted to offer a broad construction of the former definition of 'environmental 
information' of Article 2(1) of the Access-to-Information Directive741. 
                                                            
740 Emphasis added; Article 2 of the Directive states:  
“Definitions 
For the purposes of this Directive: 
1. "Environmental information" shall mean any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other 
material form on: 
(a) the state of the elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and 
natural sites including wetlands, coastal and marine areas, biological diversity and its components, including 
genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements; 
(b) factors, such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, 
discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the 
environment referred to in (a); 
(c) measures (including administrative measures), such as policies, legislation, plans, programmes, 
environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely to affect the elements and factors referred to in 
(a) and (b) as well as measures or activities designed to protect those elements;  
(…)”; 
741 The CJEU set an important precedent by interpreting the definition of 'environmental information' of 
Article 2(1) of the Access-to-Information Directive extensively741 in the case C-266/09 Stichting Natuur en 
Milieu v College voor de toelating van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden (ECR 2010 p. I-13119) which 
dealt with the refusal of a German administrative body to disclose certain studies and reports concerning the 
effectiveness of a plant protection product. The Court was asked to inquire into whether the information 
submitted within the framework of a national procedure for the authorisation of a plant protection product 
could be subsumed under the part of the definition for ‘environmental information’ of Art.2.1(c) of the 
Directive relative to “measures (including administrative measures), such as policies, legislation, plans, 
programmes, environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely to affect the elements and factors (…)”. 
(Para. 25 of judgment); The requested information did not directly involve any assessment of the 
consequences on human health and was relevant to elements of the environment which may affect human 
health (should excess levels of the residues be present) so that it was considered to fall within the ambit of the 
term ‘environmental information’. However, another issue was whether the refusal to disclose could be saved 
under the derogation relating to the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information provided in 
Art.4(2) of the Directive (Para.42). The Court pointed out that the grounds for refusal to provide information 
were to be interpreted in a restrictive way and taking into account the public interest served by the disclosure 
to the extent that the former interest appeared to outweigh the interest served by the refusal to disclose 
(Para.53).  
Subsequently, in C-204/09 Flachglas Torgau GmbH (ECR 2012 I-0000), however, the Court 
interpreted the exemption regarding 'bodies or institutions when acting in a judicial or legislative capacity' of 
the second subparagraph of Art.2(2) of the 2003 Directive in a broad manner, opining that government 
ministries participating in the legislative process were caught under the former exemption for the duration of 
the legislative process741. The case concerned a request addressed to the German Federal Ministry for the 
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While the 2003 Access-to-Information Directive lays down access-to-information 
obligations incumbent on public authorities in the Member States, as concerns the 
environmental information obtainable from the EU institutions and/or bodies, there 
appears that a dual legal regime is in place borne by, on the one hand, Regulation No 
1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters to Community institutions and bodies (the Aarhus Regulation)742 and Regulation 
1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents, on the other743. The former instrument is specific to the access to 
environmental information obtainable by private and legal persons from the EU institutions 
and bodies while the latter is a general ‘access to information’ bill for the EU institutions 
and bodies, irrespective of the type of information requested. The duality of applicable 
legal regimes has resulted in certain inconsistencies concerning their respective scope of 
application744 with a number of the provisions of the 2006 Regulation specifically being 
aimed at evening out the potential conflict of norms that may arise between the two 
regulations745. In so far as the access to environmental information is concerned, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Environment, Protection of Nature and Reactor Safety for information regarding the legislative process 
leading to the adoption of a 2007 law and its subsequent implementation (more specifically, internal 
memoranda of the Ministry and its correspondence with the Federal Office for the Environment) (Para. 22,23 
of judgment). The German Ministry had refused the request considering the information to be part of the 
legislative process that the ministry had been involved in and thereby exempt from the duty to provide the 
requested information (Para.24). The CJEU conceded that the former derogation could extend to government 
ministries to the extent that they participate in the legislative process, in particular by tabling draft laws or 
giving opinions (Para.51). However, the Court reminded that once the legislative process was finished, the 
bodies or institutions of the former kind were no longer to be regarded as ‘acting in legislative capacity’ and 
the option for the Member States to consider them in this sense had been precluded (Para.58);  
The CJEU’s has produced ample case law on access to information in the environmental field, for 
more commentary on the more recent case law, see, Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the experience gained in the application of Directive 2003/4/EC on Public Access to 
Environmental Information;  COM(2012) 774 final; Brussels, 17.12.2012; 
742 OJ L 264, 25.9.2006 p.13; In order to further implement the 2006 Aarhus Regulation, the Commission has 
adopted two decisions: Commission Decision 2008/50/EC of 13 December 2007 laying down detailed rules for 
the application of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Aarhus 
Convention as regards requests for the internal review of administrative acts (OJ 2008 L 13/24); and 
Commission Decision 2008/401/EC, Euratom of 30 April 2008 amending its Rules of Procedure as regards 
detailed rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institution 
and bodies (OJ 2008 L 140/22). 
743 OJ L 145/43, 31.5.2001. The Regulation draws from ex-Art.255(2) TEC (presently Art.15 (3)TFEU) concerning 
the right of access to documents of the Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, equally applicable to 
the Euratom scope. 
744 J. Jendroska, Citizen’s Rights in European Environmental Law: Stock-Taking of Key Challenges and Current 
Developments in Relation to Public Access to Information, Participation and Access to Justice, Journal of 
European Environmental and Planning Law, 2012, Vol. 9 Issue 1, p.81. 
745 Points 7,8,12,13,15 of the Preamble; Arts. 3,4,6 of the 2006 Regulation; 
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Regulation 1367/2006 practically extends the scope of the term ‘environmental information’ 
to the purview of Regulation 1049/2001746.  
The provisions of the 2006 Aarhus Regulation regarding access to information have 
a direct bearing on the Euratom field since the scope of the environmental information 
covered by the Regulation, extends to, inter alia, factors (such as substances, energy, noise, 
radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases 
into the environment) that affect or are likely to affect the elements of the environment 
(comprising of air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, biological diversity and its components 
etc.)747. The former inclusion of ‘radiation’ and ‘radioactive waste’ aligns with the definition 
for ‘environmental information’ provided in the Access-to-information Directive supra, thus 
making both of these acts applicable to access to information on the state of the 
environment affected or likely to be affected by radiation and/or radioactive waste.  
The Aarhus Regulation does not only adopt an inclusive approach towards the 
subject matter covered, it is equally progressive in terms of the subjects of the obligations 
provided therein. Namely, the Regulation applies equally to the EU institutions and bodies 
acting in an administrative capacity and in a legislative capacity748 which seems to be a 
revolutionary legal enterprise for the Union legislators having in view the optional character 
of the former demand under the Aarhus Convention749. Lastly, the Aarhus Regulation 
further builds up from the Convention’s requirements by adopting the ‘any person’ principle 
both in the context of submission of requests for information and the collection and 
                                                            
746 Article 3 of the 2006 Regulation determines the scope of application of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 with 
respect to access to environmental information: 
“Application of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 shall apply to any request by an applicant for access to environmental 
information held by Community institutions and bodies without discrimination as to citizenship, nationality 
or domicile and, in the case of a legal person, without discrimination as to where it has its registered seat or an 
effective centre of its activities. 
For the purposes of this Regulation, the word "institution" in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 shall be read as 
"Community institution or body. (…)";[Emphasis added]746 
On the other hand, the 2006 Regulation espouses the following definition for environmental information in 
Art. 2.1(d): 
“(...) (d) "environmental information" means any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other 
material form on: 
(i) the state of the elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and 
natural sites including wetlands, coastal and marine areas, biological diversity and its components, including 
genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements; 
(ii) factors, such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, 
discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the 
environment referred to in point (i);”[Emphasis added]; 
747 Emphasis added; Art. 2.1(d) of the 2006 Regulation. 
748 Art.2.1(c). 
749 The Preamble to the Aarhus Convention recognizes the “(…) the desirability of transparency in all branches 
of government and inviting legislative bodies to implement the principles of this Convention in their 
proceedings (…)”; 
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dissemination of environmental information750. The former progressive features of the 
Regulation are a demonstration of deference on the part of the Union legislators towards 
the general tenor of inclusiveness of the Preamble to the Aarhus Convention.  
Having in mind the Commission’s dominant prerogatives in the exercise of control 
over the flow of information under Arts.35 and 36 Euratom, referred to supra, reliance on 
the access-to-information mechanisms available under the Aarhus Regulation can be used 
to offset the potentially arbitrary behavior of the Commission in this respect - that is, to the 
extent that information related to radiation and/or radioactive waste is at issue. 
In turn, there are also several Euratom measures that have directly or marginally 
(incidentally) covered the aspect of access to information in the field of nuclear health and 
safety, the Fukushima nuclear accident serving as a reminder of the importance attached to 
enhancing the transparency on nuclear safety matters and promoting independence in 
regulatory decision-making751. In this vein, the 2014 amendments to Directive 
2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear 
safety of nuclear installations752 establish an obligation for Member States to ensure that 
necessary information in relation to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations and its 
regulation is made available to workers and the general public, with specific consideration 
to local authorities, population and stakeholders in the vicinity of a nuclear installation753. 
                                                            
750 Arts.3 and 4;  
The EU General Court narrowly defined the scope of the information to be requested from the Union 
institutions and bodies in terms of form (information contained in a document) in a case concerning the duty 
to record information T-264/04 WWF European Policy Programme v. Council (ECR 2007 II-00911), where the 
center of gravity was the 2001 Regulation, whereas the Aarhus Regulation failed to apply ratione temporae 
even though the applicants had also relied on it), For an analysis of the case, see, S. De Abreu Ferreira, The 
Fundamental Right of Access to Environmental Information: a Critical Analysis of WWF-EPO v. Council, 
Journal of Environmental Law 2007 volume 19, issue 3; 
Further on, in Joined cases C-514/11 P and C-605/11 P Liga para a Protecção da Natureza (LPN) and Republic of 
Finland v European Commission (not yet published), both the 2001 Regulation and the Aarhus Regulation were 
at issue, the cases centering on a request for access to information from the Commission concerning 
documents relating to an infringement procedure at the prelitigation stage where the applicants had invoked, 
inter alia, Art.6(1) of 2006 Regulation referring to the overriding public interest in disclosure which must exist 
where the information requested relates to emissions into the environment (para.80 of the judgment). For a 
case note, see J. Dupont-Lassalle, Accès aux documents et confidentialité des enquêtes de la Commission, 
Europe 2014 janvier Comm. nº 1 p.19-20; 
In general, for a more thorough coverage of the intersection between the 2001 Regulation and the 2006 
Aarhus Regulation and related case law, see, S. De Abreu Ferreira, Passive Access to Environmental 
Information in the EU: An Analysis of Recent Legal Developments, European Energy and Environmental Law 
Review, August 2008; and, P. Leino, Just a Little Sunshine in the Rain: The 2010 Case Law of the European 
Court of Justice on Access to Documents, Common Market Law Review, Issue 48, 2011;   
751 See, point 12 of the Preamble to Directive 2014/87/Euratom of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 
2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations OJ 2014 
L 219/42;  
752OJ 2009 L 172/18; amended by Directive 2014/87/Euratom of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 
2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations OJ 2014 
L 219/42. 
753 Art. 8(1) of the 2014 Directive. 
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That obligation entails that the competent regulatory authority and the licence holders are 
to provide in the framework of their communication policy: “a) information on normal 
operating conditions of nuclear installations to workers and the general public, and b) 
prompt information in case of incidents and accidents to workers and the general public 
and to the competent regulatory authorities of other Member States in the vicinity of a 
nuclear installation”754. Under Art.8(2) of the Directive, information is to be made available 
to the public in accordance with relevant legislation and international instruments, provided 
that this does not jeopardise other overriding interests, such as security, which are 
recognised in relevant legislation or international instruments755. In comparison to the 
treatment of the access to information under the former version of the directive, the 
amended directive is much more elaborate and underpinned by overriding transparency 
concerns.  
In the field of spent fuel and radioactive waste management, the availability of 
relevant information to the public is also of pivotal significance. Under Art.10(1) of the 
Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the 
responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste756, Member States 
are to ensure that necessary information on the management of spent fuel and radioactive 
waste be made available to workers and the general public, which is corollary to the 
obligation of ensuring that the competent regulatory authority informs the public in the 
fields of its competence. Information is to be made available to the public in accordance 
with national legislation and international obligations, provided that this does not 
jeopardise other interests such as, inter alia, security, recognised in national legislation or 
international obligations757. The language of the Directive, especially in comparison to the 
above mentioned Nuclear Safety Directive, is sketchy as to the type of information to be 
imparted with the general public since it only refers to ‘necessary information’ while 
offering no guidance as to how the necessity for making the information available is to be 
established.  
The provisions concerning the supply of information of Directive 
2013/59/EURATOM laying down basic safety standards for protection against the 
dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation758, which establishes a comprehensive 
legal regime in the matter of human health protection against (potentially or actually) 
dangerous ionizing radiaton, gravitate around the duty of Member States to ensure that 
information related to the justification of classes or types of practices, the regulation of 
radiation sources and of radiation protection is made available to undertakings, workers, 
members of the public, as well as patients and other individuals subject to medical 
                                                            
754 Idem. 
755 Emphasis added. 
756 OJ L 199 , 02/08/2011 P. 0048 – 0056. 
757 Art.10(1). 
758 OJ 2014 L 13/1. 
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exposure759. Similarly to the foregoing Euratom instruments, it envisages that information 
be made available in accordance with national legislation and international obligations, 
provided that this does not jeopardise other interests such as, inter alia, security, 
recognised in national legislation or international obligations760. Furthermore, given that 
the new 2013 Basic Safety Standards Directive has repealed the former Directive 
89/618/Euratom of 27 November 1989 on informing the general public about health 
protection measures to be applied and steps to be taken in the event of a radiological 
emergency761, it has incorporated and further developed the rules applicable to the 
exchange of information in the event of radiological emergency belonging to the latter 
directive, based on a regime applicable to members of the public likely to be affected in the 
event of an emergency or members of the public actually affected in the event of an 
emergency. Thus, Member States are under an obligation to provide members of the public 
likely to be affected in the event of an emergency with information about the health 
protection measures applicable to them and about the action they should take in the event 
of such an emergency, ensuring that the information is updated and distributed at regular 
intervals and whenever significant changes take place (the former information is to be 
permanently available to the public)762. For members of the public actually affected when 
an emergency occurs, Member States are to make sure that the former are informed 
without delay about the facts of the emergency, the steps to be taken and, as appropriate, 
the health protection measures applicable to them763. 
The foregoing regime regarding the exchange of information in the event of 
radiological emergency complements the regime established pursuant to Council Decision 
87/600/Euratom of 14 December 1987 on Community arrangements for the early 
exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency764, the scope of which 
does not cover the aspect of provision of information to the general public. Namely, the 
Council Decision deals with the arrangements that apply with regard to the notification and 
provision of information whenever a Member State decides to take measures of a wide-
spread nature in order to protect the general public in case of a radiological emergency, 
centering on the urgent exchange of information between the Member States and the 
Commission in the event of such emergency765. 
                                                            
759 Art.77. 
760 Idem. 
761 OJ L 357 , 07/12/1989 P. 0031 – 0034; The standards introduced by the original 1989 Directive have been 
considered to represent what is known as the ‘first phase’ in the evolution of the EU/Euratom legislation on 
public information and participation (Gadbois et al., supra n.659, p.9); 
762 Art.70. 
763 Art.71; The detailed arrangements for the execution of the tasks laid down in Arts.70 and 71 have been 
produced in Annex XII of the Directive. 
764 OJ L 371, 30.12.1987, p.76. 
765 See Arts.1, 2 and 3 of the Council Decision. 
For further references on provision of information in specific nuclear energy contexts, see the following 
Euratom acts: 2005/844/EURATOM Commission Decision of 25 November 2005 concerning the accession of 
the European Atomic Energy Community to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (OJ L-
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A salient feature of the foregoing Euratom instruments is their fairly permissive 
language and, consequently, the large discretion they afford to Member States and 
national authorities in the discharge of their duties regarding the provision of necessary 
information to the workers or/and the general public. The above discussed Euratom 
instruments as well as the Euratom Treaty, unfortunately, do not foresee any immediate 
involvement for the public/public concerned to address specific requests for access to 
information to the respective national authorities and, thus, only cover the ‘active’ type of 
access to environmental information. The former lack of sufficient public involvement in 
the access to information within the Euratom construct pertaining to the field of nuclear 
health and safety indicates a serious lack of environmental democracy which can (only 
partially and sporadically) be extenuated through the application of the Union instruments 
transposing the Aarhus Convention obligations which equally cover the Euratom remit. 
 
IV The participation-in-decision-making pillar of the Aarhus Convention 
 
The objective corollary to that of achieving a satisfactory and effective access to 
environmental information is the inclusion of the public in the decision-making processes 
for matters pertaining to environmental protection which is, in a certain way, the flip side of 
the ‘environmental democracy’ medal. The public’s involvement in the decision-making (in 
general) is instrumental to the accomplishment of ‘good governance’, denoting the work of 
the public administration which is efficient and effective766 as well as transparent, 
accountable and accessible. The ultimate goal of introducing the public participation 
mechanisms has been seen as not only challenging the administrative decision-making, but 
also, in the wider spectrum, challenging the very legitimacy of representative democracy767.  
The idea of including the public in the decision-making process in the environmental 
field is not an invention peculiar to the Aarhus Convention regime, it is a concept also found 
in other international instruments pre-dating the Aarhus Convention. In this sense, the 1991 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo 
Convention) which provides that the assessment of proposed activities having a potentially 
significant transboundary environmental impact is to be carried out with the participation 
of the public in the areas likely to be affected, is considered as containing one of the most 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
314 of 30/11/2005 p.21-22); 2005/845/EURATOM Commission Decision of 25 November 2005 concerning the 
accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the Convention on Assistance in the case Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency (OJ L314 of 30/11/2005 p. 27-34); 
766 Jendroska, supra n.648, Part.II.3. 
767 Lee and Abbot, supra n.676, p.106. 
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developed set of public participation provisions768. In a similar vein, the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development, instituted the requirement for public participation in 
Principle 10 which expresses that environmental issues are best handled with the 
participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level, demanding of the Parties to 
facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely 
available.  
The Aarhus Convention ‘participation in decision-making’ requirements are three-
fold, encompassing the public participation in decisions on specific activities (Art.6), the 
public participation concerning plans, programmes and policies relating to the environment 
(Art.7) and the public participation in the preparation of executive regulations and/or 
generally applicable legally binding normative instruments (Art.8). In a manner similar to 
the preceding sections of the chapter which dealt with the ‘access to information’ pillar, 
firstly, the general features of the participation in decision-making regime under the 
Aarhus Convention will be elaborated, followed by a look at the relevant Union and 
Euratom instruments transposing the Convention requirements to the EU level or 
independently drawing on the matter of public participation.  
In terms of their level of stringency, the requirements prescribed under Arts.7 and 8 
of the Aarhus Convention have been phrased in more dispositive terms thus offering the 
Parties greater flexibility in fulfilling their obligations pertaining to public participation769, 
while the Art.6 provisions are more concrete regarding the scope and content of the set 
obligations and the degree of compulsion to be borne by the Parties. Establishing these 
more precise obligations ensures greater public involvement in the decision-making on 
specific activities and reflects the consideration that the public that is (significantly) 
affected is fully entitled to influence the decision-making process770. 
 
 
IV.1 Public participation in decisions on specific activities (Art.6) 
 
The requirements of Art.6 regarding public participation in decisions on specific 
activities apply to permitting decisions on the proposed activities listed in Annex I of the 
Convention, which mainly concern specific administrative decisions (i.e. decisions adopted 
                                                            
768 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.87; See, Art.2(2) and (6), and Art.4(2) of the Espoo 
Convention. The text of the Convention is available at: 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/conventiontextenglish.pdf. 
769 See, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.86. 
770 Idem. 
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to permit a proposed project, activity or action to go forward with an activity)771. The 
proposed activities in Annex I include, inter alia, activities that concern various aspects of 
the production of nuclear energy772 and are thus directly relevant to the Euratom’s scope of 
activities. Moreover, in accordance with their national law, Parties are allowed to extend 
the application of Art.6 to other, non-listed activities which may potentially bear a 
significant effect on the environment773.  
All of the Art.6 provisions are targeted at the ‘public concerned’ (except for Art.6.7 
and Art.6.9 which grant participatory rights to the ‘public’774): the ‘public concerned’ is to be 
informed early in the environmental decision-making procedure, in an adequate, timely 
and effective manner of, among other, the proposed activity and the application upon 
which the decision is to be taken, the nature of the possible decisions or the draft decision, 
the public authority responsible of adopting the decision as well as the envisaged procedure 
                                                            
771 Idem, p.90; The acts adopted by the relevant national authorities pursuant to Art.6 of the Convention are, 
typically, permits, permissions, consents, licenses – usually in fields such as siting and construction of 
installations, use of resources, pollution control etc. (See, Jendroska, The Aarhus Convention at Ten…, supra 
n.655, p.117). 
772  “Annex I 
LIST OF ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 6, PARAGRAPH 1 (a) 
1. (…) 
- Nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors including the dismantling or decommissioning of such 
power stations or reactors 1/ (except research installations for the production and conversion of fissionable 
and fertile materials whose maximum power does not exceed 1 kW continuous thermal load); 
- Installations for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel; 
- Installations designed: 
- For the production or enrichment of nuclear fuel; 
- For the processing of irradiated nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste; 
- For the final disposal of irradiated nuclear fuel; 
- Solely for the final disposal of radioactive waste; 
- Solely for the storage (planned for more than 10 years) of irradiated nuclear fuels or radioactive waste in a 
different site than the production site.”; 
773 Art.6(1)b; The Implementation Guide of the Aarhus Convention suggests that the significance of the effect 
should be measured as the function of the usefulness and the necessity of the public participation process 
where the quality of ‘significance’ is what separates the ordinary decision-making from environmental 
decision-making (The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.93). Therefore, in order to adequately 
judge the ‘significance’ of the effect to the environment, example can be taken from the Appendix III to the 
Espoo Convention which sets out the relevant criteria to be taken into account in examining whether an 
activity is likely to have a significant adverse transboundary impact: the size of the proposed activities, the 
location for the proposed activities and the effects (i.e. proposed activities with particularly complex and 
potentially adverse effects), etc. (See, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.93,94);  
774  Article 6 
“(…) 
7. Procedures for public participation shall allow the public to submit, in writing or, as appropriate, at a public 
hearing or inquiry with the applicant, any comments, information, analyses or opinions that it considers 
relevant to the proposed activity. 
(…) 
9. Each Party shall ensure that, when the decision has been taken by the public authority, the public is 
promptly informed of the decision in accordance with the appropriate procedures. Each Party shall make 
accessible to the public the text of the decision along with the reasons and considerations on which the 
decision is based.(...)”; 
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for the adoption of the former775. The information concerning the procedure should include 
(as long as available): the start of the procedure, the opportunities for public participation, 
the time and venue of any envisaged public hearing, designation of the public authority 
from which relevant information can be obtained (as well as where the relevant information 
had been subjected to examination by the public), an indication of the relevant public 
authority/official body to which comments or questions can be addressed along with a time 
schedule for delivering comments or questions as well as an indication of what 
environmental information relevant to the proposed activity is available776. The former 
mechanisms are to be put into place within reasonable time-frames allowing sufficient time 
for the public to effectively participate777. 
 Concomitantly, the competent public authorities must be able to ensure free-of-
charge access for examination of all information relevant to the decision-making (referred 
to supra) which is available at the time of the public participation procedure to the public 
concerned778. Such information is to include, at a minimum: a description of the site and the 
physical and technical characteristics of the proposed activity (including an estimate of the 
expected residues and emissions), a description of the significant effects of the proposed 
activity on the environment, a description of the measures envisaged to prevent and/or 
reduce the effects, a non-technical summary of the former, an outline of the main 
alternatives to the proposed activity, and (in accordance with national legislation) the main 
reports and advice provided to the public authority at the time the public concerned was to 
be informed in accordance with Art. 6(2)779. It is to be gathered that, under Art.6, the ‘public 
concerned’ subset has the preferential role regarding notification and examination of the 
proposed activities as opposed to the ‘public’ which is entitled to submit (in writing or, at a 
public hearing or inquiry with the applicant) comments, information, analyses or opinions 
which it considers relevant to the proposed activity780. 
 
   In terms of the end result of the participative role of the public, Parties have the 
duty to provide that in reaching the final decision due account is taken of the outcome of 
the public participation781. The concerned term is rather evasive in view of what it is 
presumed to encompass as well as the pertinent parameters which are to be applied in 
estimating the former. In this sense, the requirement of taking ‘due account’ is to be 
construed as relative to the duty of the public authority to seriously consider the substance 
of all the comments received from the public (regardless of their source) and include the 
substance of these comments into the motivation/statement of reasons of the final 
                                                            
775 Art.6(2). 
776 Art.6(2). 
777 Art.6(3). 
778 Art.6(6). 
779 Art.6(6). 
780 Art.6(7). 
781 Art.6(8). 
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decision (the relevant authority is however not required to accept the substance of all the 
received comments and modify its decision pursuant thereto)782. Failure to respect the 
procedural requirement of taking due account of the contribution originating from public 
participation may be seen as a procedural violation and give rise to legal challenges by the 
members of the public whose comments were not duly taken into consideration783. Upon 
reaching its decision, the public authority is responsible to promptly inform the public of the 
decision and make the text of the decision accessible to the public along with a statement 
of reasons784. Moreover, it should be noted that even where the applicant’s original 
proposal does not undergo any significant changes, the successful implementation thereof 
is nonetheless often times largely dependent on the active public participation during the 
decision-making process785. Pursuant to the national defence derogation, however, all the 
former procedural obligations will fail to apply in the event that a Contracting Party 
considers that the application of these provisions would adversely affect certain activities 
that serve national defence purposes786. 
 
With respect to the nature of the Art.6 requirements, it is necessary to clarify that 
the former do not have the purpose of imposing an obligation for a licensing or permitting 
procedure to be put into place at the national level787 so that they only become applicable 
provided that such a procedure has already been envisaged under national law. Another 
caveat lies in the frequent (however, faulted) understanding that Art.6 serves to 
incorporate EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) requirements to the public 
participation process788. Actually, the EIA should not be seen as an end in itself given that it 
does not represent a permitting process, but it is essentially one of the means used in the 
decision-making process789. The application of the Art.6 requirements to a particular 
decision-making procedure is not determined by whether the procedure in question 
requires an EIA (or is labelled as ‘environmental decision-making’, for that matter), but 
rather by whether the decision-making as such is deemed liable to produce a significant 
impact on the environment790. Although the Aarhus Convention does not establish an EIA 
regime per se, its provisions do ultimately establish a kind of an obligatory review of the 
environmental effects of particular activities which is to be undertaken in the course of the 
relevant decision-making process791. Thus, the Convention does not make environment 
assessment compulsory to all public participation procedures being that environmental 
                                                            
782 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.109. 
783 As provided under Art.9.2. of the Convention. 
784 Art. 6(9). 
785 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.85. 
786 Art.6.1(c). 
787 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.89. 
788 Idem, p.90. 
789 Idem. 
790 Idem. 
791 Idem, p.91. 
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impact assessment is not necessarily part of all the public participation procedures 
potentially covered by the former – the reverse is nevertheless true: public participation 
represents a constitutive part of the environmental assessment procedure792. More 
particularly, in addition to decision-making procedures that include an EIA, Art.6 covers 
other types of decision-making where the EIA is not applicable or suitable as a mechanism 
(for example, regulatory decisions on rate-setting, approvals for the introduction of new 
products into commerce, etc.)793. In this sense, the notion of public participation is 
intrinsically linked with the EIA as a procedural mechanism given that the public will often 
not be able to form a valid science-based opinion in the course of its participation in the 
decision-making process in the absence of adequate environmental reports and related 
documents which concern the actual or potential environmental and health risks of the 
planned activities794. 
 
IV.2 Public participation concerning plans, programmes and policies relating to 
the environment (Art.7)  
 
The duties concerning public participation in the drafting of plans, programmes and 
policies relating to the environment are covered by Art.7 which, in turn, fails to define either 
of the former terms for which reason one is led to rely on their habitual, common-sense 
legal meanings in the national legal systems of the UN/ECE countries795. The regime 
applicable to plans and programmes is different from that on policies, the latter being less 
elaborate and more flexible in nature. Thus, while it is required that Parties “make 
appropriate practical and/or other provisions for the public to participate during the 
preparation of plans and programmes relating to the environment”, with relation to 
policies, Parties are required to “endeavor to provide opportunities for public participation 
in the preparation of policies relating to the environment”796. In addition, in the preparation 
of plans and programmes relating to the environment, public authorities are instructed to 
offer reasonable time-frames for the different phases of the decision-making, provide for 
                                                            
792 Jendroska, The Aarhus Convention at Ten…, supra n.655, p.101. 
793 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.91. 
794 Jendroska, The Aarhus Convention at Ten…, supra n.655, p.99; See also, Communication in case ACCC/C/24 
(Spain), para.55. 
795 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.113; The Convention introduces a comparatively higher 
standard in that it covers all plans and programmes “relating to the environment” rather than only those 
having a potential effect or a potentially harmful effect thereupon (see, The Aarhus Convention: An 
Implementation Guide, p.115); The acts typically adopted pursuant to the Art.7 rules are plans, programmes 
and strategies, while the fields they habitually apply to are zoning, spatial planning, resource management, 
water management, waste management and nature conservation (Jendroska, The Aarhus Convention at Ten, 
supra n.655, p.117). 
796 Art.7. 
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early public participation and ensure that in adopting the decision due account is taken of 
the outcome of the public participation797.  
 
Due to the lack of prescription as to the manner in which the Parties should 
implement the foregoing obligations, the former are lead to revert to the applicable 
national rules in assessing the relevance of particular plans, programmes and policies to the 
environment798. In this sense, the use of the ‘strategic environmental assessment (SEA)’ has 
been suggested as a suitable mechanism that enables the public authorities to integrate 
environmental considerations into the development of plans, programmes and policies799. 
One can conceivably make an analogy between the way in which the EIA mechanism 
vehicles the decision-making process under Art.6 with the role of the SEA mechanism in 
appraising the potential environmental effects of the proposed plans, programmes and 
policies800.  
As concerns the category of people encompassed by the requirements, the first 
sentence of Art.7 employs the ‘any person’ principle referring to the duty of the Parties to 
make appropriate practical and/or other provisions for the public to participate during the 
preparation of plans and programmes, within a transparent and fair framework and by 
having provided the necessary information to the public801. However, the second sentence 
of the article restricts the scope of the former duty to the public which may participate, 
leaving to the discretion of the relevant public authorities to identify this section of the 
public by taking into account the objectives of the Convention. The way in which the 
evident difference in scopes has been explained is that the first sentence concerns the 
obligation to provide necessary information to the public which would thereupon enable it 
to participate in the preparation of plans and programmes relating to the environment (as a 
general responsibility for notification), while the second sentence would presumably apply 
strictly to the process of participation per se802. Therefore, in determining the scope of the 
‘public which may participate’ the public authorities should take guidance from the 
provisions of the Convention’s Preamble which insists that an inclusive approach is adopted 
in identifying the interested members of the public803. In this vein, the public authorities 
should employ a methodology that is verifiable and transparent which would itself be most 
effectively accomplished by introducing a uniform definition in the national implementing 
law/s for the category of the ‘public that may participate’804. 
                                                            
797 Art.7. 
798 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.114. 
799 Idem. 
800Idem.; For more on the “strategic environmental assessment” process and the Sofia Initiative on 
Environmental Impact Assessment, see, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.115. 
801 Art.7. 
802 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.118. 
803 Idem. 
804 Idem.; The Implementation Guide suggests the drafting of standing lists of interested individuals and 
NGOs in which persons express their interest in being informed of and in participating in planning and 
policymaking in specific areas or on specific subjects, as a feasible solution.  
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IV.3 Public participation in the preparation of executive regulations and/or 
generally applicable legally binding normative instruments (Art.8) 
 
With the legislative branch of government being excluded from scrutiny under the 
Aarhus Convention regime, the legislative prerogatives of the executive branch in 
environmental decision-making are nevertheless caught under the scope of Art.8 of the 
Convention. The former article introduces a rather negligible degree of compulsion, aiming 
to provide guidance rather than lay down binding rules for the public authorities. Pursuant 
to Art.8, public authorities should strive to promote effective public participation at an 
appropriate stage (while options are still open) during the preparation of executive 
regulations or other generally applicable legally binding rules that may have a significant 
effect on the environment. Hence, to the difference of the provisions concerning plans, 
programmes and policies relating to the environment, the threshold for the application of 
Art.8 has been set higher so as to only cover legally binding rules that may have a 
significant effect on the environment. The legal acts that Art. 8 applies to are not solely 
those which are immediately executable (as the title of the acts may suggest), and can 
include various decrees, regulations, ordinances, instructions, normative orders, etc.805. For 
the purpose of allowing the public to participate, appropriate time-frames should be set 
whereas the draft rules should be published (or otherwise be made publicly available) 
providing the public with the opportunity to comment, directly or through representative 
consultative bodies806. At the stage of the final drafting of the act to be adopted, the public 
authority ought to attempt to note all the public involvement that has previously taken 
place and omitting to do so could plausibly be considered to be a breach of the Convention 
procedural requirements807. Unfortunately, though, the need for the result of the public 
participation to be taken into account as far as possible often times succumbs to the 
‘politics’ involved in the legislative process which is liable to hinder any thorough 
examination of the possible procedural defects of the decision-making process and, as a 
result, deny the possibility to challenge the outcome of the decision-making in any 
substantive manner808.  
 
A controversy that surrounds the correct implementation of the Art.8 requirements 
is the issue of whether the scope of these requirements should extend to the public 
authorities’ participation in the legislative process which concludes with the passing of the 
                                                            
805 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.120. 
806 Art.8. 
807 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.122. 
808 Idem.; In support to this claim, observe the requirement that ‘due account’ is taken of the outcome of 
public participation (under Art.6) as opposed to the requirement that the former is taken into account ‘as far 
as possible’ (under Art.8). the latter sets a slightly higher standard which can be accounted for by the fact that 
the specific activities subsumed under Art.6 directly affect the rights and interests of particular members of 
the public, unlike the legislative process which is played out at the government level and is therefore not as 
tenable and immediate as the former (The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.109). 
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acts drafted by the executive on to the legislative organs. The Implementation Guide offers 
an affirmative stance, considering that in this way the Convention rules ensure the public 
participation in the legislative process through the medium of public authorities rather than 
directly interacting with the legislative branch809. A fortiori, the stage of preparation of draft 
legislation can not be qualified as acting in a legislative capacity (within the meaning of the 
Convention) to the effect that the public’s involvement in the course of the preparation of 
the legal acts by public authorities signifies ‘participation at an early stage’810. Such public 
participation at an appropriate stage prevents that any problems regarding the adopted 
text emerge in the future so that once the draft legislation is finally passed on to the 
legislature it no longer belongs to the remit of Art.8811.  
The former progressive reading of the Convention’s provisions cannot be (without 
difficulty) reconciled with the reality of the law-making process especially in the absence of 
an express provision extending the application of the Convention rules to the preparatory 
stage of the legislative process812. Being that Art.8 is concerned with legal acts adopted by 
the public authorities which are ‘final’ rather than preparatory, the former way of 
interepreting the Art.8 provisions is potentially conducive to an unwarranted extension of 
the scope of application of the former article and the Convention as a whole. 
 
The general conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that law-
making at the domestic level remains to be a sensitive and delicate domain for the Parties, 
which is bourne out by the permissive character of the Art.8 provisions and the 
employment of a ‘best efforts’ approach813 to a field which potentially creates the most far-
reaching effects for the ordinary citizen. 
 
 
IV.4 The participation-in-decision-making pillar transposed in Union/Euratom 
law 
 
Completing the previously raised discourse regarding the scope of the transparency 
obligations belonging to the Euratom’s purview, the breadth of the participation-in-
                                                            
809 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.120. 
810 Idem. 
811Idem; Were the situation reverse, namely, should a public authority adopt a law drafted by a legislative body 
which has acted in full legislative capacity, Art.8 would consequently fail to apply as the activity in question 
cannot be qualified as “preparation” within the meaning of the Convention (The Aarhus Convention: An 
Implementation Guide, p.120). 
812 See, on this, J. Ebbesson, Public Participation and Privatisation in Environmental Matters: An Assessment 
of the Aarhus Convention, Erasmus Law Review, 2011, Vol 4 Issue 2, p.75; The author argues that the 
preparation of generally applicable regulations and normative instruments is not to be mixed with legislation 
as the Aarhus Convention, according to Art.2.2, does not apply to bodies and institutions acting in a 
legislative or judicial capacity. 
813 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.119. 
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decision-making requirements pertaining to the environmental field and applicable to the 
former purview shall be examined through an analysis of the relevant primary law and 
secondary law instruments adopted under the Union and the Euratom legal framework.  
First and foremost, it is essential to indicate that the Union Treaties contain 
provisions of a participatory nature relative to the closer involvement of the Union citizen in 
the work of the Union’s instiutions, bodies, offices and agencies (Art.15(1) TFEU)814 and, on 
a more general note, the participation in the democratic life of the Union (Art.10(3) TEU)815. 
Furthermore, Art.10(3) requires that decisions are taken as openly and closely as possible to 
the citizen (whereby it has not been specified whether the former only concerns the Union’s 
decisions or additionally includes the decisions adopted at the national level). While Art.15 
TFEU has been extended to the Euratom framework via the bridging provisions of Art. 106a 
Euratom, the Art.10 TEU requirements are however not applicable to the Euratom Treaty’s 
scope of application. Moreover, the Euratom Treaty itself fails to include any (even 
incidental) references to the participation of the public in the Euratom’s decision-making 
process. It would seem that, for a treaty which is relatively ‘old’ and has not yielded to any 
substantial changes since its adoption, it could not be expected of the Euratom Treaty 
drafters to have allowed themselves the luxury of endorsing active public participation 
mechanisms at the expense of the dominant promotional character of the Treaty with 
respect to a budding new industry which was nuclear energy at the time. 
As concerns the secondary law instruments, the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention covering the participation in the decision-making have been transposed into 
EU law via the 1985 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive 85/337/EEC816 (codified 
by Directive 2011/92/EU817) (concerning specific projects), Directive 2001/42/EC818 known as 
the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive (concerning public plans and 
programmes that are likely to have a significant effect on the environment)819 and the 2003 
Public Participation Directive 2003/35/EC820 (with respect to the drawing up of certain plans 
and programmes relating to the environment). The former directives, together with the 
                                                            
814 Article 15 TFEU: 
“1. In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible. (…)”; 
815 Article 10 TEU: 
“(…) 3. Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be 
taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.”; 
816 Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment OJ L 175, 5.7.1985, p. 40–48. The Directive has been amended three times, in 
1997, 2003 and 2009. 
817 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (codification) OJ L 26, 
pp.1-21. 
818 Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of 
the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p. 30–37  
819 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/home.htm; 
820 Directive 2003/35/EC of 26 May 2003 providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of 
certain plans and programmes relating to the environment, OJ L 156 , 25/06/2003 P. 0017 – 0025. 
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2003 Public Information Directive, have been succinctly described as largely completing the 
European regulatory framework on public information and participation in the decision-
making process on nuclear matters821. To the extent that the activity of the EU institutions 
and bodies is concerned, the second pillar requirements of the Aarhus Convention have 
been transposed to the EU level via the Regulation No 1367/2006 on the application of the 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies 
(the Aarhus Regulation). 
In this sense it is to be reminded that only the Art.6 and Art.7 (the provisions relating 
to the participation in the preparation of plans and programmes) of the Aarhus Convention 
have their corresponding implementing Union rules while the provisions regarding 
involvement in the policy-making as well as the adoption of executive regulations and 
generally applicable legally binding measures, have not been covered by Union 
implementing rules. Admittedly, EU legislators are not under an obligation to adopt the 
former implementing rules given that the Convention provisions in question merely require 
legal or policy adjustments at the domestic level822 and, in view of their pervasively 
dispositive character, do not intend to institute any strict regulatory regime.  
The EIA Directive applies to the assessment of the environmental effects of public 
and private projects that have a significant impact on the environment, where the term 
‘project’ presupposes the execution of construction works, installations, schemes and other 
interventions in the natural surroundings and landscape823. Member States bear the 
responsibility to adopt all necessary measures to ensure that prior to giving a consent on a 
proposed project likely to have a significant impact on the environment, such a project is 
made subject to an assessment with respect to its potential effects on the environment (by 
taking account of the nature, size and location of the project as well as other determinative 
characteristics etc.)824. Employing the mechanism of environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) involves the identification, description and assessment of the direct and indirect 
effects of a project on the following factors of environment: “(a) human beings, fauna and 
flora; (b) soil, water, air, climate and the landscape; (c) material assets and the cultural 
heritage; and, (d) the interaction between the factors referred to in points (a), (b) and 
(c)”825.  
The Directive covers two types of projects: projects that are subject to an EIA ipso 
jure (listed in Annex I) and projects which can be optionally included for an EIA upon the 
decision of Member States (listed in Annex II)826. With respect to the latter, Member States 
make their decision based on a case-by-case examination or by laying down various 
                                                            
821 See, Gadbois et al., supra n.659, p.14. 
822 Jendroska, The Aarhus Convention at Ten…, supra n.655, p.102. 
823 Art.1.1 and 1.2. 
824 Art.2.1. 
825 Art.3. 
826 Art.4. 
172 
 
applicable thresholds or criteria827. Thus, while the Directive follows the enumeration 
included in Annex I of the Aarhus Convention, it further allows for an extension of the scope 
of the public participation obligations by enlisting additional projects with respect to which 
the Member States enjoy the discretion in deciding on their inclusion under the Directive’s 
public participation procedures. Viz. nuclear energy projects, Annex I of the Directive copies 
the enumeration of Annex I of the Convention while Annex II thereof introduces an addition 
with regard to projects involving deep drillings for the storage of nuclear waste material828.  
The EIA Directive prescribes different responsibilities towards the ‘public’ and the 
‘public concerned’, defining the ‘public concerned’ as the “public affected or likely to be 
affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision-making procedures [dealt 
with under the Directive]”829. Under Art.6(2) of the EIA Directive, early in the environmental 
decision-making procedures or, at the latest, as soon as information can reasonably be 
provided, the public is to be informed, inter alia, of the following : “(a) the existence of the 
request for development consent; (b) the fact that the project is subject to an 
environmental impact assessment procedure; (c) the public authorities responsible for 
taking the decision (those from which relevant information can be obtained, those to which 
comments or questions can be submitted, as well as details on the time schedule for 
delivering comments or questions); (d) the nature of the possible decisions or the draft 
decision; (f) an indication of the times and places at which, and the means by which, the 
relevant information will be made available;(…) [etc]”. 
                                                            
827 Art.4.1 and 4.2; On how the process develops from the application stage to the adoption of the 
development consent, see Arts.5-10; 
828 ANNEX I  
PROJECTS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 4(1)  
2.  (…) 
(b) Nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors including the dismantling or decommissioning of such 
power stations or reactors ( 1 ) (except research installations for the production and conversion of fissionable 
and fertile materials, whose maximum power does not exceed 1 kilowatt continuous thermal load).  
3. (a) Installations for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel;  
(b) Installations designed:  
(i) for the production or enrichment of nuclear fuel;  
(ii) for the processing of irradiated nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste;  
(iii) for the final disposal of irradiated nuclear fuel;  
(iv) solely for the final disposal of radioactive waste;  
(v) solely for the storage (planned for more than 10 years) of irradiated nuclear fuels or radioactive waste in a 
different site than the production site.  
 
ANNEX II  
PROJECTS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 4(2)  
(…) 2. EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY  
(…) (d) Deep drillings, in particular:  
(…) (ii) drilling for the storage of nuclear waste material […] with the exception of drillings for investigating 
the stability of the soil (…)” [Emphasis added]; 
829 Art.1.2(e). Further on, in Art.1.2(e): “(…) For the purposes of this definition, non-governmental 
organisations promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under national law shall be 
deemed to have an interest.”; 
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Furthermore, Member States are responsible to ensure that within reasonable time-
frames the public concerned is granted access to any information gathered from the 
developer in the process and (in accordance with national legislation) the main reports and 
advice issued to the competent authorities830. The public concerned is to be given early and 
effective opportunities to participate in the environmental decision-making procedures and 
is for that purpose entitled to give comments and opinions before the decision on the 
request for development consent is taken831.  
The practical arrangements for making the information available to the public 
(usually by bill posting within a certain radius or via publications in local newspapers) and 
for consulting the public concerned (e.g., by written submissions or by launching a public 
inquiry), are to be determined by the Member States along with the requirement for 
reasonable time-frames for the different stages of the procedure allowing sufficient time 
for the public to have access to the relevant information and for the public concerned to 
prepare and effectively participate in the decision-making832. The development consent 
procedure should take stock of the results of the public consultations833 with the duty that 
once a decision to grant or refuse development consent has been taken by the authorities, 
the latter shall inform the public of the existence of such a decision and provide the public 
with the following information: (a) the content of the decision; (b) the main reasons and 
considerations on which the decision is based (including information about the public 
participation process); (c) a description (where necessary) of the main measures to be used 
to avoid, reduce and, if possible, counteract the major adverse effects834.  
 
The Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive covers plans and 
programmes that are in the process of preparation and/or adoption by a national, 
regional or local authority or which are prepared by an authority for the subsequent 
adoption, through a legislative procedure, by Parliament or Government835. Under the 
Directive, the environmental assessment is understood as the process comprising the 
preparation of an environmental report, the carrying out of consultations, the taking into 
account of the environmental report and the results of the consultations in the decision-
making and the provision of information on the final decision836. The environmental 
assessment is to be conducted during the preparation of a plan or programme, prior to 
the adoption of the latter or its submission to the legislative procedure837. The 
environmental report that is to be prepared within the scope of the assessment should 
identify, describe and evaluate the likely significant effects that the implementation of 
                                                            
830 Art. 6.3(a) and (b). 
831 Art.6.4. 
832 Art.6(5) and (6). 
833 Art.8. 
834 Art.9.1. 
835 Art.2(a). 
836 Art.2(b). 
837 Art.4.1. 
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the plan or programme may cause to the environment, coupled with a choice of 
reasonable alternatives and taking the objectives and the geographical scope of the plan 
or programme into consideration838.   
The former environmental assessment is specific to plans and programmes that 
are likely to have significant environmental effects839, namely those prepared in the fields 
of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, energy, industry, transport, waste management, water 
management, telecommunications, tourism, town and country planning or land use, 
which “set the framework for future development consent of projects listed in Annexes I 
and II to Directive 85/337/EEC” 840). To the extent that concerns the nuclear field, Annexes 
I and II of Directive 85/337/EEC cover a wide range of activities in the field of nuclear 
energy (referred to supra) which indicates that the EIA and the SEA directives cover the 
identical range of nuclear activities.  The SEA Directive does not apply to plans and 
programmes that deal with the use of small areas at local level, nor to minor 
modifications to plans and programmes which, in turn, require an environmental 
assessment (provided the Member States have not classified the former as likely to have 
significant environmental effects)841. Furthermore, plans and programmes the sole 
purpose of which is to serve the national defence or civil emergency as well as financial or 
                                                            
838 Art.5.1. Annex I outlines the type of information the environmental report is expected to contain, pursuant 
to the reference in Art.5.1.: 
ANNEX I 
Information referred to in Article 5(1) 
The information to be provided under Article 5(1), subject to Article 5(2) and (3), is the following: 
(a) an outline of the contents, main objectives of the plan or programme and relationship with other relevant 
plans and programmes; 
(b) the relevant aspects of the current state of the environment and the likely evolution thereof without 
implementation of the plan or programme; 
(c) the environmental characteristics of areas likely to be significantly affected; 
(d) any existing environmental problems which are relevant to the plan or programme including, in particular, 
those relating to any areas of a particular environmental importance, such as areas designated pursuant to 
Directives 79/409/EEC and 92/43/EEC; 
(e) the environmental protection objectives, established at international, Community or Member State level, 
which are relevant to the plan or programme and the way those objectives and any environmental 
considerations have been taken into account during its preparation; 
(f) the likely significant effects(1) on the environment, including on issues such as biodiversity, population, 
human health, fauna, flora, soil, water, air, climatic factors, material assets, cultural heritage including 
architectural and archaeological heritage, landscape and the interrelationship between the above factors; 
(g) the measures envisaged to prevent, reduce and as fully as possible offset any significant adverse effects on 
the environment of implementing the plan or programme; 
(h) an outline of the reasons for selecting the alternatives dealt with, and a description of how the assessment 
was undertaken including any difficulties (such as technical deficiencies or lack of know-how) encountered in 
compiling the required information; 
(i) a description of the measures envisaged concerning monitoring in accordance with Article 10; 
(j) a non-technical summary of the information provided under the above headings.(…)”; 
839 Art.3.1. 
840 Art.3.2(a). 
841 Art.3.3. 
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budget plans and programmes have been categorically excluded from the scope of the 
SEA Directive842.  
Given that both the EIA and the SEA Directives precede the entry into force of the 
Aarhus Convention at the EU level, the Public Participation Directive had been specifically 
targeted at transposing the Aarhus Convention requirements on participation in decision-
making in environmental matters to the EU legal framework843. The Directive lays down the 
procedural arrangements for Members States to allow the public to early and effectively 
participate in the preparation and modification or review of plans and programmes relating 
to the environment, falling within the scope of six pre-existing environmental directives844. 
There has been doubt expressed as to whether the Directive effectively covers all the 
relevant plans and programmes relating to the environment since the scope of the six 
directives it makes express reference to is fairly narrow - the reasons for such a restrictive 
approach on the part of the Union legislators remaining unclear845. On the positive side, 
there is a possibility for this impending lacuna to be counteracted by way of including 
provisions on public participation in environmental decision-making in all future Union 
legislative proposals that relate to environmental plans and programmes, which as a 
general intention has been expressed by the relevant EU institutions846.  Moreover, plans 
and programmes for which a public participation procedure is carried out under the SEA 
Directive are excluded from the scope of the Public Participation Directive847. Hence, the 
applicable regime for plans and programmes on nuclear energy is the one postulated under 
the SEA Directive, eliminating the necessity for the two separate regimes of the SEA and 
the Public Participation Directives to be reconciled concerning the former field.  
The discrepancy is further reflected in the existent inconsistencies in the 
relationship between the SEA Directive and the Public Participation Directive primarily 
                                                            
842 Art.3.8. 
843 Jendroska explains why the 2003 Directive has not supplemented the pre-existing regime on plans and 
programmes in any substantial manner (See, Jendroska, The Aarhus Convention at Ten, supra n.655, pp.99-
105); In addition, the Directive restricts the right to participate in environmental decision-making to those 
“affected by or with an interest in the decision” (i.e. “the public concerned”), rather than “any member of the 
public” (as foreseen in the Aarhus Convention) (see, also, Mason, supra n.623, p.22). Jendroska has observed 
that the difference in scope will have significant consequences since it restricts the range of subjects enjoying 
rights prescribed under the Convention which is a failure on the part of the EU legislature which has not been 
addressed - in spite of the fact that it concerns only one aspect of public participation which is the Art. 6 
possibility to submit comments and opinions (see, Jendroska, The Aarhus Convention at Ten, supra, p.132). 
844 Art.2.2. The Directives have been listed in Annex I of the Public Participation: Council Directive 75/442/EEC 
of 15 July 1975 on waste, Council Directive 91/157/EEC of 18 March 1991 on batteries and accumulators 
containing certain dangerous substances, Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the 
protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources, Council Directive 
91/689/EEC of 12 December 1991 on hazardous waste, Directive 94/62/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste; and Council Directive 96/62/EC of 27 
September 1996 on ambient air quality assessment and management; 
845 Jendroska, The Aarhus Convention at Ten, supra n.655, p.104. 
846 Jendroska, The Aarhus Convention at Ten, supra n.655, p.103. 
847 Art.2.5. 
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due to the fact that the remit of the former is manifestly narrower as it only applies to 
plans and programmes that are ‘likely to have a significant effect on the environment’ 
while the latter covers plans and programmes ‘relating to the environment’ (in keeping 
with the letter of Art.7 of the Aarhus Convention)848. Such a shortcoming rules out the 
possibility to apply the more inclusive obligations of Art.8 of the Convention (translated 
in the Public Participation Directive) to the plans and programmes already covered by the 
remit of the SEA Directive, given that the two regimes are mutually exclusive.  
In comparison to the language of the directives discussed supra, the corresponding 
duties devolving on the EU institutions and bodies under the 2006 Aarhus Regulation are 
not as prescriptive and detailed, but the core principles have nevertheless been preserved. 
Namely, the institutions are entrusted with the task of providing early and effective 
opportunities for the public to participate during the preparation, modification or review of 
plans or programmes relating to the environment when all the options are still open849. The 
Aarhus Regulation does not provide a list of the particular plans and programmes under its 
scope, although, given that it transposes the Aarhus Convention provisions on the matter, 
the silence of the Regulation’s text implies that the former covers the identical range of 
plans and programmes as the Aarhus Convention.  
As the initiator of legislation, the Commission is under the duty to ensure public 
participation in the preparatory stage for a proposal on a plan or programme relating to the 
environment which it subsequently submits to other institutions or bodies for decision850. 
The institutions and bodies are obligated to take due account of the outcome of the public 
participation and inform the public of the plan or programme that has been adopted by 
furnishing the former with the text of the plan or programme together with a statement on 
the reasons for the adoption thereof851. It is significant to note that, unlike the access-to-
information provisions, the provisions on participation in decision making of the Aarhus 
Regulation only apply to the Union institutions and bodies when in performance of an 
executive or administrative function, excluding the legislative process852.  
                                                            
848 See, also, Jendroska, The Aarhus Convention at Ten, supra n.655, p.100. 
849 Art.9.1. 
850 Art.9.1. 
851 Art.9.5. 
852 The CJEU was asked to delimit the scope of the notion of ‘legislative act’ with respect to the public 
participation process in cases such as Solvay (C-182/10 Marie-Noëlle Solvay and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:82) 
and Boxus C (134/09 and C 135/09 Antoine Boxus and Others, ECR 2011 p. I-9711). Namely, Article 1(5) of EIA 
Directive 85/337 (present Art.1(4) of the 2011/92/EU Directive) translates the Aarhus Convention Art.2(2) 
exemption regarding bodies/institutions acting in a legislative capacity and enables the disapplication of the 
Directive to projects the details of which are adopted by a specific act of national legislation on the condition 
that the objectives of the Directive together with the objective of supplying information are achieved through 
the legislative process that lead to its adoption. The Court made the application of the former exemption 
contingent on two conditions, namely that the details of the project must form part of a specific act of 
legislation, where the Directive’s objectives (including that of supplying information) are capable of being 
achieved through the legislative process (Para.31 of the Solvay judgment; the CJEU had already established 
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In consequence to the foregoing, it seems adequate to round off the discussion by 
referring to the Euratom acts which have a certain bearing on the notion of participation in 
decision-making and create obligations for Member States in this regard. The common 
approach to be observed under the Euratom framework is that of a striking deficiency of 
mechanisms for public involvement in the decision-making procedures provided under the 
Euratom Treaty and the Euratom secondary legislation - a far cry from the full blown 
transparency and participatory mechanisms fostered under the Union framework. For 
instance, the Preamble to Directive 2011/70/Euratom establishing a Community framework 
for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste853 makes a 
reference to the Public Participation Directive854, emphasizing the importance of 
transparency in the area of management of spent fuel and radioactive waste that is to be 
accomplished by providing adequate opportunities for effective public participation in the 
decision-making processes for the public and the rest of the stakeholders855. The Directive 
attempts to reconcile the public participation concerns in the domain of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste management with the security and management-of-proprietary-
information concerns856. Thus, the Member States are under the obligation to provide the 
public with the necessary opportunities to participate effectively in the decision-making 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
the former in the Boxus judgment (Para. 37) and even earlier, in C-435/97 WWF and Others [1999] ECR I-5613, 
para.57). Furthermore, the legislative act adopting the project needs to be specific and own the same 
characteristics as consent of the same kind, and, in particular, it must grant upon the developer the right to 
execute the project (Para.32 of Solvay judgment). The Court held that where a legislative act merely ‘ratifies’ a 
pre-existing administrative act, by solely referring to overriding reasons in the public interest without there be 
prior commencement of a substantive legislative process enabling those conditions to be fulfilled, it is not be 
regarded as a specific legislative act and is therefore not sufficient grounds to exclude the project at issue 
from the scope of Directive 85/337 (Para.39 of Solvay judgment, Para.45 of the Boxus judgment). Hence, the 
national court was entrusted with the duty to verify whether the two conditions are met by taking due 
account of the content of the legislative act as well as the entire legislative process that led to its adoption 
(with particular consideration of the preparatory documents and parliamentary debates) (Para.43 of Solvay); 
For a case note on the Solvay judgment, see, C. Poncelet, Évaluation des incidences sur l'environnement. 
L'arrêt Solvay C/ Région Wallonne: la technique de ratification législative des permis devant la Cour de justice, 
Revue juridique de l'environnement 2013 p.95-102; Also, for commentary on the Boxus judgment, see, M. 
Hedemann-Robinson, EU Enforcement of International Environmental Agreements: The Role of the 
European Commission, European Energy and Environmental Law Review, February 2012, p.24;  
 
Other recent public participation cases decided by the CJEU include C-115/09 Bund fur Umwelt und 
Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein–Westfalen eV  on German restrictions on NGO court 
access considered to be in breach of the EIA Directive; C-275/09 Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest et al. on the 
possibility for the renewal of an existing permit to operate an airport to be considered a ‘project’ under the 
EIA Directive and thus subject to assessment; C-416/10 Jozef Križan and others on the right to access urban 
planning decisions in competition with the confidentiality of industrial secrets, etc; For a comprehensive 
account of all the public participation cases of the CJEU involving the mechanism of environmental impact 
assessment, see, European Commission, Environmental Impact Assessment of Projects: Rulings of the Court 
of Justice, European Union, 2013;  
853 Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible 
and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste  
Official Journal L 199 , 02/08/2011 P. 0048 – 0056. 
854 Point 11 of Preamble. 
855 Point 31 of Preamble. 
856 Art.1.3. 
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process regarding the spent fuel and radioactive waste management, in accordance with 
national legislation and international obligations857. Unfortunately, the former duty seems 
to lack any binding effect and rather acts declaratory statement since it omits to foresee 
any concrete binding mechanisms for Member States to discharge of their duty to ensure 
effective public participation. 
Furthermore, it appears that the improved transparency regime endorsed under 
Directive 2014/87/Euratom of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a 
Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations858 has equally found an 
expression in the public participation domain. The Directive draws on the importance of 
giving the general public opportunities to participate in the relevant phases of the decision-
making process related to nuclear installations in accordance with the national framework 
for nuclear safety859, creating an obligation for Member States to ensure that the general 
public is given “the appropriate opportunities to participate effectively in the decision-
making process relating to the licensing of nuclear installations, in accordance with relevant 
legislation and international instruments”860. Similarly to the preceding example, the duty 
to enable the general public to participate effectively in the decision-making established 
thereby lacks any sufficiently prescriptive character and affords a large margin of 
appreciation to Member States. 
 
 
V The implementation of the Aarhus Convention obligations  
 
The preceding sections elaborated the nature and scope of the Aarhus Convention 
obligations, bringing about the necessity to shed light on the aspect of the actual 
implementation of the former obligations at the EU and the Member State level. The 
monitorning of the access-to-information and public participation requirements at the EU 
level is performed by the Commission which, to date, has issued two implementation 
reports that were thereupon submitted to the Aarhus Convention bodies (in 2008 and 
2011)861. The 2011 Implementation report (which for the time being is the most recent one 
                                                            
857 Art.10.2. 
858 OJ L 219, 25.7.2014, p. 42–52. 
859 Point 12 of Preamble. 
860 Art.8(4). 
861Although the reporting cycle of the implementation reports is three years, the 2014 Aarhus Convention 
Implementation Report has not yet been published (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/reporting.htm). 
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issued by the Commission)862 notes the most significant developments in the application of 
the Aarhus Convention requirements (mostly, the regulatory activity of the institutions and 
the relevant case law of the EU Court of Justice863), but, curiously enough, does not indicate 
any obstacles encountered therein. To the contrary, it is found there had been none, apart 
from those related to meeting the Convention’s access-to-justice requirements864 (dealt 
with in the last section of this chapter). Given its fairly laconic style and lack of 
thoroughness the Implementation report does not offer much insight into the actual effects 
of the implementation of the Aarhus Convention at the EU level.  
Generally speaking, in the context of implementing the aforementioned obligations 
and the enforcement of the rights for the public stemming therefrom, practices and 
modalities have varied from one Member State to the other. Specifically concerning the 
nuclear sector, it has been reported that in some Member States information centres have 
been established that allow the local population access to nuclear installations and easy 
access to information; the relevant authorities’ have been involved in educational activities 
in schools with the goal of increasing the awareness and knowledge of nuclear issues; the 
engagement of certain nuclear plant operators in issuing regular bulletins to local 
communities or providing information through the Internet; as well as the establishment of 
local committees as the focal point bringing together different stakeholders865. Pursuant to 
the requirements of the EIA Directive regarding public involvement, the holding of 
mandatory public hearings has been observed in some countries as well as organizing 
public meetings at the request of a certain number of local politicians or local residents and 
launching local opinion polls866.  
In this respect, it is indispensable to note that the European Commission, on its part, 
contributes to empowering the nuclear stakeholders at the national level role by setting the 
example for applying the Aarhus Convention standards on access to information and public 
participation in the decision-making to its own regulatory activity pertaining to the nuclear 
field867. In this sense, it has been insisted that the Commission involve the different 
stakeholders together with the local and regional governments in the preparatory process 
for the future legislation868. Thereby, the role of the European Parliament as an equally 
concerned institutional actor would be to counterbalance the weight of the Commission 
and the Council and strive to uphold the transparent and democratic approach in nuclear 
matters by adopting a non-provocative and non-threatening attitude toward national 
                                                            
862 European Commission, Aarhus Convention Implementation Report, Brussels 14 April 2011, COM (2011) 208 
final. 
863 Dealt with in the following section of this chapter. 
864 European Commission, Aarhus Convention Implementation Report, supra n.862, pp.28-33. 
865 Gradbois et al., supra n.659, p.26. 
866 Idem. 
867 Idem, p.14. 
868 Idem. 
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governments and other stakeholders, relying on its signature political weapon which is “the 
instrument of embarrassment’’869.  
In spite of the above mentioned implementation efforts, there exists a prevalent 
impression that the EU citizens, on the whole, do not feel well informed on nuclear issues. 
However, according to recent Eurobarometer reports scanning the European public opinion 
on nuclear safety issues870 there has nevertheless been a marked improvement in the 
attitude of European citizens towards nuclear energy. More particularly, a link has been 
discerned between public acceptance of nuclear energy and the availability of safe 
solutions for management of radioactive waste where the former grows in direct 
proportionality to the latter871.  
A 2007 Eurobarometer Report on Europeans and Nuclear Safety indicated that the 
citizens were not familiar with safety issues regarding nuclear power plants872. The notion 
of being informed was mainly in direct correlation to whether the surveyed citizens came 
from a nuclear country or non-nuclear country, where the former usually do not feel 
sufficiently informed about the safety of nuclear power plants873. According to the Report, 
although the main source of information for the EU citizens was the mass media, the very 
particular nature of the nuclear safety information prevented it from being fully and 
adequately conveyed via the mass media874. Almost half of the Europeans considered the 
information provided by scientists to be most trustworthy (48%), followed by the 
information coming from non-governmental organisations (30%) and national nuclear 
safety authorities (28%)875. As concerns the citizens’ involvement in the making of national 
energy strategies, only around 1 in 5 Europeans expressed the preference to be directly 
consulted in the decision making process (21%), with most respondents feeling more at 
ease with having their democratically elected representatives stepping in in their place and 
a considerable number of them (39%) preferring for nongovernmental organisations to be 
                                                            
869 European Parliament Working Paper, supra, p.xvii. 
870 See the following Eurobarometer reports:  
Special Eurobarometer Report 271: Europeans and Nuclear Safety (Fieldwork October - November 2006), 
February 2007 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_271_en.pdf ;  
Special Eurobarometer Report 297: Attitudes to radioactive waste, published July 2008 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_297_en.pdf. 
 Special Eurobarometer Report 324: Europeans and Nuclear Safety, March 2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_324_en.pdf.; 
871 Commission Communication: Update of the Nuclear Illustrative Programme in the context of the Second 
Strategic Energy, Update for the nuclear illustrative programme, supra, p.7. 
872 Special Eurobarometer Report 271: Europeans and Nuclear Safety (Fieldwork October - November 2006), 
February 2007 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_271_en.pdf, p.43; A quarter of the 
respondents felt completely uninformed about nuclear safety issues (26%) and a further 50% considered 
themselves not very well informed. 
873 p.44 of the Report. 
874 p.46. 
875 p.51; Followed by journalists (26%) and international organisations working on uses of nuclear technology 
(26%) which have a similar confidence level of slightly over a quarter. 
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consulted instead876. Regarding the decision-making process per se, a majority of the 
respondents would rather leave the decision-making exclusively to the authorities 
responsible for nuclear safety in their country or to NGOs involved in the field877.  
By comparison, a 2010 Eurobarometer report (which, curiously, is the most recent 
report commissioned and published by the EU regarding nuclear safety)878 revealed that 
Europeans continue to be mostly unfamiliar with nuclear safety issues related to nuclear 
power plants where only a quarter of citizens feel ‘very well’ or ‘fairly well’ informed, 
compared with three in four people who feel ‘not very well’, or ‘not at all’ informed about 
the safety of nuclear power plants. The former statistic is almost identical to the one 
showcased in the previous report879. Nonetheless, the connection between the feeling of 
being uninformed and the presence/absence of nuclear powers plants in a country appears 
to be less evident than in the past880, while respondents in countries with active nuclear 
power plants have expressed slightly more favorable opinions than citizens in countries 
where domestic electricity comes from other sources881. The mass media remains to be the 
dominant source of information; however, neither the amount nor the quality of the 
information is considered sufficient by a majority of the respondents to be able to have an 
informed opinion on the risks and the benefits of nuclear energy choices882. Curiously, even 
though the mass media has been cited as the primary information source for information 
on nuclear energy, almost half of the Europeans consider the information provided by 
scientists to be most trustworthy (46%)883 (followed by national nuclear safety authorities 
(30%), international organisations working on uses of nuclear technology (24%) and 
journalists (23%)884).   
According to the 2010 Report, only around a quarter of the EU citizens preferred to 
be directly consulted in the decision-making process (24%), while most respondents would 
like non-governmental organisations to be consulted (25%) and 24% of them would choose 
to place their trust in the responsible authorities in the field885. Manifestly, the preference 
                                                            
876 p.55.  
877 p.55. 
878Special Eurobarometer Report 324: Europeans and Nuclear Safety, March 2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_324_en.pdf. 
879 p.119 of the Report. 
880 p.88. 
881 p.92. 
882 p.91. Television ranks first (72%), ahead of all other information sources, followed by newspapers (40%), 
the Internet which is cited as the third most used source for information on nuclear energy (27%) and the 
radio (23%). Below the level of 20%, respondents cite magazines (18%) or friends and family (12%). Only 7% 
mention schools and universities (p.99 of Report). 
883 p.101. 
884p.102; Fewer than 20% of the sample mention non-governmental organisations (19%), national 
governments (18%) and the European Union (15%). Energy companies that operate nuclear power plants and 
regional and local authorities have a similar confidence level (12% and 10%, accordingly). 
885 p.114. A further fifth would prefer national parliaments to be consulted and to participate in the decision-
making process (18%).  
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for personal and direct involvement in the decision-making process has remained stable 
with a notable decline in the trust in NGOs, the results of the reports suggesting that as far 
as decisions on energy issues in general and the use of nuclear energy in particular are 
concerned citizens favour discussion and debate. Therefore, it remains to be considered a 
priority that the responsible authorities in the Member States include the different 
stakeholders (and the civil society, in particular) when taking decisions on nuclear energy-
related issues886. 
 
VI The access-to-information and participation-in-decision-making requirements 
in environmental and nuclear matters before international and regional judicial 
fora 
 
On the point of the actual enforcement of the right of access to information and the 
right to participate in decision-making processes as corollary rights, what needs to be 
emhpasized is that the two rights are intrinsically linked both in terms of their respective 
scope and content, which commonly renders them intertwined in the jurisprudence of 
international and regional courts. Cases that relate to access to information would 
frequently also involve participation issues and vice versa, since it is not always possible to 
draw a stark line between information and participation: one needs to have access to 
information in order to be able to participate and, conversely, the key of the participation 
process lies in obtaining information. Thus, the participation requirement should be 
perceived as not only complementing the information requirement but rather being the 
essential motivation thereof887. The respective remits of the right of access to information 
and the right to participation in decision-making differ depending on the particular 
international legal instrumentaria they have been covered under. Since these are rights of a 
relatively recent coinage, their exact scope and content are still currently modelled by the 
hands of the judges so that, in the absence of a more stringent international legal regime in 
this respect, courts can be seen as acting at the same time both as creators and defenders 
of the right of access to information and the right to participate in decision-making 
processes.  
Being that to date only few cases involving access to information and public 
participation in the nuclear field have arisen before international and regional judicial 
forums, the present section will deal with the relevant cases in this regard that have 
appeared before the European Court of Human Rights and certain international tribunals 
and bodies. While the EU Court of Justice has thus far not dealt with cases pertaining to 
aplication of the Aarhus obligations to the nuclear field, the issue of access to information 
                                                            
886 p.115. 
887 The latter has been pointed out in, Gadbois et al., supra n. 659, p.8. 
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in the nuclear field has indeed arisen before the ECtHR concerning the health protection in 
the nuclear field. Even though it has comparatively been less favourably placed than the 
CJEU whose adjudicatory role has been enabled by a panoply of primary and secondary 
legal instruments covering the fields of access to information and participation in decision-
making in the environmental protection domain, the ECtHR has made its own contribution 
in the development of the participatory concepts in the field of environmental 
protection888. In the absence of an expressly prescribed right of access to information under 
the European Convention on Human Rights, the ECtHR habitually decides to rely on Art.8 
(right to private and family life)889 as the suitable proxy for the safeguarding of the 
procedural rights in the environmental realm. Thus, surprisingly enough, despite of the 
former shortcoming, the case-law of the ECtHR in the field has proven to be similarly or 
even just as authoritative as that of the CJEU890.    
                                                            
888For a more general discussion on the European Court of Human Rights’s stake in the environmental 
protection equation, see, M. Fitzmaurice, The European Convention of Human Rights and the Human Right to 
a Clean Environment, in, M. Fitzmaurice, Contemporary Issues of International Environmental Law, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2009, pp.170-206; O. W. Pedersen, The Ties that Bind: The Environment, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Rule of Law, European Public Law, 2010, Vol. 16 Issue 4; and, O. W. 
Pedersen, European Environmental Human Rights and Environmental Rights: A Long Time Coming?, 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 2008-2009, Vol. 21 No. 1;  
889 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”; 
Nevertheless, the text of the ECHR does offer a reference to the ‘freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’ (Art.10(1) as 
one constitutive of the right to freedom of expression. However, the wording of the former provision reveals 
that the intent of the drafters was not to lay down an independent right to information, but the freedom to 
receive and impart information in the context of the ECHR is rather conceived as ancillary and therefore in 
service to the fulfilment of the right to freedom of expression. The former has also been reflected in the 
extensive scope of the derogation belonging to states in upholding these freedoms Art.10(2)(Art.10(2) states: 
“The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary”; 
890Two of the more recent access-to-information judgments deserve a mention as they represent the current 
approach of the ECtHR in the matter. The reasoning offered by the ECtHR in the recent Di Sarno judgment 
(Di Sarno et autres c. Italie , no. 30765/08, ECHR 2012) is consistent with all similar access to information cases 
that have appeared before the Court. The case deals with the state of emergency in the Campania region of 
Italy and the related failure of the system for waste collection, treatment and disposal. The Court held that by 
virtue of Art.8 ECHR states were under a duty to establish a pertinent regulatory framework applicable to 
hazardous activities so that in the instant case it was Italy’s obligation to impart information to the public 
enabling it to assess the degree of the danger it had been exposed to. Namely, considering that the collection, 
treatment and disposal of waste are hazardous activities, the state was responsible to adopt appropriate 
measures in order to uphold the right of the persons concerned to respect for their private life and home, and 
in a more general manner, their right to a healthy and safe environment (Para.110 of judgment). The Italian 
authorities had for a relatively long period failed to assure the proper functioning of the waste collection, 
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The ECtHR has decided two cases involving the access to information in the nuclear 
field, examining the application of Art.6 (right to a fair trial) and Art.8 (right to respect for 
family and private life) of the ECHR. Both cases concern the nuclear weapons atmospheric 
tests performed by the UK in the Christmas Island in the Pacific Ocean in the period 
between 1952 and 1967 involving around 20.000 servicemen. McGinley and Eagan v. 
United Kingdom891 relate to the pension claims of two UK citizens involved in the Christmas 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
treatment and disposal service which directly affected the former rights of the applicants (Para. 111 et seq.). 
Inter alia, specific reference was made to Art.5.1(c) of the Aarhus Convention which has been ratified by Italy 
(Para.107). However, the Court only found a breach of the material component of Art.8, being satisfied that 
the procedural component of the article had been met, mainly on account of the involvement of the Italian 
authorities in conducting and publishing of the impact studies in 2005 and 2008 which the Court considered as 
demonstrative of the authorities having fulfilled their duty to inform the persons concerned on the potential 
risks to which they had been exposed (Para. 113).  
 
A case much in line with the last is Tatar (Tatar c. Roumanie, Requête no. 67021/01, ECHR 2009)  concerning 
applicants that lived in the vicinity of a gold mine the extraction process for which involved the use of the 
hazardous chemical compound sodium cyanide. In the Tatar judgment the Court refers to the Aarhus 
Convention in its elaboration on the particular situation of the interested parties who attempt to challenge 
the result of the impact studies and thus have access to documents relative to the decision-making process 
considering themselves a subset of the ‘population potentially affected’ category (Para.119), considering the 
Aarhus Convention to be relevant to the case (Para.118). The Court observed that the existence of a serious 
and material risk for the applicants’ health and well-being triggered the duty of the State to conduct an 
assessment of the risks and take appropriate measures, both at the time the operating permit was granted 
and once the accident had occurred (Para.118 et seq.). It was noted that in spite of the preliminary impact 
assessment conducted by the Romanian Ministry of the Environment, the Romanian authorities did not take 
sufficient account of the risks caused by the extraction activity to the environment and human health when 
laying down the operating conditions (Paras. 118-124). The Court further stressed that it fell upon the national 
authorities to ensure public access to the conclusions of the available investigations and studies and to 
guarantee the right of members of the public to participate in the decision-making process regarding 
environmental issues (Paras. 118-124). In this regard, it found that the Romanian Government had neglected 
its obligation to inform the public, especially by failing to publicize the 1993 impact assessment on the basis of 
which the operating licence had initially been granted and thus making it virtually impossible for members of 
the public to challenge the results of that assessment (Para.122). In addition, the Court observed that this 
state of unavailability of information persisted in spite of the probable anxiety experienced by the local people 
(Para.). Finally, the Romanian authorities were found to be in breach of their duty to assess the potential risks 
of the extractive activity and accordingly take appropriate measures to protect the concerned population’s 
right to respect for their private life and home and, more generally, their right to have a healthy and safe 
environment (Para.112 of judgment); For a case note on the Tatar judgment, see, D. Shelton, International 
Decision: Tatar c. Roumanie, App. No. 67021/01 European Court of Human Rights, Jan. 27, 2009, American 
Journal of International Law (2010) Issue 104); 
 
Both the Tatar and Di Sarno judgments are marked by strong environmental considerations, prioritizing the 
applicants’ right to a safe and healthy environment. In terms of the actual legal outcome, while in Tatar a 
breach of Art. 8 ECHR was found in its ‘entirety’, in di Sarno the Court was only satisfied with the existence of 
a material rather than a procedural breach of the said article. From a ‘bottom line’ point of view, making a split 
between the procedural and the material violation of the duty to respect the right to respect of family life and 
home in the context of human health and environmental protection seems both artificial and superfluous 
given that the procedural aspect of the former right is intrinsically linked to its material aspect. In fact, one 
could not speak of an adequate and satisfactory fulfilment of the right to a safe and healthy living 
environment in any substantial manner where the procedural safeguards for that right have not been met, 
and vice versa. 
891 Application no.21825/93 and 23414/94, ECHR 1998-III. See, also, for  a commentary on the case, Chapter 2, 
Section II.1.2; 
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Island tests whose appeals before the Pensions Appeal Tribunal (PAT) had been dismissed 
by reason of their lacking the required documents proving deterioration in their health 
attributable to the carrying out of the nuclear tests. The UK’s defense relied on the 
applicants’ failure to avail themselves of the opportunity to request the production of the 
relevant documents in accordance with the procedure available under Rule 6 of the national 
PAT Rules892, claiming that the applicants had not exhausted all the legal avenues available 
under national law.  
Viz. the alleged breach of Art.6(1) ECHR, the Court was not convinced that the UK 
government possessed the documents which the applicants claimed were central to their 
pension appeals and inferred that since no individual monitoring of servicemen was 
performed during the nuclear testing it followed that there were no personal medical 
records in existence (the applicants had acknowledged that the records relative to the 
environmental radiation on Christmas Island would not have assisted them in their 
claims)893. To the extent that it could hypothetically be established that the State was in 
possession of the relevant documents at the time the applicants had deposited their 
appeals, the Court noted that the latter had the possibility to make use of the Rule 6 
procedure of the PAT Rules in order to request the material containing radiation levels 
records (along with the impending guarantee that no security derogation for withholding 
the records would apply)894. Since that the applicants did not avail themselves of such an 
option, the Court did not find it conclusive that they had been denied effective access to or 
a fair hearing before the PAT which would point to a violation of Article 6(1)895. 
Furthermore, the European Commission of Human Rights (at the time) observed 
that the applicants’ pension claims notwithstanding, the State had not aligned with its 
Art.8 positive obligation to provide to the applicants “(…) on an individual basis any 
explanation or information as to the nature and impact of their participation in the test 
programme”896. The Court conceded that the applicants had an interest under Art.8 to 
obtain such records assessing the radiation levels they had been exposed to, but noted that 
the existence of such records had not been confirmed or proven897. It reiterated that where 
states engage in hazardous activities with potentially adverse consequences on those 
involved in the activities, they are required under Art.8 to set up an effective and accessible 
procedure through which these persons could obtain access to all the relevant 
information898. Finally, the Court did not find that the evidence adduced before it indicated 
                                                            
892 Para.31. 
893 Para.88. 
894 Para.89. 
895 Para.90. 
896 Para.95. 
897 Para.99. 
898 Para.101. 
186 
 
that the procedure laid down in Rule 6 would prove ineffective for the provision of the 
documents sought by the applicants899. 
According to the Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges De Meyer, Valticos and 
Morenilla, the mere existence of the Rule 6 procedure was not sufficient to conclude that 
the State had exhausted its positive obligations under Arts. 6 and 8 of the Convention. 
According to the former judges, the applicants had the right to be informed of all the actual 
consequences their presence during the testing could have borne on their health, even 
without them having to specifically ask for such information. In addition, Judge Pekkanen in 
his Dissenting Opinion suggested that the applicants had a general interest in obtaining 
access to information relating to the harmful levels of radiation, independent of their 
particular interest to be awarded pension entitlement900. The former argument stands valid 
especially in light of the fact that the rights obtainable under the PAT rules were of a strictly 
procedural nature whereas what was essentially (if only, implicitly) at issue in the case was 
the material breach of Art.8 i.e. the positive obligation of the State to have produced, kept 
and made available records on the actual health effects caused by the nuclear tests on the 
nuclear servicemen concerned (regardless of the nature or intensity of the effects)901.  
The Christmas Island tests saga did not end there. The European Commission of 
Human Rights lodged a request for revision of the judgment of 9 June 1998 in the McGinley 
and Egan case902 to the ECtHR. The revision request reflected on the inadequate character 
and lack of effectiveness of the Rule 6 procedure which had been proven through another 
person’s unsuccessful application under the same procedure which itself was cited as a fact 
that had been discovered but which the applicants could not reasonably have known before 
the delivery of the judgment in the original case903. The applicants claimed that the newly 
found correspondence arguing against the Government's written and oral submissions to 
the Court “would have had a decisive influence on the original judgment of the Court”904. 
The Court responded by offering a purely textual reading of the revision criteria of the Rules 
of the Court which require that the fact which might have a decisive influence be unknown 
to the Court and to the party demanding the revision, at the time when the judgment was 
delivered905. It was gathered that the applicants had sufficiently detailed knowledge about 
the developments in the other person’s case to the effect that they had undoubtedly been 
aware of the existence of the correspondence prior to the commencement of the 
proceedings in the original case906. While the Court conceded that the copies of the 
                                                            
899 Para.103. 
900 Point 3. 
901 This argument would have been further reinforced had the Court brought the precautionary principle into 
play. 
902 Decision pursuant to Rule 58 of former Rules of Court, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-I. 
903 Para.25. 
904 Para.26. 
905 Para.24. 
906 Para.35. 
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correspondence on which the revision request was based could not have been effectively 
obtained by the applicants until after the delivery of the original judgment, it found that it 
was manifest that the applicants had prior knowledge of the existence of such 
correspondence907 therefore rejecting the request for revision. In spite of the failure to 
meet the procedural criteria, the substantive issue of the existence of an ineffective and 
inadequate national procedure for the award of certain types of pension claims in the UK 
remained unaddressed by the Court. Furthermore, the Court failed to acknowledge the 
overriding concern over the existence of a substantive breach of the right to information of 
the applicants as one taking priority over the procedural issue of pension claims 
compensation908. 
The lack of contemporaneous health records from the time of the Christmas Island 
tests further gave rise to the L.C.B. v. United Kingdom case909 over UK Government’s 
alleged failure to take preventive measures regarding the health of the child of a 
serviceman (the applicant in the case) who took part in the aforementioned nuclear tests. 
The Court examined the applicability of Art.2 (right to life) and Art.8 of the ECHR deducing 
that the records of contemporaneous measurements of radiation on the Christmas Island 
submitted to it did not indicate that radiation had reached dangerous levels910. It 
considered that the state would only have been required to provide advice to the 
applicant’s parents and monitor her health had it appeared likely at the time that any such 
radiation exposure of her father might have engendered a genuine risk to the applicant’s 
health911. In view of the body of information it was presented with, the Court could not 
discern a causal link between the father’s radiation exposure and the subsequent illness of 
the applicant912. It unanimously held there had been no violation of Art.2, considering it 
unnecessary to further examine the alleged failure of the state under Art.8, to take 
preventive measures with respect to the applicant’s health, in the absence of a causal link 
between the two. Nevertheless, the case remains to be authority for the States’ obligation 
under Art. 2 to take preventative measures to protect life on the condition that a causal link 
is proven whereby the former obligation is to be considered in the light of the scientific 
knowledge available at the time and the evidence made available to the Court913. 
                                                            
907 Para.36. 
908 Some have argued that the outcome of the case might have been different had the case been decided 
after the coming into force of the Aarhus Convention given that in a subsequent case related to requests for 
information in connection with military activities (Roche v. United Kingdom, Application no. 32555/96 ECHR 
2005) the ECtHR had found a breach of Art.8 ECHR (See, O.W. Pedersen, The Ties that Bind: The 
Environment, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Rule of Law, European Public Law (2010) 
Vol. 16 Issue 4, p. 580). 
909 L.C.B. v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 212; For more on this case, see Chapter 2, Section II.1.2.; 
910 Para.37. 
911 Para.38. 
912 Para.39. 
913 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) Compendium on Human Rights and the Environment: Selected 
International Legal Materials and Cases, UNEP, 2013, 
(http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/publications/UNEP_Compendium_HRE.pdf), p.60. 
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There are two additional cases that have appeared before the ECtHR (Balmer-
Schafroth and Athanassoglou)914, concerning with the health effects of nuclear energy 
projects, where the applicants claimed a material breach of Art.8 ECHR. The facts of both 
of the cases did touch upon issues of access to information and public participation as they 
dealt with the granting of operating licenses for nuclear installations in Switzerland. 
However, the Court failed to establish the existence of a causal link between the effects of 
the activities in question and the health of the applicants, finding the link to be too remote 
so as to trigger any substantive assessment on its part. 
  
The case law analysis will proceed with two cases dealing with certain aspects of 
public involvement in the preparation and execution of nuclear projects, one appearing 
before an OSPAR Convention Arbitral Tribunal and the other before the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee. The first case elucidates one aspect of the cumbersome Sellafield 
MOX plant legal saga which comprised of several different litigations before different 
tribunals. The issue related to the radioactive discharges into the Irish Sea stemming from 
the mixed oxide (MOX) fuel plant at the Sellafield nuclear facility in the UK915. Ireland 
instituted proceeding against the UK relying on the Art.9(2) of the Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) regarding the 
Contracting Parties’ obligation to provide access to any available information on activities 
or measures adversely affecting or likely to affect the maritime area916.  
The application before the OSPAR Arbitral Tribunal gravitated around the matter of 
provision of the information requested by Ireland and additionally raised other issues which 
were not confined to the interpretation of the OSPAR Convention provisions on the scope 
of the term ‘environmental information’ but extended to placing the nature and scope of 
the former term in a wider, more general context. Namely, Ireland had relied on the access-
to-information provisions of Art.9 of the 1992 OSPAR Convention in order to request 
access to information which had been redacted from certain reports commissioned by the 
UK government as part of the approval process for the commissioning of the Mox Plant at 
                                                            
914 The two cases have been discussed in greater detail supra in Chapter 2, Section II.1.2; 
915 Also, on the MOX case, see supra Chapter 1, Section III.3.5 and Chapter 2, Section II.1.2; 
916 Emphasis added; Final Award 2 july 2003, Ireland v UK, Dispute concerning access to information under 
Article 9 of the Ospar Convention (http://pca-cpa.org/upload/files/OSPAR%20Award.pdf).  
Concomitantly, Ireland raised proceedings against the UK before a UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea) Arbitral Tribunal. Pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, Ireland requested the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to adopt a decision on provisional measures ordering the 
UK to immediately suspend the authorisation of the operating license of the Sellafield MOX plant or 
alternatively, take appropriate measures to prevent the operation of the MOX plant. The proceedings before 
the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal were suspended due to uncertainties regarding the division of competences 
between the European Union (Community) and the Member States with respect to the scope of the UNCLOS 
Convention, implicating the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU in these matters (para 
43 Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland C-459/03, ECR 2006 p. I-4635. 
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Sellafield917. The UK had refused to provide the requested information, considering the 
Art.9 OSPAR requirements to be inapplicable to the case, and, in any event, caught under 
the Art.9(3) OSPAR exceptions918. Thus, Ireland demanded full disclosure of two reports 
(referred to in the proceedings as the ‘PA’ and the ‘ADL’ reports) for the purpose of being 
able to fully envisage the impacts that the commissioning of the MOX plant would or might 
have on the marine environment of the Irish Sea919.  
The background to the dispute reveals complex administrative procedures that 
preceded the final decision to approve the operation of the MOX plant to process spent 
nuclear fuels. Originally, British Nuclear Fuels, plc ("BNFL"), a public limited company 
wholly owned by the United Kingdom, applied for a permission to build the MOX plant. The 
consents to build the plant were given in 1994, the construction was completed by 1996920 
and the UK Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs finally approved the 
manufacture of Mox fuel at Sellafield in 2001921. Ireland asked for the Tribunal to find the 
UK to be in breach of its obligation for disclosure under Art.9 of the OSPAR Convention and 
order the UK to provide Ireland with a complete copy of both the PA and ADL reports (or, 
alternatively, provide a copy of the reports which contains all information the release of 
which the arbitration tribunal decides would not affect the commercial confidentiality 
within the meaning of Article 9(3)(d) of the Convention)922. The UK refused the disclosure 
purporting that Ireland had failed to show that the requested information fell within the 
scope of Art.9(2) given that the former could not be qualified as information sufficiently 
linked to ‘the state of the maritime area or to measures or activities affecting or likely to 
                                                            
917 Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention 
“ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
1.The Contracting Parties shall ensure that their competent authorities are required to make available the 
information described in paragraph 2 of this Article to any natural or legal person, in response to any 
reasonable request, without that person's having to prove an interest, without unreasonable charges, as soon 
as possible and at the latest within two months.  
2.The information referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is any available information in written, visual, aural 
or data base form on the state of the maritime area, on activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to 
affect it and on activities or measures introduced in accordance with the Convention.  
3.The provisions of this Article shall not affect the right of Contracting Parties, in accordance with their 
national legal systems and applicable international regulations, to provide for a request for such information 
to be refused where it affects: (a)the confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, international 
relations and national defence; (b)public security;  
(c)matters which are, or have been, sub judice , or under enquiry (including disciplinary enquiries), or which 
are the subject of preliminary investigation proceedings;  
(d)commercial and industrial confidentiality, including intellectual property;  
(e)the confidentiality of personal data and/or files; (f)material supplied by a third party without that party 
being under a legal obligation to do so;  
(g)material, the disclosure of which would make it more likely that the environment to which such material 
related would be damaged.  
4. The reasons for a refusal to provide the information requested must be given.” [Emphasis added]; 
918 Para.1 et seq. of the Final Award. 
919 Para.41. 
920 Para.15. 
921 Para.37. 
922 Para.42. 
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affect it’923. Ireland had identified fourteen categories of information that had been 
redacted or removed from the pubic version of the reports924. Looking at the nature of the 
information, the Tribunal considered that none of these categories of information could 
plausibly be characterized as ‘information on the state of the maritime area’ and therefore 
none of the material contained therein could be presumed to fall within the definition of 
information of Art.9(2)925.  
Furthermore, the Tribunal referred to the concept of “inclusive causality” which was 
invoked by Ireland, pursuant to which “(…) anything, no matter how remote, which 
facilitated the performance of an activity is to be deemed part of that activity”926. In this 
vein, Ireland argued that in the absence of the two reports there would not be any 
discharges from the MOX plant into the Irish Sea927 urging the Tribunal to examine whether 
the drafters of the OSPAR Convention had intended to endorse the interpretative theory of 
inclusive causality, which was finally concluded in the negative928. The Tribunal held that 
Ireland had not succeeded to prove the existence of adverse effect given that its 
argumentation had largely been focused on the directness of the effect and the 
environmental character of the information sought929. The decision of the Tribunal 
dismissed Ireland’s claims regarding the applicability of Art.9(2), inter alia, taking note of 
Ireland’s reliance on treaties that were, at the material time, not yet ratified and not in force 
(among which, the Aarhus Convention) and observing that it was “(…) arguable - but in the 
view of the Tribunal not conclusive - that Ireland's claim might have succeeded under some 
of these instruments” (such a task exceeding the competence of the Tribunal which was not 
empowered to apply “legally unperfected instruments”)930.  
Evidently, the decisive element in the decision to dismiss Ireland’s claims under 
Art.9(2) was that of Ireland’s failure to provide sufficient proof that the measures in 
question ‘affect adversely’ rather than simply ‘affect’ the maritime area931. Nevertheless, 
the Tribunal’s literal reading of the OSPAR Convention does not sit well with a reader 
knowledgeable in international environmental law. Looking at the attached dissenting 
                                                            
923 Para 43. 
924 Para.161. These categories concern information related to: 
“(…)(A)Estimated annual production capacity of the MOX facility; (B)Time taken to reach this capacity; 
(C)Sales volumes; (D)Probability of achieving higher sales volumes;  
(E)Probability of being able to win contracts for recycling fuel in `significant quantities'; (F)Estimated sales 
demand; (G)Percentage of plutonium already on site; (H)Maximum throughput figures; (I)Life span of the 
MOX facility; (J)Number of employees; (K)Price of MOX fuel; (L)Whether, and to what extent, there are firm 
contracts to purchase MOX from Sellafield; (M)Arrangements for transport of plutonium to, and MOX from, 
Sellafield; (N)Likely number of such transports.(…)”; 
925 Para.163. 
926 Para.164. 
927 Para.164. 
928 Para.164. 
929 Para.180; Emphasis added. 
930 Para.180. Ireland ratified the Aarhus Convention as late as in 2012.  
931 Para.180. 
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opinion of one of the three members of the tribunal, Gavan Griffith QC, one gains insight 
into quite a different angle to the dispute (the decision of the Tribunal was not unanimous). 
Griffith considers that the Tribunal should have applied the letter of the Convention in 
accordance with the broadly-defined concept of ‘international law’, in the place of being 
confined strictly to the international law in force binding on the Parties932. His view departs 
from the majority’s view to reject the normative value and applicability of the unratified 
international instruments relied on by Ireland and, in this sense, dismissing the relevance of 
the Aarhus Convention933. He concurs that the Aarhus Convention- which both the UK and 
Ireland had only signed but not yet ratified at the material time- could not act as binding 
international law for either of the parties934, but the former could not in itself discount 
reliance on the Aarhus Convention for the purpose of arriving at a proper construction of 
Art.9 of the OSPAR Convention935. The Aarhus Convention can be seen as providing a 
“relevant normative and evidentiary value”936 to the MOX case, serving to “inform and 
confirm the content of the definition of information contained in Article 9(2) of the OSPAR 
Convention”937. Griffith argued against the majority’s view that the Aarhus Convention was 
unperfected law especially since it had entered into force on 30 October 2001 with the 
majority of the signatory parties having already ratified it so that it should have been 
treated as lex lata938. Moreover, it could be argued that although the UK was not directly 
bound by the Aarhus Convention, under the letter of Art.18 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties939, as a signatory to the Aarhus Convention the UK was nonetheless 
under the obligation to refrain from any act that would undermine the objectives of the 
Aarhus Convention provisions940.  
Given that the essential issue in the dispute concerned the breadth of the Art.9(2) 
reference to “information on activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to affect the 
state of the maritime area” and the extent to which the commercial nature of the redacted 
parts of the reports could preclude them from falling within the scope of the former 
term941, Griffith suggested employing an approach similar to the one previously endorsed 
by the CJEU in the Mecklenburg case where the CJEU decided to treat a ‘statement of views’ 
                                                            
932 Point 5. 
933 Point 7. 
934 Pont 9. 
935 Point 10. 
936 Point 10. 
937 Point 19. 
938 Point 11. 
939 Article 18  
“Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force  
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when:  
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, 
acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or  
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and 
provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.(…)”; 
940 Point 13. 
941 Point 41. 
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as a ‘measure’ by establishing the existence of a causal link between the document and the 
hazardous activity in question942. The UK had stressed the fact that the nature of the 
reports was decidedly commercial which makes the balancing exercise between the 
potentially harmful effects and the operation of the facility ‘broadly neutral’, precluding the 
information contained in the reports to be treated as ‘environmental’943. In sum, it was the 
economic effect of authorizing the operation of the facility that outweighed the 
environmental considerations, in spite of both the parties having agreed that the 
manufacture of Mox fuel may affect the maritime area944.  
Regarding the ‘likely adverse effect’ requirement, Griffith suggests that the former 
could have plausibly been extensively interpreted so as to be equated with the notion of 
‘potentially adverse effect’ as conceived under Article 9(2)945. The former article could have 
been constructed in such a way that the requirement to establish a direct and proximate 
link between the harmful activity and its effect on the state of the maritime area is 
dispensed with and replaced by the possibility to merely prove the existence of any link 
between the potential harmful effects of the MOX plant operation and the information 
contained in the reports946. Furthermore, although the application of the precautionary 
principle to this case could have changed the inequality of arms in the procedure947, the 
Tribunal failed to examine the applicability of the former principle thus putting the burden 
of proof on Ireland to show that the radioactive discharges from the Mox facility were 
capable to potentially significantly harm the marine environment of the Irish Sea948.  
Having in mind the substantive aspects of the MOX case, Ireland arguably stood a 
better chance at winning the case had it brought its claim before the CJEU, given that the 
                                                            
942 Point 48. 
943 Point 60. 
944 Point 69; Emphasis added. 
945 Point 79. 
946 Point 97. 
947 Article 2.2 of the OSPAR Convention: 
“General obligations:  
2.The Contracting Parties shall apply:  
a. the precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventive measures are to be taken when there are 
reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine 
environment may bring about hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, 
damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even where there is no conclusive 
evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and the effects (…)”; 
The application of the precautionary principle (enshrined in Article 2(2)(a) of the OSPAR Convention) to the 
present case would result in the responsibility to provide scientific evidence being transferred to the producer 
of potentially hazardous substances rather than the potential victim (see, point 73 of Griffith’s Opinion). 
Furthermore, it is possible that the outcome of the proceedings may have been different had the Tribunal 
deferred to take into consideration Article 2(3)(b) of the Aarhus Convention which refers to "(…) cost-benefit 
and other economic analyses and assumptions used in environmental decision-making" as part of the 
definition of environmental information (point 115 of Opinion) enabling for the proximity of the link between 
the contents of the reports and the effects from the operation of the MOX plant to be automatically 
presumed.  
948 Points 70 and 72. 
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Union offered a satisfactory access-to-information and decision-making regime. Even 
though the Environmental Information Directive and EIA Directive were still in their original 
versions at the time, they provided for more detailed procedural obligations than the 
OSPAR and the UNCLOS Conventions949. Nevertheless, the CJEU gave its own imprint on 
the MOX saga, even if only marginally since the case before the CJEU (Commission v. 
Ireland950) only related to Ireland’s failure to respect its obligations as a Member State by 
having submitted a dispute concerning the interpretation and/or application of a 
Convention signed by the Union before a jurisdiction different from that of the Union’s. 
Thus, the CJEU was not called upon to adjudicate on the substantive issues of the dispute - 
that is, the possible violation of the Union environmental rules on the part of the UK. The 
foregoing produced a situation where different judicial bodies (each of them for different 
reasons) circumvented addressing the substantive issues of the MOX case, leaving Ireland’s 
right to justice clearly violated951 and its essential claim unresolved. While the CJEU’s 
judgment confirms the Union court’s exclusive jurisdiction in such type of cases and 
strengthens the uniformity and consistency of the Union legal order, the issue of protection 
of the Irish Sea marine environment and the related health concerns of the population of 
the surrounding area remains unaccounted for952. 
 
 Lastly, a case which is illustrative of the Aarhus Convention Compliance 
Committee’s practice in handling the breaches of the public’s participatory rights under the 
Convention which concerned the extension permits for the Mochovce nuclear power plant 
in Slovakia953. Namely, the original construction permit for Mochovce NPP was issued in 
1986 (Slovakia acceded to the Aarhus Convention in 2005)954 while the case before the 
Compliance Committee concerned the extension permits adopted by the Slovak Nuclear 
Regulatory Authority subsequently in 2008. After confirming that permitting activities for 
civil nuclear power plants such as the Mochovce NPP are activities covered by Article 6(1) 
and Annex I.1 of the Aarhus Convention which require public participation955, the 
Compliance Committee focused on examining whether the 2008 decisions of the nuclear 
authority could be qualified as “reconsideration or an update of the operating conditions’’ 
within the meaning of Art.6.10 of the Convention956.  By establishing a breach of the 
provisions on public participation of Art.6 of the Convention, the Compliance Committee 
                                                            
949 R. Churchill and J. Scott, The MOX Plant Litigation: The FirstHalf-Life, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 2004, Vol 53, pp.674-675; See, also, N. Lavranos, The Epilogue in the MOX Plant Dispute: An End 
Without Findings, European Energy and Environmental Law Review, June 2009, p.182. 
950 C-459/03 Commission v Ireland ECR 2006 p. I-4635; For more on this case, see Chapter 1, Section III.3.5; 
951 See, Lavranos, supra n.949, pp.180-182. 
952 See, also, S. Marsden, MOX Plant and the Espoo Convention: Can Member State Disputes Concerning 
Mixed Environmental Agreements be Resolved Outside EC Law?, Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law, 2009, Vol 18 Issue 3, p.313; Also, Lavranos, supra, p.184. 
953 Communication ACCC/C/2009/41 concerning compliance by Slovakia, adopted on 17 December 2010 
ECE/MP.PP/2011/11/Add.3. 
954 Para.43. 
955 Para.43. 
956 Para.50.  
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concluded that the decision of the nuclear regulatory authority, regardless of whether it 
resulted in any significant change or extension of the activity, was to be considered as a 
‘reconsideration and update of the operating conditions by a public authority’ in 
accordance with Art.6.10 of the Convention, Slovakia having failed to ensure that the 
provisions of Art.6(2)-(9) were applied “mutatis mutandis, and where appropriate”957.  
 
In this sense, the terms ‘mutatis mutandis, and ‘where appropriate’ are not to be 
construed as bestowing upon states an absolute discretionary power in subsuming 
potential situations within the remit of these terms958, and are to be considered as 
representing an “objective criterion to be seen in the context of the goals of the 
Convention”959. In view of the potential impact the permitting of the nuclear installation 
would have on the public and the environment, the Compliance Committee found that 
public participation would have been appropriate960 so that by neglecting to provide for 
public participation as foreseen in Art.6(2)-(9) during the decision-making process resulting 
in the 2008 decisions, Slovakia failed to comply with Art.6(10) of the Convention961.  
 
Further on, the Committee went on to verify whether the criterion contained in 
Art.6(4) for ensuring public participation in decisions on specific activities at an early stage 
“when all options are open and effective public participation can take place” had been 
satisfied962. It was noted that an EIA procedure under Slovak law had been put in place in 
2009 before the adoption of the operating permit for the Mochovce plant but however after 
the issuing of the construction permit963. The Committee observed that once the 
installation was constructed there was considerable risk that it would be no longer 
politically realistic to expect the public authority to block the operation on the basis of 
issues relating to the construction, technology or infrastructure which have been 
discovered or revealed subsequently964. Consequently, it was concluded that the former 
was incompliant with Art.6.4 of the Convention965.  
 
The Committee did not articulate whether the detected deficiency in the Mochovce 
NPP decision-making process was indicative of a general failure of the Slovak legal 
framework on public participation - namely, whether the current Slovak legislation on 
reconsideration and updating of old permits complies with the Aarhus Convention’s public 
                                                            
957 Para.55; Art.6 para.10 reads : “Each Party shall ensure that, when a public authority reconsiders or updates 
the operating conditions for an activity referred to in paragraph 1, the provisions of paragraphs 2 to 9 of this 
article are applied mutatis mutandis, and where appropriate.”; 
958 Para.55. 
959 Para.56. 
960 Para.57. 
961 Paras.57 and 59. 
962 Para.61. 
963 Para.61. 
964 Para.64. 
965 Para.64. 
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participation requirements. What was emphasized was that the legal framework of the 
state concerned should ensure early and effective public participation in accordance with 
Art.6(4) of the Convention966 and, in this vein, it was recommended that the former 
undergoes a revision to this effect967. In conclusion, the Compliance Committee decided 
that by omitting to ensure early and effective public participation in the decision-making 
leading to the 2008 decisions concerning Mochovce NPP, Slovakia failed to meet the 
requirements of Art.6(4)-(10) of the Convention968.  
 
The foregoing case law analysis has demonstrated a tendency of the courts to 
address the issues regarding access to information and public participation in the nuclear 
arena in a less straightforward manner than the ‘regular’ environmental cases where the 
courts seem better accustomed to the subject matter and therefore felt better placed to 
proceed. What is manifest is a ‘lingering’ deference towards the vested prerogatives 
belonging to the states coupled with an impending wariness on the part of the courts not to 
trample thereupon, which thickens the shroud of confidentiality typically vitiating the 
nuclear field. Therefore, pro futuro, it is indispensable that international and regional courts 
exhibit a more activist approach when interpreting and applying the legal rules pertaining 
to access to information and public participation in the nuclear domain thus empowering 
the national courts to follow suit. It is highly unlikely that in the absence of an activist 
international and regional jurisprudence in the matter, the Member States’ judicial organs 
will have the courage to independently take a more open and flexible stance towards 
applying the Aarhus Convention’s standards for environmental democracy to matters in the 
nuclear domain. 
 
VII The Aarhus Convention access-to-justice regime in EU law – an 
‘accomplished’  failure 
 
 
The issue of fully transposing the access-to-justice requirements of Art.9 of the 
Aarhus Convention to the EU level, as was indicated at the outset, remains to be 
contentious especially in view of the Union’s already well established regimes on access to 
information and public participation in decision making in the field of environment. At this 
point it would be pertinent to make a reference to EU’s Declaration of competence made to 
                                                            
966 Para.67. 
967 Para.70 (a). 
968 Para.69; For an insight into the back and forth correspondence between the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee and Slovakia on the progress of the implementation of the findings and 
recommendations of the Compliance Committee, see at: http://www.unece.org/environmental-
policy/treaties/public-participation/aarhus-convention/envpptfwg/envppcc/envppccimplementation/fourth-
meeting-of-the-parties-2011/slovakia-decision-iv9e.html. 
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the Aarhus Convention969 where the European Community (at the time) affirmed that while 
it has adopted several legal instruments binding on the Member States which implement 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention, the legal instruments in force did not fully cover the 
implementation of the obligations resulting from Art.9(3) of the Aarhus Convention which 
concerns the administrative and judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by 
private persons and public authorities other than the Community institutions. 
Consequently, according to the Declaration of competence, the Member States are 
considered responsible for the performance of the former obligations until the Community 
adopts provisions of Community law covering the implementation of those obligations. 
Therefore, given that almost a decade later the requirements of Art.9 (3) of the Aarhus 
Convention have not been fully transposed to the EU level970 (the proposal for a directive on 
access-to-justice in environmental matters in 2003 being unsuccessful, having remained at 
the proposal stage971), in the absence of Union regulation it has fallen upon the Member 
                                                            
969Declaration by the European Community in accordance with Article 19 of the Convention on access to 
information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, Annex to 
Council Decision 2005/370/EC, cited supra.  
970 Relevant parts of the text of Art.9 of the Aarhus Convention will be reproduced in full: 
“Access to justice  
1. Each Party shall, within the framework of its national legislation, ensure that any person who considers that 
his or her request for information under article 4 has been ignored, wrongfully refused, whether in part or in 
full, inadequately answered, or otherwise not dealt with in accordance with the provisions of that article, has 
access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by 
law. 
In the circumstances where a Party provides for such a review by a court of law, it shall ensure that such a 
person also has access to an expeditious procedure established by law that is free of charge or inexpensive for 
reconsideration by a public authority or review by an independent and impartial body other than a court of 
law. 
Final decisions under this paragraph 1 shall be binding on the public authority holding the information. 
Reasons shall be stated in writing, at least where access to information is refused under this paragraph. 
2. Each Party shall, within the framework of its national legislation, ensure that members of the public 
concerned  
(a) Having a sufficient interest or, alternatively, 
(b) Maintaining impairment of a right, where the administrative procedural law of a Party requires this as a 
precondition, have access to a review procedure before a court of law and/or another 
independent and impartial body established by law, to challenge the substantive and procedural legality of 
any decision, act or omission subject to the provisions of article 6 and, where so provided for under national 
law and without prejudice to paragraph 3 below, of other relevant provisions of this Convention. 
What constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall be determined in accordance with the 
requirements of national law and consistently with the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to 
justice within the scope of this Convention. To this end, the interest of any non-governmental organization 
meeting the requirements referred to in article 2, paragraph 5, shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of 
subparagraph (a) above. Such organizations shall also be deemed to have rights capable of being impaired for 
the purpose of subparagraph (b) above. 
(…) 
3. In addition and without prejudice to the review procedures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, each 
Party shall ensure that, where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in its national law, members of the 
public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons 
and public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment.”; 
971Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on access to justice in 
environmental matters, Brussels, 24.10.2003, COM(2003) 624 final, 2003/0246 (COD). 
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States to independently align their national legal regimes with the Convention’s provisions. 
The modalities in which the Conventions’ provisions become binding national law for the 
Member States as Contracting Parties are determined by the particularities of their 
domestic legal systems (monist v. dualist approach): in most of the Western European 
countries national implementing legislation  must be passed in order for the Convention to 
become part of domestic law (dualist approach), while in most East European countries 
international legal instruments as sources of law are presumed to be directly applicable and 
do not require any transposing legislation (monist approach)972. However, in the case of the 
Aarhus Convention such general ‘rule of thumb’ is not always fully applicable, primarily 
because of the manner in which the Convention provisions are drafted973. A predominant 
number of the articles of the Convention entrust the States with a duty to legislate in order 
to conform to the rules of the Convention, which indicates that the former is not essentially 
conceived to be a self-executing treaty, at least not to a full extent974.  
Concerning the possibility for the provisions of international agreements concluded 
by the Union, such as the Aarhus Convention, to produce direct effect, the EU Court of 
Justice confirmed the former possibility in the Lesoochranárske zoskupenie case975 provided 
that the criteria applicable to examining the direct effect of international agreements 
concluded by the Union have been satisfied: namely, that the provision the direct effect of 
which is being appraised must be put into the context of the purpose and the nature of the 
international agreement and therefore must contain a clear and precise obligation which is 
not further subject to the adoption of any subsequent implementing measure976. The case 
concerned the issue of direct applicability of Art.9(3) of the Aarhus Convention before 
national courts, more precisely, the issue of access to courts for national non-governmental 
organizations in cases of breaches of national environmental laws. Notwithstanding that 
the provisions the direct effect of which the CJEU was called upon to appraise (Art. 9(3) of 
the Aarhus Convention) had not previously been subject to EU regulation, the Court noted 
that an issue addressed in an international agreement concluded by the EU but not yet 
                                                            
972 Wates, supra n.621, p.9. 
973 Idem.  
974For example, note the language of the following articles: Art. 3.1 (“Each Party shall take the necessary […] 
measures’ (…)”), Art 3.2 (“Each Party shall endeavour to ensure that (…)”), Art.5 (“Each Party shall ensure that 
(…)”), Art.6 (“Each party shall (…)”), etc.  
975 C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej republiky, ECR 
2011 p.I-1255. 
976 Para.44 of the judgment. The criteria to be applied in the appraisal of the direct effect are the following: 
“(…)[A] provision in an agreement concluded by the European Union with a non-member country must be 
regarded as being directly applicable when, regard being had to its wording and to the purpose and nature of the 
agreement, the provision contains a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or 
effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure (…)” (para.44 of judgment);  
The former attempt for inclusiveness toward the legal standing of applicants is difficult to be reconciled with 
the governing national practices in Member States such as France. The French Conseil D’Etat had on one 
occasion rejected the claims made by French environmental NGOs attacking the validity of the Decree 
licensing the construction of the nuclear installation “Flamanville 3’’ purporting that the former violates 
Art.6(4) and Art.8 of the Aarhus Convention considering that the Convention did not have direct effect in the 
domestic legal system (Case-law Digest: France, Nuclear Law Bulletin, Vol. 2009/1, p.92,93). 
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subject to specific EU legislation was nevertheless to be considered as part of EU law where 
the issue concerns a field to a large extent covered by EU law977. 
While concluding that the provisions of Art.9(3) of the Aarhus Convention failed to 
satisfy the criteria for producing direct effect, the Court considered that the former 
provisions, although drafted in broad terms, were nonetheless intended to ensure effective 
environmental protection978. It thereby emphasized the importance of ensuring effective 
judicial protection in the fields covered by EU environmental law which required that 
national courts interpret national law in a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is 
consistent with the objectives laid down in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention979. In this 
way, the CJEU instructed the referring national court to interpret, to the fullest extent 
possible, the national procedural rules relating to the conditions to be met in order to bring 
administrative or judicial proceedings in accordance with the objectives of Article 9(3) of 
the Aarhus Convention and the objective of effective judicial protection of the rights 
conferred by EU law thus enabling an environmental protection organisation, such as the 
non-governmental organization in question, to challenge before a national court a decision 
taken following administrative proceedings which is liable to be contrary to Union 
environmental law980. The CJEU's findings recognized the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention as source of EU law containing binding obligations for national courts to take 
into account for the purpose of interpreting national rules concerning the rights of access to 
justice of the public relying on EU environmental legislation (in the instant case the EU 
‘Habitats Directive’981)982 thus superseding restrictive national rules regarding legal 
standing of non-governamental organizations. Finally, in consequence to the ruling the 
                                                            
977 Paras. 40-42 of judgment.  
It has been suggested that by making this pronouncement the CJEU failed to offer a proper reading of the 
EU’s Declaration of competence or rather, ran counter to the wording of the declaration, potentially creating 
problems as far as the participation of the EU and its Member States in the Aarhus Convention. Namely, by 
stating that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention falls within the scope of EU law since it relates to a field 
covered in large measure covered by it, the Court seemed to argue that Article 9.3 of the Aarhus Convention 
falls within EU’s exclusive competence even though the declaration of competence provides that unless the 
Union has adopted legislation on that specific issue Member States retain their competence on Article 9(3). 
The foregoing goes to the extent of interpreting the Court’s approach as that, according to the Court, 
Member States seem to even be no longer competent on issues covered by Article 9(3) (See, Casteleiro, supra, 
n.642, p.507); 
978 Paras.45,46. 
979 Para.50. 
980 Para.51.  
981 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora OJ 1992 L 206/7. 
982See, M. Hedemann-Robinson, EU Implementation of the Aarhus Convention's Third Pillar: Back to the 
Future over Access to Environmental Justice? (Part 1), European Energy and Environmental Law Review, June 
2014, p.113. 
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Slovak referring court, by way of interpretation, had admitted the appellant non-
governmental organization as party to the proceedings983.  
The lacuna that the absence of an access-to-justice directive creates in the Union 
environmental transparency regime has been offset to a certain degree by the insertion of 
access-to justice provisions in the existing Union legal instruments implementing the 
Aarhus Convention which corresponding to the first and the second pillar of the Convention 
(the Public Information Directive and the EIA Directive). The Union legislators’ 
inconsistency in approach regarding the Convention’s first and second pillar requirements, 
on the one hand, as opposed to the third pillar requirements, on the other, seriously 
jeopardizes the uniformity of legal effect of the Convention at Union level and further 
allows for different national courts to potentially give diverse interpretations and therefore 
distinctly apply the Convention’s access-to-justice provisions (however, the latitude given 
to national courts has been significantly reduced in light of the CJEU’s pronouncement in 
Lesoochranárske zoskupenie establishing a duty for national courts to interpret national 
rules consistently with the provisions of the Aarhus Conventions which have not yet been 
covered by EU regulation). 
Therefore, Union regulatory action is imperative primarily due to the existing 
shortcomings regarding the control over the application of environmental law in the 
Union984 which derive from the notable difference in the level of environmental protection 
offered by and the procedural safeguards for environmental law enforcement applied by 
different Member States985. Such disparities in the application of environmental law may 
generate conflicts among Member States, especially in the areas of international 
watercourse and air quality protection, and cross border emissions of polluting substances 
thus contributing to the weakening of the overall impact of the Aarhus Convention986. 
However, the perceptible lack of urgency for adopting a directive of the former kind can be 
plausibly accounted for by the fact that at the time the Aarhus Convention was negotiated 
most Member States had already well-established legal traditions in the application of the 
Art.9(3) requirements regarding breaches of national environmental laws, some of which 
                                                            
983 See, E. Mariolina, Collective Redress in Environmental Matters in the EU: A Role Model or a “Problem 
Child”?, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 2014, Vol.41 Issue 3, p.269.  
According to Mariolina, the Court of Justice did not merely point to the duty of consistent interpretation, but, 
somewhat ‘directed’ the results of the exercise of interpretation to be performed by the national court, since 
it sort of directs that the interpretation is to enable environmental protection organizations such as the Slovak 
NGO, to challenge before a court a decision taken following administrative proceedings liable to be contrary 
to EU environmental law’. Mariolina considers this pronouncement of the Court as remarkable as the CJEU 
effectively broadens the scope of indirect effect quite significantly thus inevitably overstepping the 
competences of the EU legislature, which has, as mentioned above, not yet legislated on Article 9(3). The 
question which arises is then how national courts would have to go about their interpretative duty if national 
procedural law did not allow for such an interpretation, or if there was no national law to be interpreted.44 
(see, Mariolina, p.268); 
984 p.6 of the Proposal for the Access-to-justice Directive cited supra.  
985 p.6 of the Proposal. 
986 p.6 of the Proposal. 
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were much more liberal than those envisaged by the proposed access-to-justice 
Directive987.  
 
With the benefit of hindsight, the (unsuccessful) proposal for a Directive on access 
to justice in environmental matters will be looked at in order to gain insight into what was 
initially envisaged for the Union access-to-justice regime to be. Firstly, laying down 
obligations aiming to ensure access to justice in environmental proceedings to members of 
the public and to qualified entities in the Union, the provisions of the proposed Directive did 
not intend to prejudice the existing Community provisions concerning access to justice in 
environmental matters (included in the Public Information Directive and the EIA Directive). 
Secondly, the term ‘environmental proceedings’ under the proposed Directive 
encompassed the administrative or judicial review proceedings in environmental matters 
(excluding the proceedings in criminal matters) before a court or other independent body 
established by law which are concluded by a binding decision988. Member States were to 
ensure that members of the public and qualified entities who have legal standing and “(…) 
who consider that an administrative act or administrative omission is in breach of 
environmental law, are entitled to make a request for internal review to the public 
authority that has been designated in accordance with national law”989.  Furthermore, the 
proposal foresaw the holding of an internal review as a preliminary step which entails strict 
time limits to be respected and requires that the decision of the authorities performing the 
                                                            
987 M. Bar, Towards Implementation of the Aarhus Convention Third Pillar: Draft EU Access directive 
Compared with the Situation in Poland, Environmental Liability, 2004, Vol. 12 Issue 2, p.68. 
988 Art.2 of the proposed Directive. 
989Art.3 of the proposed Directive; Under Art.2 of the proposed Directive the scope of the term 
‘environmental law’ included Union legislation and legislation adopted to implement EU legislation which 
“have as their objective the protection or the improvement of the environment, including human health and 
the protection or the rational use of natural resources, in areas such as:  
i) water protection 
ii) noise protection 
iii) soil protection 
iv) atmospheric pollution 
v) town and country planning and land use 
vi) nature conservation and biological diversity 
vii) waste management 
viii) chemicals including biocides and pesticides 
ix) biotechnology 
x) other emissions, discharges and releases in the environment. 
xi) environmental impact assessment 
xii) access to environmental information and public participation 
in decision-making”; 
The proposed Directive offers an inclusive definition for the term ‘environmental law’ by introducing a catch-
all enumeration in determining the scope of the term in that the former lack of prescription makes way for a 
greater discretion to be exercised on the part of the Member States in assessing the scope of the term 
‘environmental law’. If the same inclusiveness is maintained in a future directive, nuclear emissions as well as 
radioactive waste would presumably be caught under the ambit of that directive. One cannot claim with 
certainty whether the inclusiveness in the proposed directive’s approach constitutes one of the reasons why 
the adoption of the text has been so objectionable. 
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review to be sufficient as to ensure compliance with environmental law990. Failing this, the 
applicant would be entitled to further institute environmental proceedings whereby it 
devolves on the Member States to provide adequate and effective proceedings which are 
objective, equitable, expeditious and not prohibitively expensive991.  
 
The failure to adopt the access-to-justice directive notwithstanding, the observance 
of the public participation and access-to-information rights of the EU citizens has been 
secured via the corresponding access-to-justice provisions inserted in the Access-to-
information and the EIA directives, however only to a limited degree. According to the 
Aarhus Convention, in granting the access to information each Party is to ensure that any 
person who considers that their request for information made pursuant to Art.4 of the 
Convention has been ignored, wrongfully refused, inadequately answered, or in any other 
way not dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Art.4, is entitled to a review 
procedure before a court of law (or another independent and impartial body established by 
law)992. While the former requirement has been mirrored in Art.6 of the 2003 Access-to-
information Directive, the access-to-justice provisions of the Directive further provide an 
added value by extending the breadth of the procedural protection espoused under Art.9(1) 
and (2) so as to include the Art.5 and Art.6 access-to-information requirements in addition 
to the Art.4 requirements which the Convention foresees as the ‘minimum standard’993. The 
‘enhanced’ scope of the judicial protection under the Directive evidences an 
implementation effort which has exceeded the minimum standard by setting a higher 
threshold of protection. 
 
With regard to participation in decision-making, the Aarhus Convention endorses 
the participatory rights under Art.6 as a kind of ‘threshold’, allowing national legislators to 
further extend the scope of judicial protection with respect to, inter alia, Arts.7 and 8, or 
even Art.5994. Thus, each Party should, within the framework of its national legislation, 
                                                            
990 Arts. 9 and 10. 
991 Art.10 of proposed directive; Emphasis added. 
992 Art.9.1. 
993 Art.6.1 (Access to justice) of Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information: “Member 
States shall ensure that any applicant who considers that his request for information has been ignored, 
wrongfully refused (whether in full or in part), inadequately answered or otherwise not dealt with in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 3, 4 or 5, has access to a procedure in which the acts or omissions of 
the public authority concerned can be reconsidered by that or another public authority or reviewed 
administratively by an independent and impartial body established by law. Any such procedure shall be 
expeditious and either free of charge or inexpensive”; 
994 Art.9.2 of the Aarhus Convention reads: 
“Each Party shall, within the framework of its national legislation, ensure that members of the public 
concerned  
(a) Having a sufficient interest or, alternatively, 
(b) Maintaining impairment of a right, where the administrative procedural law of a Party requires this as a 
precondition, 
have access to a review procedure before a court of law and/or another independent and impartial body 
established by law, to challenge the substantive and procedural legality of any decision, act or omission 
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ensure that members of the public concerned that have a sufficient interest or, alternatively, 
maintain the impairment of a right, have access to a review procedure before a court of law 
(and/or another independent and impartial body established by law) to challenge the 
substantive and procedural legality of any decision, act or omission subject to the 
provisions of Art.6 or, where provided by national law – other relevant provisions of the 
Convention995. The frame of reference used for appraising ‘sufficient interest’ and 
‘impairment of a right’ is also to be foreseen under national law, in accordance with the 
general objective of providing wide access to justice to the public concerned996. 
Furthermore, any non-governmental organization meeting the requirements referred to in 
Art.2 (5) of the Convention is presumed as having ‘sufficient interest’997. These 
requirements have found an adequate expression in the EIA Directive (more particularly, 
through the amendments introduced by the 2003 Public Participation Directive which have 
enhanced the EIA Directive’s public participation regime by adding adequate access-to-
justice provisions998). While a satisfactory judicial review regime has been established with 
respect to public participation in specific projects on the environment, a similar regime has 
not been envisaged in the context of public participation in the drafting of plans and 
programmes relating to the environment. Failing to extend the application of the access-to-
justice provisions to the process of preparation of plans and programmes relating to the 
environment represents a serious drawback to the Union’s public participation regime that 
has not been sufficiently well addressed999. 
 
With respect to the justiciability of the administrative acts and omissions of the 
Union institutions and bodies regarding environmental matters, the former are (to a certain 
extent) reviewable under Art.10 of the 2006 Aarhus Regulation. Nonetheless, the scope of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
subject to the provisions of article 6 and, where so provided for under national law and without prejudice to 
paragraph 3 below, of other relevant provisions of this Convention.”; 
For further reading, see, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, p.128; In the context of the 
application Art.9(3) there does exist a possibility for the provisions of Arts.7 and 8 of the Convention to be 
justiciable. However, being that Art.9(2) and (3) of the Convention contain certain provisions which are to be 
implemented only at the discretion of national legislators, it cannot be claimed that Arts. 7 and 8 create 
legally binding obligations (see, Jendroska, Aarhus Convention at Ten, supra n.655, p.96). 
995 Art.9.2. 
996 Art.9.2. 
997 Under Art.2.5 of the Aarhus Convention, “the public concerned” means the public affected or likely to be 
affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision-making; for the purposes of this definition, 
non-governmental organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements 
under national law shall be deemed to have an interest.” [Emphasis added]; 
998 Article 1 
Objective 
“The objective of this Directive is to contribute to the implementation of the obligations arising under the 
Aarhus Convention, in particular by: 
(a) providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to 
the environment; 
(b) improving the public participation and providing for provisions on access to justice within Council 
Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC." (…)”; 
999 The decision on the part of the Union legislators to maintain such a restrictive approach was not preceded 
by any significant debate within the EU (for this, see, Jendroska, supra n.648, Part VII. 1). 
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persons entitled to require the judicial review is highly restrictive, if not poor. More 
particularly, under the Regulation only non-governmental organizations have the legal 
standing to challenge the administrative acts and omissions of the Union institutions and 
bodies1000, by lodging a request for internal review before the concerned EU institution or 
body allegedly at fault followed by the option to further initiate a procedure before the 
CJEU1001. The generous procedural entitlement given to non-governmental organizations 
closely follows the language of Art.9.2(2) of the Aarhus Convention whereby non-
governmental organizations are presumed to have sufficient interest to initiate 
proceedings before courts or other relevant bodies. All the while, the Regulation makes a 
clear retreat from the Convention’s liberal approach of prescribing the ‘any person’ 
requirement for cases of denied or unsatisfactory access to environmental information 
(Art.9 (1)), equally failing to foresee legal standing for ‘members of the public concerned 
having a sufficient interest’ or ‘maintaining impairment of a right’ by reason of their Art.6 
entitlements (pursuant to Art. 9.2(1) of the Convention).  
 
The Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee addressed the forementioned 
lacuna in the access-to-justice regime established under the 2006 Aarhus Regulation in its 
findings adopted pursuant to a communication proceded by the non-governmental 
organization ClientEarth which brought attention to EU’s failure to comply with Art.9(2) of 
the Convention concerning access to justice of members of the public concerned1002. More 
specifically, the Communication attacked the Union’s restrictive rules regarding standing in 
matters related to the environment which impede the NGOs as well as the individuals from 
having full access to justice in challenging the decisions of the Union institutions. Grosso modo, 
the communicant observed a general failure on the part of the EU to comply with the 
provisions of the Convention on access to justice in environmental matters1003. In addition, 
the communicant claimed that should the jurisprudence of the EU courts not be altered, the 
EU would fail to comply with Art.9(2)-(5) of the Convention. In response to the communication, 
the Compliance Committee expressed the need for a new direction in the jurisprudence of 
the EU Courts to be established in order to ensure compliance with the Convention and 
recommended that “(…) all relevant EU institutions within their competences take the 
steps to overcome the shortcomings reflected in the jurisprudence of the EU Courts in 
providing the public concerned with access to justice in environmental matters’’1004. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to claim with certainty whether the former recommendation 
                                                            
1000 Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation: 
“Request for internal review of administrative acts 
1.   Any non-governmental organisation which meets the criteria set out in Article 11 is entitled to make a 
request for internal review to the Community institution or body that has adopted an administrative act under 
environmental law or, in case of an alleged administrative omission, should have adopted such an act. (…)”; 
1001 Art.12 of the Regulation. 
1002 Findings and recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I) concerning 
compliance by the European Union, Adopted on 14 April 2011 ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1. 
1003 Para.3 of the Findings.  
1004 Paras.97 and 98 of the Findings.  
204 
 
voiced by the Compliance Committee intimates at the need for revision of the existent EU 
access-to-justice regime for environmental matters.  
 
The restrictive approach exhibited by the EU legislator in the 2006 Aarhus 
Regulation can be explained with the caution not to tramle upon the established rules on 
legal standing of the TFEU1005 and the related case law of the CJEU in the matter combined 
with the fear of potentially opening the ‘floodgates’ for natural or legal persons (other than 
NGOs) to challenge all administrative acts and omissions of EU institutions coming within 
the scope of the Regulation (certainly, provided the concerned persons are at the outset 
able to prove direct and individual concern). Arguendo, such a state of affairs points to the 
existence of a democratic deficit (reflected in the difficulty to challenge the acts and 
omissions of the EU institutions before the EU courts) which invariably engenders an 
‘implementation deficit’ for the Union environmental rules1006. Such implementation deficit 
is to be attributed both to the Member States and the EU institutions given that the acts 
and omissions of the latter determine the degree and quality of the implementation efforts 
of the former1007.  
 
Concerning the nuclear field (and thus the scope of the Euratom), pending the 
adoption of an access-to-justice directive, the potential legal avenues for safeguarding the 
access-to-information and public participation rights in environmental matters will be 
those provided under the Public Information and the EIA directives, to the extent applicable 
to nuclear projects and activities. It follows that until a directive on access to justice is 
adopted, the scope of the judicial protection of the Aarhus Convention rights in the nuclear 
sector will be questionable in terms of determining the ‘minimum’ standard for procedural 
protection in view of the lack of comprehensive codification. Given the delicate nature of 
the judicial protection of procedural environmental rights, it is insufficient to presume the 
existence of a standard - it is indispensable to have one ink on paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1005 On the criteria regarding legal standing, see Art.263(4) TFEU. 
1006 J. Ebbesson, Chapter 2:European Community, in, J. Ebbesson (ed.), Access to justice in environmental 
matters in the EU, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.52.   
1007 Idem. 
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Chapter 4: 
The Euratom and Non-Proliferat ion of 
Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter 4: The Euratom and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 
The present chapter covers the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as 
covered under the purview of the Euratom Community and the nuclear safeguards 
mechanisms devised thereunder as well as the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons as a policy inaugaurated under the Union framework stricto sensu. The former two 
areas of focus are approached from the perspective of the legal and political instruments 
that the Euratom and the Union, respectively, have at their disposal in the achievement of 
the non-proliferation objective.  
The global nuclear non-proliferation discourse is as old as the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons itself, the latter being arguably the only weapons which best achieve their 
goal when not used, given their potentially far-reaching devastating effects1008. Matters are 
made more complex by the delicate nature of nuclear technology as inherently dual give 
that the possibility for diversion from peaceful to non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy is 
technically a straightforward exercise, making the two types of uses of nuclear energy 
difficult to always fully differentiate one from the other1009. It is for this reason that the legal 
regimes applicable to both civil and military uses of nuclear energy, although clearly 
distinct, are functionally intertwined and inter-dependent. In addition, there have been 
certain ‘grey-zone’ issues (e.g. the issue of radioactive waste from military nuclear 
installations) which implicate the two legal regimes, but nevertheless necessitate that only 
one regime is applied. Thus, the struggle to find the pertinent legal rule to apply proves to 
be a weighty and a potentially perilous exercise, directly implicating the states’ sovereignty 
and security concerns. 
The term ‘nuclear weapons proliferation’ has been defined as the multiplication of 
nuclear arms without distinguishing the number of states that possess them1010. While the 
subject of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons pertains to both civil and military uses of 
nuclear energy, the former, understandably, has a predominant bearing on the latter. The 
subject has been deeply rooted in the history of European integration: looking at the very 
                                                            
1008 N. Pélopidas, Non-proliferation through International Norms: A European Preference?, Cahiers Europeens 
N°02/2006 (http://www.portedeurope.org/IMG/pdf/Cahier_norme_1_Pelopidas.pdf), p.2. 
1009 Scheinmann, supra n.44, p.12. 
1010 G. Fischer, The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Europa Publications, 1971, p.21. 
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beginnings of the Euratom Community, one of the conceptual questions that spurred harsh 
disagreement among the Member States at the time was the question of whether the 
future Euratom member states should forswear the use of nuclear energy for military 
purposes1011 and whether the Euratom Treaty should cover the realm of military uses of 
nuclear energy.  
In parallel to the nuclear non-proliferation objective furthered under the Euratom 
purview through the application of the nuclear safeguards arrangements, the Union stricto 
sensu participates in the non-prolferation equation through the development of the Union’s 
non-proliferation policy, a subset of which is the policy regarding the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. Thus, the Euratom and the Union having remained to exist as separate 
legal entities after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), both have an important 
stake in the non-proliferation equation, in function to their respective competences in the 
area of non-proliferation1012. Indeed, the EU of today has been equipped with both the 
adequate resources and legal mechanisms to contribute to the global non-proliferation 
dialogue and claim its role as a serious actor in the field.  
The chapter deals both with the legal dimension of non-proliferation devised at the 
EU level, assumed by the Euratom and represented by the Euratom safeguards regime, and 
the policy dimension, belonging to the scope of the Union framework and known as the 
Union’s non-proliferation policy - the former two being intrinsically linked and, thus, co-
existent. It starts out by looking at the global legal regime on non-proliferation, exploring 
the principles and mechanisms endorsed under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nulcear Weapons (NPT)) (in force since 1970) and, more specifically, the nuclear safeguards 
component which is further implemented through the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) safeguards agreements. Nuclear safeguards, as technical measures aimed at 
deterring the proliferation of nuclear weapons1013, represent a crucial component of the 
NPT regime and thus an essential asset for achieving the non-proliferation objective. The 
analysis puts the non-proliferation obligations established at the international level are 
subsequently into the context of the Euratom safeguards framework devised pursuant to 
the Euratom Treaty and the Euratom secondary legislation, inquiring into the relationship 
between the corresponding NPT/IAEA and Euratom safeguards regimes. 
With the intent to comprehensively delimit Euratom’s portion of competence in the 
field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the analysis further addresses the 
controversial issue of the existence of any (if only marginal) Euratom competence in the 
field of military uses of nuclear energy. In this vein, it is to be reminded that, typically, 
                                                            
1011 M. Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-1963, Princeton University Press, 1964, p.54. 
1012 For practical reasons, throughout the text the term ‘non-proliferation’ will sometimes be used 
interchangeably with the term ‘non-proliferation of nuclear weapons’, certainly, bearing in mind that the 
scope of the latter term belongs to the much larger scope of the former.    
1013 http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/. 
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military uses of nuclear energy are presumed to be ‘vested’ Member State competence1014 
(depending on the nature of the issue, implicating the EU Foreign and Security policy) 
whereas civil uses have traditionally been seen as ‘trademark’ Euratom competence. 
Furthermore, the exercise of delimiting the competence of Member State as opposed to 
Euratom competence regarding the civil and military applications of nuclear energy is 
significant not solely from the perspective of those Member States which are nuclear 
weapons states  (France and the United Kingdom) as well as those Member States that host 
NATO tactical nuclear weapons on their territory under the nuclear weapons sharing 
arrangements (Belgium, Germany, Italy, etc.), but equally for those Member States that 
have developed purely civil nuclear programmes primarily due to the national security risks 
involved therein1015 (along with the impending difficulty to precisely separate the purely 
peaceful from the purely military uses of nuclear energy1016).  
The former delimitation of scopes cannot be accomplished by simply looking at the 
text of the Euratom Treaty since the former fails to provide any express or blanket 
exemption regarding military uses so that, in the absence of an explicit exemption, an 
attempt to find a tacit one will be undertaken. For the purpose of giving an answer on 
whether certain Euratom Treaty provisions can be presumed to apply to the nuclear 
defence sector, the discussion begins by elucidating the original intentions of the Union’s 
founding fathers and employing a historical and teleological approach by reviewing the 
relevant historical projects and documents that pre-date the adoption of the Euratom 
Treaty (the 1956 Spaak Report, the Draft Minutes of the 1956 Venice Conference, etc.). The 
inquiry further focuses on particular provisions of the current text of the Euratom Treaty 
(the chapters on Nuclear Supplies, Nuclear Safeguards and Property Ownership) which can 
be considered as pertaining (directly or indirectly) to the Member States’ defence interests. 
Being that the issue of the relationship between the Euratom and military applications of 
nuclear energy remains to be labeled as a legal ‘grey area’, the chapter concludes with a 
section elaborating the EU Court of Justice’s pronouncements in several cases that touch 
upon the issue of applying the Euratom Treaty or the Euratom secondary legislation to 
matters related to the national nuclear defense of Member States. 
  
 
 
                                                            
1014 See, Case Commission v UK, C-61/03, ECR 2005 p. I-2477, para. 44. 
1015 R. Kobia, The EU and Non-Proliferation: Need for a Quantum Leap?, Nuclear Law Bulletin, June 2008, 
No.81, p.39. 
1016 D. A. Howlett, Euratom and Nuclear safeguards, Macmillan Press, 1990, p.8. 
208 
 
I Non-proliferation and disarmament – two concomitant objectives of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) 
 
“The unleashed power of the atom 
has changed everything except our 
way of thinking.” – Albert Einstein 
 
The devastating effects of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki heralded 
the advancement of a clear and unshakeable non-proliferation objective pursued by the 
entire international community. The idea to put the control of manufacturing of nuclear 
weapons under the umbrella of one international treaty is one of the greatest enterprises in 
human history especially since it is one thing to advocate non-proliferation through policy 
mechanisms, but quite another to establish an international legally binding instrument in 
the area of non-proliferation such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT)1017.  
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty - 
NPT) is the key international legal instrument that regulates the field of non-proliferation 
on a global and all-encompassing scale. So far a total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty 
(including the five nuclear weapons states: USA, Russia, China, France and the United 
Kingdom) which was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 
19701018. All the countries of the famous EU ‘Six’1019, except for France, signed the NPT in 
August 1968 and ratified it as late as in May 19751020. France was the last of the EU founding 
member states and Security Council permanent members to accede to the NPT as late as in 
August 1992, the French government having stated on several occasions that although not 
a party to the Treaty, France considered itself bound by its provisions1021. The principal 
reason why France abstained from becoming part of the NPT was because it did not 
                                                            
1017 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol.729, I-10485. 
1018See, the website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 
(http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml); 
1019 The ‘Six’ reference relates to the six founding members of the then, European Community: France, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.  
1020 Consult the site of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs for an overview of the States that 
have signed and ratified the Treaty 
(http://unhq-appspub-
01.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf/NPT%20%28in%20alphabetical%20order%29?OpenView); 
1021 B. Goldschmidt, Proliferation and Non-proliferation in Western Europe: A Historical Survey, in H. Muller 
(ed.), A European Non-Proliferation Policy: Prospects and Problems, Clarendon Press, 1987, p.24. 
Fischer reports a statement from a French delegate at the UN General Assembly: “No country that has the 
terrifying responsibilities resulting from the possession of these [nuclear] weapons will ever agree to share 
them with others. For its part, France will not sign the Treaty but will behave in future in this field exactly like 
the states which do decide to adhere.” (See, Fischer, supra n.1010, p.62); 
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perceive the NPT as an effective disarmament mechanism1022. The United Kingdom, on the 
other hand, which became a Member State in 1973, was one of the original signatories to 
the NPT and had deposited the instrument of ratification already in November 19681023. 
Since the entry into force of the NPT, regular review (and extension) conferences have been 
held every year while at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension conference it had been 
decided that the NPT be extended indefinitely1024.  
The NPT pursues three fundamental objectives: non-proliferation as a focal 
objective, disarmament as a secondary, more remote objective (the two being inherently 
intertwined) and lastly, the objective of ensuring the transfer of nuclear technology in the 
pursuance of peaceful uses of nuclear energy1025. Within the term proliferation, distinction is 
to be made between vertical and horizontal proliferation. Vertical proliferation refers to 
quantitative and qualitative increases in weapons held by states that have already declared 
themselves as nuclear weapon states and is to be differentiated from horizontal 
proliferation covered by the NPT and related to the increase in the number of countries that 
have nuclear weapons1026. Non-proliferation, as endorsed by the NPT, seeks to prevent the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by states other than the five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) 
recognized by the Treaty1027. Pursuant to the letter of the NPT, possession and acquisition 
of nuclear weapons is prohibited for all states considered to be non-nuclear weapon states 
(NNWS). Concomitantly, the NPT does not oblige the NWS to disarm their nuclear 
arsenals, but guides them, together with the NNWS, in the direction of disarmament as a 
long-term perspective: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations 
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control”1028. It follows that the NPT has a pervasive 
non-proliferation objective which is distinguishable from its subsidiary, but equally 
important disarmament objective and is therefore not a disarmament treaty per se1029. 
                                                            
1022 V. Lamm, The Utilization of Nuclear Energy and International Law, Akademia Kiado, Budapest, 1984,p.93. 
 
1024 Final Document, 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, NPT/CONF.1995/32 
(Part I), p.13. 
1025 Mölling, The Grand Bargain in the NPT: Challenges for the EU beyond 2010, in, J. P. Zanders, (ed.), Chaillot 
Papers (April 2010), European Union Institute for Security Studies, accessible at 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp120.pdf, p.51. 
1026 Fischer, supra n.1010, p.21. 
1027 Mölling, supra n.1025, p.51. 
1028 Emphasis added; Art.VI of the NPT. 
1029 B. Tertrais, Summary of the meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Subcommittee 
on Security and Defence (SEDE), Public hearing: "The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)", 
Brussels, 12 July 2006 Brussels, 13157/06 PE 294, p.2.; Compare the foregoing statement with the clear 
disarmament character of the Tlatelolco Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America which 
establishes a nuclear weapons-free area among the contracting parties (United Nations, Treaty Series, 
Vol.634, I-9068); The NPT, unlike the Tlatelolco Treaty, by making the distinction between NWS and NNWS 
actually recognizes the right of NWS to manufacture nuclear weapons. 
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According to the letter of the NPT, a nuclear weapon State is one which has 
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 
January 1967 (Art. IX)1030. This means that the Treaty allows for the NWS to maintain their 
nuclear weapons arsenal and indeed increase it if they so wish, at the same time prohibiting 
horizontal proliferation i.e. any future rise in the number of nuclear weapon states. In this 
respect the NPT provisions are overtly discriminatory in their letter and effect- the NNWS 
that would have aimed to test-explode a nuclear weapon after the designated date are put 
in an unfavorable position while the ‘nuclear weapons state’ status of the other five is being 
preserved. The Treaty in a certain way treats nuclear weapons as a ‘necessary evil’, 
something one is compelled to condone on the condition that the status quo in the number 
of nuclear weapons states is complied with. However, such a status quo requirement 
regarding the augmentation of the NWS’ nuclear weapons arsenals is absent from the 
Treaty. Admittedly, this sort of ‘endorsed discrimination’ in law and fact is redeemed 
through the inclusion of the Art.VI disarmament objective. 
In furtherance of the disarmament objective, the NPT endows the signatory parties 
with a long-term mandate to draft a treaty on general and complete nuclear disarmament 
that fosters the objective for a complete cessation of the nuclear arms race (Article VI of the 
NPT). It is common knowledge that a large majority of the international community1031 
subscribes to a world free of nuclear weapons, however, in realistic terms, complete nuclear 
disarmament is a gradual process dependent on many factors (political, economic, social 
and cultural) which themselves cannot be artificially influenced. The task of complete 
nuclear disarmament may well take several decades, even centuries or, ultimately, may 
never happen1032, putting into perspective all the challenge the global community is 
                                                            
1030 Something which has caused disagreements among nuclear scientists over the years is the parameter to 
be used to determine whether a state qualifies as a nuclear weapons state. According to the conventionally 
accepted parameter, a state that has conducted a nuclear test is automatically presumed to have the nuclear 
capacity to produce nuclear weapons (i.e. the nuclear test/no nuclear test criterion)(see, J. E. C. Hymans, When 
Does a State Become a “Nuclear Weapon State”?: An Exercise in Measurement Validation, Non Proliferation 
Review, March 2010, Vol.17 Issue 1, p.176); There are also those who favor the test which examines whether a 
state has accumulated sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear bomb (significant quantity (SQ) test) in 
order to establish the military nuclear readiness of a particular state (See, Hymans, p.176). 
1031 There are certain controversies surrounding the nuclear programs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (a 
contracting party to the NPT), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (which withdrew from the NPT in 
1993 and conducted a nuclear weapons test in 2009 (see on that the Security Council Press Release SC/9679 
12 June 2009, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm. For a chronology of the relations 
between IAEA and DPRK, see, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/chrono_pre2002.shtml;  
The IAEA has also expressed concern about the Israeli nuclear capabilities, having called upon Israel to accede 
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards (IAEA, 
General Conference, Israeli nuclear capabilities: Resolution adopted on 18 September 2009 during the tenth 
plenary meeting (http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Resolutions/English/gc53res-17_en.pdf); 
1032 An American theoretical physicist, Robert Oppenheimer, has expressed a very radical view on the future 
possibility of adopting a convention that would ban nuclear weapons. He envisioned such a nuclear-weapons-
free world as a world laden with an ever present climate of distrust among states where states would only 
maintain civil nuclear facilities, but at the same time the design of these facilities would be such that would 
enable an easy and straightforward conversion to the production of nuclear weapons. ("We know very well 
what we would do if we signed such a convention: We would not make atomic weapons, at least not to start 
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currently facing regarding the untimely ratification of certain international instruments in 
the field of non-proliferation (see, for instance, the ratification status of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty1033). 
The disarmament process should be seen as an important corollary to the non-
proliferation process whereby the two should rather be perceived as complementing rather 
than contradicting each other. The Conference on Disarmament (CD), established in 1979 
under the auspices of the United Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG), is the key multilateral 
disarmament negotiating forum of the international community1034 which focuses on 
managing projects and activities related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear 
disarmament, prevention of nuclear war and all related matters1035. Currently, the 
negotiations for the conclusion of the future Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty1036, which is 
expected to ban any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other 
explosive devices, have been underway under the auspices of the Conference on 
Disarmament. 
It has been argued that a complete achievement of all three of NPT’s objectives 
outlined supra would be a most difficult if not an impossible task since certain of these 
objectives are to a certain degree and in certain instances mutually exclusive (e.g., the non-
proliferation and the disarmament objective) so that it is possible that the strengthening of 
one can have a detrimental effect on the other objective1037. In fact, sanctioning the 
differentiation between NWS and NNWS, on the one hand, and working at attaining a fully 
nuclear-weapons-free world, on the other, is, at least on the face of it, a contradictory 
exercise intrinsic to the system created by the NPT which should nevertheless not be 
exaggerated given that it is a ‘workable’ contradiction, not affecting in any way the overall 
functioning of the non-proliferation regime. 
Ultimately, the fact that the NPT text has endorsed the existence of nuclear 
weapons and has thus made it ‘legal’, inevitably raises the question of the legitimacy of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
with, but we would build enormous plants, and we would design these plants in such a way that they could be 
converted with the maximum ease and the minimum time delay to the production of atomic weapons saying, 
this is just in case somebody two-times us; we would stockpile uranium; we would keep as many of our 
developments secret as possible; we would locate our plants, not where they would do the most good for the 
production of power, but where they would do the most good for protection against enemy attack.") 
(http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/pages_us_en/fissile/production/production.php); 
1033 http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXVI/XXVI-4.en.pdf.  
1034 The Conference on Disarmament presently counts 65 Member States, including all of the world’s nuclear-
weapons states. For a complete membership list, see, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/6286395D9F8DABA380256EF70073A846?Open
Document. 
1035http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/2D415EE45C5FAE07C12571800055232B?Ope
nDocument.  
1036 The term ‘fissile material’ relates to high enriched uranium and plutonium. On the current status of the 
negotiations for the conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, see, http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-
regimes/proposed-fissile-material-cut-off-reaty/; 
1037 Mölling, supra n.1025, p.51. 
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maintenance of national nuclear weapons arsenals. In this vein, the International Court of 
Justice was asked by the UN General Assembly to give an Advisory Opinion on whether the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance is permitted under international 
law1038 where the Court’s response was that of failing to find a specific authorization of the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons in neither customary nor conventional international 
law1039, or, any comprehensive and universal prohibition thereof1040. It opined that “(…) the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international 
law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian 
law (...)”1041. However, taking stock of the current state of international law, the Court could 
not conclude “(...) definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be 
lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of 
a State would be at stake”1042. More importantly, the Court closed with a very important 
dictum urging the states to pursue negotiations that would lead to nuclear disarmament 
“(…) in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”1043. Effectively, having 
in mind the political sensitivity of the issue and the highly conflicting opinions shared by 
different states, the Court did not opt for an unequivocal solution and chose not to 
completely criminalize the threat or use of nuclear weapons, pulling the ‘self-defence’ 
trump card and allowing for the threat or use of nuclear weapons to be exercised only in 
extreme instances necessitating the dire need for the survival of a state to be preserved.  
 
II The architecture of the NPT regime and the IAEA safeguards 
arrangements    
 
As mentioned supra, the NPT regime is grounded upon a basic differentiation 
between Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) to 
which the Treaty accords different rights and obligations. Primarily, the Treaty foresees a 
passive obligation for the Nuclear Weapon states i) not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices or control over such weapons or 
devices, directly or indirectly; and ii) not to assist, encourage or induce any NNWS to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other n-explosive devices or control 
over such (Art. I). The mirroring obligation on the part of  Non- Nuclear Weapons States is 
not to receive transfer, not to manufacture and not to seek or receive any assistance in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons (Art. I).   
                                                            
1038 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226. 
1039 Para.105(2)A. 
1040 Para.105(2)B. 
1041 Emphasis added; Para. 105(2)E(1). 
1042 Para. 105(2)E(2). 
1043 Para. 105(2)F. 
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Secondly, it is incumbent on both NWS and NNWS not to provide to any non nuclear 
weapon state source or special fissionable material1044 or equipment or material especially 
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material 
for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to the 
safeguards arrangements required by the same Article III (Art. III(2)). The latter provision 
vehicles the commitment of NNWS to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA for 
the purpose of verifying the fulfillment of their NPT obligations regarding prevention from 
diversion from peaceful uses (Art. II). These verification procedures are to be applied to 
source or special fissionable material that is being produced, processed or used in any 
principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility (i.e. all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the NNWS, under its 
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere else)(Art. III(1)). 
Nevertheless, the established NPT non-proliferation regime is certainly not flawless: 
for instance, on a simple reading of the provisions regarding the obligation for NWS not 
“[..] to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices” (Art I), it can be observed that the Treaty fails to foresee 
such a prohibition for the NNWS. The former lacuna potentially opens way for NNWS that 
are effectively prepared for the manufacture of nuclear weapons1045 to act as the go-
between in practices of ‘assisted’ or ‘encouraged’ acquiring of nuclear weapons. Evidently, 
this is a grey area that the NPT has omitted to address.  
Additionally, in order to further reinforce the non-proliferation role of the NWS, the 
UN Security Council Resolution 9841046 has introduced the mechanism of security assurances 
which are essentially statements or declarations issued by NWS in which they undertake 
not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS, parties to the NPT, carrying a passive obligation 
for NWS and therefore qualifying as negative security assurances1047. Furthermore, it is also 
possible to offer a positive security assurance where the NWS pledges to NNWS that it “will 
act immediately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations, in the event that such States [NNWS] are the victim of an act of, or object of a 
threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used”1048. While it is clear from the text 
of UN Security Council Resolution 984 is that all the NWS have offered negative security 
                                                            
1044 For the terms ‘source and special fissile material’, the definition provided in Art. XX of the IAEA Statute is 
followed: 
“1. The term "special fissionable material" means plutonium-239; uranium- 233; uranium enriched in the 
isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; […]       
[…] 3. The term "source material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; 
uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical 
compound, or concentrate; […]”; 
1045 Lamm, supra n.1022, p.96. 
1046 S/RES/984 (1995), UN Security Council Resolution 984.  
1047 Point 1. 
1048 Point 2. 
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assurances whereas in the case of positive security assurances the Security Council merely 
“[w]elcomes the intention expressed by certain States1049 that they will provide or support 
immediate assistance, in accordance with the [UN] Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon 
State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an 
act of, or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used”1050. A 
comparison between the corresponding passages of all the NWS statements on security 
assurances given to the Security Council and the General Assembly reveals a variance in the 
extent of the assistance that NWS are ready to offer in the event of nuclear attack of a 
NNWS1051. Four of the NWS (China, France, the United Kingdom and the Russian 
Federation) consider the positive security assurances through the medium of taking action 
within the Security Council by urging the former to take appropriate measures in the event 
of attack, while the United States are the only NWS which is itself ready to“ [...] provide or 
support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon 
State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an 
act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used”1052. 
Before proceeding with an elaboration of the international safeguards 
arrangements devised pursuant to Art. III(2) NPT, it  is useful to note that all the EU 
                                                            
1049 Emphasis added. 
1050 Point 7. 
1051 For comparison, relevant parts of different statements on security assurances have been reproduced: 
“[…] China, as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, undertakes to take action 
within the Council to ensure that the Council takes appropriate measures to provide, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, necessary assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that comes under 
attack with nuclear weapons, and imposes strict and effective sanctions on the attacking State.” (Emphasis 
added), Statement on security assurances of the People’s Republic of China S/1995/265; 
"[…] France, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, pledges that, in the event of attack with nuclear 
weapons or the threat of such attack against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, France will immediately inform the Security Council and act within the 
Council to ensure that the latter takes immediate steps to provide, in accordance with the Charter, 
necessary assistance to any State which is the victim of such an act or threat of aggression” (Emphasis 
added), Statement of France S/1995/264; 
“[…] The United States affirms its intention to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance 
with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are 
used”. (Emphasis added), Statement of the United States of America S/1995/263; 
“[…] I, therefore, recall and reaffirm the intention of the United Kingdom, as a Permanent Member of the 
United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in 
accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which 
nuclear weapons are used.” (Emphasis added; Statement of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, S/1995/262); 
“[…] In the event of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a 
non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the nuclear 
Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council will immediately bring the matter to the 
attention of the Council and will seek to ensure that they provide, in accordance with the Charter, necessary 
assistance to the State that is a victim of such an act of aggression or that is threatened by such aggression” 
(Emphasis added; Statement of the Russian Federation Russia S/1995/261); 
1052 Emphasis added; Statement of the United States of America S/1995/263. 
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Member States have signed and ratified the NPT and are thus fully bound by the Treaty’s 
provisions. In this sense, a pattern can be discerned in the treaty accession practice within 
the EU whereby international conventions/treaties with non-proliferation relevance are 
customarily signed by the Member States1053 while for the conventions/treaties dealing 
exclusively with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it is either the Euratom or the Union 
that appear as signatory parties1054. The fact that neither Euratom nor the Union have 
acceded to the NPT signifies that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons persists to be 
predominantly Member State competence which, nevertheless, does not rule out a 
complementary or shared Euratom/Union involvement in the area. 
The pervasive non-proliferation objective of the NPT cannot be separated from the 
objective of promoting and safeguarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as the former 
cannot be accomplished without the use of nuclear safeguards as the essential tool in 
countering the diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful uses. Thus, even though 
nuclear safeguards are instruments aimed at furthering the civil uses of nuclear energy, 
they are at the same time considered to be an integral part of the non-proliferation 
equation1055. Arguably, nuclear safeguards are a manifestation of the overlap between the 
two concurring objectives – the promotion of civil uses of nuclear energy and the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear safeguards are not conceived as a nuclear 
weapon deterrent and are therefore specifically concerned with the non-diversion of the 
civil uses of nuclear energy to military ends.  
In order to arrive at a precise and exhaustive definition for nuclear safeguards, 
academic literature first had to deal with semantically delimiting ‘peaceful uses’ from 
‘military uses’ of nuclear energy. The language used in international treaties indicates a 
noteworthy difference between the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency1056 
and the NPT regarding the approach the two instruments have towards ‘military uses’. 
Namely the scope of the IAEA Statute is different from that of the NPT in that it is confined 
to civil uses of nuclear energy while the NPT covers both civil and military uses (in function 
to the status of a contracting party as a NWS or a NNWS). Moreover, to the difference of 
the IAEA’s Statute, the objectives of the NPT are not anti-military per se given that the 
Treaty sanctions the maintenance and production of nuclear weapons by NWS. The purely 
peaceful character of IAEA’s objectives has been articulated in such a way that the Agency 
                                                            
1053 See, the Partial Nuclear-test-ban Treaty (UN Treaty Series, vol. 480, I-6964) and the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban treaty (not yet in force) at 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XXVI-
4&chapter=26&lang=en#Participants. 
1054 See, the Convention on Nuclear Safety (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1963, I-33545), acceded to by the 
Euratom Community in April 2000. Further, see the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management 
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste management and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material, where the Euratom Community also appears as a signatory party. 
1055 Howlett, supra n.1016, p.4. 
1056 The IAEA Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and came into force on 29 July 1957 (http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html). 
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is to “(…) ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under 
its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”1057. 
The IAEA is vested with the responsibility “(t)o establish and administer safeguards 
designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, 
facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its 
supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”1058. 
It has been suggested that the reference to military purposes employed thereby is very 
broad and, in addition to encompassing the production and use of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear explosive devices, further extends to materials and activities potentially related 
therewith1059. By comparison, the NPT precludes the involvement of NNWS in the 
acquisition of ‘any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’ (Art.II NPT), 
Art.III(1) NPT stipulating that the “purpose of the IAEA verification is preventing diversion 
of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices”. The language employed here could suggest that under the NPT regime the 
utilization of nuclear energy for certain military purposes is to be considered permitted – 
namely, for military applications other than the acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear 
explosive devices1060.  
The foregoing variance of approaches leads to a difference in the scope of 
application between the NPT and the IAEA regimes, primarily determined by the category 
of safeguards each of them applies to: material or personal safeguards1061. Material 
safeguards are those applied to specified materials and installations, presupposing a limited 
scope of control and usually used when a state receives nuclear material, equipment or 
facilities subject to IAEA safeguards either from the IAEA or from another state through the 
IAEA as intermediary1062. Safeguards are carried out on personal grounds on account of a 
state’s status vis-à-vis the IAEA, so that the state is bound, under previously assumed 
international obligations, to submit all of its peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards 
control1063. With regard to the former distinction, the scope of ‘military uses’ provided 
under the IAEA Statute would be presumed to apply to material safeguards while for the 
personal safeguards arrangements the NPT formula is to be followed1064. 
The ensuing discussion will focus on the category of personal safeguards applied by 
virtue of Art.III(4) NPT, according to which NNWS-parties to the NPT undertake to 
conclude agreements with the IAEA in order to meet the NPT safeguards requirements 
thereby allows for the safeguards to be applied on all source or special fissionable 
                                                            
1057 Emphasis added; Art.II of the IAEA Statute. For a downloadable version of the IAEA Statute, see 
http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html. 
1058 Emphasis added; Art.III A(5) of the Statute. 
1059 Lamm, supra n.1022, p.64. 
1060 Idem, p.65. 
1061 Idem, p.69. 
1062 Idem. 
1063 Idem, p.70. 
1064 Idem, p.69. 
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material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State in question, 
under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere1065. 
 
II.1 The IAEA Safeguards Agreements 
 
The safeguards agreements the IAEA has the authority to conclude with NNWS can 
be generally divided into three categories: comprehensive, item specific and voluntary offer 
safeguards agreements1066. The comprehensive type agreements1067 are concluded by 
NNWS who undertake to accept the Agency safeguards on all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within their territory, under their jurisdiction, or 
carried out under their control anywhere1068. In order to strengthen the IAEA safeguards 
system, in particular the Agency’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and 
activities in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements, as from 1991, the Agency 
fundamentally modified its safeguards system aiming to increase the information available 
regarding States’ nuclear activities, broaden the Agency inspectors’ access to relevant 
locations and improve technical verification measures1069. The further reinforcement of the 
safeguards efforts culminated with the approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of a model 
Protocol1070 accompanying the safeguards agreements which provides the Agency with 
more extensive and elaborate tools in the verification process. The added value of the 
modified system is that it introduces a safeguards system that verifies not only the 
correctness of States’ declarations of nuclear material, but also the completeness thereof1071. 
Consequently, it is only with relation to States that have both a comprehensive safeguards 
agreement and an additional protocol in force that the Agency has the complete requisite 
machinery to verify the existence of any undeclared nuclear material and activities1072. 
As was indicated supra, the NPT requires all the NNWS to have signed safeguards 
agreements while the same is not foreseen with respect to the NWS (Art. III NPT); however, 
for legitimacy and confidence-building reasons, all five NWS have concluded safeguards 
agreements with the IAEA, voluntarily offering the nuclear material and/or facilities on 
                                                            
1065 Emphasis added; Art.III(1). 
1066 http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf, p. 1. 
1067 The template for the IAEA safeguards agreements, INFCIRC/153(Corrected). 
1068 http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf, p.2. 
1069http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf, p.4.  
By concluding a safeguards agreement with the IAEA under the INFCIRC/153 format, States undertake to 
establish a State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC), the reports from which serve as a basis for 
independent verification by the IAEA (See, L. Scheinmann, Transcending Sovereignty in the management and 
control of nuclear material, IAEA Bulletin, 2001, Vol.43 Issue 4, p.34); 
1070  IAEA, Model Protocol Additional to Agreement(s) between State(s) and the IAEA for the Application of 
Safeguards (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected). 
1071 http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf, p.4. 
1072 Idem, p.2. 
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which the Agency may selectively apply the safeguards measures. These voluntary offer 
safeguards agreements (VOAs) generally follow the format of the comprehensive 
safeguards agreements, but vary in the scope of materials and facilities covered (materials 
and facilities with national security significance are excluded from the scope). Moreover, 
the VOAs envisage the possibility for withdrawal of materials and facilities from the scope 
of application of the voluntary safeguards, at the discretion of the NWS concerned1073. 
Presently, 122 out of a total of 190 State Parties to the NPT1074 have both 
comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force1075. The 
incomplete coverage with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols 
not only leaves gaps in the system, it also undermines the normative strength of the 
international safeguards regime. Only once all NPT States1076 with comprehensive 
safeguards agreements equally have an Additional Protocol in place, will the desired 
success for a massive compliance with the IAEA principles materialize1077. Hence, the 
ultimate goal for the future would be a timely completion of the IAEA safeguards 
agreements and protocols with all NPT States (including the nuclear weapon States in 
accordance with their voluntary safeguards arrangements with the IAEA)1078. Enforcing 
compliance with the NPT obligations through the medium of safeguards is vital to the 
sustainability of the overall global safeguards system. The former goes to the extent that, if 
need be, the UN Security Council would be called upon to act as the ‘last instance’ forum in 
the event that all IAEA compliance mechanisms have previously been exhausted1079.  
 
II.2 The Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA, Euratom and the Member 
States 
 
While Art.III(4) NPT provides the legal basis for the conclusion of safeguards 
agreements between the NPT countries and the IAEA, in the particular case of the Euratom 
states a certain confusion existed from the outset regarding the potential ‘duplicity’ 
between the IAEA and Euratom safeguards regimes since a fully devised nuclear safeguards 
framework had already been established under the Euratom Treaty prior to the adoption of 
the NPT. There was thus a potential danger for collision or mutual exclusion between the 
                                                            
1073 Idem, p.3. 
1074 According to the latest status of the Treaty (http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt). 
1075For the status of the Additional Protocols, see 
http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/AP_status_list.pdf; The Euratom Community signed the 
Additional Protocol in September 1998, which entered into effect in April 2004. 
1076 States like India and the Islamic Republic of Iran have not yet brought their Additional Protocols into force.  
For the status of all the signed Additional Protocols with the Agency, see, 
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/protocol.html. 
1077 L. Scheinmann, supra n.1069, p.34. 
1078 Idem. 
1079 Idem, p.34,35. 
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safeguards competences exercised under the IAEA and the Euratom systems, respectively. 
In order for this to be averted, on the occasion of the signature of the NPT, the Euratom 
states made a declaration to the effect that the former would only ratify the NPT after 
having concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA1080. It was for this reason that the 
period of ratification of the NPT for the five Euratom countries (Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg, with the exception of France) took longer than 
expected, thereby exceeding the time limit for the start of negotiations for the conclusion 
of safeguards agreements imposed by Article III(4) NPT1081.  
It was indispensable that the Euratom and the IAEA secure their future relationship 
of cooperation for the purpose of enabling a smooth co-existence between the two 
safeguards regimes, prior to the conclusion of the trilateral safeguards agreement between 
the IAEA, Euratom and the Member States. To this end, the 1975 Cooperation Agreement 
between the Euratom Community and the IAEA1082 was concluded under which the IAEA and 
the Euratom agreed to act in close cooperation and “[...] consult each other regularly on 
matters of mutual interest with a view to harmonizing their efforts as far as possible, having 
due regard to their respective characters and objectives”1083. The entry into force of the 
Cooperation Agreement facilitated the coming into effect of the Safeguards Agreement 
between the Euratom Member States, the Euratom and the IAEA implementing Article III (1) 
and (4) of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons1084, signed in September 
1973 and coming into effect in February 19771085. The primary objective of the Safeguards 
Agreement was to delimit the respective competences of the Euratom Community and the 
IAEA by laying down the modalities in which both safeguards systems are to be 
implemented. The definition for nuclear safeguards that the Agreement espouses follows 
the NPT formula discussed supra, extending to all source or special fissionable material 
which can potentially be diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices1086. 
                                                            
1080 See the Preamble of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
(78/164/Euratom OJ L 051 , 22/02/1978 P. 0001 – 0026): 
“(…) NOTING that the States, which were members of the Community when they signed the [NPT] Treaty, 
made it known on that occasion that safeguards provided for in Article III (1) of the [NPT] Treaty would have 
to be set out in a verification agreement between the Community, the States and the Agency and defined in 
such a way that the rights and obligations of the States and the Community would not be affected (…)”; 
1081 Article III(4) NPT: “Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original 
entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 
180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such 
agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.”; 
1082 Cooperation Agreement between the EURATOM and the IAEA, OJ L 329, 23/12/1975 p.0028-0029. 
1083 Emphasis added; Art.1 of the Cooperation Agreement. 
1084 See IAEA, INFCIRC/193. 
1085 http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sir_table.pdf. 
1086 Art.1 of the Safeguards Agreement: “The States undertake, pursuant to Article III (1) of the Treaty, to 
accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within their territories, under their jurisdiction or carried out under 
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Following the terms of the Agreement, Euratom has the authority to apply the safeguards 
while the IAEA assumes the role of a supervisory authority which verifies the accuracy of 
the conducted safeguards checks1087. Therefore, the Euratom is under the responsibility to 
regularly submit reports to the IAEA in accordance with the requirement that the exchange 
of information between the two organizations is frequent1088. Furthermore, the IAEA is 
entitled to conduct additional checks on its own discretion by gaining direct access to 
nuclear sites, in a way that would be least disruptive to the effectiveness of the established 
Euratom system of safeguards1089. 
 
II.3 The voluntary offer agreements with France and the United Kingdom 
 
The voluntary offer agreements (VOAs) are confidence and transparency building 
measures applied to the relationship between the nuclear-weapon states and the IAEA, 
underpinned by the benevolence of NWS to make part of their civil nuclear programme 
subject to safeguards arrangements which the former are not legally obligated to do. By 
concluding the voluntary offer agreements, which are to some extent modeled on the 
safeguards agreements between the NNWS and the IAEA, the NWS put their civil 
production of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards, however, with the caveat that this 
type of agreements (to the difference of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements 
with the NNWS) do not extend to the entire civil nuclear sector in the state. Instead, a 
selective, numeris clausus approach is employed by specifying the type and scope of nuclear 
material the safeguards are to be applied to - thus, the NWS themselves select the exact 
civil nuclear facilities and materials that will be subject to the VOA’s safeguards 
requirements.  
While all of the NNWS of the Euratom currently have comprehensive safeguards 
agreements with the IAEA in place, the NWS of the Euratom (France and the United 
Kingdom), alongside the Euratom, have concluded Voluntary Offer Agreements with the 
IAEA which entered into force in 1978 (the UK) and 1981 (France). For France the conclusion 
of the VOA created a ‘pre-emptive’ effect to its relationship with the NPT regime as it 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
their control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”(Emphasis added); 
1087 Art. 3(b) of the Agreement states that: 
“The Agency shall apply its safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, in such a manner as 
to enable it to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses 
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of the Community's system of safeguards. 
The Agency's verification shall include inter alia independent measurements and observations conducted by 
the Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in this Agreement. The Agency, in its verification, 
shall take due account of the effectiveness of the Community's system of safeguards in accordance with the 
terms of this Agreement.”; 
1088 Art.8(a) of the Agreement. 
1089 Art.3(b) of the Agreement. 
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officially became a party to the Treaty in 1996. Thus, by concluding the VOA prior to 
becoming a party to the NPT, France became impliedly bound by the NPT rules, at least as 
far as the material scope of the VOA was concerned.  
The texts of the VOAs signed with France and the UK are almost identical; there is, 
however, a noticeable difference in the way certain articles are phrased. Namely, the 
French VOA misses the reference to the NPT, and instead foresees that the IAEA is to apply 
safeguards at the request of the State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of nuclear 
energy, pursuant to Art. III(5) of the IAEA Statute1090. In this way, by endorsing the IAEA 
Statute as the legal basis for the application of safeguards, an indirect link is established 
between France and the NPT framework in this respect given that the IAEA safeguards 
system is the main facet through which the NPT regime is sustained1091. In turn, the UK’s 
VOA cites the relevant NPT articles as the basis for the application of safeguards, according 
to which the UK, by virtue of its status as NPT party, undertakes to co-operate in facilitating 
the application of the IAEA safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities1092. Furthermore, both 
Agreements make a reference to Euratom’s respective competence in the area of nuclear 
safeguards1093. 
The objective of UK’s VOA is to “encourage widespread adherence to the Treaty 
[the NPT] by demonstrating to non-nuclear-weapon States that they would not be placed 
at a commercial disadvantage by reason of the application of safeguards pursuant to the 
Treaty”1094. In order to meet this objective, the UK offers its readiness for the Agency 
safeguards to be applied on its territory “[…] subject to exclusions for national security 
reasons only”1095. Hence, the scope of application of the safeguards extends to all source or 
special fissionable material in facilities or parts thereof within the United Kingdom, subject to 
exclusions for national security reasons (Art. 1(a)) whereby the UK is to provide the Euratom 
Community and the IAEA with a list of the facilities or parts thereof which contain the types 
of nuclear material indicated supra (Art. 1(b)). For national security reasons, the UK is 
entitled to make deletions from the list by notifying the Euratom Community and the 
Agency to this effect (Art. 1(b)). The UK is also entitled to reintroduce the material 
previously removed from safeguards control by notifying the Euratom Community and the 
Agency of the termination of the national security requirement (Art. 14).  
                                                            
1090 IAEA, INFCIRC/290, December 1981, Agreement of 27 July 1978 between France, the European Atomic 
Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in France 
(http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc290.pdf, point 1 of the Preamble). 
1091 Art.III NPT. 
1092 IAEA, INFCIRC/263, October 1978, Agreement of 6 September 1976 between the United Kingdom Of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection 
with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  of Nuclear Weapons, point 1 et seq. of Preamble; The Agreement 
entered into force on 14 August 1978 
(http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc263.pdf). 
1093 See, paras. 5-8 of the French VOA and paras. 6-9 of the UK VOA. 
1094 Preamble of the VOA, Point 4. 
1095Preamble of the VOA, Point 5. 
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The VOA with France covers the source or special fissionable material which is to be 
designated by France (Art. 1(a)), whereby France provides the Community and the Agency 
with a list of facilities or parts thereof which contain the said material (Art.1(b)). Concerning 
the option for removal of certain materials or facilities from the scope of the safeguards, 
the same conditions mutatis mutandis as the ones provided for in the UK VOA apply 
(Art.14). The difference is that France, unlike the UK, is not under any obligation to state 
the reasons for which a removal of from the list is made1096. 
A verbatim reading of the cited passages of the French and the UK voluntary offer 
agreements, points to a difference in the scope of application of the safeguards. While for 
the UK the safeguards apply to all source or special fissile material subject to exclusions for 
national security reasons, according to the French VOA, safeguards apply on source and 
special fissionable material which is to be designated by France. In the latter instance, 
national security reasons (or any other reasons, for that matter) have not been foreseen as 
derogation from the safeguards obligations.  Nevertheless, the foregoing does not entail 
that France is given any advantageous treatment. In fact, being that the UK’s VOA does not 
define the scope of the ‘national security reasons’ derogation, the UK possesses a large 
margin of appreciation in construing the elusive ‘national security’ category. Such a 
generous discretion amounts to very much the same effect as the one produced via the 
application of the corresponding derogation of the French VOA. Evidently, there is no 
possibility to exert any control over a nuclear-weapon state’s discretion in selecting the 
facilities to be subjected to the IAEA safeguards and it is this very latitude of discretion 
afforded to NWS that belies the quid pro quo rationale of the IAEA safeguards 
arrangements with the NWS and serves as the ultimate guarantee fending off any potential 
encroachment upon the national security interests of NWS.  
 
III The Euratom safeguards framework 
 
The Euratom safeguards system forms part of what can be viewed as a four-tier 
nuclear safeguards system devised at i) the international level (IAEA safeguards instruments 
and mechanisms adopted pursuant to the provisions of the IAEA Statute and the NPT; ii) 
the primary EU level (safeguards mechanisms established under the Euratom Treaty as 
primary source of EU law); iii) the secondary EU level (acts adopted by the EU institutions, 
implementing the Euratom Treaty safeguards provisions); and lastly, iv) the Member State 
                                                            
1096 Additional Protocols to France and UK’s Voluntary Offer Agreements were signed on 22 September 1998 
and have been in effect since April 2004. Admittedly, the importance and the effectiveness of these Protocols 
has been largely reduced as a result of the limited mandate given to the IAEA and the Euratom Community by 
virtue of the limited scope of the original VOAs (Additional Protocol with France, INFCIRC/290/Add.1, Date: 
24 February 2005; and Additional Protocol with the UK, (INFCIRC/263/Add.1, Date: 24 February 2005); 
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level (the implementation of the Member States’ international and regional obligations in 
the field of safeguards).  
Having covered the interaction between the IAEA, NPT and Euratom safeguards 
regimes occurring at the international level in what can be described as a relationship of 
‘controlled deference’, the discussion will now focus on how the Euratom safeguards 
regime has been devised internally, at the primary and the secondary EU level.  
 
III.1 The Euratom Treaty safeguards provisions 
 
The Safeguards Chapter of the Euratom Treaty (Arts.77-85) establishes the legal 
framework for the application of nuclear safeguards in the territory of the Union at the level 
of primary law. The institution entrusted with the authority to comprehensively control and 
overview the application of the Euratom safeguards requirements is the European 
Commission, its chief responsibility being to ensure that in the Member States’ territories 
ores, source materials and special fissile materials1097 are not diverted from their intended 
uses as declared by the users (Art.77 Euratom). The Euratom Treaty only employs the term 
‘intended uses declared by the users’ without specifying whether the former strictly covers 
peaceful uses, which, in turn, reveals an important difference in the way in which the 
concept of safeguards has been construed under the IAEA and the Euratom regimes. 
Namely, Art.1 of the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA, the Euratom and the Member 
States provides that IAEA safeguards are applied on all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the states’ territories, under their 
jurisdiction or carried out under their control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of 
verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices. Manifestly, in difference to the language of the Euratom Treaty, the prohibition of 
diversion to military uses is mentioned expressis verbis in the Safeguards Agreement. The 
former lack of precision of the Euratom Treaty has been somewhat compensated by the 
Art.84(3) Euratom derogation regarding the Member States defence requirements, 
according to which “[t]he safeguards may not extend to materials intended to meet 
defence requirements which are in the course of being specially processed for this purpose 
or which, after being so processed, are, in accordance with an operational plan, placed or 
stored in a military establishment”. 
However, there have been objections expressed with respect to the former 
‘complementary’ paragraph completing the Euratom Treaty definition of nuclear 
safeguards due to its ambiguous character. For instance, AG Geelhoed’s Opinion in C-61/03 
Commission v UK suggested that Art. 84(3) Euratom may be interpreted in a way that the 
                                                            
1097 For the definition of ores, source materials and special fissile materials, see Art.197 Euratom, reproduced 
supra at n.125.   
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Euratom safeguards should not be considered as inapplicable to all the nuclear materials 
intended to meet defence requirements, but rather, only to those materials which are “in 
the course of being specially processed for [defence purposes] or which, after being so 
processed are, in accordance with an operational plan, placed or stored in a military 
establishment”1098.  
In order for the safeguards requirements to be correctly implemented, anyone 
setting up or operating an installation for the production, separation or other use of source 
materials or special fissile materials or for the processing of irradiated nuclear fuels is 
required to declare to the Commission the basic technical characteristics of the former 
installations (Art. 78(1)). Additionally, the Commission approves the techniques to be used 
for the chemical processing of irradiated materials to the extent necessary for the attainment 
of the objectives set out in Art. 77 (Art.78(2)). In function to the supervision exercised by the 
Commission, it is required that operating records are kept and produced so as to enable 
accounting for ores, source materials and special fissile materials used or produced (which 
equally applies to the transport of source and special fissile materials) (Art. 79(1)). The 
subjects coming within the scope of the foregoing obligations have to notify the national 
authorities of the respective Member State of any communications made to the 
Commission pursuant to the foregoing obligations (Art. 79(2)). 
Furthermore, the Commission is entitled to send on-site inspectors to the Member 
States, and consult the Member State concerned regarding the first assignment of an 
inspector in its territory (the consultation covers the current and all the future assignments 
of the inspector (Art. 81(1)). The Euratom inspectors, upon presenting a document 
establishing their authority, are to have access at all times to all places and data and to all 
persons who, by reason of their occupation, deal with materials, equipment or installations 
subject to the safeguards, to the extent necessary to apply the safeguards to ores, source 
materials and special fissile materials and to ensure compliance with the provisions of 
Article 77 (Art.81(1)). In the event of opposition to the carrying out of an inspection, the 
President of the EU Court of Justice or the Commission can issue a decision to the effect 
that the inspection on the territory proceeds (Art. 81(2)). The Euratom inspectors are 
recruited by the Commission and are responsible for obtaining and verifying the records 
outlined in Art. 79 (Art.82(2)) as well as reporting any sort of infringement to the 
Commission (Art.82(2)). Once an infringement on the part of a Member State has been 
found, the Commission may issue a directive calling upon the Member State to rectify the 
infringement (Art.82(3)). In the event of persistent non-compliance, the matter can be 
directly referred to the EU Court of Justice thus circumventing all the steps foreseen for the 
conventional enforcement procedure of Art. 258 and 259 TFEU (Art.82(4)). Moreover, if the 
infringement has been committed by persons or undertakings, the Commission has the 
                                                            
1098 See the AG Geelhoed Opinion in C-61/03 Commission v. UK, para.52; In addition, the 2005 Euratom 
Safeguards Regulation further clarifies the scope of application of the Euratom safeguards (see, infra in this 
section). 
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authority to impose sanctions which can vary from issuing a warning to ordering a total or 
partial withdrawal of source or special fissile materials (Art.83(1)). The Commission 
decisions imposing these sanctions are fully enforceable in the territories of the Member 
States)(Art.83(2))1099.  
 
III.2 Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 
 
Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 on the application of Euratom 
safeguards1100  complements the safeguards arrangements set out under the Euratom 
Treaty by precisely defining the nature and scope of the safeguards requirements of Arts. 
78 and 79 Euratom and providing for a more detailed and comprehensive regime for the 
application of the Euratom safeguards requirements. The Regulation is highly technical in 
nature and therefore only those provisions which contribute to the enhancement of the 
non-proliferation component of the Euratom safeguards system shall be examined. 
Firstly, Art.34(1) of the Regulation clarifies the dilemma raised supra regarding the 
correct interpretation of the Art.84(3) Euratom derogation on the Member States’ defence 
requirements by stipulating that materials, installations and parts of installations that have 
been assigned to meet defence requirements by nuclear-weapon Member States have been 
excluded from the ambit of the Regulation. In comparison to the above cited Art.84(3) 
Euratom which did not confine itself to the notion of  ‘materials or installations intended to 
meet defence requirements’ and went on to enumerate the types of nuclear material that 
the ‘defence requirements’ exemption applies to (that is “(…) materials intended to meet 
defence requirements which are in the course of being specially processed for this purpose 
or which, after being so processed, are, in accordance with an operational plan, placed or 
                                                            
1099 The following two Commission decisions can serve as an illustration of the manner in which the 
Commission disposes of its prerogative to impose the sanctions: 
Commission Decision 90/413/Euratom of 1 August 1990 relating to a procedure in application of Article 83 of the 
Euratom (OJ L 209/8) was related to the undeclared export of nuclear material from the Federal Republic of 
Germany to the United States of America by Advanced Nuclear Fuels GmbH ('ANF Lingen') which ran a 
fabrication plant which regularly received nuclear material from Advanced Nuclear Fuels of Richland (USA). 
The sanctions that the Commission imposed on the undertaking in question via the Decision was the placing 
of the former under the administration of a person or board appointed by common accord of the Commission 
and the Federal Republic of Germany for a period of four months; 
In comparison to the previous Decision which concerned a material breach of the Euratom safeguards 
obligations, the Commission Decision of 15 February 2006 pursuant to Article 83 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community (2006/626/Euratom OJ L 255/5) addressed to the British Nuclear Group 
Sellafield (BNG SL) was only limited to issues of adequacy of the accounting and the reporting procedures in 
place at Sellafield and did not find any material to be actually lost or diverted from its intended purpose. The 
Commission issued a warning to BNG SL with the understanding that, within a specified period, the 
undertaking implements adequate remedies against the failures and sources of infringement identified. 
1100  Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 on the application of Euratom safeguards of 8 February 
2005, OJ L 54/1 (replacing Regulation (Euratom) No 3227/76 of 19 October 1976 concerning the application of 
the provisions on Euratom safeguards). 
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stored in a military establishment”), conversely, Art.34(1) of the Regulation does without 
the reference to the specific kinds of nuclear material which are to be excluded from the 
safeguards’ remit and adopts a simpler, catch-all formula (“materials/installations assigned 
to meet defence requirements”)1101.  
Further on, the Regulation addresses certain grey areas concerning the use of 
nuclear energy as is the case with installations and materials that can potentially be 
assigned to meet defense requirements or, indeed, with installations which at certain times 
operate with nuclear materials for strictly civil purposes and other times operate with 
materials liable to be assigned to meet defence requirements. Thus, Art.34(2) of the 
Regulation covers installations and materials that are situated in the territory of a Member 
State which is a nuclear-weapons state and are liable to be assigned to meet defence 
requirements. The breadth of application of the former provisions of the Regulation is to be 
defined by the Commission in consultation and in agreement with the Member States 
concerned, whereby the objectives of the Euratom safeguards regime need to be taken into 
account1102. 
 It follows from the foregoing Euratom primary and secondary law safeguards 
arrangements that the Commission has been mandated with developing and implementing 
the Euratom safeguards system which covers all civil nuclear installations in the Union1103 
which is a task consisting of two parts: the first part which concerns the nuclear material 
accountancy system implemented by the nuclear operators of the EU (and their related 
accountancy declarations made to the Commission as prescribed by Commission 
Regulation (Euratom) 302/2005); and the second part which is relative to the activities of 
the Commission to verify the completeness, correctness and coherence of the former 
nuclear operator accountancy declarations1104. As was indicated supra, in the performance 
of the latter, the Commission is assisted by the Euratom on-site inspectors that are sent to 
do accountancy as well as physical and other verifications on the nuclear material present 
at the installations in order to verify the correctness and coherence of the nuclear 
operators’ declarations1105.  
In order to monitor the progress of the implementation of the safeguards 
obligations, the Commission issues regular yearly reports taking note of the progress in the 
                                                            
1101 Provisions specific to nuclear-weapon Member States: “1. This Regulation shall not apply: a) to 
installations or parts of installations which have been assigned to meet defence requirements and which are 
situated in the territory of a nuclear-weapon Member State; or (b) to nuclear materials which have been 
assigned to meet defence requirements by that nuclear-weapon Member State (…)”(Art.34(1)); 
1102 For the applicable regime to installations which are at times operated exclusively with nuclear materials 
liable to be assigned to meet defence requirements and at times operated exclusively with civil nuclear 
materials, see Art.34(3)a;  while for installations which produce, treat, separate, reprocess or use in any other 
way, simultaneously, both civil nuclear materials and nuclear materials assigned or liable to be assigned to 
meet defence requirements, see Art.34(3)b; 
1103 European Commission (Directorate-General for Energy), Report on the Implementation of Euratom 
Safeguards in 2013, Ref. Ares(2014)1534607 - 14/05/2014, April 2014, p.3. 
1104 Report on the Implementation of Euratom Safeguards, p.4. 
1105Idem. 
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implementation of the Euratom safeguards, the most recent of which covers the time 
period of the year 2013. The Report shows that a total of 1300 inspections were carried out 
by the Commisison’s Department-General for Energy in 2013, 626 of which were joint 
inspections executed together with the IAEA1106 whereby no cases of nuclear material 
diversion have been found nor any irregularities have been reported for the EU by the 
IAEA1107. 
To complete the foregoing discussion regarding the NPT/IAEA and the Euratom 
safeguards systems, when speaking of the coexistence of the legal orders created under the 
Euratom Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, one speaks of two distinct but at the 
same time intrinsically linked regulatory frameworks that complement each other. In spite 
of there being no superiority of one legal order over the other, it is arguably the Euratom 
safeguards system which can be said to derive its legitimacy from the NPT regime (even 
though the former regime pre-dates the latter as such)1108.  
There are nevertheless certain inherent conceptual differences that underlie the 
relationship between the Euratom and the NPT regimes which need to be pointed out. 
These differences are especially pronounced with regard to the application of the non-
discrimination principle and the scope of the objectives fostered under each of the two 
legal frameworks. Namely, by establishing the NNWS/NWS division the NPT endorsed a 
sort of an ‘implied’ discrimination between those states which are allowed to produce and 
maintain nuclear weapons on their territory and those that are not. By contrast, the 
principle of non-discrimination is an essential part of the European Union’s raison d’etre and 
is therefore deeply embedded in the Euratom legal and political construct. The fact that all 
of the Euratom states have become parties to the NPT effectively creates a difference in 
                                                            
1106 Idem, p.5. 
1107 Idem, p.4. 
1108 There exists a legal curiosum as to whether, formally speaking, the Euratom is to be presumed bound by 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty as such. Among the Member States, France had in the past adopted a clear 
stance on the issue, the background of which comes from a heated dispute between France and the Euratom 
Commission occurring over the application of nuclear safeguards to the French plutionum producing plant at 
Marcoule, France (See, Howlett, supra, p.108). The European Commission considered that it was entitled to 
perform safeguards controls on all nuclear materials on the Community territory up to the point where the 
former have been turned into weapons or stored in military establishments thus extending the scope of the 
control also to the previous production stages. To the contrary, France claimed that nuclear military 
establishments fell outside of the scope of Euratom safeguards (See, J. G. Polach, EURATOM: Its Background, 
Issues and Economic Implications, Oceana Publications inc., 1964, p.129.). France reiterated its resolute stance 
once again on the occasion of Spain’s accession negotiations in the course of the discussion as to whether 
Spain’s accession to the NPT should be imposed as a pre-requisite for the country’s accession to the European 
Community. France took the view that no link could be established between the NPT and the Euratom Treaty 
since it regarded non-proliferation as a purely political issue which did not concern the Euratom in any way 
(See, J. R. Goens, The opportunities and Limits of European Co-operation in the Area of Non-proliferation, in, 
H. Muller (ed.), A European Non-Proliferation Policy: Prospects and Problems, Clarendon Press, 1987, p.41).  
Nevertheless, it seems fairly difficult to support the claim that the the Euratom is not to be considered (at 
least, impliedly) bound by the NPT in view of the existent elaborate Euratom safeguards framework and the 
Safeguards Agreement between the Euratom Member States, the Euratom and the IAEA which provide the 
legal mechanisms for the furtherance of the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the EU level.  
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treatment between those Member States that are NWS and those that are NNWS, in light 
of the application of the NPT rules1109. Given that the maintenance of such a ‘warranted’ 
discrimination between the NPT countries is critical to the attainment of the global non-
proliferation objective, the difference in treatment thus occurring is more of a prima faciae 
type of incompatibility between the NPT and the Euratom regimes rather than a 
substantive one. 
In view of the objectives pursued, apart from the non-proliferation objective, the 
scopes of the NPT and the Euratom legal frameworks also coincide with regard to the 
objective for the development of the civil nuclear industry. However, unlike the NPT 
framework where the objective concerning the development of the civil nuclear industry 
has remained rather rudimentary and has not been elaborately articulated, the Euratom 
framework takes the former objective further from a purely policy level to a fully fledged 
regulatory level by establishing a comprehensive legal regime for the civil nuclear industry.  
 
 
IV  Euratom and EU’s policy on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
 
IV.1 The raison d’être of EU’s non-proliferation policy 
 
The competence of the European Union in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons can be said to have assumed two intrinsically linked dimensions, a legal and a 
policy dimension. While the former has been embodied by the Euratom safeguards regime 
and has been devised through the application of nuclear safeguards, health and safety and 
physical protection measures as well as measures linked to export controls and countering 
illicit trafficking1110, the latter has been assumed by the Union stricto sensu and exists as a 
subset of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a much wider, over-arching 
policy. The Union’s policy on non-proliferation, being intergovernmental in character1111, 
has been devised on a confederal rather than a federal level1112 and can be described as a 
joint effort among the Union, the Euratom Community and the Member States, which 
                                                            
1109 Fischer, supra n.1010, p.96. 
1110 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Communication on 
nuclear non-proliferation, Brussels, 26.3.2009, COM (2009) 143 final, Section 3. 
1111 Mölling, supra n.1025, p.61.  
1112 H. Müller, Non-proliferation Policy in Western Europe: Structural Aspects, in, H. Müller (ed.), A European 
Non-Proliferation Policy: Prospects and Problems, Clarendon Press, 1987, p.92. 
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coordinate their actions in accordance with their respective competences under the CFSP 
and the Euratom frameworks1113.  
EU’s policy regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons represents only one 
aspect of the larger EU policy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) which covers the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons1114. The 
Union’s adherence to the promotion of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is seen as 
a clear and straightforward objective and, thus, a non-issue - however, this does not 
eliminate the competition of competences which subsists in the non-proliferation arena 
among the Union institutional actors, most notably, the European Commission (serving as 
the ‘guardian’ of the Union’s interests) and the European Council (representing the ‘voice’ 
of the Member States)1115. Such competition is habitually resolved in favor of the European 
Council, the Commission being regarded as competent to decide only on issues that strictly 
concern the Euratom scope1116. The European Council, pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty 
amendments, has been placed as the highest decision-making organ under the CFSP which 
works in close co-relation with the Council of the EU and the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as the key exponent of EU’s external action1117. As 
regards the involvement of the European Parliament, even though the Treaties have 
accorded it a relatively marginal role within the scope of the CFSP1118, and, more 
particularly in the context of the non-proliferation policy, the latter has nonetheless 
attempted to be ever more closely associated to the matter of non-proliferation, mostly by 
issuing a number of resolutions pertaining to the field1119. 
In retrospect, the initial step marking the conception of a singular EU approach 
toward the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was the creation of a Working 
group on nuclear questions within the context of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) 
                                                            
1113 Commission Communication (2009), supra, Section 1. 
1114 See, Council of the European Union, EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
15708/03, 10 December 2003, p.3. 
1115 T. Sauer, How “common” is European nuclear non-proliferation policy, Joint Session of Workshops of the 
European Consortium for Political Research, Edinburgh, 2003, p.18. 
1116 Idem. 
1117 On the respective prerogatives of the European Council, the Council of the EU and the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the framing and the implementation of the CFSP, 
see, Arts. 24-31 TFEU. 
1118 The Parliament is regularly consulted by the High Representative on the main aspects and the basic 
choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy and is 
informed of how these policies evolve. The High Representative is to ensure that the views of the Parliament 
are duly taken into consideration (Art. 36 TFEU). 
1119 On this, see, Van Ham, supra, p.6; Further reading: European Parliament, Resolution on measures to 
safeguard the Non-Proliferation Treaty, OJ C262, 14 October 1985, p. 84; European Parliament, Resolution on 
the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, OJ C262, 14 October 1985, p. 85; European 
Parliament, Report on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Role for the European 
Parliament, Committee on Foreign Afairs, 2005/2139, FINAL A6-0297/2005, 12 Oct. 2005; 
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in 19811120. Ever since, the non-proliferation policy has been undergoing an active 
consolidation mainly on account of the new strategic environment created after the end of 
the Cold War which lead to the creation of a separate CFSP pillar under the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty thus facilitating a more intense and more immediate cooperation in foreign and 
security matters among the Member States (including in the area of WMD non-
proliferation)1121. The WMD non-proliferation policy of the EU gained greater momentum 
on a global scale in the past decade, mostly as a result of the aftermath of the September 
11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA and the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 20031122.  
 
EU’s involvement in the field non-proliferation of WMD has been succinctly 
described as being developed on three levels: the first level is designated for the political 
dialogue the EU conducts with third countries concerning the non-proliferation agenda, the 
most prominent feature here being the introduction of the requirement for a ‘non-
proliferation clause’ to be included in EU agreements with third countries1123. The 
requirement was introduced with the adoption of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy 
against Proliferation at the European Council Summit in Thessaloniki in 20031124. The second 
level comprises activities pertaining to the implementation of the safeguards systems and 
the commitments undertaken by the Member States in the context of the export controls 
and non-proliferation regimes1125, and the third level being concerned with strategizing and 
implementing assistance programmes for third countries1126. 
The European Security Strategy1127 and the EU Strategy against Proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction1128, adopted in 2003, are the key policy documents that 
                                                            
1120C. Portela, The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Way to Thessaloniki and 
Beyond (Research Report no.65), Peace Research Institute - Frankfurt, 2003, p.2;  
The activities of the Working group were confidential, its existence being formalized in 1986 with the Singe 
European Act (see, P. Van Ham, The European Union’s WMD Strategy and the CFSP: A Critical Anaysis, Non-
Proliferation Papers, September 2011, p.1). For a recent account on the external dimension of EU’s non-
proliferation policy, consult, P. J. Cardwell (ed.), EU External relations law and policy in the post-Lisbon era, 
Springer, 2012. 
1121 Van Ham, supra, p.2. An additional enabling factor for the reinforcement of the EU non-proliferation policy 
was France’s long-awaited accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992 as the last EU Member State to 
accede to the Treaty (see, Van Ham, supra, p.2). 
1122 Van Ham, supra, p.3. 
1123 A. Wetter, Enforcing European Union Law on Exports of Dual-use Goods, Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute Research Report No.24, Oxford University Press, 2009, p.23,24. 
1124 The ‘Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation’ were drafted in parallel to the EU’s ﬁrst-ever 
security strategy, both having been presented at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003. See, Council 
of the European Union, Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10354/1/03 Rev 1, 13 June 2003. 
1125 Wetter, supra n.1123, p.24. 
1126 Idem, p.25. 
1127 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 
2003. 
1128 Council of the European Union, EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 15708/03, 
10 December 2003; Both the European Security Strategy and the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction identify the WMD proliferation as potentially the greatest threat to EU security. 
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provide the structural framework for conducting the EU’s non-proliferation policy which 
equally serve as the basis for the future adoption of all EU documents concerning non-
proliferation. Furthermore, the EU is equipped with a satisfactory institutional capacity and 
manpower put at disposal for the realization of the non-proliferation goals. EU’s WMD 
monitoring centre, founded in 2003 and attached to the Council Secretariat, serves to 
enhance the consistent implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, ensuring a joint collaboration among the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission and the Member States1129. One of the 
chief tasks of the centre is to oversee the collection of information and intelligence 
regarding the flow of WMD-related materials and provide for a permanent channel of 
communication with the relevant international bodies1130. The Centre is the focal point 
bringing together the work of the Council (i.e. the Member States) and the Commission1131. 
Rather than monitoring WMD-related developments around the world as its name 
suggests, the centre acts more as a coordination mechanism aimed at streamlining the 
non-proliferation policies of EU institutions1132. 
Upon the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the responsibility for providing 
consistency in EU’s action in the field of WMD non-proliferation had been principally taken 
over by the European External Action Service (EEAS), headed by the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and more specifically, under the 
auspices of the Directorate for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament1133. In this respect, it is 
important to mention the work of the European Council Working Group on Global 
Disarmament and Arms Control1134, as well as the Council of the EU’s Working Party on 
Non-Proliferation (CONOP) and the Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms 
Control (CODUN) which are now permanently chaired by EEAS officials1135.  
With the adoption of Council Decision 2010/430/CFSP establishing a European 
network of independent non-proliferation think tanks in support of the implementation of the 
                                                            
1129 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD : Effective 
multiaterlaism, prevention and international cooperation, November 2008, 
(www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/EN), p.12. 
1130 Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles, supra, part B point 14; See also, Council of the 
EU, EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD: Monitoring and enhancing consistent implementation, 
16694/06. 
1131 Idem. 
1132 Van Ham, supra n.1120, p.6. In 2003 the former High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Mr. Javier Solana, even appointed a Personal Representative for Non-Proliferation of WMD (See, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/09-06-22_speech_Sopot_AG.pdf). 
1133http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-policy/non-proliferation,-disarmament-and-export-control-
/wmd?lang=en 
1134http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-policy/non-proliferation,-disarmament-and-export-control-
/ms-clara-ganslandt?lang=en 
1135 Van Ham, supra n.1120, p.6. 
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EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction1136, the WMD non-
proliferation role of the EU further evolved through the establishment of a network 
assembling foreign policy institutions and research centres from across the EU in order to 
encourage political discussion and exploration of measures to combat the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems1137. The EU Non-Proliferation 
Consortium, introduced by virtue of the former Council Decision, counts over 60 think-
tanks from all over Europe and has assumed a large part of the technical operation and 
responsibilities, working in close cooperation with the European External Action Service.  
 
IV.2 EU’s policy on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
  
In light of the objectives fostered by the NPT (non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament 
and development of civil uses of nuclear energy), the Union has attempted a cautious 
approach to not favor any one objective in particular and thus afford equal importance to all 
three objectives1138. However, the former has not always been feasible given that the 
objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament are often found inter-twined in EU’s non-
proliferation practice. The difficulty to precisely separate the Union’s non-proliferation 
objective from its disarmament objective is mainly due to two factors that characterise EU’s 
nuclear reality: on the one hand, the diversity of nuclear attitudes in the Union (ranging 
from Member States that are nuclear weapon states (France and the UK), nuclear states 
that only subscribe to peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Germany, Italy, Finland, Slovenia, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria etc.) to countries that champion the foregoing of the use of nuclear 
energy altogether (Austria, Ireland, Sweden)1139), and, on the other hand, the ongoing plans 
for the future creation of a common European nuclear deterrent (also known as a dissuasion 
concertée) to be headed by France and the UK as EU’s only two nuclear weapon states.  
Marked skepticism has been expressed with regard to the nuclear deterrence 
arrangements as they are seen as liable to compromise Member States’ non-proliferation 
commitments under the NPT. It has been argued that the existence of a common nuclear 
deterrent would produce quite the contrary effect of encouraging states outside the EU to 
acquire nuclear weapons in order to counterbalance the common nuclear deterrent shared 
                                                            
1136 Council Decision 2010/430/CFSP of 26 July establishing a European network of independent non-
proliferation think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction OJ L 202/5. 
1137 Consult the website of EEAS, for more on the operational structure and mechanisms involved in the 
promotion of the causes of non-proliferation and disarmament, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-
proliferation-and-disarmament/index_en.htm; 
1138 L. Kulesa, Global Zero: Implications for Europe, in, Jean Pascal Zanders (ed.), European Union Institute for 
Security Studies Chaillot Papers, 2010, p.96,97. 
1139 Van Ham, supra n.1120, p.5,6. 
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by France and the UK1140. Therefore, in the long run, it would prove imminent to address 
the issue of the role played by nuclear weapons in EU’s security in the sense of whether 
they constitute both a guarantee and a threat to security1141. The issue becomes 
increasingly topical in view of the new-and-improved Union defense policy which is to be 
put into place under the Lisbon Treaty amendments1142 in that the success of the concept of 
a common European nuclear defense has been conditioned upon the accomplishment of a 
fully developed and implemented European Security and Defense Policy1143.  
The legal repercussions from the operation of a European dissuasion concertée in the 
nuclear domain are, arguably, prone to jeopardize or even outright contradict the NPT-
established non-proliferation regime. Namely, a system of concerted dissuasion of the 
former kind may potentially trigger the participation of non-nuclear weapon Member 
States that have, pursuant to Arts. I and II of the NPT, committed not to develop nuclear 
weapons or be involved in transfer thereof or transfer of materials linked thereto. The 
former practice is to be regarded as contrary both to the letter1144 and spirit of the NPT 
regime1145, the main logic of the NPT being for states to eventually completely cease the 
production and use of nuclear weapons and devote solely to furthering the development of 
the civil nuclear industry1146. Furthermore, on account of the EU’s non-proliferation policy 
being based on the concept of ‘lowest common denominator’ for states with divergent 
attitudes towards the use of nuclear weapons, in reality the objective of nuclear 
disarmament has been overshadowed by and appears secondary to pursuing the objective 
                                                            
1140 C. Portela, and U. Jasper, EU Defense Integration and Nuclear Weapons: A Common Deterrent for 
Europe?, Security Dialogue, 2010, p.163. 
1141 Mölling, supra n.1025, p.64. 
1142 Idem. 
1143 B. Ribeiro, Le role de l’arme nucleaire dans la mise en oeuvre d’une PESCD, in,  P. Buffotot et N. Vilboux 
(dirs.), Vers une politique europeenne de securite et de defense: Defis et opportunites, Economica, 2003, p.168. 
1144 The three main NPT objectives have been outlined in Arts. I, II and VI: 
“(…) Article I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices 
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices. 
Article II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any 
transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons 
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices. 
(…) Article VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. (…)” (source: Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol.729, I-10485); 
1145 Ribeiro, supra n.1143, p.166; See also, Portela and Jasper, supra n.1140, p.162. 
1146 Portela and Jasper, supra, p.163. 
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of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons1147. For instance, while the text of the NPT clearly 
recognizes the link between disarmament and non-proliferation, EU’s policy documents in 
the field have not adequately addressed the issue of EU’s own disarmament so that the 
accent is put largely on the enforcement of the disarmament obligations of third countries 
rather than the EU Member States1148.  
Irrespective of the lack of an unequivocal stance on the part of the EU with regard to 
important nuclear proliferation issues which comes as a result of the divergent domestic 
nuclear attitudes1149, the Member States have nonetheless managed to accumulate a solid 
track-record of concerted actions within the NPT forum. The EU has brought a prolific 
contribution to the NPT deliberation forum through the preparation of working papers and 
issuing statements addressed at the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conferences which 
have been the result of an achieved consensus between the Member States that takes into 
careful consideration the individual states’ prerogative to issue workings papers and 
statements in their national capacity1150. EU’s ambitious diplomatic campaign for the 
indefinite extension of the NPT is one exceptional proof of EU’s vigorous involvement in the 
global non-proliferation cause1151. In the one year period preceding the 1995 NPT Review 
and Extension Conference which was to decide whether the NPT would be renewed for a 
limited period of time or extended indefinitely, the EU adopted a Joint action in support of 
the option of indefinite extension of the NPT1152. Finally, the goal was met, among other, 
due to the contribution of EU’s relentless diplomatic activity, at the 1995 Conference1153 
where it was decided for the NPT to be extended for an indefinite period of time. It has thus 
become common practice that prior to each NPT Review Conference the Council of the EU 
adopts common positions through which the Member States outline the priorities to be 
discussed among the participants to a given NPT conference1154.  
                                                            
1147 Idem, p.155. 
1148 Idem. 
1149 See, Summary of the meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Subcommittee on 
Security and Defence (SEDE), Public hearing "The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)" 
Brussels, 12 July 2006 Brussels, 22 September 2006, 13157/06 PE 294 –ANNEX: The future of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty: The approach of the EU to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Annalisa 
Giannella, Personal Representative of the High Representative - Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Brussels, 14 IX 2006, at p.8; 
1150 Portela, supra n.1120, p.7. 
1151 Idem. 
1152 As reported in, Portela, supra n.1120, p.7.; See, Presidency Conclusions, Corfu European Council, 24-25 
June 1994. The text of the Joint Action was also reprinted in: Europe no. 6277, 20 July 1994, p.6; 
1153 Portela, supra, p.7. 
1154 See, the following documents: Council Decision of 25 July 1994 (OJ L 205/0001-0002) regarding the 
preparation for the 1995 Conference of the States parties to the NPT; Council Common Position of 29 July 
1999  (OJ L 204/1-2) relating to EU’s contribution to the promotion of the early entry into force of the CTBT; 
Council Common Position 2000/297/CFSP of 13 April 2000 relating to the 2000 Review Conference of the 
Parties to the NPT (L 97/1-3); Council Common Position of 25 April 2005 relating to the 2005 Review 
Conference for the NPT (OJ L 106/32-35). 
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Subsequently, in the run up to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Member 
States again successfully aligned their positions by adopting the 1999 and the 2000 
Common Positions, where the emphasis was put on further strengthening of the 
international non-proliferation legal instruments through the promotion of their timely 
signature and/or implementation (particularly with respect to the NPT and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty)1155. The former produced a tangible impact on to the 
outcome of the Review Conference, given that at least three provisions in the 2000 NPT 
Conference Final Document are recorded as having been inspired by EU’s Common 
Positions, most notably, the reference to the principles of “irreversibility” and 
“transparency”1156. Another important point thereby raised by the Member States was 
urging the NPT states to reduce the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons which was 
considered as a precedent that an appeal for the reduction of non-strategic nuclear 
weapons1157 had appeared in an NPT Conference Final Document1158. The EU also engaged 
tremendous efforts in anticipation of and during the 2010 NPT Review Conference where 
action taken by the Union consisted of issuing demarches regarding states parties or states 
non-parties to the NPT urging their alignment with the NPT objectives1159; working on draft 
proposals to be submitted by individual Member States on behalf of the Union as potential 
basis for adoption of the final decisions at the 2010 Review Conference1160; releasing 
various statements in the framework of the debates organized at the Review 
Conference1161; etc.  
While it cannot be denied that the EU recognizes the NPT as “a unique and 
irreplaceable multilateral instrument for maintaining and reinforcing international peace, 
security and stability”1162, a comparison of the texts of EU’s common positions adopted on 
the occasion of the 2005 and the 2010 Review Conferences points to a departure in 
approach. In the latter document, the EU positions itself more boldly as a non-proliferation 
actor by being more vocal about the pressing problems surrounding the global non-
proliferation and disarmament regime. The 2010 Common Position is much more detailed 
                                                            
1155 See, Council Common Position of 29 July 1999  (OJ L 204/1-2) relating to EU’s contribution to the 
promotion of the early entry into force of the CTBT; and, Council Common Position 2000/297/CFSP of 13 April 
2000 relating to the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT (L 97/1-3); 
1156 Noted in, Portela, supra n.1120, p.7. For this purpose, also see, Final Document of the NPT Review 
Conference 2000, Art. VI, paragraph 15, sub-paragraphs 5 and 9. 
1157 Strategic nuclear weapons are to be contrasted to non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons in that the 
former relate to a strategic plan for attack and are usually targeted at military bases or highly populated 
civilian areas. They have longer or inter-continental ranges while the non-strategic weapons have shorter 
ranges (Hans M. Kristensen, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists, Special 
Report No. 3 May 2012 (http://www.fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf), p. 9. 
1158 Portela, supra n.1120, p.8. 
1159 See, Council Decision 2010/212/CFSP  of 29 March 2010 relating to the position of the European Union for 
the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, OJ L 
90/8, Art.4(a). 
1160 Art.4(b) of Council Decision. 
1161 Art.4(c). 
1162 Art.3(b)(2). 
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and concrete and less declaratory in nature1163 whereas the 2005 Common Position mostly 
contained declaratory statements drawing attention to the potential implications borne to 
international peace and security by the withdrawal from the NPT and calling for the 
adoption of measures aimed to discourage such withdrawal1164. Furthermore, while the 
2005 Common Position simply took notice of “serious nuclear proliferation events [that] 
have occurred since the end of the 2000 Review Conference”1165, the 2010 Common 
Position did some finger-pointing by specifically referring to the major proliferation 
challenges encountered in the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. The former statements do not simply figure as dead letter on paper 
as they reflect EU’s practical on-the-field efforts in advocating non-proliferation throughout 
the globe1166. 
In anticipation of the upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference, the Preparatory 
Committee for the conference has held three sessions, the most recent of which was held in 
April/May 2014. At the occasion, the EU reiterated the formerly voiced concerns regarding 
the nuclear programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, and, additionally, addressed the issue of the deployed nuclear weapons on 
the territory of Europe. Namely, the Union welcomed the proposals made by US President 
Obama in June 2013 in Berlin to reduce deployed strategic nuclear weapons by one-third 
and to seek bold reductions on US and Russian non-strategic weapons in Europe, 
considering such further bilateral voluntary reduction to be a contribution to the goal of 
complete nuclear disarmament1167. At the occasion, the priority attached to the immediate 
commencement and early conclusion of the negotiation for a Treaty banning the 
production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices had 
been emphasized, in accordance with the nuclear disarmament objective of the NPT1168. 
                                                            
1163 Art.3(b)(28). 
1164 Art.2(b)(8). 
1165 Art.2(b)(6). 
1166 For this, see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.26 Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review, Conference of 
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 6 May 2009: Working paper on 
forward-looking proposals of the European Union on all three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  of 
Nuclear Weapons to be part of an action plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference. 
1167 EU Statement By Mr. Jacek Bylica, Principal Adviser and Special Envoy for Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament European External Action Service, Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 
Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster 
1), United Nations, New York, 2 May 
2014(http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/documents/eu_statments/conference_disarmament/201
4_05_02_npt_prepcom_cluster_1_eu_statement_final.pdf), point 6. 
(Note: Up to the date of submission of the final draft of the present thesis, the EU hadn’t still adopted a 
Common Position relating to the 2015 NPT Revision Conference). 
1168Idem, at point 14; Supporting the work of the Conference on Disarmament for the expected conclusion of a 
Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons the EU has encouraged all States to 
uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices (See, Council Common Position of 13 April 2000 relating to the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties 
to the NPT (L 97/1-3); Common Position of 25 April 2005 relating to the 2005 Review Conference for the NPT 
(OJ L 106/32-35)); 
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Additionally, in keeping with the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Union 
has also been fervent in advocating for the timely entry into force Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty1169 - the universalisation of which remains to be one of the top priorities of the 
Union’s non-proliferation agenda1170. 
 
IV.3 The ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)’ clause in agreements with third 
countries 
 
 The EU has been actively involved and has exhibited a serious commitment to 
implement its agenda in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction1171 
and one of the most tangible manifestations of the Union’s commitment to further the 
non-proliferation cause, or as one author phrases it, the “only coercive policy used by the 
EU to promote non-proliferation”1172 is the endorsement of a non-proliferation 
conditionality applied to its co-operation agreements and assistance programmes 
concluded with third countries1173. To this end, since 2003 the Council of the EU has urged 
for the insertion of a ‘non-proliferation of WMD’ clause to agreements with third countries 
thus making non-proliferation an important - if not essential - component of EU’s relations 
                                                            
1169 Council Common Position of 29 July 1999  relating to the EU’s contribution to the promotion of the early 
entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty OJ L 204/1-2. 
1170 See, supra, EU Statement, Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of 
the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster 1), at point 12. 
See, also, the following statements the EU has issued at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for 
the 2015 NPT Review Conference: EU Statement By Mr. Jacek Bylica Principal Adviser and Special Envoy for 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament European External Action Service Third Session of the Preparatory 
Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (Cluster 2), United Nations, New York, 1 May 2014 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/documents/eu_statments/conference_disarmament/2014_05_
01_eu_statement_cluster_2_final.pdf);  EU Statement By Mr. Jacek Bylica Principal Adviser and Special Envoy 
for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament European External Action Service, Third Session of the Preparatory 
Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (General Debate), United Nations, New York, 29 April 2014 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/documents/eu_statments/conference_disarmament/2014-04-
29-npt-2014-prepcom-eu-general-statement_final.pdf); 
1171 The Council of the EU issues regular six-monthly reports noting the progress in the implementation of the 
2003 EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. For the more recent of these 
reports, see Council Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy Against the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Desctruction (2013/I), OJ 2013/C 228/05; Council Six-Monthly Progress 
Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Desctruction 
(2013/II) OJ 2014/C 54/01;  
1172 Van Ham, supra n.1120, p.4. 
1173 Council of the European Union, Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU 
Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10354/1/03 Rev 1, 13 June 2003, part B, point 
8. 
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with its partners throughout the world1174. The Council defines the non-proliferation clause 
as part of “an effective stick and carrot policy linked to non-proliferation commitments in 
[EU’s] relations with third countries”1175, and thus, an enterprise of ‘mainstreaming non-
proliferation policies into the EU's wider relations with third countries”1176. The standard 
non-proliferation clause is based on the mutual understanding between the EU and the 
other country “to cooperate  and  to  contribute  to  countering  the  proliferation  of 
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery through full compliance with and 
national  implementation of  their existing  obligations  under  international  
disarmament  and  non-proliferation  treaties  and  agreements  and  other  relevant 
international  obligations”1177. 
In addition to requiring compliance with existing non-proliferation obligations under 
international non-proliferation instruments, the WMD clause requires cooperation aimed at 
taking part in all other relevant international instruments the country has not yet acceded to, 
for the purpose of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery1178. Furthermore, under the terms of the WMD clause, the contracting 
party undertakes to establish an effective system of national export controls for the export 
and transit of WMD-related goods (including WMD end-use control on dual-use 
technologies1179) and to provide effective sanctions for breaches of export controls1180.  
                                                            
1174 Pursuant to the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (See, on this, Council of the EU General Secretariat Brussels, 
Note on the implementation of the WMD clause 5503/09 (2003-2008 period) of 19 January 2009, p.2); 
1175 Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles, part B, point 8.  
1176 Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles, part B, point 8.  
1177 Emphasis added; For the text of the standard WMD clause, see, Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
between the European Communities and  their Member States, of  the one part, and  the Republic of 
Montenegro, of  the other part (OJ L 108/3): 
“(…) 3.  The  Parties  consider  that  the  proliferation  of weapons  of mass  destruction  (WMD)  and  their  
means  of  delivery,  both  to state  and  non-state  actors,  represents  one  of  the  most  serious threats  to  
international  stability  and  security. The  Parties  there-fore agree  to cooperate and  to contribute  to 
countering  the pro-liferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  and  their  means  of delivery  through  full 
compliance with and national  implementa-tion of their existing obligations under international disarmament 
and non-proliferation Treaties and Agreements and other relevant international  obligations.  The  Parties  
agree  that  this  provision constitutes an essential element of this Agreement and will be part of  the  political  
dialogue  that  will  accompany  and  consolidate these elements. The Parties  furthermore agree  to  
cooperate and  to  contribute  to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means 
of delivery by:  
(a)  taking steps  to sign,  ratify, or accede  to, as appropriate, and fully  implement all other relevant  
international  instruments;(b)  establishing  an  effective  system of national  export  controls, controlling  the 
export as well as  the  transit of WMD-related goods,  including a WMD  end-use  control on dual use  
tech-nologies  and  containing  effective  sanctions  for breaches of export controls; (…) 
(c) Political dialogue on this matter may take place on a regional basis. (…)”;  
1178Observe the text of the standard WMD clause reproduced in, Note on the implementation of the WMD 
clause, supra, p.4. 
1179 When in the non-proliferation arena, another issue that cannot be neglected is EU’s export controls 
regime for dual-use items and technology. It is a matter which is hybrid in nature as it follows two 
concomitant objectives: a commercial and a non-proliferation objective whereby the former takes priority. 
The predominance of the commercial aspect of the dual-use items regime has been rubberstamped by the 
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Technically, the WMD clause can be split into two parts: under the first part, the 
parties commit themselves to fully comply with and implement their already existing 
obligations in the fields of non proliferation and disarmament whereas the second part is 
more generally phrased urging the parties to a mutual cooperation which is expected to 
result in the country’s becoming member of international instruments it has not yet 
participated to1181. The obligations covered by the first part of the WMD clause are usually 
interpreted as pertaining to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (including IAEA Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocols), the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and the relevant UN Security Council 
Resolutions, in particular Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)1182 and the Resolutions 
dealing with nuclear crises1183. The former types of obligations are what is effectively 
considered as an essential element of the agreement whereby failure to comply therewith 
may, in extreme cases, lead to the suspension of the concerned agreement1184. However, 
depending on the particularities of each case, at its own discretion, the EU may also decide 
to regard the second part of the WMD cause as an essential element to the agreement1185. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
CJEU in the Werner (C-70/94 - Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen GmbH v Federal Republic of Germany) and 
Leifer (C-83/94 - Criminal proceedings against Peter Leifer, Reinhold Otto Krauskopf and Otto Holzer) 
judgments where the Court pronounced the dual-use items export controls to be a facet of EU’s common 
commercial policy. The dominant commercial aspect has been further substantiated by the choice of former 
Art.133 TEC (presently, Art.207 TFEU) on the EU common commercial policy as legal basis for Council 
Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 L 134/1 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, 
brokering and transit of dual-use items. The ratio behind the passing of the Regulation is to establish a 
common system of export controls that is in accordance with international non-proliferation commitments 
and responsibilities of the Member States and the EU (point 3 of Preamble). The Regulation sets up a Union-
wide regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items, aiming to eliminate 
national differences in the treatment of exports of dual use items, thus unifying and strengthening Member 
States’ export control policies and practices concerning dual-use items. Article 2 of the Regulation defines 
"dual-use items" as “items, including software and technology, which can be used for both civil and military 
purposes, and shall include all goods which can be used for both non-explosive uses and assisting in any way 
in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. Therefore, nuclear materials, 
facilities and equipment are caught by the provisions of the Regulation as dual-use items (Listed in Annex 1, 
under Category o). 
For an overview of the dual-use export control system of the European Union, see, European Commission 
Green Paper, The dual-use export control system of the European Union: ensuring security and 
competitiveness in a changing world, COM (2011) 393 final.); For a look at the CJEU’s reasoning in the Leifer 
and Werner, see, I. Govaere, Case commentary, cases C-70/94 and C-83/94 (Leifer and Werner) of the 
European Court of Justice concerning dual use goods, Common Market Law Review Vol. 34. 1997 pp.1019-
1037; 
1180 Note on the implementation of the WMD clause, supra, p.4. 
1181 Note on the implementation of the WMD clause, supra, p.4. 
1182 The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 describes the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery 
as a threat to international peace and security and is most commonly cited as one of the legal bases for the 
decisions adopted within the official NPT forums as well as EU’s common positions regarding non-
proliferation (for example, see, point 4 of the preamble of 2010 Decision on the NPT; point 3 of the preamble 
of 2005 Decision on the NPT, etc). 
1183 Note on the implementation of the WMD clause, supra, p.5. 
1184 Note on the implementation of the WMD clause, supra, p.5. 
1185 Note on the implementation of the WMD clause, supra, p.4. 
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Manifestly, the aim of the WMD clause is to factor the WMD non-proliferation 
concerns into EU’s external diplomatic and economic activities and programmes1186 in a 
way that EU’s declared political principles can be translated into concrete EU actions1187. 
The conditionality approach is similar to the kind of conditionality the EU applies in 
promoting human rights and democracy in third countries1188 - the notorious ‘human rights 
clause’ which represents an essential element to EU’s trade and cooperation agreements 
with third countries. According to the Council’s WMD strategy progress reports, the EU has 
concluded negotiations with (a rough estimate of around) 100 countries for agreements 
containing a clause which is adequate to the spirit and the content of the standard WMD 
standard clause1189. However, with regard to the entry into force of EU agreements 
incorporating a WMD clause, the situation has been rather complicated for mixed 
agreements as the former additionally require the ratification by all the EU Member States 
appearing as signatory parties1190.  
Although the effectiveness of the WMD clause as EU’s non-proliferation tool has 
had a solid track-record1191, it is nonetheless difficult to measure the extent to which the 
increasingly wider coverage of the international non-proliferation instruments is to be 
                                                            
1186 EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra, p.13. 
1187 Note on the implementation of the WMD clause, supra, p.4. 
1188 Van Ham, supra n.1120, p.7. 
1189 Council, Six-monthly progress report on the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2009/I) 11490/09, 26 june 2009, p.36; See also, General Secretariat of the 
Council of the EU, The EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD: Effective multiateralism, prevention 
and international cooperation, November 2008, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/EN, p.11.  
The site of the EU External Action Service which contains all the EU official documents and publications on 
non-proliferation does not provide a more recent official estimate of the number of EU agreements covered 
by a WMD non-proliferation clause.  
1190 L.Grip, The EU Non-proliferation Clause: A Preliminary Assessment, Stockholm International Peace 
Research Instiute Background Paper, November 2009 (http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP0911.pdf), p.6; 
As reported in the former paper, an interview with a European Commission official has confirmed that it is the 
general impression that the WMD clause has met resistance from third countries in most negotiations. 
1191 The Note on the implementation of the WMD clause recorded the accomplishments in the implementation 
of the WMD clause for the time period between 2003 and 2008, reporting on the countries that have been 
assisted by the EU in signing and ratifying the relevant international non-proliferation instruments after the 
adoption of the WMD strategy in December 2003. Since the former date, 34 countries have joined the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTBT) although EU’s actions in this respect did not target any 
country in particular, whereas since the same referring time period, 16 new countries have signed a 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and 29 countries signed the Additional Protocol to the 
IAEA Agreement, while 15 of them have benefitted from EU’s assistance in concluding the final act of 
signature (Note on the implementation of the WMD clause, supra, p.9). The EU has been involved in providing 
legislative assistance for the implementation of State's obligations under IAEA safeguards agreements and 
additional protocols, with regard to the following countries: Angola, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Botswana, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Gabon, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Turkey, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan; Furthermore, the EU has been active in strengthening States' capabilities for 
detection of and response to illicit trafficking: Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ghana, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Serbia & Montenegro, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and 
Zambia (Note on the implementation of the WMD clause, supra, p.9). 
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attributed to EU’s direct or indirect involvement. In fact, the wider impact of the WMD 
clause has been regarded as very limited and highly political1192, or even somewhat 
questionable1193. For instance, while EU’s important trade partners such as China, India, and 
certain Central American states have been reluctant to accede to agreements containing a 
WMD clause, countries where the conclusion  of such agreements has been successful and 
unproblematic are predominantly countries with fairly marginal stake in the field of non-
proliferation1194 (e.g., the revised Cotonou Agreement with most of the African, Carribean 
and Pacific Group of States, the Association Agreement with Albania, The Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement with Montenegro, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
with Tajikistan, etc.).  
 
 
IV.4 The nuclear sharing arrangements under NATO 
 
The NATO nuclear sharing arrangements on the territory of the EU have not been 
devised under either the Euratom or the Union framework – these arrangements have been 
entered into independently by certain (non-nuclear-weapon) Member States of the EU and 
the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The existence of the NATO nuclear 
sharing arrangements has been a controversial issue that has raised many eyebrows both in 
political and legal terms as the former have been considered liable to prejudice the 
relationship between the EU and the NPT framework. 
The practice of certain Member States storing NATO nuclear weapons on their 
territory dates back to the period of the Cold War (Belgium- 1962, Italy-1960, Germany-
1959, Netherlands-1959)1195. The nuclear sharing arrangements are part of NATO’s security 
concept of ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ in Europe1196, the original reason for their putting 
into place being to secure the peace and stability on the European continent. In this sense, 
the chief objective of NATO’s nuclear forces in Europe (headed by the U.S.) is purely 
political and centers on the maintenance of peace and prevention of war1197. Views on the 
nuclear sharing concept vary from those perceiving it as a valuable nuclear deterrence and 
                                                            
1192 See, Van Ham, supra n.1120, p.7. 
1193 Mölling, supra n.1025, p.59. 
1194 Van Ham, supra n.1120, p.7. 
1195 L. Spagnuolo, NATO nuclear burden sharing and NPT obligations, BASIC Getting to Zero Papers Number 13, 
April 2009 (accessible at http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/gtz13.pdf), p.3. 
1196 For more on this concept, see,  M. Chalmers, NATO’s Nuclear Weapons: An Introduction to the Debate, in,  
M. Chalmers and S. Lunn (eds.), NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma, March 2010, Royal United Services 
Institute (downloadable at http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf), p. 1 et seq. 
1197 http://www.nato.int/issues/nuclear/sec-environment.html. 
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non-proliferation instrument1198 to those that regard the deployed NATO nuclear weapons 
as “ ‘political’ weapons, [where] appearances matter as much, if not more, than what 
might, or might not, happen in the event of war”1199. 
Although the exact numbers for the NATO-stored weapons on the European 
continent have very often been kept in strict confidentiality, estimates show that weapons 
available to NATO’s sub-strategic forces in Europe today amount to approximately 180 
nuclear weapons1200 which is a notable reduction by from the the peak reached at the 
height of the Cold War1201 and the 2500 nuclear warheads that were reportedly in place in 
19911202. Presently, a secure and well organized weapon-storage system has been devised 
consisting of the remaining gravity bombs delivered by Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) that 
have been stored safely in storage sites under highly secure conditions1203. NATO has not 
neglected to assure that its present nuclear forces in Europe are not aimed at targeting any 
particular country indicating that their future putting to use is a highly unlikely 
possibility1204.  
The ‘nuclear weapons sharing’ is put into place through the conclusion of bilateral 
agreements between the host states and the US (or NATO)1205. These agreements are part 
of a meticulously elaborated legal framework1206 comprising of i) agreements governing 
the use of the territorial state military bases (entered into by the US (or NATO) and the host 
state) which are general in nature and scope and often referred to as ‘umbrella 
agreements’; on to ii) agreements for cooperation on the use of atomic energy for mutual 
defense purposes (between the US and a host state) which are unclassified agreements 
                                                            
1198 M. Ruhle, NATO and Extended Deterrence in a Multinuclear World,, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28 No. 1, 
January 2009, p.10. 
1199 Chalmers, supra n.1196, p.2. 
1200 Originally reported by the US mission to NATO (U.S. Mission to NATO: PDUSDP MILLER CONSULTS 
WITH ALLIES ON NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW, Cable 09USNATO0378, Brussels, 4.9.2009), reproduced in, 
O. Nassauer, Die Nuklearwaffen der USA in Europa - Doch kein Ende in Sicht?, Wissenschaft und Frieden, 
August 2012, No.3/12, p.1 ( downloadable from the website of the Berlin Information center for Transatlantic 
Security http://www.bits.de/frames/publib.htm); As a comparison, 240 NATO nuclear weapons were reported 
to be in existence in Europe in 2010 (reported in, Le Soir, 22 April 2010, “Arme nucléaire en Europe : pas de 
retrait sans accord de l’Otan”,  http://archives.lesoir.be/arme-nucleaire-en-europe-pas-de-retrait-sans-
accord_t-20100422-
00VYHQ.html?query=armes+atomiques&queryand=armes+atomiques,+OTAN&queryor=armes+atomiques&
firstHit=0&by=10&when=-1&sort=datedesc&pos=1&all=65&nav=1);  
1201See,http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20091022_NATO_Position_on_nuclear_nonpr
oliferation-eng.pdf. 
1202 Chalmers, supra n.1196, p.1; There are also reports of 1400 nuclear bombs in existence at the end of the 
cold war (see, Nassauer, supra n.1200, p.1); 
1203 http://www.nato.int/issues/nuclear/sec-environment.html. 
1204 http://www.nato.int/issues/nuclear/sec-environment.html. 
1205 J. Burroughs, Two Legal Issues Confronting NATO And The Non-Proliferation Regime: US Presidential 
Decision Directive 60 Versus Pledges of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Made to Non-Nuclear Weapon States and 
NATO Nuclear Sharing versus the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, 
1999, p.9. 
1206 Spagnuolo, supra n.1195, p.2. 
243 
 
determining the rules by which US nuclear weapons are deployed in NATO countries; and 
lastly, ii) technical agreements implementing the former two. 
The nuclear sharing arrangements are carried out in a way that in peacetime the 
stored NATO nuclear weapons are under full control and possession of the US1207 whereas 
in time of war the US passes the control of the nuclear weapons over to the host states’ 
pilots for use with aircrafts belonging to these states. Thus, once the aircraft has started its 
mission, control over the respective weapon(s) is presumed to have been transferred to the 
state hosting the weapons1208. In peace time, the weapons are controlled by US Munitions 
Support Squadrons (MUNSS) and can only be released for use through an allied Dual-
Capable Aircraft (DCA) upon NATO command, securing the authorization of both of the 
governments involved1209. The air forces of Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands 
continue to organise and train for such missions and their aircraft are prepared for the use 
of nuclear munitions1210. 
 
Legality and legitimacy issues linked to the practice of nuclear weapons sharing 
 
Bearing in mind the non-proliferations obligations incumbent on nuclear-weapon 
states and non-nuclear-weapon states, the NATO nuclear weapons sharing arrangements 
elaborated above seem to be patently in breach of Art. I and II of the NPT as the key 
premise of the overall NPT regime which is the obligation for NWS not to transfer nuclear 
weapons or control thereof and the corresponding obligation for NNWS not to receive such 
transfers. The act of deployment of US nuclear weapons on foreign territory can be 
regarded as a kind of ‘transfer’ of nuclear weapons or transfer of ‘control’ thereof to non-
nuclear weapons states which is what the US is basically performing when assisting non-
nuclear weapon states in possibly acquiring such control1211.  
Not surprisingly, the issue was raised in the run-up to the adoption of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty when the US asserted its steadfast conviction that the NPT “[…] does 
not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory as 
these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until 
a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be 
                                                            
1207http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20091022_NATO_Position_on_nuclear_nonprolifer
ation-eng.pdf. 
1208 O. Nassauer, Nuclear Sharing in NATO: Is it Legal?, Newsletter of the Institute for Energy and 
Environmental Research: Science for Democratic Action Vol. 9 No.3, May 2001 (accessible at 
http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/vol_9/9-3/nato.html); 
1209 M. Chalmers, NATO Dual-Capable Aircraft: A Stocktake, in, M. Chalmers and S. Lunn (eds.), NATO’s 
Tactical Nuclear Dilemma, 2010, Royal United Services Institute, accessible at 
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf, p.21. 
1210 For a table of the current capabilities in each of the four states, see Chalmers, supra, p.22. 
1211 Burroughs, supra n.1205, p.11. 
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controlling”1212. The main reason why the US presumes the NPT to be inapplicable in times 
of outbreak of a general war is because from that point further there would be no possibility 
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons thus making the purpose of the Treaty 
obsolete1213. Another argument the US has used to support its controversial position is a 
temporal one – which is the fact that the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements had been put 
in place prior to the signature of the NPT in consequence to which they do not “[…] 
represent proliferation subsequent to the establishment of the NPT regime”1214.  
Provided that the arguments offered by the US in this regard lean on a purely 
‘legalist’ understanding of the implementation of the NPT non-proliferation commitments, 
it has been suggested that the former can quite plausibly be discounted in light of the 
standpoint of the NPT contracting parties taken in the Final Document of the 1995 Review 
Conference1215 according to which “[t]he Conference agrees that the strict observance of 
the terms of Articles I and II [NPT] remains central to achieving the shared objectives of 
preventing under any circumstances further proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security (…)”. It is evident that the 
participating parties to the Conference have esteemed the NPT’s provisions to be binding 
under any circumstances - that is, including in wartime1216. Moreover, the former claim 
stands valid bearing in mind the consideration that the NPT is a treaty that deals with 
nuclear weapons so that the obligations stemming therefrom should a fortiori be regarded 
as all the more prominent during wartime1217. Ultimately, upon weighing in on all the pros 
and cons regarding the existence of the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, it is fair to 
point out that a practice such as nuclear sharing, if not against the letter of the NPT per se, 
is nevertheless in open contradiction with the spirit and the objectives of this Treaty as it 
                                                            
1212 Emphasis added; Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Asked by U.S. Allies Together With 
Answers Given by the United States” in, NPT Hearings, US Senate 90-2, p.262. 
1213 The key reason why the US presumes the NPT to be inapplicable in war time is given in the following 
statement extracted from a secret US memorandum: 
“(…)The purpose of such a treaty [NPT], as the preamble could be expected to express it, would be to prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapons and, by this measure among others, to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war 
anywhere in the world. Thus the treaty has its application in time and in a situation when no conflict has 
broken out and when it continues to be possible to prevent such a conflict. Once general hostilities 
involving nuclear weapons have occurred, however, the point of prevention has been long passed, and 
the purpose of the treaty can no longer be served. In such circumstances the treaty would not apply, and a 
nuclear power would be free to transfer nuclear weapons to an ally for use in the conflict (…)” (as reproduced 
in M. Butcher, O. Nassauer, T. Padberg and Dan Plesch, Questions of Command and Control: NATO, Nuclear 
Sharing and the NPT, British American Security Information Council Research Report, PENN Research Report 
vol.1 2000, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2000nuclearsharing3.htm, Section 2.5.) 
1214 Burroughs, supra n.1205, p.12. 
1215 Part II, NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/1, p. 307.  
1216 On the applicability of the NPT regime in war time, see, Burroughs, supra, p.11,12; and, Spagnuolo, supra, 
p.3, 4. 
1217 See, Burroughs, supra n.1205, p.11.  
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effectively turns the NNWS into “‘surrogates’ on behalf of the nuclear powers”1218, serving 
as a covert extension of the NWS’ military nuclear power.  
The issue of the compatibility between the NATO nuclear sharing and the NPT is 
not merely an issue of legality, but also an issue of legitimacy since enhancing the 
legitimacy of these arrangements reinforces their legality and ultimately - their 
justifiability1219. Despite the apprehensions expressed with regard to the legitimacy of the 
practice of nuclear weapons sharing, NATO remains fully ascribed to maintaining all of the 
nuclear capacities that form part of its deterrence strategy’1220. Furthermore, a change in 
NATO’s nuclear policy cannot be done unilaterally and requires a common accord of all the 
NATO allies1221, and, judging by the rhetoric used in the new NATO Strategic Concept 
adopted in November 2010, any further reduction of the number of deployed NATO 
nuclear weapons is to be directly conditioned upon Russia’s cooperativeness in relocating 
its own nuclear weapons in Europe away from the territory of NATO member states1222. 
The former equally stands valid in light of the present day circumstances1223. 
                                                            
1218 H. M. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War 
Planning, Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005 (accessible at 
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf), p.71. 
1219 Reports show that public opinion in certain European countries has been increasingly favorable of a 
reduction that would lead to a complete elimination of NATO nuclear weapons from the territories of the 
Member States (See S. Lunn, A Crucial Decision: NATO’s Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, in, M. 
Chalmers and S. Lunn (eds.), NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma, 2010, Royal United Services Institute, p. 12). 
The EU Member States’ national governments have articulated different responses to the issue, with views 
ranging from German Chancellor Merkel fully supporting the NATO nuclear sharing, having stated on one 
occasion that hosting American nuclear weapons secures Berlin’s influence in NATO as a defense alliance 
(SpiegelOnLine, 4 October 2009, “Foreign Minister Wants US Nukes out of Germany” 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-618550,00.html.), to the view taken by the former 
Belgian Senator Phillipe-Mahoux who proposed a bill in October 2009 before the Belgian Senate to 
constitutionally ban nuclear weapons on Belgian territory (http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/belgian-senate-to-
consider-nuclear-weapon-ban/); 
1220See, O. Meier,  “NATO Sticks With Nuclear Policy”, Arms Control Today, June 2012, 
(https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_06/NATO_Sticks_With_Nuclear_Policy);  
1221 Le Soir, 22 April 2010, “Arme nucléaire en Europe : pas de retrait sans accord de l’Otan”, at : 
http://archives.lesoir.be/arme-nucleaire-en-europe-pas-de-retrait-sans-accord_t-20100422-
00VYHQ.html?query=armes+atomiques&queryand=armes+atomiques,+OTAN&queryor=armes+atomiques&
firstHit=0&by=10&when=-1&sort=datedesc&pos=1&all=65&nav=1; 
1222 NATO, Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon) (at: 
http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf), point 26: “(..) In any future reductions, our 
aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and 
relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account 
the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons”; 
1223 See, New York Post, 10 September 2014, Russia developing new nuclear weapons to counter US, NATO 
(http://nypost.com/2014/09/10/russia-developing-new-nuclear-weapons-to-counter-us-nato/); 
NATO nuclear weapons do not merely represent a military force, but, also, and possibly more importantly, 
they are to be perceived as political weapons. The deployment of US nuclear weapons in foreign territories 
has served as a visible symbol of the U.S. commitment to defend NATO countries with all of the military 
power it possesses which carries the concern that withdrawing the weapons would symbolize lessening of the 
U.S. commitment to defend the former (see, B. Scowcroft, S. J. Hadley and F. Miller, “NATO-based nuclear 
weapons are an advantage in a dangerous world”, The Washigton Post, 17 August 2014 
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The implications stemming from the view that nuclear (or any other kind) weapons 
can serve as a deterrent from further weapons proliferation cuts both ways, especially since 
the mere fact of maintaining a nuclear arsenal (however small or insignificant) on one’s 
territory sends the message of potential readiness to go to war. In this way, the practice of 
nuclear sharing inadvertently contributes to the possibility of a nuclear war outbreak as 
whilst providing deterrence, it also potentially serves as a provocation to other nuclear 
weapon states1224. This is an issue the EU institutions have not been very vocal about, but 
which is of direct relevance to EU’s non-proliferation policy and one liable to affect (if not 
tarnish) EU’s non-proliferation ‘image’. In this respect, it is important to re-evaluate the 
message the Union sends to the world by condoning the existence of a deterrence 
mechanism on its territory which is liable to promote nuclear weapons proliferation. 
Therefore, the EU is running the risk of possibly being labeled as violator of the letter and 
spirit of the NPT1225 which, in turn, would need to be reconciled with the pacifist and value-
oriented approach assumed in the conduct of its external policy.   
 
IV.5 Concluding observations 
 
Decidedly, the EU places immense importance on portraying itself as a serious 
global and regional non-proliferation actor. However, it is a different matter whether this 
self-projected image matches the political reality. Advocating the non-proliferation of 
WMD - nuclear weapons in particular - is not a cause liable to be easily or ever fully 
achieved, mainly since it involves the joining together of extensive resources (human and 
other). Nevertheless, in spite of the elaborate framework of EU organs and bodies working 
on non-proliferation, it appears that in reality the EU persists to experience a large 
capabilities–expectations gap in the field1226.  
For the time being, the greatest obstacle to a coherent and effective Union WMD 
non-proliferation policy is the variance of nuclear attitudes among the Member States, 
encompassing both of Member States which are nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon 
states as well as Member States which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and those that are non-NATO states1227. Hence, despite EU’s sincere 
efforts, its non-proliferation policy remains largely dependent on the willpower and the 
extent of the involvement of national experts and representatives from Member States1228. 
Having assumed a somewhat supporting rather than leading role in the global non-
                                                                                                                                                                                             
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nato-based-nuclear-weapons-are-an-advantage-in-a-dangerous-
world/2014/08/17/059d0ddc-23ba-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html)). 
1224 Burroughs, supra n.1205, p.13. 
1225 Nassauer, supra n.1208, p.4.  
1226 Van Ham, supra n. 1120, p.5. 
1227 Idem, p.5,6. 
1228 Idem, p.6. 
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proliferation campaign, EU’s status as independent actor - especially with respect to 
nuclear disarmament - has become highly questionable1229. It seems that the Union is more 
at ease with the ‘road more traveled by’, predominantly relying on multilateral diplomacy 
skills and the use of ‘soft power’ mechanisms1230 as the modus operandi it is commonly best 
known for. Thus, its contribution to non-proliferation on a global scale boils down to 
performing the role of an enabling structure i.e. an intermediary rather than a primary 
actor1231, merely supporting policy decisions and providing the necessary channels of 
communication among various interest groups1232. Regrettably, a realistic projection into 
the future indicates that a double role for the EU as both an active non-proliferation 
advocate and a nuclear defense force would be an untenable concept, the EU, arguably, 
remaining to act as a soft power rather than a bastion of nuclear defense. 
 
 
V The Euratom and military uses of nuclear energy – a thundering silence? 
 
Being an issue that exists at the dividing line between civil and military applications 
of nuclear energy, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons implicates the national defence 
interests and thus, national sovereignty concerns. In order to round off the discussion 
regarding the Euratom’s share in the non-proliferation equation, it is pertinent to proceed 
by examining the ambiguous and highly controversial relationship between Euratom and 
the military uses of nuclear energy. The Euratom Treaty is silent on the matter – it neither 
provides for a complete exemption of military uses from its scope nor does it make an 
express reference with regard to the Euratom Community’s extending its prerogatives to 
the former field. The foregoing begs the question whether such ‘omission’ comes as a 
consequence to the fact that at the time of the adoption of the Euratom Treaty the issue 
was considered to be clear and self-evident beyond reasonable doubt, or, indeed, the issue 
was considered so controversial that addressing it needed to be avoided.  
In order to appraise, to the extent possible, the potential for Euratom Community’s 
claim over the area of military uses of nuclear energy, the discussion starts out by providing 
a historical perspective on the original intentions of Europe’s founding fathers with respect 
to the matter through the analysis of several important documents concerning the 
European integration which have pre-dated the Euratom Treaty, proceeding with a look at 
the relevant chapters of the Euratom Treaty which directly or indirectly touch upon the 
                                                            
1229 Kulesa, supra n.1138, p.96,97. 
1230 Idem, p.98. 
1231 Mölling, supra n.1025, p.59. 
1232 Idem, p.60. 
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scope of Member States’ military activities in the nuclear sphere1233, and concluding with 
the relevant pronouncements of the EU Court of Justice regarding the possibility for 
applying the Euratom Treaty provisions to the nuclear defense industry. 
 
V.1. The concepts and strategies for nuclear energy in Europe before the 
adoption of the Euratom Treaty 
 
By omitting to provide a de integro exemption for military applications of nuclear 
energy, the Euratom Treaty opens a generous leeway to the Member States and the EU 
institutions in the interpretation of the Treaty provisions. Another curiosum which arises in 
this respect is whether the ‘silence’ of the Euratom Treaty is accidental or, indeed 
deliberate. In the absence of a straightforward answer, it is appropriate to employ a 
historical and teleological approach to the issue and look at the original intentions that 
guided the treaty makers in deciding to condone such ambiguity. The historical 
developments that lead to the establishment of the Euratom Community showcase the 
diverse national perceptions on the issue whereby an insight into the historical projects of 
European integration with relevance to the nuclear field will help to acquire an accurate 
perspective on the history of European non-proliferation and, additionally, acquiring a 
better grasp of the current non-proliferation reality in the EU. A both textual and contextual 
analysis of these historical documents (draft treaties and policy documents) may help shed 
some light on the initial reasons that lead the drafters of the Euratom Treaty to evade 
addressing the issue of the relationship between the Euratom and military uses of nuclear 
energy in a more straightforward manner - the European Defence Community Treaty, the 
Western European Union Treaty, the Spaak Report and the Draft Minutes of the Venice 
Conference shall now be examined in turn. 
 
V.1.1 The European Defence Community (EDC) 
 
The project for the establishment of the European Defence Community (EDC), 
which dates back to the 1950s, is one of the most ambitious projects in the history of the 
European political integration and one that was arguably the most ‘supranational’ in tenor. 
The EDC Treaty, signed in Paris on 27 May 1952 by ‘the Six’ (France, W. Germany, Italy, 
Benelux)1234, foresaw the establishment of a common supranational institutional 
                                                            
1233 Since the current chapter deals exclusively with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, all the references in 
the Treaty dealing with national defense issues bearing no relevance to the subject of non-proliferation shall 
not be examined. 
1234 Traité instituant la Communauté européenne de défense, Mémorial du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 
05.05.1954, No 24, pp. 644-675. 
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framework (Council of ministers, a Commissariat, a Common Assembly, a Court of Justice – 
Art.8), the constitution of a democratically elected Assembly (Art. 38), common European 
defence forces and a unified coordination of Member States’ defence strategies (Arts. 9-18; 
Arts. 68-79) as well as a centralized control on the production of war material by the 
Member States exercised by the Commissariat (Art. 107)1235.  
The scope of the EDC Treaty covered the following categories of war material: 
conventional weapons, biological, chemical weapons and atomic weapons (Annex I to Art. 
107) whereby the production, import and export of these weapons was to be prohibited in 
the Community - with the exception of the EDC Commissariat granting a special license 
stating otherwise (Art. 107(1)). However, the Commissariat was not empowered to grant 
licenses regarding items (the weapons outlined in Annex I) placed in ‘strategically exposed 
areas’, except upon unanimous decision by the Council to this effect (Art. 107(4)a). The 
Treaty did not offer a clarification on what the term ‘strategically exposed areas’ (régions 
stratégiquement exposées) covers1236. As regards civil uses, the extent to which the EDC 
Treaty intended to regulate the former field is not clear - the single reference to civil uses 
was given in Art. 107(4)f which entrusted the Commissariat with the responsibility to grant 
general licenses concerning certain products outlined in Annex I when these are destined 
for civil purposes1237.  
Unfortunately, the ambitiously articulated objectives of the EDC Treaty fell short of 
materializing when in August 1954 France failed to ratify it (it was the last of the ‘Six’ to 
ratify). The draft Treaty did not win the French Assembly’s confidence vote, to the extent 
that the Assembly even refused to consider the ratification of the Treaty as a point of order, 
having reached a 319 to 264 vote to proceed to other business1238. The period immediately 
preceding the Assembly vote was characterized by much upheaval in the French political 
climate where the ratification of the EDC Treaty had been fervently debated among French 
parliamentarians whose objections to the draft Treaty mainly centered on the Treaty’s 
pervasive supranational character and the modalities for the French involvement in the 
integrated forces that the former envisaged1239.  
 
                                                            
1235 A simple reading of the text of the EDC Treaty points to a great resemblance between the prerogatives of 
the EDC institutions and their subsequent EC/EU counterparts.  
1236 In light of the post war climate of mutual distrust among the former adversaries at the time (Germany as 
opposed to the other countries of the ‘Six’), the term should be given the conventional definition as 
encompassing zones or territories that make for favourable points for the conduct of military activities.   
1237 Contra to some authors (see, G. Mallard, Can the Euratom Treaty Inspire the Middle East: The Political 
Promises of Regional Nuclear Communities, Non Proliferation Review, November 2008, Vol.15 Issue 3, p.462), 
it cannot be held that the EDC Treaty had the objective of establishing an all-encompassing control over both 
the civil and military nuclear industry in the Member States, since according to the letter of the Treaty, the 
former did not have such a far-reaching objective.  
1238 Camps, supra n.1011, p.16. 
1239 Idem. 
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V.1.2. The Western European Union (WEU) 
 
In the wake of the unsuccesful ratification of the EDC Treaty, Europe witnessed the 
creation of the Western European Union (WEU) (now extinguished)1240 which came much 
closer to a traditional intergovernmental form of organization than a supranational entity 
of the type the European Defence Community was conceived to be1241.  On 17 March 1948 
the UK, France and Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels (Treaty of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense), amended by the Paris Agreements of 
23 October 1954 following the failure of the EDC 1242, which made way for the 
establishment of the Brussels Treaty Organization i.e. the Western European Union1243.  
The WEU compensated for the defense identity the European Community was 
lacking while maintaining a full alignment with NATO’s activities and operations thus 
avoiding any unnecessary duplication in their respective tasks. In defense terms, the 
novelty introduced by the amended WEU Treaty was the creation of a collective defense 
system between the contracting parties which was to be put into operation in the event a 
contracting party was the object of an armed attack, alerting the other parties to offer to 
the attacked party all the military and other aid and assistance in their power (Art.V WEU 
Treaty)1244.  
The main body entrusted with implementing the Brussels Treaty was the Council of 
the WEU which shared an important part of its duties with the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments (Art.VIII). The exercise of common control over the Contracting Parties’ 
armaments was devised through the provisions of the Protocol No.III on the ‘Control of 
armaments’ and the Protocol No.IV on the ‘WEU Agency for the control on armaments’. In 
particular, Article III of the Protocol on the Control of armaments introduced control on the 
level of stocks of atomic1245, biological and chemical weapons which the contracting parties 
                                                            
1240 See, the Statement of the Presidency of the WEU of 31 March 2010, where the Parties to the WEU Treaty 
confirm the termination of the Treaty and the dissolution of organization. Pursuant to the Statement issued 
by the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on 31 March 2010 (http://www.weu.int/), the 
Presidency considers that a new phase in European security and defence begins with the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, and that the WEU has therefore accomplished its historical role. 
1241 Camps, supra n.1011, p.17. 
1242 The Modified Brussels Treaty as amended by the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty 
(Paris, 23 October 1954), available at: http://www.weu.int/index.html; 
1243 The Federal Republic of Germany was now able to join the WEU. Article I of Protocol III on the Control of 
armaments takes note of the Declaration submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany whereby the country 
undertakes not to manufacture, inter alia, atomic, chemical or biological weapons on its territory. This was the 
quid pro quo Germany had to concede to in order to be included in the European ‘defense club’ (See, Protocol 
III on the Control on Armaments, Annex I). 
1244 With the changes introduced via the Lisbon treaty, this provision has now been mirrored in Article 42(7) of 
the Treaty on the European Union. 
1245 ‘Atomic weapon’, pursuant to Annex II (I(a)) of the Protocol, refers to “any weapon which contains, or is 
designed to contain or utilise, nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncontrolled 
nuclear transformation of the nuclear fuel, or by radioactivity of the nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes, is 
capable of mass destruction, mass injury or mass poisoning”; while according to Annex II: “[A]ll apparatus, parts, 
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were allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe. The former type of control was to be put 
into effect by a majority vote decision of the Council of the WEU, which never materialized 
since the Council of the WEU, up until the dissolution of the WEU in 2010, did not adopt 
such decision.  
Protocol IV to the Brussels Treaty defined the primary role of the WEU Agency for 
the control of armaments which was to ensure that the obligations undertaken by virtue of 
Protocol III were being observed by the contracting parties. The WEU Agency was 
mandated to scrutinize the statistical and budgetary information supplied by the members 
of the WEU and the NATO authorities, conduct test checks on the mainland of Europe, 
execute visits and inspections at production plants, depots and forces (other than depots or 
forces under NATO authority) and subsequently report to the Council of the WEU. 
(Art.VII(2)). For the purposes of conducting test checks, visits and inspections, the members 
of the Agency were accorded free access on demand to plants and depots where all 
relevant accounts and documents were to be made available to them (Article XII).  
A remarkable complementarity can be observed between the established Euratom 
safeguards system and the envisaged WEU armaments control system, the former covering 
the civil and the latter covering the military applications of nuclear energy, provided both of 
these systems had been in their full operational capacity. Regrettably, as ambitious as the 
elaborateness of the armaments control system may have seemed at first glance, the 
concept was never implemented mainly due to the WEU’s lack of authority to be able to 
force the contracting parties to respect their armaments commitments1246. Another 
prohibitive factor was the difficulty to obtain the consent of the WEU Council which 
resulted in the gradual diminishment of the role of the WEU Agency (especially with regard 
to atomic weapons)1247. In hindsight, the establishment of a functional WEU armaments 
control system could have potentially made up for the Euratom military applications lacuna 
in that once the safeguards controls to the materials entering the military facility were no 
longer applicable, the former were to be subsequently covered under the WEU armaments 
control regime1248.  
Its role having become obsolete with time, the WEU Agency for the Control of 
Armaments was abolished in 1997, leaving the Protocol IV of the modified Brussels Treaty 
without any practical effect1249. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the Western 
European Armaments group (WEAG) the European armaments cooperation was still able 
to continue1250, however with a less binding tenor. The inevitable dissolution of the Western 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
equipment, installations, substances and organisms, which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical 
and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.”; 
1246 D. Keohane, The EU and Armaments Co-operation, Centre for European Reform Working Paper 
(www.cer.org.uk), London, December 2002, p.32. 
1247 http://www.ena.lu/collective_defence_armaments_control-2-35601. 
1248 Goldshmidt, supra n.1021, p.12, at footnote 5. 
1249 WEU Council of ministers, Erfurt Declaration 18 November 1997, p.12, accessible at: http://www.weu.int. 
1250 WEU Council of Ministers, Rome Communique 19 May 1993, accessible at: http://www.weu.int. 
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European Union, which was once conceived as the future defense pillar of the European 
Union, was the cumulative result of a long standing practice of deference toward the NATO 
alliance translated in the way that the WEU mechanisms themselves had been devised and 
implemented. The execution of the WEU’s tasks had frequently been made contingent on 
the prior careful coordination with the NATO forces, an attitude further confirmed by the 
last statement of the WEU Permanent Council Presidency issued on the occasion of the 
dissolution of the WEU which asserted that NATO “(…) for those States which are members 
of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its 
implementation” 1251.  
 
V.1.3 The Spaak Report 
 
After the failure of the European Defence Community, the motors of the relance of 
European economic integration were set in motion by the Messina Resolution1252, adopted 
by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in June 1955. The Resolution entrusted the Spaak Committee (composed of 
government delegates headed by the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak) with a 
mandate to draft a Report which was later on to be submitted to the ECSC Foreign 
Ministers for discussion. As far as nuclear energy was concerned, their task focused on the 
civil uses of nuclear energy with the understanding that the development of civil nuclear 
industries will open up “(…) prospects of a new industrial revolution far beyond anything 
achieved during the past hundred years (…)”(Part I, A.2). 
                                                            
1251 In the statement issued following the dissolution of the WEU, the Presidency of the Permanent Council of 
the WEU (31 March 2010, (http://www.weu.int/) outlines the novelties introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the 
field of security and defense. It states that the newly framed European Security and Defense policy of the 
Union after Lisbon has taken on a number of the objectives and mechanisms that were already available 
under the WEU Treaty. Further on, it marks the establishment of a European Defence Agency in the field of 
defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments which “(…) shall identify operational 
requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where 
appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the 
defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the 
Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities [i.e. the military capabilities that the Member 
States have made available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy]” 
(Art.42(3) TEU); In this respect, NATO’s crucial role in the Union common defense policy has been confirmed 
in the new Art.42(7) TEU pursuant to which “[the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] […]  for those States 
which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its 
implementation”. 
1252 Archives historiques du Conseil de l'Union européenne, Bruxelles, Négociations des traités instituant la 
CEE et la CEEA (1955-1957), CM3. Réunion des ministres des affaires étrangères, Messine, 01-03.06.1955, 
CM3/NEGO/006 
(http://www.ena.lu/resolution_adopted_foreign_ministers_ecsc_member_states_messina_june_1955-2-
24617). 
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The Spaak Report1253, adopted on 21 April 1956, was expected to offer an elaborate 
plan for the future of European economic integration and set out the priority goals for a 
more intensive integration among the Member States. The Intergovernmental Committee 
drafting the Report devoted their attention to two focal areas - the Common Market and 
the Atomic Energy Community projects. Wary not to overstep its prerogatives, the 
Committee considered the issue of military uses of nuclear energy as a political issue that 
surpassed the limits of its mandate for which reason the delegates felt no need to 
pronounce themselves on the matter (Part II). Nevertheless, the last sentence of Part II 
leaves an important caveat and raises certain ambiguities of interpretation specifically with 
regard to military uses: “This issue […] concerns very important technical aspects, but they 
[the Heads of Government] believe it is possible to elaborate a solution which would 
preserve the efficacy of the system they propose one of the essential features of which 
would be a fail-proof control”1254. 
Furthermore, before the holding of the Venice Conference where the Foreign 
Ministers were expected to discuss the Spaak Report and the future creation of the 
Common Market and the Euratom Community, Paul-Henri Spaak addressed a letter on his 
own motion1255 to the Member States’ ministers where he elaborated the possible routes to 
be taken in order to resolve “one of the most difficult problems that are before the 
delegates”1256. In his letter, which can be regarded as a prelude to the upcoming 
conference, Spaak noted that during the discussions the heads of delegation had conceded 
to the position that in order to provide for efficient solutions to certain problems related to 
the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it would be indispensable for the 
Member States to agree on the conditions under which certain of them could eventually 
proceed to undertake military applications of nuclear energy1257. Spaak reminded that the 
heads of delegation had been aware of the fact that the issue raised important political 
aspects, but, nevertheless, decided to abstain from giving any suggestions of their own 
thus remaining within the limits imposed by the scope of their mandate. In order not to 
compromise the credibility of the Intergovernmental Committee members, Spaak 
expressed the desire to submit his own proposition on what could serve as basis for the 
future discussions of the Member States’ foreign ministers.  
                                                            
1253 Comité intergouvernemental créé par la conférence de Messine, Rapport des chefs de délégation aux 
ministres des Affaires étrangères. Bruxelles: Secrétariat, 21 avril 1956, pp. 9-135. 
(http://www.ena.lu/report_heads_delegation_foreign_ministers_brussels_21_april_1956-2-25213). 
1254 Free translation from French by the author; The original version reads: “(...) Cette question revêt des 
aspects techniques très importants, mais [les délégations] croient possible qu’une solution soit élaborée qui 
maintienne l’efficacité du système qu’ils proposent et dont un des traits essentiels est un contrôle sans 
fissure”; 
1255 Archives historiques du Conseil de l'Union européenne, Bruxelles, Négociations des traités instituant la 
CEE et la CEEA (1955-1957), CM3, Conférence intergouvernementale: documents divers concernant 
principalement l'utilisation militaire de l'énergie nucléaire, CM3/NEGO/187. 
1256 Last paragraph of the Spaak letter. 
1257 Para.2 of letter. 
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Hence, in line with the long-term objective of global disarmament, Spaak suggested 
a renouncement of the production of strategic nuclear weapons (of massive destruction) 
and tactical nuclear weapons, for a certain period. Upon expiration of the given time period, 
a Member State would only be entitled to produce nuclear weapons by way of consent 
given by at least two other Member States. The Euratom Community would be in charge of 
ensuring that the supply of nuclear combustibles for the military production is carried out 
as agreed upon among the Member States, while the production thereof would be subject 
to the same rules and controls envisaged for the civil uses of nuclear energy.  
Emphasizing Euratom’s fundamental commitment to the development of atomic 
energy for peaceful aims, Spaak considered that establishing uniform conditions for 
eventual derogation from this commitment would make any unilateral derogations 
impossible thus creating a climate of confidence among the Member States and preserving 
the functioning of the established system. In this sense, it was considered that according an 
unrestricted freedom of military use of nuclear energy to the Member States would 
inevitably entail the danger of rendering the system proposed by the experts inefficient and 
useless.  
Although an informal document, Spaak’s letter is an indication of the importance 
the national delegations attached to the national military nuclear programs as the former 
represented one of the most delicate issues that the foreign ministers had been presented 
with in their deliberations on the future of European integration. Evidently, as head of the 
Intergovernmental Committee, Spaak was against a liberal, laisser faire approach to the 
issue and - while not completely opposing the nuclear weapon industry - he was 
nonetheless convinced that once the proposed ‘moratorium’ on nuclear weapons 
production expired the Member States should be accorded a controlled discretion in 
deciding on their national nuclear weapons policies. Therefore, in Spaak’s opinion, the 
drafting of the Euratom Treaty could not have been finalized without previously clarifying 
whether and to what extent the future Euratom Community would be involved in the 
Member States’ nuclear energy production for military aims. 
 
V.1.4 The Draft Minutes of the Venice Conference 
 
 The Draft minutes of the Venice Conference held on 29 and 30 May 1956 1258 shed 
further light on the positions taken by the participating national delegations regarding the 
projects of the Common market and the Euratom. On this occasion, at the insistence of Mr. 
Spaak, the issue of eventual military use of nuclear energy by the Member States was 
                                                            
1258 Archives historiques du Conseil de l'Union européenne, Bruxelles, Négociations des traités instituant la 
CEE et la CEEA (1955-1957), CM3, Conférence des ministres des affaires étrangères, Venise, 29-30.05.1956, 
CM3/NEGO/093. 
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examined. Namely, the French minister Pineau considered the letter addressed by Spaak as 
a solid starting point for the discussion between the ministers, noting however that the 
nature of the subject itself is more political rather than technical1259. The German position, 
presented by Mr. Hallstein, was in favour of all military applications of nuclear energy being 
subject to the same general rules and controls that apply to the peaceful applications1260. 
The Italian side considered it inopportune for continental Europe to a priori renounce the 
use of the most modern instrument of defence of the time1261, esteeming that the 
production of nuclear weapons required a long period of preparation during which time the 
links of cooperation and confidence between the Member States, which represent the very 
essence of the Euratom regime, could be strongly reinforced. In that sense, it was believed 
that a possible solution could be negotiated by the governments only after that said period 
had expired1262. In closing, it was agreed that the foreign ministers reconvene periodically in 
order to examine the reports drafted by the heads of delegation and, consequently, take 
the necessary political decisions. In this regard, a special mention was made of the fact that 
in the future the ministers would especially have to pronounce themselves on, inter alia, the 
eventual military use of nuclear energy1263. 
Ostensibly, in view of the divergent attitudes towards the possibility to include the 
military applications of nuclear energy within the scope of the Euratom Treaty, it was 
impossible for the ‘Six’ to reach a unanimous decision on the matter: Germany was at one 
of end of the spectrum, being in favor of the maintenance of a controlled nuclear weapons 
programme, while at the opposite end was France as a proponent of keeping the military 
uses outside of the scope of the Euratom Treaty and, thus, safe from any Community 
interference1264. What further complicated matters was the heated debate regarding the 
creation of the Euratom Community before the French Assembly in July 1956 where 
observations were raised with regard to the supranational nature of the Euratom as well as 
the potential for the Euratom Treaty to possibly prevent France from becoming the fourth 
nuclear power in the world1265 (the motion in support of continuing the negotiations on the 
Euratom Treaty was approved by a 332 to 181 vote with 70 abstentions1266). For some, the 
                                                            
1259 Point 5. 
1260 Point 7. 
1261 Point 13. 
1262 Point 13. 
1263 Point 14. 
1264 It has also been reported that from the outset Jean Monnet, one of the European Community’s founding 
fathers, was much more inclined to the Member States committing themselves solely to furthering the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, once it became clear that such a position could potentially rekindle 
many of the same French arguments used against the ratification of the European Defence Community 
Treaty, Monnet, being wary of risking another treaty debacle, abandoned his original position (See, Camps, 
supra, p.55); 
1265 Camps, supra n.1011, p.67. 
1266 Idem, p.68. The negotitating parties arrived at a bargain where the French Government would undertake 
not to explode an atomic bomb before 1 January 1961, but after that regain complete freedom of action, on 
the condition that there would be no restriction on the research and development of the atomic bomb (as 
reported in, Camps, supra, p.68). 
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much publicized debate on the prospects of the Euratom Treaty before the French 
Assembly was the ‘kiss of death’ for any future non-proliferation role for the Euratom1267. 
Nevertheless, upon receiving the green light from the French Assembly, the Euratom 
Treaty negotiations could finally gain momentum the end result of which is mutatis 
mutandis the version of the Euratom Treaty we have today which, save for the explicit 
exclusion of ‘materials intended to meet defence requirements’ under the Safeguards 
chapter, is otherwise completely mute on the issue of military uses of nuclear energy. 
 
V.2 The Euratom Treaty provisions  
 
 In spite of a lack of an express (general or specific) provision in the Euratom treaty 
concerning the military applications of nuclear energy, there are scattered references in the 
treaty text directly or indirectly pertaining to the national defense requirements of Member 
States found in the Supply, Safeguards and Property Ownership chapters.  
As regards the Euratom Community’s nuclear supply policy (Chapter VI), the supply 
of ores, source materials and special nuclear materials in the Euratom Community is 
ensured through the instruments of the common supply policy based on the principle of 
equal access to sources of supply (Art. 52(1)). The Euratom Supply Agency is the body 
charged with the execution of the policy which works under the supervision of the 
Commission and has the right of option on nuclear materials (ores, source materials and 
special fissile materials) produced in the territories of Member States paired with the 
exclusive right to conclude contracts relating to the supply of nuclear materials coming from 
inside or outside of the Community (Art.52 (2b)).  
The Supply Agency exercises its right of option mainly through the conclusion of 
contracts with producers of ores, source materials and special fissile materials carried out in 
a way that the producer first offers the materials to the Agency which acts as the 
intermediary at the point where the available supply and demand orders meet (Art.57(2)). 
The potential users periodically inform the Agency of the supplies they require (Art.60(1)) 
upon which the Agency informs all potential users of the offers made and calls upon them 
to place their order (Art.60(3)). Subsequently, the Agency matches the supply offers and 
the demand orders while in doing so, it is not allowed to discriminate between the users on 
grounds of the use which they intend to make of the requested supplies unless such use is 
unlawful or is found to be contrary to the conditions imposed by suppliers outside the 
Community on the consignment concerned (Art. 52(2)). The Euratom Treaty does not offer 
further explanation on what these ‘grounds of use’ encompass, opening way for the Supply 
Agency to be able to broaden its scrutiny to national-defence-related grounds for use of 
                                                            
1267 See Camps, supra, p.68. 
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nuclear material, given the lack of a specific ‘national defence requirements’ derogation in 
the ‘Supplies’ chapter alike to the one regarding the application of the safeguards 
provisions1268.  
Another issue that has caused ambiguities in interpretation is the ‘unlawful use’ of 
supplies which the Agency has to oversee. The Euratom Treaty does not provide any 
referential criteria for the Agency to rely on in assessing the ‘unlawful’ character of the use, 
again leaving generous margin of interpretation that would potentially consider both the 
use of nuclear supplies that contravenes the Euratom safeguards criteria and the use 
thereof for military purposes as unlawful. The letter of the Euratom Treaty being extremely 
sketchy as to the extent of the Supply Agency’s non-proliferation role, it was as late as in 
2009 that the Commission issued a Communication on nuclear non-proliferation1269 that 
clarified the confusion. Namely, the Commission determined the Supply Agency’s role as 
one of verifying that all supply contracts contain a safeguards clause and are solely 
concluded for peaceful end-uses1270 thus going beyond simply an extensive interpretation 
of the Euratom Treaty regarding the modalities of the execution of the Supply Agency’s 
prerogatives and writing a new approach into the Treaty which itself was not evident and 
could not be prima faciae inferred from the relevant Treaty provisions. 
 In addition, there have been futher differences in interpretation with respect to the 
authorisation of export of materials outside of the Community borders where by virtue of 
Art. 59(2) Euratom the Commission is entitled to refuse to grant such authorisation should 
it not be convinced by the recipients of the supplies that the general interests of the 
Community will be thereby safeguarded or should the terms and conditions of the export 
contracts be contrary to the objectives of the Euratom Treaty. In this sense, the 
Communication on non-proliferation sets out the criteria the Commission is to rely upon in 
assessing the ‘general interest of the Community’ when granting the authorisations for 
export of nuclear materials produced within the Community. These criteria include, among 
other, verifying that the materials will be used for non-explosive purposes and ensuring 
that adequate IAEA guarantees are duly applied to them1271. The Communication 
compensates for the lack of prescription of the Treaty provisions by clarifying that in order 
for the Euratom Community’s interests to be preserved the nuclear supply provisions are 
only to be applied in conjunction with the safeguards requirements1272. In truth, the 
appraisal of the ‘general interest’ in this regard has largely been political where practice has 
shown that the Commission frequently turns to the relevant provisions of the Non-
                                                            
1268 For an insight into how the Agency’s tasks are performed in practice, see, Report on the annual accounts 
of the Euratom Supply Agency for the financial year 2009, OJ C 338, 14/12/2010 P. 0006 – 0009; also, Report 
on the annual accounts of the Euratom Supply Agency for the financial year 2008, together with the Agency’s 
replies, OJ C 304 , 15/12/2009 P. 0006 – 0009. 
1269 Communication on nuclear non-proliferation, COM(2009) 143 final, Section 3.3. 
1270 Section 3.3 of Communication. 
1271 Section 3.3 of Communication. 
1272 See, also, A. Bouquet, How Current are Euratom provisions on Nuclear Supply and Ownership in view of 
the European Union’s enlargement?, Nuclear Law Bulletin, No.6, December 2001, p.19. 
258 
 
Proliferation Treaty and other non-proliferation instruments as benchmarks1273. Therefore, 
some view the broad discretion the Commission enjoys in applying the nuclear supply 
provisions as the stepping stone for the future creation of a Euratom common non-
proliferation policy in its own right1274.  
 As concerns the Safeguards chapter (Chapter VII) which covers the nuclear 
safeguards arrangements as the key tool in the furtherance of the non-proliferation 
objective, the former contains the only specific mention to Member States’ defence 
requirements in the Euratom Treaty to the effect of excluding nuclear materials intended to 
meet defense requirements from the safeguards’ scope of application. More particularly, 
pursuant to Art.84(3) Euratom, the safeguards are not to be applied to materials intended 
to meet defence requirements “which are in the course of being specially processed for this 
purpose or which, after being so processed, are, in accordance with an operational plan, 
placed or stored in a military establishment”1275.  
 Lastly, the chapter that deals with the Euratom Community’s right of ownership 
(Chapter VIII-Property Ownership) which foresees that special fissile materials are the 
property of the Euratom, the Community’s right of ownership extending to all special fissile 
materials which are produced or imported by a Member State, a person or an undertaking 
and are subject to the safeguards provided in Chapter 7 (Art.86 Euratom). The second part 
of the former definition is very significant since it links the exercise of ownership by the 
Community with the application of safeguards to the respective nuclear material. 
Consequently, material imported into or produced in the Community which is intended to 
meet military ends is exempted from the application of the safeguards requirements 
(according to Article 84 (3)) and therefore remains outside Community ownership1276. 
Furthermore, the Commission considers that the concept of Community ownership entails 
the responsibility to apply nuclear safeguards as well as physical protection measures, 
taken in the broader sense of the term1277. Applying the former inclusive approach 
suggested by the Commission results in additionally extending the scope of application of 
safeguards so as to accommodate the objectives linked to the physical protection of 
nuclear material (nuclear security objectives).  
                                                            
1273 Idem, p.18. 
1274 Goens, supra n.1108, p.43.   
1275 For an elaboration on the Euratom safeguards arrangements, see, supra, Section III. 
1276 Bouquet, supra n.1272, p.28. 
1277 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Communication on 
nuclear non-proliferation, COM (2009) 143. 
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V.3 Clearing the waters – the CJEU on the application of the Euratom Treaty to 
military uses of nuclear energy 
 
From the legal and contextual analysis of the foregoing chapters of the Euratom 
Treaty it is to be concluded that (inadvertently or not) military uses have not been 
completely and categorically excluded from the remit of the Treaty. However, the absence 
of any blanket exclusion does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the Euratom 
Treaty is not to apply to the military filed under any circumstance. The lacuna created by 
the Euratom Treaty’s elusiveness regarding military uses of nuclear energy has engendered 
various interpretations, depending on the context in which they were made. This existent 
lacuna peculiar to the Euratom system has indeed been addressed in the case law of the EU 
Court of Justice: following is an elaboration of the Court’s standpoint, but also the 
standpoint of different EU institutions and Member States on the matter which have been 
part of or have intervened in the procedure before the Court. 
Bearing in mind the compelling legal ambiguity vitiating this issue, it was as late as 
in 2005 that the highest judicial authority of the Union offered its unequivocal stance on the 
issue, after what amounted to circa four decades of legal uncertainty. In this respect, a 
pattern is to be observed in the positions assumed by, on the one hand, the Commission as 
a proponent for an extensive reading of the Euratom Treaty endorsing the inclusion of 
military uses within the Treaty remit and, on the other hand, the nuclear-weapon Member 
States (United Kingdom and France) as traditional opponents to the possibility of Member 
States’ military nuclear programs being (even if only incidentally) affected by the Euratom 
rules. Notwithstanding the final outcome of the decade long dispute, it is the 
argumentation offered by the two camps that deserves special attention especially the 
pervasiveness of policy-oriented as opposed to strictly legal arguments used in support of 
their positions.  
 
V.3.1 Ruling 1/78 
In Ruling 1/781278, around three decades before finally ‘sealing’ the issue, the EU 
Court of Justice was called upon to rule on the compatibility of the provisions of the 
Euratom Treaty with the envisaged accession of the Euratom Community to the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports1279. 
Having acknowledged that the Convention excludes installations, materials or transports 
destined for military purposes from its scope1280, the Court went on to state that the fields 
                                                            
1278Ruling 1/78 of 14 November 1978, ECR 1978 p. 2151. 
1279 Ruling 1/78 has been examined supra in Chapter 1, Section III.3.1 in the context of the international legal 
personality of the Euratom and its competence to enter into international agreements. 
1280 Para.8 of Ruling. 
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of application of the Convention and the Euratom Treaty overlap in that in substance they 
both cover the same type of materials and nuclear facilities, whereas “(…) materials and 
facilities for military purposes are excluded from the scope of the Convention as well as 
from that of the Treaty” (Art.2 of the Convention and Arts.84 and 86 of the Euratom 
Treaty)1281. 
Admittedly, the Court opted for a somewhat rash generalization, possibly unawares 
of the potential ramifications of such a statement, especially given that the issue of military 
uses was only discussed on the sidelines of the proceedings and the case itself being 
centered on a different subject matter. The Court’s pronouncement provided supra will 
from then on be used as a trump card by both France and the UK in the subsequent cases 
dealing with the issue of military applications of the Euratom rules1282. In this respect, it 
would be ill-advised to consider the former statement of the Court as one intended to 
establish a general rule of non-application of the Euratom Treaty to uses of nuclear energy 
for defense purposes: the statement was made specifically and explicitly with regard to 
Arts. 84 and 86 Euratom (the derogation referring to the exemption of the materials 
intended to meet national defense requirements from the application of safeguards), in the 
context of a general comparison between the fields of application of the Convention and 
the Treaty1283. 
 
V.3.2 T- 219/95 R Danielsson v Commission 
An interesting issue arose before the General Court (formerly, the Court of First 
Instance) in Danielsson and Others v Commission1284 concerning an application for interim 
measures where the Court ruled that the applicants which were private persons could not 
be regarded as being prima faciae individually concerned by the Commission decision they 
attempted to challenge, declaring the action as manifestly inadmissible1285. The applicants 
had requested that the legal effects of a Commission decision of 23 October 1995 allowing 
for the French nuclear tests in French Polynesia be suspended as well as that an order is 
issued empowering the Commission to take all necessary measures to protect the 
applicants’ rights under the Euratom Treaty. The latter concerned the obligation flowing 
from Art.34 Euratom for the Member States in whose territories particularly dangerous 
                                                            
1281 Emphasis added; Para.12. 
1282 See, AG Geelhoed Opinion, C-61/03 Commission v. UK, ECR 2005 p. I-2477, para. 54.   
1283See, AG Geelhoed Opinion, C-61/03 Commission v. UK, ECR 2005 p. I-2477, para. 95.  The academic 
commentary covering Ruling 1/78 has not dealt with the aspect of military uses of nuclear energy given that 
the former was minor and non-substantial to the problematic at issue (see, J. A. Usher, International 
Competence of Euratom, European Law Review, 1979 Vol 4, p.306; D. Allen, The Euratom Treaty, Chapter VI: 
New Hope or False Dawn, Common Market Law Review, 1983 Vol. 20, Issue 3, p.483);  
1284 Case T-219/95 R, ECR 1995 Page II-03051 (Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 22 
December 1995); 
1285 Para.76 of judgment. 
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experiments are to take place to apply additional health and safety measures. To the 
contrary, the French Government’s leading argument submitted at the hearing was that 
the health and safety provisions of the Treaty did not apply to nuclear activities in the 
military sphere1286. The Commission's essential position, as presented by Commission 
President Santer before the European Parliament, was that Article 34 applied to both civil 
and military experiments, and that an experiment was to be regarded as particularly 
dangerous for the purposes of that article if it were to present a perceptible risk of 
significant exposure of workers or the general public to ionizing radiation1287.  
The General Court considered that the applicants had failed to demonstrate to be 
individually concerned by the Commission decision, in accordance with the ex-Art.146(4) 
TEC (now Art.263(4) TFEU) test for ‘individual and direct concern’  in order to establish the 
legal standing for applicants1288. The Court decided to dismiss the application, refusing to 
pronounce itself on the question of military applications as a question belonging to the 
examination of the merits of the contested act and concluded that “[…] it is not appropriate 
to rule in advance, in the present interim proceedings, on the question whether, in 
accordance with the Commission's interpretation which was challenged by the French 
Government at the hearing, Chapter 3 of the Treaty, concerning health and safety 
measures, and Article 34 in particular, is applicable to nuclear activities of a military 
nature”1289. Given that the Commission was intent on persuading the Court to endorse the 
former option, the instant case can, arguably, be regarded as a missed opportunity for the 
General Court to deliberate on the long standing problematic. Nonetheless, the CJEU 
compensated for this shortcoming in the following case Commission v. UK where it finally 
‘cut the knot’ and gave the much awaited ‘in or out’ verdict.   
 
V.3.3 Case C-61/03 Commission v. UK 
In case C-61/03 Commission v. UK1290 the Commission was seeking for a declaration 
that the UK, by having failed to provide general data relating to a plan for the disposal of 
radioactive waste regarding the decommissioning of the Jason reactor at Royal Naval 
College in Greenwich, had breached its obligation stemming from Art. 37 Euratom. The 
Jason reactor was operated by the UK Ministry of Defense and subsequently 
decommissioned where upon the Commission’s request for detailed information 
                                                            
1286 Para.33. 
1287 Para.12. 
1288 See, in particular, paras. 71,75 and 76 of the judgment. For a  critique of the restrictive stance of the 
General Court in applying the criteria on legal standing for applicants, see, S. Schikhof,  Direct and individual 
Concern in Environmental Cases: The Barriers to Prospective Litigants, European Environmental Law Review 
October 1998, p.280;  
1289 Para.62. 
1290 C-61/03 Commission v. UK, ECR 2005 p. I-2477. 
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concerning the decommissioning the UK responded that the facilities used for military 
purposes were not caught under the provisions of the Euratom Treaty entailing that the UK 
was under no obligation to provide the Commission with any general data within the 
meaning of Art.37 Euratom.  
The Court provided a solid argumentation, starting out by looking at the objectives 
of the Euratom Treaty and concluding that the intention of the signatories of the Treaty was 
to emphasize its non-military character, thereby confirming the essentially civil and 
commercial objectives of the Treaty1291. It provided an overview of the events that had 
preceded the drafting of the Euratom Treaty thereby looking at the respective positions of 
the representatives of the founding Member States who, in lack of a unanimous solution, 
decided to leave the issue of military applications unresolved qualifying it as 
inconclusive1292. Most importantly, the Court pointed to the significance the Member 
States attached to their defense interests, making it “[…] inconceivable for them to have 
impliedly waived the right to establish adequate guarantees in a field as sensitive as that of 
military applications of nuclear energy “1293.  
As the case concerned the application of the health and safety provisions of the 
Euratom Treaty (Arts. 30 et seq.), it was acknowledged that Arts. 34, 35 and 37 of the Treaty 
do not in any way specify that the activities covered by them are exclusively civil, but 
however esteemed that the application of such provisions to military installations, research 
programmes and other activities may be liable to compromise essential national defence 
interests of the Member States1294. In order to further substantiate its reasoning, the Court 
borrowed the arguments offered by France and the UK which all revolved around the fact 
that the absence from the Treaty of a derogation laying down detailed rules to be relied 
upon by the Member States to protect their defense interests indicated that military 
activities fell outside the scope of the Treaty1295. Moreover, the UK contended that the 
derogation contained in ex-Art.296 EC (present Art.346 TFEU) concerning the protection of 
the essential interests of national security presents a vital asset in safeguarding Member 
States’ security interests, the absence of an analogous provision in the Euratom Treaty 
constituting “[…] an irremediable ‘lacuna’ militating against the application of this Treaty to 
the defence sector”1296.  
The Court circumscribed the field of military uses of nuclear energy as falling outside 
the scope of the Euratom Treaty and thus ruled against the Commission’s attempt to rely 
on Article 37 Euratom in order to require of Member States provision of information on the 
                                                            
1291 Paras.26-27. 
1292 Para.29. 
1293 Para.30. 
1294 Para.35. 
1295 Para.36. 
1296 Para.51 of the AG Opinion. 
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disposal of radioactive waste from their military installations1297. It, nonetheless, noted that 
the former did not in any way undermine the vital importance of the objective of protecting 
the health of the public and the environment against the dangers related to the use of 
nuclear energy. Therefore, to the extent that the Euratom Treaty does not provide the 
Euratom Community with a specific instrument to pursue the former objective, the Court 
suggested the use of appropriate measures which would be adopted on the basis of the 
relevant provisions of the EC Treaty (now, TFEU)1298. The most adequate nexus to attaining 
the stated objective available within the framework of the TFEU (ex-EC Treaty) would be 
the corresponding public health (Art. 168; ex-Art.152 TEC) and/or the environment 
protection (Arts. 191-193; ex-Art.174-176 TEC) provisions of the TFEU. Consequently, in the 
future, a TFEU (ex-EC)-based health/environment protection instrument ought to be used 
in order to counter the potentially harmful effects of waste stemming from military 
establishments which would further enable the Member States to invoke the Art.346 TFEU 
(ex-Art.296 EC) derogation whenever they consider their vital security interests threatened.  
The judgment in Commission v. UK is clearly an example of judicial self-restraint 
exhibited by the CJEU as it was clearly not the intention of the Court to disrupt the 
sovereignty ratio between the Member States and Euratom by ruling in favor of an 
unwarranted encroachment on the Member States’ military nuclear industries. The Court 
was manifestly more inclined to accept the policy-related considerations (the safeguarding 
of Member States’ defense interests) as opposed to the purely legal argumentation offered 
by both the Commission and the AG Geelhoed which in itself contributed to a colorful legal 
dispute. The Commission’s arguments in the case again confirmed this institution’s 
adamancy toward extending the scope of the Euratom Treaty provisions to the use of 
nuclear energy for defense purposes1299. The Commission argued that the Art.37 obligation 
on provision of general data relating to any plan for the disposal of radioactive waste 
equally applies to radioactive waste emanating from a military facility1300. Realizing that it 
would be highly impossible for the Court to acquiesce to such a broad interpretation of the 
issue, during the oral procedure the Commission suggested a mid-way approach. It 
suggested that in applying Art. 37, each Member State should decide on the moment in 
time from which a military source of radioactive waste is to be regarded as waste within the 
wording of the said article, before communicating the plan for its disposal to the 
Commission1301.  
A similar approach was suggested by Advocate General Geelhoed who was in favor 
of the possibility of extending the remit of the Euratom Treaty to the defense sphere. AG 
Geelhoed focused on the impending legal void created by the lack of an explicit exclusion of 
                                                            
1297 Para.44. 
1298 Para.44. 
1299 See, para.36 of judgment in Case C-61/03; para.51 of the AG opinion in idem, and para.62 in Danielsson. 
1300 Para. 42 et seq. 
1301 Para.37. 
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military uses of nuclear energy from the scope of the Treaty. The AG presumed Art. 37 
Euratom to be equally applicable to military uses; however, in order to avoid any 
compromising effects that a blanket application of Art. 37 to the defence sector would 
engender, he suggested a case-by-case, dialogue-based approach between the 
Commission and the Member State concerned1302. In this way, when supplying the 
Commission with a plan for disposal of radioactive waste emanating from defence-related 
activities the State would be entitled to withhold the information it considers indispensable 
for the protection of essential defence interests1303. Hence, according to the AG, in the 
absence of a provision in the Euratom Treaty analogous to ex-Art.296 EC (Art. 346 TFEU) 
and insofar as adequate instruments have not been provided by the Euratom Treaty or the 
implementing legislation, the former article should be presumed to apply. The AG offered 
the example of Opinion 1/941304 where the Court examined the European Community’s 
exclusive competence to conclude the Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods as 
regards Euratom products and found that in the absence of specific external trade 
provisions in the Euratom Treaty, there was nothing preventing international agreements 
covering the former products to be concluded under ex-Article 133 EC (present 207 TFEU; 
the common commercial policy), thus widening the scope of the EC (TFEU) provisions to 
also cover Euratom products1305. Following the same line of reasoning, so long as the 
Euratom Treaty and implementing legislation have not provided equivalent safeguards for 
Member State’s essential security interests, it is the safeguards offered in Art.346 TFEU 
that should apply to products covered by the Euratom Treaty1306. In view of the Court’s final 
conclusion, it seems like AG Geelhoed’s Opinion lost the war, but it certainly won some very 
important battles. Admittedly, the Court yielded to the overwhelming political tenor of the 
issue by being wary of any undesired effect an ‘inclusive’ judgment would have on the 
Member States’ defence interests. In this sense, the Advocate General’s progressive 
approach was no match for the compelling political reality of the Member States’ military 
nuclear industries being a notorious ‘hot potato’ for national governments1307. 
A case largely similar to the one supra and raising the same point of law, was C-
65/04 Commission v. UK1308 where the Commission demanded that the CJEU declare that 
the UK, by failing to give the public likely to be affected in the event of a radiological 
emergency prior information on the local emergency plan existing in Gibraltar, failed to 
fulfill its obligations stemming from Article 5(3) of Council Directive 89/618/Euratom on 
                                                            
1302 Para.117. 
1303 Para.114 of AG Opinion. 
1304Opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994 (ECR 1994 p. I-5267). 
1305 Para.105 of Opinion. 
1306 Para.107 of Opinion. 
1307 For further commentary on the Court’s approach in this case, see, A. Schrauwen, “Treaties and Trade-
offs”, editorial, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 2005 Vol.32 Issue 4, p.336,337; I. Cenevska, The exercise 
of giving way to ’giving in’—some aspects of the Member States’ EURATOM obligations revisited, Journal for 
European Environmental and Planning Law, 2009 Vol.6 Issue 4, pp.487-489; 
1308 ECR 2006 p. I-2239. 
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informing the general public about health protection measures to be applied and steps to be 
taken in the event of a radiological emergency1309. The Directive, adopted pursuant to Art.31 
Euratom, sets out the common objectives regarding the measures and procedures for 
informing the general public for the purpose of improving the health protection in the 
event of a radiological emergency1310. The Court asserted that the case concerned the 
possibility of applying the Euratom Treaty to military uses of nuclear energy thereby 
automatically referring back to its previous judgment in case C-61/03 Commission v UK and 
reiterating the stance that the exclusion of military uses of nuclear energy from the remit of 
the Euratom Treaty represents a blanket exclusion which does not apply partially but 
extends to all the provisions of the Euratom Treaty1311. 
 
 V.3.4 Joined Cases C-205/10 P, C-217/10 P and C-222/10 P, Eriksen, Hansen and Lind 
 
The CJEU had a chance to depart from its restrictive stance in C-61/03 Commission v. 
UK, in a more recent case - Eriksen, Hansen and Lind v Commission1312 - which concerned the 
controversy surrounding the environmental effects of the radiation following the crash of a 
US military aircraft carrying nuclear weapons in Thule, Greenland in January 1968 in 
relation to which it was reported by the US Atomic Energy Commission that approximately 
six kilograms of weapons grade plutonium had been released1313. In the aftermath of the 
accident, emergency clean-up operations had begun, the applicants in the cases under 
examination belonging to the group of workers involved in the operations1314. Initially 
brought before the General Court, the cases went on appeal before the CJEU as a joinder 
application1315. Before the CJEU the applicants claimed compensation for the damage they 
had suffered as a result of the Commission’s alleged failure to ensure implementation of 
the medical monitoring provisions of Directive 96/29/Euratom laying down basic safety 
standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the 
dangers arising from ionizing radiation which covered workers who, like Mr Eriksen, Mr 
Hansen and Mr Nochen, had in the past been potentially exposed to radiation at Thule1316. 
They claimed that the harm suffered by them was to be attributed exclusively to the 
Commission, which had failed to ensure implementation of those provisions in spite of the 
                                                            
1309 OJ 1989 L 357, p. 31. 
1310 Art.1 of Directive. 
1311 Para.26. 
1312 Joined Cases C-205/10 P, C-217/10 P and C-222/10 P, Eriksen, Hansen and Lind v Commission (Order of the 
Court (Fifth Chamber) of 12 January 2011) ECR 2011 p. I-1 
1313 Para.5 of judgment. 
1314 Para.6 of judgment. 
1315 The protracted element of the case (the Thule accident had occurred in 1968, while the initial applications 
were lodged before the EU General Court in 2008 and 2009) is due to the fact that the workers concerned 
were only diagnosed with malignant illnesses as late as in 2002, 2006 and 2007, respectively.  
1316 Para.16. 
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existence of a Parliament Resolution pressuring the Commission to this end1317. They 
insisted that the lethal illness which followed after their exposure to weapons grade 
plutonium would have been less severe had it been detected and treated earlier to the 
effect that prompt intervention by the Commission would have alleviated the gravity of the 
harm they suffered1318.  
Prior to examining the particularities of the case, it is instructive to refer to the 
European Parliament Resolution of 10 May 2007 on the public health consequences of the 
1968 Thule crash which was adopted in response to a petition presented to the Petitions 
Committee of the European Parliament in 2002 by the Association of Thule workers affected 
by radiation that sought implementation of the medical monitoring requirements of 
Directive 96/29 (Petition 720/2002)1319. The resolution drew on the same issues that 
subsequently gave rise to the Eriksen et al. case, indicating that the petition in question had 
revealed that workers and members of the public had been irradiated by extremely 
hazardous weapons grade plutonium as a result of the crash at Thule in 19681320. As a 
consequence, in the years that followed a number of the Thule survivors had died of 
radiation-related illnesses due to the lack of medical monitoring while the other survivors 
were at the material time still at risk of contracting such illnesses1321. Furthermore, it was 
confirmed that some of the radiation-related illnesses could have been detected at an early 
stage and treated provided that a mechanism of monitoring of the health of the Thule 
survivors had been put into place1322. The Parliament invoked the prominence of the health 
and safety objective of the Euratom Treaty, acknowledging the disagreement arising 
between the Commission and the Kingdom of Denmark regarding the possibility to apply 
the Euratom Treaty and the relevant secondary legislation to the health and environment 
effects of the Thule crash1323. While taking stock of the CJEU’s stance on the inapplicability 
of the Euratom Treaty to uses of nuclear energy for military purposes, the Parliament 
considered the CJEU’s restrictive approach to the matter as largely determined by the need 
to protect the national defence interests of the Member States1324. Nonetheless, the 
Parliament considered that a restrictive view on the remit of the Treaty should not be taken 
in relation to the application of the health and safety provisions in ’’situations where the 
alleged military purpose concerns a third State (…) and where the only feasibly present 
                                                            
1317 Para.16. 
1318 Para.17. See, paras. 10 and 11 for the medical condition of the applicants which concerned was malignant 
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1319 P6_TA(2007)0182 Environmental protection from radiation following the crash of a military aircraft in 
Greenland: European Parliament Resolution of 10 May 2007 on the public health consequences of the 1968 
Thule crash (Petition 720/2002) (2006/2012(INI)); 
1320 Point A of Resolution. 
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connection with a defence interest of a Member State is that the release of nuclear 
material occurred on its territory’’1325.  
For these reasons, the Parliament called upon Denmark to apply the relevant 
provisions of Directive 96/29/Euratom by implementing surveillance and intervention 
measures1326 and, in the light of the protection of fundamental rights as a general principle 
of EU law and the positive obligations stemming from Articles 2 (right to life) and 8 (right to 
home and family life) of the ECHR, urged the Member States engaged in hazardous 
activities with potential adverse effects to lay down adequate procedures providing the 
persons involved in such activities access to all the relevant information1327. The Parliament 
noted the failure of the Kingdom of Denmark to fully comply with its obligations under 
Directive 96/29/Euratom in countering the after-effects of the Thule crash1328 and 
requested that Member States implement and apply Directive 96/29/Euratom without any 
delay thereby insisting that the Commission vigorously pursue any failure to fulfil the 
former obligations1329.  
The applicants, Mr Eriksen, Mr Hansen and Ms Lind (acting on behalf of her 
deceased brother), initially brought actions for compensation before the General Court1330 
where the latter had taken note of the absence of a concrete reference in the application to 
the acts or omissions the Commission had allegedly refrained from taking in order to 
ensure the application of Directive 96/29/Euratom as the applicants focused their claim on 
the possibility for compensation deriving from the Commission’s non-contractual 
liability1331. The General Court considered that the only means the Commission had at its 
disposal in urging the Danish government to implement the medical monitoring provisions 
of Directive 96/29/Euratom with regard to the Thule workers was to bring infringement 
proceedings under then, Article 226 EC or Article 141 Euratom against the Kingdom of 
Denmark1332. In turn, Mr. Eriksen, one of the applicants, argued that the Commission’s 
alleged inaction had breached the principles of the duty of care and good administration 
(thereby referring to the Parliament Resolution which had requested of the Commission to 
pursue any failure by the Members States to respect their obligations under Directive 
96/29/Euratom)1333. However, the General Court considered that the only type of omission 
attributable to the institutions which could potentially trigger the liability of the Union was 
the instance where the institutions would infringe their legal obligation to act, thereby 
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1328 Point 10. 
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1330 See, Order of 24 March 2010, Eriksen v Commission (T-516/08, ECR 2010 p. II-40); Order of 24 March 2010, 
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inferring that there did not exist a legal obligation for the Commission to bring 
infringement proceedings against Member States and that its decision not to bring 
proceedings could not be qualified as unlawful and give rise to non-contractual liability for 
the Union1334. It was maintained that the former finding could not be affected by the text of 
the Parliament Resolution which was not a legally binding instrument and simply ’urged’ 
the Commission to pursue any existing failures on the part of Member States without 
prescribing an obligation for the Commission to act in order to initiate infringement 
proceedings1335.  
In the judgment on appeal, the CJEU aligned with the reasoning adopted by the 
General Court, addressing, inter alia, the applicant’s plea that the latter had failed to 
consider the fact that the Commission was required to ensure the application of the 
protective measures foreseen under Directive 96/29/Euratom to the after-effects of the 
military accident1336. In addition, the applicants relied on the European Parliament 
Resolution as a non-binding instrument in order to support their argumentation regarding 
the Commission’s alleged failure to act where the Parliament urged, in particular, that the 
Commission tackles any failure [of the Member States] to fulfill their obligations under 
[Directive 96/29/Euratom]”1337. In response, the Court decreed that it had already been 
established in cases C-61/03 Commission v United Kingdom and C-65/04 Commission v 
United Kingdom that the Euratom Treaty ’’has to be interpreted restrictively, that is to say 
that all military activities should be excluded from its scope’’1338. To the contrary, the 
applicants insisted that the Commission was not entitled to grant exemptions so as to 
exclude military activities from both the scope of the Euratom Treaty and Directive 
96/29/Euratom considering that the former had in any event been under the responsibility 
to initiate proceedings for failure to fulfill the relevant obligations stemming therefrom1339. 
The Court did not further examine the Commission’s prerogative to grant the exemptions, 
centering on the argument that the Euratom Treaty did not apply to military activities as 
sufficient grounds to reject all of the applicants’ pleas as unfounded and dismiss the 
appeals in their entirety1340. Hence, it was concluded that the relevant question in the case 
was not whether the Commission had the power to grant exemptions for that type of 
activity but rather whether those activities in fact fell within the scope of the Euratom 
Treaty which the Court’s settled case-law clearly indicated did not1341. 
Dismissing the foregoing actions prevented the General Court and the CJEU from 
dealing with the issue substantively – the two courts could have arguably offered a more 
                                                            
1334 Para. 29. 
1335 Para.30 
1336 Para.63 of Eriksen et al.; 
1337 Para.12 of Eriksen et al.; 
1338 Para.63. 
1339 Para.64. 
1340 Para.66. 
1341 Para.66. 
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comprehensive argumentation, especially by taking note of (while not necessarily aligning 
with) the European Parliament’s Resolution invoked by the applicants which underscores 
the significance of tackling the issue of protection of the health of workers that had been 
exposed to dangerous radiation and furthermore, sheds light on the existence of a gap in 
the current regime for the protection of the health of the workers and the general public 
linked to the use of nuclear energy for military purposes, making a plea to the Commission 
to address the lacuna1342.  
Conceivably, properly construing the argument that Denmark is not a nuclear-
weapons-state and that the military applications of nuclear energy in the Thule case can be 
exclusively attributed to the US as a ‘third state’ could have potentially changed the 
outcome of the legal dispute. Moreover, the fact that the Parliament Resolution closely 
predates the original applications before the General Court could plausibly signify that the 
Parliament was attempting to suggest a possible direction to be taken by the Union courts 
in this regard. Sadly, the refusal on the part of the Union courts to deal head-on with a 
substantial issue such as that of the health effects arising from nuclear weapons-related 
accidents occurring in the territory of the Member States reveals a tendency to downplay 
the gravity of the problem which can only be explained with the overriding political 
sensitivity thereof1343. By contrast, the Parliament’s readiness to initiate a broadening of 
the approach towards this sensitive issue represents yet another of this institution’s 
endeavours to be closely associated with the work and influence the policy of the other 
Union institutions with greater legal and political leverage under the Euratom construct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1342 Points 11 and 12 of the Parliament’s Resolution. 
1343 Academic literature has not covered the Eriksen et al. case in any substantial manner; it has, however, 
been noted that the “contentious legacy” of the Thule accident persists (see, A. J. K. Bailes, Human Rights and 
Security: Wider Applications in a Warmer Arctic, Yearbook of Polar Law, 2011, Vol.3, p.533,535). 
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Conclusions 
 
The research set out to detect the inconsistencies or loopholes existing in the 
Euratom health and safety and nuclear safeguards regimes in the light of their relationship 
to the policies under the Union framework they most immediately interact with – the 
Union’s environmental policy and non-proliferation policy. The potential ‘problem areas’ 
that the foregoing analysis identified in this regard can be grouped into four clusters, 
following the subject matter covered by each of the four chapters – namely: the 
(dis)balance of institutional powers and the democratic deficit under the Euratom system; the 
relationship between the Euratom health and safety regime and the Union’s environmental 
policy; the environmental democracy mechanisms devised under the Aarhus Convention and 
the extent of their application to the scope of the Euratom; and lastly, the Euratom’s and the 
Union’s role in the area of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the issue of the Euratom’s 
relationship with the domain of military applications of nuclear energy. 
 
The (dis)balance of institutional powers and the democratic deficit under the Euratom system 
Prior to going into the two specific areas of focus of the research, the discussion 
commenced by providing an insight into the nature and purview of the Euratom 
Community from a constitutional perspective, observing the Euratom as a unique creation 
within the wider context of the Union and the specificity of the Euratom Treaty juxtaposed 
to the other Community/Union founding treaties. In this sense, the analysis revealed 
certain deficiencies embedded in the current institutional framework of the Euratom and 
the institutional dynamic created thereunder.  
Firstly, a discrepancy was noted between the decision-making patterns set out 
under the Union framework stricto sensu and those under the Euratom, the latter having 
resisted the Lisbon Treaty reforms directed at democratizing the Union’s decision-making 
procedures. Under the Euratom system, the Commission figures as the organ that fully 
embodies the supranational tendency, being endowed with prerogatives that are 
ostensibly prevalent to those belonging to the Council and the Parliament. Namely, the 
increase in legislative power for the Parliament introduced by the Lisbon amendments 
remains confined to the Union framework, failing to be matched by a corresponding reform 
under the Euratom compact. The Parliament is accorded a fairly peripheral role under the 
Euratom institutional dynamic, disposing of meager decision-making powers which in itself 
adds weight to the argument on the existence of a democratic deficit within the Euratom 
institutional system. In spite of the Council acting as the main legislative organ for the 
Euratom, it is effectively the Commission, which enjoys extensive executive and 
supervisory authority, that carries the ‘real’ institutional weight.  
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In order to tackle the foregoing inconsistencies it is necessary that a balanced 
division of powers is introduced to the Euratom institutional framework matching that of 
the Union framework, first and foremost, by instituting effective accountability 
mechanisms with respect to the work of the Commission and the Council along the lines of 
a ‘checks and balances’ (or ‘weight and counterweight’) model. Therefore, it is vital that the 
institutional dominance of the Commission is curbed and the chances for abuse thereof 
reduced by vesting one of the Union institutions with the prerogative to regularly overview 
the work of the Commission. Given that under the Union framework the Parliament is the 
institution endowed, for the most part, with prerogatives of supervision over the activities 
of other Union institutions and bodies, a step in the direction of extending the former 
mechanism of supervision to the Euratom scope seems pertinent. Such a reform could be 
accomplished either by Treaty amendment, or, (with a relatively more limited effect) by 
amending the existing or introducing new Euratom secondary legislation. Thus, some of 
the modalities in which the Euratom institutions are to discharge of their tasks can be 
prescribed by non-binding policy documents such as communications, modus vivendi, etc.  
Secondly, with respect to the applicable legislative procedures, there exists a purely 
formalistic extension of the relevant articles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union concerning the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to the remit 
of the Euratom Treaty (effectuated through Art.106a Euratom). Nevertheless, in spite of 
the former extension, the Euratom decision-making procedures (under the current, 
consolidated version of the Euratom Treaty) have not been impacted. The former points to 
the perfunctory character of the extension, requiring that this important, deliberate or 
inadvertent, inconsistency be addressed and rectified as soon as possible. The peculiarity of 
the Euratom decision-making patterns can be plausibly explained by the unique nature of 
the Euratom Treaty as a sectoral treaty of a prevalently technical character, accounting for 
the visibly dominant role of the Commission as a key institutional player. The former was 
considered as instrumental at the initial, promotional stage of Euratom’s existence where 
the nuclear was still a budding industry - however, with nuclear energy in Europe having 
long since moved on from the promotional era, it is necessary that the pervasive 
technocratic tendency embedded in the Euratom Treaty is reconsidered in light of the 
present-day circumstances. Understandably, it is the very nature of the field that the 
Euratom Treaty covers which makes it less liable to democratic scrutiny, endowing it with a 
democracy-deficient disposition. Nevertheless, as unique a creation the Euratom 
Community may be, it should not be considered exempt from the Union’s governing 
principles and standards for democracy, accountability and transparency, making it 
indispensable that the functioning of the Euratom is brought in line with these principles 
and standards with the Euratom institutions and functioning mechanisms having to 
undergo a substantial and thorough democratization.  
Thirdly, the analysis appraised the democratic deficit in the Euratom Community 
primarily through the spectrum of the above elaborated insufficient involvement of the 
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Parliament in the decision-making processes under the purview of the Euratom as well as 
the options available for direct citizen involvement in the Euratom decision-making. Under 
the Union framework stricto sensu, a significant progressive development was observed in 
the new role accorded to national parliaments that have been enabled to be active 
participants in the democratic review of legislative proposals, pursuant to the Protocol on 
the role of national parliaments in the European Union  (annexed to the TEU, TFEU and the 
Euratom Treaty) and the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality (annexed to the TEU and the TFEU). In spite of the legal void created by the 
fact that the latter protocol has only been annexed to the Union Treaties, this protocol (or 
at least the relevant provisions thereof) is to be presumed to apply per extensiam to the 
Euratom given that Art.3(1) of the Protocol on the role of the national parliaments makes 
direct references to those provisions laying down the procedure involving the national 
parliaments. Nevertheless, for reasons of legal certainty, it is not sufficient that the 
applicability of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality  to the Euratom purview is merely presumed, therefore necessitating a 
clarification in this respect and a formal extension of the Protocol to the scope of the 
Euratom Treaty. Another  similar inconsistency is noted with respect to Art. 5 TEU which 
codifies the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as key principles of Union action, 
which has not been formally extended to the Euratom remit all the while being manifest 
that the assessment performed in light of the principle of subsidiarity under the Protocol on 
the role of national parliaments in the European Union is instrumental to the discharge of the 
newly accorded role of national parliaments in the Union legislative process. 
The mechanisms of direct democracy inaugurated by the Lisbon Treaty such as the 
principle of representative democracy (Art.10(1) TEU) and other direct democracy 
mechanisms such as consultations with interested parties and citizens’ initiatives (Art.11 
TEU) have added significant democratic flesh to the Union structure. In this sense what 
represents a revolutionary step is introducing the option for one million citizens of a 
significant number of Member States to take the initiative of inviting the European 
Commission to submit a legislative proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal 
act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties (Art.11(4) TEU).  
Unfortunately, the former direct democracy mechanisms have fallen short of being 
extended to the Euratom remit which is a missed opportunity for the empowerment of EU 
citizens to become more actively involved in the Euratom decision-making process. Again, 
this important drawback of the democracy-deficient Euratom system cannot be 
compensated by simply employing an extensive interpretation of the relevant provisions of 
the Union Treaties so that a formal extension to the Euratom purview would be required in 
this regard. 
In terms of the Euratom’s accessibility for the ordinary citizen, somewhat mitigating 
the situation, but again confirming the irregularity in approach, is the extension to the 
Euratom scope of the duty of transparency and good governance of the Union institutions 
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established under Art.15 TFEU, according to which the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies are required to conduct their work as openly as possible and promote good 
governance and ensure the participation of civil society. In addition, a correlative duty is 
established for each institution, body, office or agency to ensure that their proceedings are 
transparent where the details for the execution of the former duty are to be additionally 
devised in their respective Rules of Procedure (Art.15(3) TFEU).  
Arguably, the previously indicated loopholes in the Euratom system reveal a striking 
democratic deficit which cannot be overcome by relying on a broad construction of the 
relevant rules of the Union Treaties thereby considering the extrapolation of the relevant 
Union rules and principles to the Euratom domain as ‘implied’. Therefore, in order to 
overcome the former democratic deficit (to the extent achievable) it is imperative that the 
Euratom Treaty is amended and/or other relevant legal instruments be adopted to the 
effect that the detected shortcomings can be overcome. Failing this, it would be impossible 
to speak of an accomplished balance of institutional powers within the Euratom system 
with the former continuing to be considered democracy-wise as an anachronistic system.  
 
The relationship between the Euratom health and safety regime and the Union’s 
environmental policy 
 
The second potential problem area that the research addressed was the interaction 
between the Euratom health and safety policy and the Union’s environmental policy 
devised under the Union framework stricto sensu. For this purpose, the research firstly 
looked at the possibilities for extending the application of Union rules to the Euratom field 
and discerned the types of instances where such extension occurs following the lex specialis 
derogate legi generali formula according to which the provisions of the Treaty on European 
Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should not derogate 
from the provisions of the Euratom Treaty (Article 106a(3) Euratom). The former formula 
for extrapolation of Union rules to the Euratom purview has general applicability and is not 
confined solely to the interplay occurring between the Union environmental policy rules 
and mechanisms and the Euratom health and safety domain. It was noted that the spill-
over effect of the former kind arises either where an issue of the nuclear domain has not 
been or cannot be adequately regulated by a Euratom legal rule thus requiring for 
corresponding Union rules to be applied in order to fill the legal void; or, alternatively, in 
instances where the competence to regulate a particular issue falls equally under the scope 
of the TFEU/TEU and that of the Euratom Treaty (concurring competence). In addition, it 
was observed that the former type of instances occur more frequently, especially in case of 
absence of relevant Euratom rules to be applied so that Union rules are used to fill in the 
void (e.g. rules adopted under the Union’s common commercial policy, the competition 
policy, the environmental policy, the health policy, etc.). The latter type of instances which 
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concern the concurring competence between the Union and the Euratom are habitually 
resolved in favor of one of the two potentially applicable legal regimes, depending on the 
nature and character of the issue and upon an exercise of weighing in on the dominant legal 
basis has been performed (e.g. as the EU Court of Justice proceeded in Chernobyl II).  
The relationship between the Euratom and the Union’s environmental policy was 
examined in the light of the ‘environmental protection’ aspect underlying the health 
protection and nuclear safety provisions of the Euratom Treaty and the Euratom secondary 
legislation. The analysis established that the dynamic of interaction between the Euratom’s 
health and safety policy and the Union environmental policy has primarily been reflected in 
the number of Union legal instruments adopted in the field of environmental protection 
which - comprehensively or marginally - cover a particular aspect belonging to the field of 
nuclear safety or radiation protection (e.g., Directive 85/337/EEC on assessment of the effects 
of certain public and private projects on the environment (codified by Directive 2011/92/EU); 
Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the 
environment; Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information). In turn, the  
spill-over has cut both ways, given that there are also purely Euratom acts which pertain to 
the prevention and/or protection from nuclear risks liable to adversely affect the 
environment and have been underpinned by environmental considerations.  With the 
‘environmental’ approach to radiation protection taken to comprise both the human health 
protection requirements and the requirements specific to the protection of ‘air, water, soil, 
flora and fauna’, these Euratom acts can be qualified as endorsing an ‘environmental’ 
approach towards radiation protection (e.g., former Directive 96/29/EURATOM of 13 May 
1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the 
general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation and its successor Directive 
2013/59/EURATOM laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers 
arising from exposure to ionising radiation; the Directive establishing a Community framework 
for nuclear safety, the Directive on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive 
waste and spent fuel; Directive 2003/122/Euratom on the control of high-activity sealed 
radioactive sources and orphan sources). Furthermore, the analysis characterised the 
approach adopted by the majority of EU institutions towards ‘radiation protection’ as 
mostly environmental, although sometimes short of consistent. Among the majority of 
institutions, there has been noticeable tendency not to prioritize or in any way favor the 
health protection over the environmental protection objective, but rather couple the two 
together into one single objective of protecting ‘the population and the environment’ 
against the risks of ionising radiations. The ‘environmental’ approach towards radiation 
protection has been further asserted through the activist jurisprudence of the EU Court of 
Justice with the Court deciding to view the health and safety provisions of the Euratom 
Treaty as representing a set of rules which are specifically relevant to the protection of 
populations and the environment against ionising radiations (e.g., Cattenom; Commission v. 
UK; Temelin). 
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The fully endorsed possibility to extend the scope of the Union environmental 
provisions to the Euratom domain has further lead to the possibility (if not, duty) to 
integrate the principles of the Union’s environmental policy into the Euratom health and 
safety policy. The discussion focused on two principles - the principles of prevention and 
the precautionary principle – considering their application to the Euratom scope, in the 
absence of an express reference in the Euratom Treaty to this effect, as implied given the 
nature of the health protection objective of the Treaty as one thoroughly underscored by 
the notion of prevention. In this context, the research noted that part of the Euratom 
secondary legislation is indeed underpinned by a certain aspect of ‘prevention’ (most 
salient examples include: Directive establishing a Community framework for the nuclear 
safety of nuclear installations; Directive 96/29/EURATOM of 13 May 1996 laying down basic 
safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the 
dangers arising from ionizing radiation; Directive 2003/122/Euratom on the control of high-
activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources). Thus, the principle of prevention is 
held to be, at the very least, impliedly written into the Euratom Treaty while the same 
argument could not be extended to the application of the precautionary principle as a 
relatively novel principle, difficult to reconcile with the longevity of the Euratom Treaty and 
therefore impossible to have underlain the intentions of the Treaty’s drafters. Nevertheless, 
a dynamic interpretation of the Euratom Treaty provisions should be permitted in this 
respect, taking into account the new evolved context in which the Treaty provisions are to 
be interpreted and applied.  
Nevertheless, for the purpose of legal certainty, the intention of the Union 
legislators to extend the principles of prevention and precaution to the Euratom scope 
cannot simply be presumed and therefore needs to be expressly prorogated either via a 
Union or a Euratom rule. The prevention and the precautionary principles are legal 
concepts that have become increasingly prominent in the fields of environment protection 
and human health protection and are as such inextricably linked to the health and safety 
aspects of nuclear energy production. The failure to provide a formal extension of these 
principles (as well as the other environmental principles sanctioned under Art. 191(2) TFEU 
such as the principles that environmental damage should be rectified at source and that the 
polluter should pay) to the Euratom domain significantly compromises the Euratom 
standard for health protection and nuclear safety. 
Going beyond strictly the scope of application of the principles of the Union’s 
environmental policy, another issue that has arisen in the context of the spill-over of Union 
rules to the Euratom scope has been the possibility to apply the general principles of Union 
law as primary sources of law to the Euratom domain. The EU Court of Justice has, to a 
limited extent, granted the possibility for general principles of law as constitutive 
components of the legal framework of the Union to be presumed equally applicable to the 
purview of the Euratom. More particularly, with respect to the principle of equality, the 
Court considered it to be contrary to both the purpose and the consistency of the Treaties 
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for discrimination on grounds of nationality to be prohibited under the Union framework all 
the while being allowed within the scope of application of the Euratom Treaty (the Temelin 
case). What can be inferred from the Court’s reasoning is that it would be equally possible 
for all the other general principles of Union law to be considered applicable to the Euratom 
scope (e.g., the principle of protection of fundamental rights, the principle of legal 
certainty, the principle of proportionality, etc.). However, the activist jurisprudence of the 
EU Court of Justice in this regard is not sufficient and the matter should be resolved in a 
more comprehensive manner in the form of a formal extension of the application of the 
general principles of EU law to the Euratom field, which is to be foreseen either under the 
Euratom Treaty or the Union Treaties. Failing this, the application of the general principles 
of Union law to the Euratom field will continue as an irregular and inconsistent practice (i.e. 
a backdoor-type of application).  
 
The environmental democracy mechanisms devised under the Aarhus Convention and the 
extent of their application to the scope of the Euratom 
 
Bearing in mind that the nuclear field has traditionally being regarded as an area 
shrouded with confidentiality and notorious for escaping the grip of transparency, primarily 
attributed to the inherently dual nature of nuclear energy as an energy source potentially 
catering to both civil and military demands, the research noted the (un)democratic 
disposition of the Euratom specifically in matters related to the environmental field and 
thus, the environmental democracy mechanisms applicable to the Euratom, as a problem 
area in need of addressing. Namely, the procedural requirements endorsed under the 1998 
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters were examined to the extent that the former 
pertain to the Euratom’s purview where the analysis established that the respective scope 
of application of the requirements of the three pillars of the Aarhus Convention - access to 
environmental information, participation in decision-making and access to justice in 
environmental matters – coincides in important respects with the purview of the Euratom. 
Consequently, the Union instruments (directives and regulations) transposing the Aarhus 
Convention requirements to the Union level are equally, to the relevant extent, applicable 
to the Euratom’s purview. 
As regards the access-to-information pillar of the Aarhus Convention, the Union 
passed instruments specifically aimed to transpose the former to the EU level (Directive 
2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information; and Regulation No 1367/2006 on 
the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to 
Community institutions and bodies). The approach of opening up the national authorities 
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and the Union institutions to requests for environmental information coming from the 
public is consistent with the requirement that the EU institutions promote transparency 
and good governance prescribed in Art.15 TFEU (and extended to the Euratom scope), 
further guaranteeing the right of access to documents to every citizen of the Union. 
Namely, all citizens of the Union and all natural or legal persons residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State are granted a right of access to documents from the 
Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies whereby as s a corollary to the former 
right, a duty is established for each institution, body, office or agency to ensure that their 
proceedings are transparent. 
The Euratom Treaty itself does establish rules regarding access to and exchange of 
information among the EU institutions and the Member States, however, the aim of these 
rules is neither one of making the information accessible to the public, nor one of increasing 
the level of transparency of the information the Euratom Community has at its disposal. For 
the most part, with the exception of the health and safety provisions of the Euratom Treaty 
dealing with the human health and environmental effects of radiation and disposal of 
radioactive waste, the types of information covered by the Treaty are linked to the 
technical aspects of nuclear energy production which, by their nature, cannot be subsumed 
under the notion of ‘environmental information’. Furthermore, the option for the public or 
the public concerned to be able to directly address specific requests regarding access to 
information to the respective national authorities has neither been foreseen under the 
Euratom secondary legislation, in keeping with the overall tendency of lack of transparency 
exhibited under the Euratom Treaty. Therefore, what remains as the only applicable regime 
for requests regarding access to environmental information originating from private 
persons concerning the nuclear field is the legal regime created pursuant to the Union 
instruments transposing the Aarhus Convention obligations.    
With respect to the participation-in-decision-making pillar of the Aarhus 
Convention, the analysis looked at the Union instruments transposing the former 
requirements in EU law, which are also, to the relevant extent, applicable to the Euratom 
domain: the 1985 Environmental Impact Assessment Directive1344 (concerning specific 
projects which have a significant effect on the environment), the 2001 Strategic 
Environmental Assessment Directive1345 (concerning public plans and programmes that are 
likely to have a significant effect on the environment) and the 2006 Aarhus Regulation on 
the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to 
Community institutions and bodies). In contrast to the foregoing Union regime on public 
participation in decision-making which pertains inter alia to the Euratom purview, the 
options for public participation in decision-making available strictly under the Euratom 
Treaty and the Euratom secondary legislation are practically non-existent and, thus, a far 
                                                            
1344 Directive 85/337/EEC (codified by Directive 2011/92/EU); 
1345 Directive 2001/42/EC. 
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cry from the elaborate transparency mechanisms fostered under the Union framework. The 
striking lack of public involvement mechanisms regarding the access to information and 
public participation in decision-making concerning health and environmental protection 
under the Euratom legal framework reveals a dire lack of ‘environmental democracy’ which 
can (merely partially and sporadically) be mitigated through the application of Union rules 
transposing the corresponding Aarhus Convention obligations relative to the Euratom 
domain.  
It follows from the analysis of the available mechanisms under the Euratom system 
on access to environmental information and participation in decision-making in the nuclear 
field in matters concerning the environment, that there do exist certain participative 
mechanisms which the citizens have at their disposal which, nevertheless, originate in the 
Union instruments that apply to the Euratom domain and which are in themselves far from 
being sufficient and offer comprehensive procedural protection. Moreover, there does not 
exist a Euratom-specific transparency mechanism envisaged by a Euratom rule that 
provides procedural involvement for the public not only concerning the field of health and 
environmental protection, but also generally, as far as the entire Euratom purview is 
concerned. Such a reticent approach towards providing specific democratic mechanisms 
under the Euratom systems reverts to the democracy-deficient disposition of the Euratom 
Community – thus, once there is an overall change in approach towards attaching a greater 
weight to the general democracy mechanisms within the purview of the Euratom, the 
scope of the options for ‘environmental democracy’ in this regard will follow suit. 
The evasiveness exhibited towards giving the ‘environmental democracy’ 
mechanisms any real weight under the Euratom construct - and in the nuclear field 
altogether - has been substantiated by the case law of the international and the Union 
courts, demonstrating that issues in the nuclear arena pertaining to access to information 
and public participation in the environmental field are usually tackled in a less 
straightforward manner than the ‘regular’ environmental cases. In this sense, what has 
been manifest is the precaution readily exercised by the courts which, in fear of impinging 
upon the ‘vested’ national prerogatives in the nuclear domain, have additionally enhanced 
the element of confidentiality typically vitiating the nuclear field. In this vein, it is curious 
that the EU Court of Justice, otherwise considerably prolific in dealing with cases 
concerning the application of the first and second pillar requirements of the Aarhus 
Convention1346, has thus far not dealt with a single case concerning the application of the 
former requirements to the Euratom domain, which inevitably brings into question the 
                                                            
1346 The seminal cases include: C-266/09 Stichting Natuur en Milieu v College voor de toelating van 
gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden; C-204/09 Flachglas Torgau GmbH; T-264/04 WWF European Policy 
Programme v. Council, etc. – regarding the access-to-information requirements; C-182/10 Marie-Noëlle Solvay 
and Others; C-134/09 and C 135/09 Antoine Boxus and Others; C-115/09 Bund fur Umwelt und Naturschutz 
Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein–Westfalen eV; C-275/09 Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest et al.; C-416/10 
Jozef Križan and others, etc. – regarding the participation-in-decision-making requirements. 
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extent to which the Aarhus Convention requirements relevant to the Euratom field can be 
considered reviewable before the Union courts. 
As concerns the access-to-justice requirements of the Aarhus Convention, the 
discussion addressed the issue of the Union’s failure to adopt an access-to-justice directive 
transposing the Aarhus Convention regime concerning the justiciability of the requirements 
envisaged under the Convention’s first and second pillar. The failure to adopt the directive 
leaves a void in the Union regime pertaining to the implementation of the Aarhus 
Convention requirements which has been offset to a certain limited degree by the insertion 
of corresponding access-to justice provisions in the Union acts implementing the first and 
the second pillar requirements of the Aarhus Convention. It follows that until a directive on 
access to justice is adopted, there will persist to be an important void in the judicial 
protection of the participatory rights of the citizens and the non-governmental 
organizations in matters concerning, inter alia, the health and environmental protection in 
the nuclear domain. 
 
 
The Euratom’s and the Union’s role in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
Euratom’s stake in the field of military applications of nuclear energy 
The last area where the research found there to be potentially problematic issues is 
the  field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons where the Euratom’s share of competence 
concerns the prerogatives exercised by the Euratom Community in the field of nuclear 
safeguards as a competence exercised internally (within the Union borders) whereas the 
external aspect of the competence comes under the scope of the Union’s policy on the non-
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and is devised via the mechanisms of the 
Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
The Euratom safeguards regime forms part of a four-tier nuclear safeguards system 
comprising of the international level, the primary EU level, the secondary EU level and, lastly, 
the Member State level. The safeguards regime devised under the auspices of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and having its original source in Art. III of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) stands at the top of the hierarchy with the Euratom 
safeguards regime acting in strict adherence to the rules and principles established under 
the former regime and complementing it to the extent necessary. From a legal standpoint, 
the two safeguards regimes have been secured a smooth coexistence via the 1975 IAEA-
Euratom Cooperation Agreement under which both contracting parties have undertaken to 
act in close cooperation and in due regard to their respective tasks and objectives, which 
facilitated the coming into force of the Safeguards Agreement between the Euratom Member 
States, the Euratom and the IAEA in 1977. While it is only the Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
(NNWS) of the Union that are contracting parties to the Safeguards Agreement with the 
IAEA, the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) – France and the United Kingdom – are covered 
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by voluntary offer agreements (VOAs) concluded with the IAEA which, in turn, express the 
benevolence of the two countries to subject part of their civil nuclear programs to 
safeguards arrangements in spite of there being no legal obligation to this effect. 
The Euratom Treaty provides the legal framework for the establishment of a 
comprehensive safeguards regime which ensures that in the Member States’ territories 
ores, source materials and special fissile materials are not diverted from their intended use 
as declared by the users. The Euratom Treaty’s safeguards regime is complemented by the 
Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005 on the application of Euratom safeguards 
which comprehensively and in a detailed manner defines the nature and scope of the 
safeguards requirements laid down in the Treaty. In this respect, coming to the fore is the 
dominant role the Commission enjoys by acting as the chief authority in overseeing the 
execution of the safeguards obligations both at the EU and the Member State level. To the 
difference of the other potential ‘weak spots’ of the Euratom system in need of amending, 
the analysis of the Euratom safeguards framework has found the former to be an almost 
fail-proof system from a legal standpoint.  
Lastly, the analysis dealing with the relationship between the Euratom safeguards 
system and the Union’s non-proliferation policy noted two problematic issues. The first one 
relates to the nuclear weapons sharing arrangements between NATO and a certain number 
of NNWS of the Union which act as part of NATO’s security concept for an ‘extended 
nuclear deterrence’ in Europe. The nuclear weapons sharing arrangements are entered into 
by certain of the Member States, however, in their individual capacity – not in their capacity 
of Union Member States which, formally speaking, puts the former arrangements away 
from the scope of Union action. The NATO nuclear sharing arrangements nevertheless 
have the potential to compromise the Union’s non-proliferation efforts since, following the 
letter and spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the practice of nuclear weapon sharing 
should be seen as incompliant with Arts. I and II of the NPT (precluding NWS from 
transferring nuclear weapons or control thereof to NNWS coupled with the corresponding 
obligation for NNWS not to accept such transfers of the NPT) and, more generally, as 
contradictory to the NPT regime’s very reason of being. Admittedly, the act of NATO’s 
deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the NNWS of the EU can be regarded as 
a kind of ‘transfer’ of nuclear weapons or transfer of ‘control’ thereof – characterizing the 
practice of nuclear weapons sharing as dubious from a legal standpoint.  
Given the delicate political character of the issue, the EU institutions have thus far 
distanced themselves from confronting it and have avoided making any official statements 
in this regard – possibly for reasons of exercising caution as not to prejudice the EU-NATO 
relations. Meanwhile, maintaining these nuclear weapon sharing arrangements runs the 
risk of the EU being labeled as violator of the letter and spirit of the NPT, potentially 
compromising the Union’s role as global non-proliferation actor and arguably undermining 
the non-proliferation objective as the central limb upon which the NPT regime rests. 
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The second problematic issue that the analysis detected in this respect concerns the 
dividing line between the applicable regimes for civil and military uses of nuclear energy, 
and more particularly, the issue of the relationship between the Euratom and the military 
uses of nuclear energy and the question as to whether and to what extent the Euratom 
Treaty can be considered to apply to the domain of military applications of nuclear energy. 
The fact that the Euratom Treaty is silent on the matter and fails to explicitly exclude or 
include military applications from its remit has engendered contradicting interpretations of 
the Treaty text. Moreover, the fact that military uses of nuclear energy have indeed not 
been completely and categorically excluded from the remit of the Euratom adds greater 
ambiguity to the issue and confirms the existence of a loophole peculiar to the Euratom 
system in this regard.  
The EU Court of Justice, almost a half century later, gave its final verdict on this 
issue which had been considered as contentious ever since the creation of the Euratom 
Community in its judgment in C-61/03 Commission v. UK . The Court declared the military 
applications of nuclear energy to fall outside of the scope of the Euratom Treaty, grounding 
its finding on two chief arguments: the lack of intention on the part of the Euratom 
Community’s creators to this effect and the absence from the Euratom Treaty of a specific 
provision foreseeing the possibility for Member States to derogate from their Treaty 
obligations in order to safeguard their defense interests (alike the one of ex-Art.296 EC 
(present Art.346 TFEU)). As regards the latter argument, the Court considered it decisive 
that the Euratom Treaty did not contain any derogation concerning the protection of the 
essential interests of national security of Member States, thus inferring that the drafters of 
the Euratom Treaty would have foreseen such derogation had they considered the military 
applications as belonging to the purview of the Treaty. By deciding to completely exclude 
the nuclear defense field from the purview of the Euratom and by failing to offer a 
purposive and non-textual reading of the Euratom Treaty in this context, the Court of 
Justice showed deference to the national security prerogatives of the Member States which 
patently indicates that the political climate in the Union is not mature enough for judicial 
activism in the direction of allowing controlled interference in the Member States’ national 
defense sphere.   
The issue of Euratom’s stake in the Member States’ nuclear defense sphere caused a 
stark division among certain EU institutions, the Commission having been fervently in favor 
of placing the contentious field of military applications of nuclear energy (to the extent 
appropriate) within the purview of the Euratom – however, after the judgment in C-65/04 
Commission v. UK it finally ceded to the Court’s stance. The Parliament, in turn, has been 
persistent in its conviction that – at the very least - the application of the health and safety 
provisions of the Euratom Treaty needs to be extended to the realm of military applications 
of nuclear energy. Namely, in the 2007 Resolution on the public health consequences of the 
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1968 Thule crash1347 the Parliament drew attention to the existence of a gap in the current 
regime for the protection of the health of the general public related to the use of nuclear 
energy for military purposes, making a plea to the Commission to address the lacuna1348. In 
this context, it is interesting to note that all the cases in which the CJEU expressed its 
stance were concerned with the particular issue of applying Euratom’s health and safety 
rules to the realm of military applications of nuclear energy (C-61/03 Commission v. UK; C-
65/04 Commission v. UK; C-205/10 P, C-217/10 P and C-222/10 P Eriksen et al.). The major 
lacuna to be observed here is that with the possibility for such an application having been 
ruled out, there remains to be no Union/Euratom health and safety regime in place that is 
applicable to military applications of nuclear material, while concomitantly there exists a 
strong necessity for the Euratom regime pertaining to civil applications of nuclear energy to 
be matched with a corresponding one in the defense sector.  
Bearing in mind that for issues involving activities in the military sphere there can 
rarely be uniform and catch-all solutions as the former sphere is considered as highly 
politically sensitive and is often kept in strict confidentiality, it would nevertheless be of 
utter importance that minimum standards are established at the Union/Euratom level as 
such (or, at the international level and then subsequently transposed at Union level) for 
Member States to observe in instances of potentially adverse effects to human health 
resulting from the operation of military nuclear installations. By preserving the status quo, 
the population of the EU which is actually/potentially affected from the use of nuclear 
materials for military purposes will be left to rely solely on the mechanisms provided under 
domestic law which can vary considerably from one legal system to another.  
 
Therefore, it is indispensable that, especially in light of the plea made by the 
European Parliament, the Member States and the Union decision-makers look beyond the 
individual national defense concerns and devise an adequate Union or Euratom-specific 
legal framework safeguarding the health of the population actually/potentially adversely 
affected. The most politically feasible way of accomplishing this is amending the Euratom 
Treaty by inserting a provision analogous to the national security derogation envisaged 
under Art.346 TFEU or by extending the application of the former derogation to the 
Euratom Treaty’s remit. The former would be in line with what the Court of Justice 
observed was missing from the current text of the Euratom Treaty when outlining the main 
reasons to support its stance against the inclusion of military applications of nuclear energy 
within Euratom’s scope. In the meantime, while waiting for this lacuna to be adequately 
resolved, the caveat suggested by the Court in C-61/03 Commission v. UK and C-65/04 
Commission v. UK can plausibly be utilized – namely, relying on the rules available under the 
current Union framework in order to tackle the issue of adverse health effects arising from 
                                                            
1347 Environmental protection from radiation following the crash of a military aircraft in Greenland: European 
Parliament Resolution of 10 May 2007 on the public health consequences of the 1968 Thule crash, 
P6_TA(2007)0182. 
1348 Points 11 and 12 of the Resolution. 
283 
 
the operation of military nuclear facilities or the handling of nuclear materials destined for 
military purposes. Unfortunately, the former route would seem exceptionally difficult to 
follow due to the singular and delicate character of the issue as one that would not as easily 
yield to a legal solution originating from outside of the Euratom framework per se.  
 
 
General observations 
 
The overriding impression gathered from the foregoing elaboration of the problem 
areas that the research detected in the Euratom health and safety and safeguards regimes 
is that these ‘weak spots’ or deficiencies of the Euratom system stem from the highly 
unique character of this system and the legal framework created thereunder. In fact, these 
deficiencies have been embedded in the Euratom system in such a way that they can be 
claimed to be inherent thereto. 
More particularly, the common aspect the majority of the detected problem areas 
share is that they are a direct or indirect result of the democracy-deficient disposition of the 
Euratom Community. Namely, going beyond the scope of the Euratom safeguards and 
health and safety regimes, it is manifest that the Euratom is a community in dire lack of 
transparency and one which persists to be, figuratively speaking, out of reach for the 
common EU citizen. Resistance to public scrutiny for the matters falling under the 
Euratom’s purview was possibly justified in the early days of the Euratom when nuclear 
energy was still being introduced as a novel field in regulatory terms – however, the 
present-day context of an increasingly more democratic Union bringing its citizens more 
closely involved in its work does not bode well with a strikingly non-transparent and 
undemocratic Euratom. There is therefore a pressing need for the Euratom Community to 
keep pace with the democratic reforms established under the Union framework stricto 
sensu since its current democracy-deficient disposition is liable to compromise the future 
existence of the Community. This systemic deficiency of the Euratom system, paired with 
the argument concerning the out-datedness of the Euratom Treaty, figures among the 
central arguments advocating the need for substantial amendment of the Euratom Treaty 
and a reform to the Euratom system as such. 
 
Predictions on the future of the Euratom have revolved around several scenarios, 
the most favorable of which concerns a substantial revision of the Euratom Treaty 
alongside the preservation of the Euratom Community’s legal personality. The 
‘rejuvenation’ of the Euratom Treaty text should focus on providing greater involvement for 
the Parliament in the Euratom decision-making process as well as updating and, if 
necessary, deleting certain treaty provisions, especially those that have become obsolete 
with time. The saving grace for the Euratom essentially lies in the democratization of the 
Euratom system which is to be effected primarily by granting the Parliament as the most 
democratic Union institution greater and more substantial involvement in the Euratom 
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decision-making and by broadening the scope of the available mechanisms for direct 
citizen involvement in the decision-making process. Unless Euratom’s democratic deficit is 
overcome (or at least, significantly reduced), the legitimacy of the Euratom will continue to 
decrease and possibly lead to the demise of the Community as a self-fulfilling prophesy.  
Another plausible scenario for the future suggests that the Euratom Treaty be 
repealed and the Euratom Community as such abolished, thereby deleting the outdated 
provisions and the provisions of the Treaty which duplicate the corresponding TFEU 
provisions, incorporating the remainder of the still ‘current’ Euratom Treaty provisions into 
the TFEU, either as a separate chapter or within the existent ‘Energy’ chapter. With respect 
to how the former scenario would affect the two areas of focus of the thesis (Euratom 
safeguards and health and safety) as prominent areas covered by separate legal 
frameworks devised to a comprehensive level, it is arguable that such a development will 
annihilate the autonomy and coherence of the Euratom safeguards and health and safety 
regimes in a way that would potentially lead to conflict with the existent provisions of the 
Union Treaties and make the ‘imported’ Euratom Treaty provisions act as a Trojan horse 
within the Union framework.  
 
A radical third scenario, mainly supported by the European green political parties, 
NGOs working in the field of environmental protection and other actors belonging to the 
European anti-nuclear lobby, suggests that the Euratom Treaty and all of the Treaty 
provisions in their entirety should be repealed. The major claim here is that the Euratom 
Treaty is an obsolete treaty which does not reflect the EU’s nuclear reality and necessitates 
for the EU’s nuclear policy to be brought back to the national level i.e. become re-
nationalized. On the face of it, the former scenario proposes that the Union dispenses with 
an undemocratic and out-dated treaty and the governing rules and principles for the civil 
nuclear industry are reinstated to Member States competence. It is important to remind 
that the Euratom safeguards and health and safety regimes have become so vital to the 
civil nuclear energy industries of the Member States that it would seem counterintuitive - 
let alone unreasonable - to bring them back under solely Member State competence. The 
former development is liable to open the Pandora’s box in the nuclear field for the Union: 
all the problems associated with giving full control over the implementation of the nuclear 
safeguards arrangements to the national authorities will surface increasing the national 
security of Member States since the chances for uncontrolled and illicit diversion of nuclear 
material will effectively multiply. Moreover, abolishing the Euratom policy on health and 
safety and re-nationalizing the standards for health and safety in the nuclear domain will 
lead to unwarranted and dangerous discrepancies reflected in the multitude of applicable 
national legal regimes, acting primarily to the detriment of the Member States’ general 
population.  
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In a Declaration attached to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on 
the Lisbon Treaty, the governments of five Member States (Germany, Ireland, Hungary, 
Austria and Sweden) expressed their support for the convening of a conference of 
representatives of the governments of the Member States as soon as possible and for the 
purpose of bringing the Euratom treaty provisions up to date. The hour for deciding on the 
definitive future of the Euratom and the convening of a conference of the former kind will 
possibly strike soon based on the increasingly divergent attitudes towards the use of 
nuclear power in the EU, which include Member States with active phase-out policies in 
place (Austria, Germany) at the one end of the spectrum, and Member States which 
continue to rely on the nuclear as a vital energy source catering not only to the demands of 
their civil industry, but also their military industry (France, the UK). The highly diverse 
nuclear landscape of a Union of twenty-eight significantly departs from the initial nuclear 
consensus among the six founding members out of which the Euratom Community was 
born and it is this very consensus that will be put to the test in the years to come.  
Back in 1958, an American scholar speaking about the Euratom posed the following 
question: “Can supranational regulation of atomic energy contribute, by way of example, to 
the realization of the vision of a united region of the old continent, an entire and perfect union 
in itself”?1349. With the benefit of hindsight, the lingering question is whether the Euratom 
as we know it today indeed comes close to an entirely successful model for supranational 
regulation in the nuclear field and whether the Union’s decision-makers are willing to invest 
the necessary effort in order for the former question to be answered in the affirmative 
nearly 60 years on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1349 H.J. Hahn, “EURATOM - The Conception of An International Personality”, Harvard Law Review, 1958, Issue 
71-6, p.1056. 
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